Order And Self: An Exercise in the Phenomenology of Human Being

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DECLARATION:

I have composed this thesis myself on the basis of my own work.

ABSTRACT

This thesis is an exercise in the phenomenology of human order, as a necessary prelude to a new understanding of postcolonial global change. Its starting point is to question the Western tradition of knowledge as the highest point of human "development". This is a critique of the traditionally Western notion of reason in which I argue that an understanding of human order must be grounded in a phenomenology of religion. In this way I seek to reinterpret the Weberian categories which have shaped modern/ Western social understanding. In the first part of the thesis, "Institutions and Legitimation", I describe three *ideal types* of views of reality: the *pagan/primitive*, the *Western/Christian*, and the *Eastern/mystic* types. Nevertheless, these *pure types* are also theoretically posed as three aspects of experienced reality, and so, they are considered as both mixed and complementary in human interaction. I am aware that this leads to a theoretical paradox; but this is justified by the intuition that *at the same time* as paradox rules the immediacy of experienced reality, coherence rules the order and exposition of our disciplined observations, explanations, and cosmologies. The appreciation of this "simultaneity" (social reality as both "created" and "creative") leads me to propose a perspective of observation: the *present moment of meaningful experience.* This perspective highlights this aspect of "simultaneity" (synchrony) as opposed to, and in contrast with, the aspect of coherent "sequentiality" (diachrony) in human order. In the second part of the thesis, "Organisation and Structure", I propose two ideal types of organisation structured around the experience of immediate simultaneity. These two types are considered as complementary aspects of human order: the *organic* and the *artificial* ideal types of organisation. This perspective of observation is congenial both with phenomenological observation and with the emerging paradigm of "complexity". My approach counters the traditional view in the social sciences that "complex" or "higher" forms of order progressively emerge in interaction through specialisation and differentiation from homogeneity to heterogeneity in time. While belief in progress may be an important feature of discipline (and a particularly important one for the modern notion of self), I argue that it should not be imposed as a deterministic characteristic of the observed processes themselves (social or otherwise).

A mis padres:
Judith y Rubén

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If it were within our power,
beyond the reach of slavish pride.
To no longer harbour grievances,
behind the mask's opportunists facade.
We could welcome the responsibility
like a long lost friend,
and re-establish the kingdom of laughter
in the dolls house once again.
For time has imprisoned us
in the order of our years,
in the discipline of our ways
and in the passing of momentary stillness
we can view our chaos in motion
and the subsequent collisions of fools
well versed in the subtle art of slavery

--Dead Can Dance: *A Passage in Time*, track 14

INTRODUCTION:
Human Order and the Interpretation of Self

This thesis is the product of trying to make sense of my own personal and life-long troubled relationship with a "Western" sense of self. Right now I identify myself simultaneously as much with Westerners as with the 'other' in contrast to whom the Western self identifies itself. This is not really a contradiction but a living paradox, and it is from within the present experience of this paradox that this phenomenological exercise of self-interpretation is framed. As an initial approach, and in order to illustrate where my own effort to explore *hybridity* is located theoretically, I will sketch in this introduction the current predicament of the Anglo-Oriental postcolonial studies (see Ashcroft *et al.* 1995, Gandhi 1998). I argue that if the postcolonialist theoretical predicament illustrates anything at all, it is the need to drop the categories West and non-West to theoretically qualify power-struggles. I will then introduce the reader to the main working hypothesis, concepts, and assumptions in this theoretical thesis. In the first instance, in a phenomenological interpretation of self, the categories West/non-West are transformed and diversified to theoretically describe the hybrid experience and interpretation of self under the conditions of globalisation. I will propose to re-examine the roots of the difference West/non-West towards a tolerant and unencumbered interpretation of the modern self with respect to the excluded 'other'. Having both critically questioned *and* embraced the Western cultural inheritance in academic practice, a second (more general) instance of *hybridity* can then be observed in the human condition itself. Both through a (dis)continuity with Darwinian (Western) cosmology and in the embodied experience of being human, it is plain to see that we are all hybrids of nature and culture --animal and human-- at the same time. The abased 'other' in Western cosmology refers not only to the peoples who suffer the historical consequences of colonisation, but also to women, children, and nature in general (the latter defined as *essentially* different from humanity). The 'unknowable other' could then be considered as 'infinite particularity' and the legitimate source of various forms of knowledge and discipline that are relevant to human life (in particular) and to life in this planet (in general) right now.

The national identity of the people among whom I was born and raised is an intricate mixture of cultures and creeds with no inner coherence, arbitrarily made up to be a unity: the Mexican identity is not framed in a cosmology but in a handful of them. This is due as much to accidents of history as to imperial violence. Mexico is a nation created by imperial will-to-power: "If Mexico", says Paz, "is born in the XVI century, we must agree that it is a child of a double imperial and unitary violence: that of the Aztecs and that of the Spanish" (1993:110). The peoples that today embody the Mexican nation were arbitrarily unified as a consequence of cosmological empires based on hierarchical and sacred relationships; first with the gods (nowadays transformed into saints), and then with the Christian monotheistic God through the Pope[1]. Today Mexico is already a genetic and symbolic mixture between natives and Europeans through "*mestizaje*"[2]. In order to create a nation, these mixed peoples eventually produced a relevant "historical" tale of (dis)continuity with their own pagan past and also with their European colonisers, already their own ancestors. The contemporary Mexican identity interprets itself with respect to this colonial past as well as with respect to its present economic (and political) dependence on the United States at the same time as it admires, criticises, mixes, deplores, and embraces the latter's developed and wealthy modernity. It is from the perspective of this contemporary and "peripheric" hybrid nature --with which my own sense of self finds itself entangled-- and in the modern spirit of self-interpretation, that I question the theoretical logic of insisting in finding ontological divides between the West and the non-West, between culture and nature.

Postcolonial theory needs the "Western" centre in order to criticise and reject it at the same time; much in the same way as structuralism depends on an absolutist

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[1] About the colonial Catholic cosmos, Paz says: "Catholicism is the centre of the colonial society because it really is the source of life that nourishes the activities, passions, virtues, and even sins of servants and masters, functionaries and priests, traders and militaries. Thanks to religion the colonial order is not a mere superposition of new historical forms, but a living organism. With the key of baptism Catholicism opens the door of society and makes it into a universal order, open to all inhabitants" (Paz 1993:111)

[2] *Mestizaje* is the mixture of European blood with native blood of the Americas. While the Spanish empire ruled New Spain (Mexico today) there was a caste system which showed every subject their place in the cosmos with respect to the crown, and ultimately, to the Pope. The Spanish natives were above the children of Spanish people born in the Americas (*criollos*), who were above the mixture of Indian with Spanish (*mestizos*) who were above pure native Americans and blacks.

centre and post-structuralism on the absolutist negation of *any* centre (Merquior 1986). Its politics of opposition have both the potential to make postcolonialism "yet another totalising method and theory" while at the same time it "lacks the methodological structure, and will to totalise, necessary for right thinking and left politics" (Gandhi 1998:167). My own intellectual exercise is not framed within the theoretical confines of postcolonial studies, mainly because its internal theoretical inconsistency fails to clarify the paradoxical nature of our immediate contemporary hybrid situation (even as it illustrates it). And yet, one of the main intuitions that has guided this work is a suspicion --analogous to Edward Said's own about *Orientalism* (1978)-- that the "West", as clearly situated in anything or anybody at all, contemporaneously, is an imaginary invention of many people's emotional involvement with both West and non-West all over the world. James Clifford (1988) has pointed out that Said himself is unable to evade embracing humanist and typically Western values in his will-to-oppose and criticise European attitudes towards the conquered East.

Postcolonial intellectuals find themselves in the predicament of needing to use the Western tools for their own self-interpretation, at the same time as they aspire to speak for the 'unknowable other' or the *subaltern* (Spivak 1995). That is, they become the *voice* for the non-Western 'other' at the same time as they see themselves as non-Westerners (or invent themselves as non-Westerners) within their Western situation. In other words, they must make-up some kind of explicit and "authentic" non-West in order to oppose the West. And if the non-Western 'other' is an "inauthentic" invention of the Western imagination; is not the non-Western "authentic" self of the Westernised postcolonial intellectual also an invention of this self-same type of imagination? To use such terms as Western and non-Western people within the intellectual circles of modern academia makes no sense: one must have already assimilated Western beliefs and categories of thought --be conscious of historical "reality"-- in order to participate in the debate at all. The factual emancipatory claims of the modern "rationalistic" discipline(s) produce the structural need for an ongoing "progress" of intellectual knowledge, while it is created, revised, and re-interpreted as it is taught. And today, it is taught all over the world. The rationalist Western tradition makes universalist claims that have been used as

legitimising tools for colonial unifying imperial violence. But as I hope to show in this thesis, imperial will-to-power always resorts to its "language of truth" in order to make legitimacy claims, be they cosmological, universalistic, or scientific.

Modernity has already superseded the confines of the "West". Even if it is originally tied to Europe, modern imagination leads the ideals of a global arena of interaction in which the whole world participates. While current global political power relations are necessarily tied to colonialism (past or present), it is already useless to lay the blame for this on a "West" that is no longer embodied in anything or anybody anymore. Its "embodiment" is really an "enactment" of Western values and categories of thought that go by the title of "reality". And so, whenever I refer to the "West" or to the "Western tradition of knowledge" in this thesis, I mean to speak about a belief system that is already also an intimate aspect of many people living in the periphery (we find ourselves with it). Factual power relations among human beings (and living entities in general) take place at all levels of interaction, and I believe that it is useful to attempt an understanding of one's own emotional, imaginary, and biological relationship with them before deciding if there is anyone to "blame" for our present factual, historical, and political predicaments. West and non-West are not analytical tools, but a traditional identity that defines itself with respect to an unknown (and unknowable) 'other'. And so, in the postcolonial contemporaneity, nobody is to blame for this estrangement, we can only blame for this our own beliefs of what we consider as *valid* knowledge, *valid* morality, *valid* humanity, *valid* consciousness of self. *Validity* and validity claims are in the Weberian interpretive sociology intimately related to belief (Weber 1987, Löwith 1993). And it is at this point that I find all pagan and monotheistic religions, intellectual philosophies, and mystic cosmologies to converge: any type of symbolised "knowledge" must be accompanied by belief --even an intellectual-factual-historical-scientific one.

What we call the "West" today has many faces and moving "centres of power" in the current global arena: it can be identified with advanced capitalism, with the "first world", with consumerism, with the arbitrariness of the powerful, and even with their painful arrogance; but also with modernity, social revolution, liberal democracy, academia, science, philosophy, "*intelligentsia*", and the humanist

cosmopolitan ethics. While it is true that both the former and the latter groups of characteristics can today be observed and related to Western peoples, they can also be related and observed as common characteristics and practices of peoples that, today we would consider as "peripheric". The mistake of a postcolonial politics of opposition against the mythical "West" is that, currently, modernity is embodied both nowhere in its purist and purifying aspirations (see Latour 1993) and everywhere in the world at the same time. What this means is that political opposition "against" the tyrant West becomes *ipso facto* an existential opposition against oneself. This inner opposition is, then, the existential predicament in which a hybrid postcolonial identity finds itself. This hybrid identity is then a product, on the one hand, of an imaginary modernity and our practical and emotional engagement with it at the same time, and on the other, of an imaginary *past* that is nonetheless very much practically and emotionally alive right here and now in us. The possibility, then, of a contemporary hybrid consciousness of self who lives within this existential predicament is the "object" of observation and analysis throughout this thesis.

This "existential predicament" problematises many of the instances in which the modern self perceives itself. A basic one in this thesis is the modern self's secular "historical consciousness". If we look at this consciousness without questioning our participation in this "reality" at the same time, it becomes impossible to see the roots of its legitimacy qua "reality". And so, a phenomenological reduction is necessary in order to contemplate the history within which we find ourselves as mere "appearance". From the perspective of history as appearance, we can then discover that its production as "legitimate reality" is tied as much to imperial violence, as it is to the ongoing human production of sacred roots to reality. One of the working hypotheses in this work is that the sacred roots to reality are never left behind by human beings, as one of the major myths of modernity would have us believe. I construct an analytical justification for this assertion through a phenomenology of religion that contemplates the sacred roots to reality as emanating from three distinct centres lying on either 'world', or 'transcendence', or both at the same time. This leads me to resort to three constructed types of legitimate reality --pagan/primitive, Eastern/mystic, and Western/Christian-- which remain very much related to Western culture and belief, but also to the Western tradition's knowledge and appreciation of

"other cultures". These ideal types are not mutually exclusive: human experience of "reality" can be framed within any of the three ideal-typical constructions regardless of our own cultural inheritance.

From the standpoint of *hybridity*, I attempt a critique of the modern notion of "objectivity" as used to denote actual reality --or the only admitted type of legitimate reality. We can identify the source of the modern discipline of self-interpretation with the European Enlightenment as a mixture of (dis)continuities with the Christian order and dogma (with its own (dis)continuities with the Jewish cosmology) after "rediscovering" the Greek classics --with (dis)continuities of their own. The Western tradition, as we know it today, is created through disciplined observation of "objective" factuality or "historical consciousness". This factuality is created by the constant discipline (ritual) of objective observation at the same time as "objective" observation is made possible by the disciplined experience of factuality itself. In this thesis I will argue that our modern "objective" view of reality --as well as any other type of view of reality-- is tied to imaginary and emotionally cognised assumptions about "reality". That is, here, human beings are regarded as a type of animal that needs myth to interact and sustain a meaningful sense of reality, and thus, of social order. I am aware that this assumption as a working hypothesis effectively means that *logos* and *mythos* overlap to become the same thing, but I hope that the reader will allow this extreme artifice initially in order to allow commensurability between the modern sense of self and its unknown 'other'.

The main thesis of this work is that, what we perceive as reality, is intimately entwined with what we believe to be reality, and so, it produces 'us' (our sense of self) as we reproduce it in our daily practices. This means that while social reality is imaginatively constructed by social actors and interpreters, it also constructs emotionally the social actors' sense of self back: The moment that we perceive ourselves as "something", this imagined "something" becomes an intimate emotional experience of self that defines us. In society, we live 'caught' within this activity which is partly intended and partly inherited by the business of living in society. We find ourselves already with it, and believing in it, to sustain our sense of self (and embodiment) by it. And so, I propose the phenomenological artifice of "bracketing"

reality in order to contemplate "objective" reality, and the coherence that it allows us to live in, as a mere appearance of our cultural modern present situation.

"Objectivity", I believe, is the one notion through which the Western tradition of knowledge can do violence to other views of reality in its universalistic and totalitarian assumptions. And yet, objectivity can also be a very useful tool in a specific type of appreciation of our immediate reality. And so, objectivity cannot be wholly rejected or fought against through a politics of opposition, but I argue that it should be relativised and regarded as a useful "myth". In order to realise the critique of "objectivity" as the only legitimate reality, I engage with what it is that produces and legitimises what we perceive as our immediate "reality". Max Weber's interpretive sociology is very useful in this task as I argue that, in contemporary scientific knowledge (especially in Physics), it has become possible to say that "subjectivity" is the basis for *any* kind of "objectivity" (see Delanty 1997). The traditional subject/object divide is radically questioned in this work as an ontology, in epistemology though, the subjective and objective poles can be radicalised as ideal typical forms between which there lies a sea of complexity (which can also be seen as simplicity at the same time). The existential predicament of hybridity is situated amid complexity and uncertainty, and so, I believe that it is useful to resort to other (than Western) traditions of knowledge in order to be able to live with this existential predicament, while refusing to resort solely to the usual totalitarian ontological assumptions of the Western tradition of knowledge.

Following the Weberian methodology for a sociology of knowledge that engages in a constant self-interpretation, then, I relativise the notion of "reality" and consider it as an unfathomable and ongoing mystery, more readily ruled by paradox than coherence, which we must unavoidably deal with through our conscious experience and set of beliefs. But both paradox and coherence are ultimately mediated by conscious experience. As I have said, the main thesis of this work is that human consciousness is bootstrapped to its own created notion of reality in such an intimate manner that this notion of reality creates for human consciousness its notion of self back. This is illustrated by its *autopoietic* nature, as described by Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela (1987) in their theory about life and cognition, which in this work is regarded as a useful metaphor for "consciousness". And so, views of

reality in this work are regarded as both humanly created and also simultaneously creative of the particular notion of human self which can be individual, but which can also be collective. Legitimation in this work is therefore used to denote belief in a specific ideal type of reality, and only indirectly does it refer to legitimate authority (yet any form of authority must resort to the prevalent idea of reality in order to formulate any legitimacy claims). As Weber puts it, legitimation lies on belief and he stresses that political legitimacy must be considered only as a probability, and that obedience is not always oriented by a belief in legitimacy (Weber 1987). Instead of being legitimate, subordination to a type of domination can be "faked by individuals and whole groups due to convenience, practised effectively obeying material self-interests, or accepted as something that individual weakness and lack of power cannot change" (Weber 1987:171). And so, the Weberian notion of legitimacy can be more strongly related to belief in an ideal sense of "reality" than to the political structures of authority in any society.

In the contemporary modern arena of global interaction, political legitimation is already tied to the particular shape and exercise of liberal democracies all over the world; but this legitimacy is sustained as a consequence of European colonisation at the same time as contemporary political authority bases its legitimacy claims on belief in the "superior" modern notions of progress as wealth expansion and political freedom. In order to define his ideal types of domination, Max Weber relied more heavily in the latter legitimate belief than in awareness of the consequences of colonisation. The Western rational enlightenment has traditionally based its claims of superiority on its cultural creation of a secular (civilised) path that unifies humanity around the ideal of a universally powerful moral individual and her/his will to put political power away from religious elites --in the hands of *enlightened* rational institutions-- which cannot help but to produce a new political elite (however "rational"). My argument is that although this could be regarded as one of the most rationally impeccable achievements of the West, it was still conceived within the Christian view of reality and in the spirit of rational theological speculation. When in rejection of dogma the latter became secular, Western philosophers turned to their intellectual teachers (the Greek classics) within their European-Christian background. The Hellenic ideal of cosmopolitanism had inspired the Catholic drive

to world-conversion to achieve universal unification of humankind in Christianity. Humanist theology was the prelude to Reformation and to the achievement of secular universalist-humanist philosophy[3]. However, humanism keeps the inherently divided cosmos of Christianity, which also brings about the (always latent) possibility of a divided world and a divided human race:

> All humanisms, until now, have been imperial. They speak of the human in the accents and the interests of a class, a sex, a 'race'. Their embrace suffocates those whom it does not ignore. The first humanists scripted the tyranny of Borgias, Medicis and Tudors. Later humanisms dreamed of freedom and celebrated Frederick II, Bonaparte, Bismarck, Stalin. The liberators of colonial America, like the Greek and Roman thinkers they emulated, owned slaves. At various times, not excluding the present, the circuit of the human has excluded women, those who do not speak Greek or Latin or English, those whose complexions are not pink, children, Jews. It is almost impossible to think of a crime that has not been committed in the name of humanity (Davies 1997:131).

It is useful to contemplate the Western Enlightenment under this light in order not to become too excessively zealous about its claimed *superiority*.

However, Weber managed to translate the political arenas of the colonised world into theoretical evolutionary terms which, due to the imperial upper hand, evidently contemplated Western countries as the most *advanced* stage. While Weber did not mean for this stage necessarily to be of a superior *quality*, he inadvertently organised a hierarchy with respect to which modernity could identify itself as opposed to its own past *and* as opposed to the rest of the world (its own colonies) at the same time. There was only a small step --which in sociology Jürgen Habermas (1989, 1990) explicitly took-- to make the Weberian hierarchy into a structure that organises the degrees of rational *Enlightenment* with respect to the proximity that interaction in any cultural situation has with respect to the Western style of order. In the current scenario of global interaction this hierarchy is only "acceptable" in the

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[3] "Well known scholars of a radical turn of mind, Valla in Italy, Reuchlin in Germany, Colet in England, were, like Erasmus, attracted to the humanist theology made possible by Renaissance scholarship which the rediscovery of the original Hebrew and Greek texts of scripture, hitherto available only in the Latin Vulgate of St. Jerome, brought into existence. Concerned to take the dust-covers off the Latin Vulgate Erasmus published in 1516 a fresh edition of the Greek New Testament which if not free from error at least showed up the mistakes and even doctrinal tendentiousness in Jerome's version [...] Humanism fertilised the ground for the Protestant reformers, making possible a more sympathetic response to Protestant criticism of the contemporary Church and to its stress to scriptural theology [...] Yet though it was to be popularised, humanist theology was pabulum for only

legal plane of "reality", the one that puts factuality and objectivity as the most relevant aspects of interaction, and the one that in modernity is valued for its ability to calculate outcomes and rationalise interaction. But Habermas' universalistic hierarchy becomes unacceptable very soon, when it takes a cosmic jump to assert that this value characterises a *superior* form of human consciousness. While individually-based rationality, impersonality, and even calculabilility might be favourable to rule both civilised legal-rational interaction and mass production (and consumption); when it comes to organisations formed by human beings, the assumptions of an *enlightened* rational and universalistic impersonality break down due to the particular animal and spiritual human elements involved in daily interaction --which are either systemically neglected by the modern life-style or insufficiently dealt with[4].

Globalisation is generally related to economic interaction, but it would be a mistake to regard it as only this; globalisation is the major producer of hybrid identities. Interaction is a creative source of social structures that reproduce themselves in institutions and organisations, which function in the background of interaction, laying common grounds for coordination of meaningful human activities. Weber's types of domination are useful tools for historical analysis, but they have an in-built bias towards the phenomenon of authority, which is too strongly seen as domination and not as wilful subordination. I believe this to be related to a Western obsession with control and rational domination of experienced "reality"; but if we consider the aspect of wilful subordination in legitimate authority, we are in a better position to explain how it is that belief systems produce human order through disciplined practices all over the world. Weber's other ideal-types of domination (traditional and charismatic) have come to be regarded as (an unreflective) part of the Western historical past and the peripheric, underdeveloped domination structures of our days; which renders them primitive and undesirable *per se*. However, this produces a biased perception of institutions and organisations that relies too heavily in the absolutist assumptions of a universalistic type of "objective"

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a small scholarly élite, some of whom, like Sir Thomas More and even Erasmus himself, remained loyal to the Catholic faith" (Green 1996:125-126).

[4] The contemporary and popular acknowledgement of existence of wide-spread functional-systemic mind diseases, such as stress and anxiety, are illustrative symptoms derived from a rationalised existence.

rationalism. As Barbara Czarniawska (or Czarniawska-Joerges) has argued, organisations have been found to be pre-eminently cultural phenomena, intimately entwined with the consciousness of self that lives in them (1992, 1997, 1998). Under the light of contemporary world globalisation the Weberian types of domination should be reconsidered as an exercise of hybrid/modern self-interpretation that cannot regard itself at the apex of human consciousness anymore.

The Weberian ideal types of domination can be said to be theoretically mutually exclusive in terms of rationality, but empirically observed to be mixed with one another in actual social interaction --especially in these days of globalised interaction. Pre-eminently traditional and/or charismatic types of domination, according to Weber, still require an administrative structure, which he calls "organisation" (Weber 1987:212). Legal-rational domination is based upon legitimate and systematic construction of such "organisation" that will enable society to achieve specific ends pondered and pursued rationally. This formulation conveys the idea that due to the lack of stability in traditionally and charismatically dominated environments it is possible (however deplorable or desirable) that they disappear through development or "progress" towards complex interaction, or that they become subordinated to the more stable rational structures which function on the basis of calculability and thus can be administrated. It takes this subordination for granted, making it into a theoretical assumption. Ironically, Weber considered impersonality and calculability as some kind of biblical monsters with apocalyptic superiority to anything else that would unavoidably bring about an administrative "iron cage".

However, it has become apparent in organisational theory that a legal-rational structure on its own will not suffice for sustaining interaction among people, who *always* tend to develop some form of "collective action [...] based on interpersonal relationships, not a system of formal rules" (Czarniawska-Joerges 1992:18), which is generally identified with the traditional view of order. While the traditional and charismatic categories of ideal-type domination --as described by Weber-- are an evident manner of differentiating the "West" from the "non-West", a sociological study of organisational structures today tends to regard them as marginal and primitive forms of order that the world ought to overcome, or is in the process of

overcoming, as a systemic necessity. This amounts to an organisational prejudice against spontaneity and primitivity, a fear motivated by the belief in their potentially chaotic effects and an empirically groundless assumption that they will eventually be left behind in human existence. Ultimately, I believe this prejudice to emerge from a Christian cosmology that contemplates a divided universe of salvation (transcendence) and condemnation, that relates the latter to sin and the inferior primitivity of embodiment. In modernity this division evolved into a social thrust to rationally dominate and control nature, contingency, and the primitive human aspect in civilised and disciplined interaction. Nevertheless, non-legal-rational elements in organisation can be said to come from spontaneous arrangements which can become very useful sources of order which should be considered as such theoretically.

We can consider the legitimacy of tradition and charisma --as Weber described them-- as being different from that of the legal-rational type, by considering that they are based on different conceptions of self and of time. The legal-rational type of legitimacy rests on the modern value of the individual self, and the other (traditional and charismatic) types, rest on a higher estimation of the collectivity as a form of self. Weber defines legitimacy as based on belief and stresses that it should only be regarded as a probability, its presence or absence depending on individual prerogatives (Weber 1987:170-1). Nevertheless, the value of the individual is greater in the Western world-view than in the non-legal-rational cosmologies because the interacting individual depends on his/her own personal awareness of rational interaction. Further, an ideal rational individual believes in and concedes a much greater value to categories like efficiency and cost reduction during interaction, which should be possible to submit to rational scrutiny; while legitimacy in traditional or charismatic types of domination is based on much more communal values: belief in ancient tradition, strength in relation of kinship, the shared perception of the sanctity of the leader, mass euphoria. Rationality and calculability in government ideally should produce public policy with material consequences that need to be justified rationally; while tradition and charisma are fulfilled in themselves; that is, ideally, they produce bonding and an immediate justification for order that is not rationalised because it is lived. The legitimacy of rationality and calculability is discovered in a historical time-span: the process of legitimation is

postponed to the analysis of the effects of the action; while the legitimacy of tradition and charisma is experienced *in situ*: legitimation is the enactment of a perceived order. I propose to reformulate Weber's ideal types of domination towards an appreciation of tradition and charisma where they are not necessarily contemplated as inferior sources of unreflective "reality" and that can be useful and meaningful sources of order.

The Weberian types of domination are built on the assumption of an individual basis for social order, and so, are displaced from conceptualising a collective notion of self. This means that the phenomenon of authority in Weber considers its empirical manifestation as "domination", but is displaced from considering wilful "subordination" through trust in discipline and in the creative spontaneous possibilities of interaction. For this reason, I conceptualise authority around the notion of its sacred roots to reality as basic categories (as opposed to Weberian individual agency), which I have conceptualised as three distinct phenomenological "centres" on which belief in a view of reality is based. And so, initially, I relate belief in each of the three ideal typical "views of reality" proposed in this work (pagan/primitive, Western/Christian, and Eastern/mystic) to the notions of either synchrony (simultaneity) or diachrony (sequence) to illustrate how different time-frames may be the basis for legitimate "reality" (as in the above discussion of the Weberian types of domination). But I also relate the types of views of reality with the notion of phenomenologically differentiated types of ascendant "languages of truth". In the first part of the thesis I use the concept of *institution*, and its relationship to ideal typical categories of time and language that refer to the ideals and disciplinary maxims of the prevalent conception of *legitimate* "reality". I will argue that while human consciousness and embodiment can experience all types of time (synchronic and diachronic) and language (metaphor, metonymy, and description) identified, legitimate order institutionalises as "real" only one of the types of time and only one of the types of language through discipline, according to the prevalent view of reality. However, in the second part, I attempt to show that while a legitimate type of time-frame and language may be relevant to a disciplined interpretation of reality; all views of reality include both time-frames and the three types of language in the *organisation* of their practices and cosmologies at the same

time. And so, all the types of time and language distinguished are seen as relevant to the dynamic *structures* of interaction in everyday life (however legitimate or not in a particular cultural setting). My argument is that beyond (or below) the legitimacy of an ascendant type of time or language in institutions, there lies the pragmatic need for organisation in embodied human interaction, which I conceptualise as two ideal types of human order (organic and artificial) that are regarded as simultaneous and co-creative.

In this way I attempt to draw a clear analytical difference between the notions of *institutions* and *organisations*, which in organisational theory, remain loosely defined with respect to each other[5]. In this work, I define institutions as the ideal (sacred, mythical, imaginary) aspect of human interaction, while organisations are defined as the pragmatic and experienced consequences of human interaction. The institutional aspect of order is identified in this work with the *ideal* intention of disciplined interaction, while the organisational aspect of order is *practically* seen as 'shaped' by disciplined practice *at the same time* as it must deal with the spontaneity of everyday life. And so institutions are the ideal aspect of human order (principles of discipline) while organisations are the pragmatic aspect (disciplined practice and spontaneity). To be sure, these are artificial (ideal, imaginary) analytical tools in order to approach the phenomenon of human order; but I have defined this "clean" and arbitrary distinction for the purposes of analysis, even as institutions and organisations are deeply entwined with one another and, as social phenomena, are observed to overlap and become indistinguishable.

I relate the notion of "discipline" to sacred realms of human consciousness (even secular discipline) which are claimed to be emotionally and imaginatively cognised. I do not necessarily ascribe a connotation of "goodness" or "rightness" to "discipline", as *any* form of ritualised and systematic human behaviour in this work may be regarded as "discipline" (such as systematic "sacrifice" of any kind). I

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[5] In their introduction to their *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analisis*, Powell and DiMaggio say that while "Institutionalism" is a distinctive approach to the study of society, it is not easy to define what it is that it analyzes. "There are" Powell and DiMaggio say, "several reasons for this ambiguity: scholars who have written about institutions have often been rather casual about defining them; *institutionalism* has disparate meanings in different disciplines; and even within organisation theory, "institutionalists" vary in their relative emphasis on micro and macro features, in their weightings of cognitive and normative aspects of institutions, and in the importance they attribute to interests and relational networks in the creation and diffusion of institutions" (1991:1)

artificially isolate the disciplined aspect of human order through the concept of *institution* due to its acquired connotation of an "aura of distance" from worldly life that the term *organisation* never got. This radicalised distance is meant to point at the sacred origins of disciplined practice. I consider the concept of organisation as "closer" to the ordinary practices of everyday life and to the constant need of improvisation and spontaneity. Organisation in this work thus comprises both the practical consequences of disciplined practice *and* its constant reliance on spontaneity. What we can observe empirically are human forms of *organisation*, as they are embodied in human practice, emotional, and imaginative involvement; while *institutions* can only be analysed conceptually as they have a more "ethereal" existence in their imaginary and emotionally cognised legitimacy.

As has been argued, in globalised current interaction it is already a myth to consider that we can draw conceptual borders between cultures that co-exist in the world today in different levels of synchretic mixture. This is why the traditional modern self-interpretation as the highest manifestation of human consciousness is radically questioned in this work. Rather, a non-hierarchical theoretical construction is attempted in order to put forms of human knowledge at the same level of relevance to human life, which I have conceptualised as primary, intellectual, and spiritual knowledge. 'Legitimate reality' and its relationship with our experienced reality is equivalent to the relationship between the view of reality that is kept 'alive' through disciplined practice and the view of reality that is experienced by virtue of our being alive and embodied in a humanly conscious manner. This involves our enactment of interaction through language and time, as our most immediate sources of a humanly experienced idea of reality. Language and time are immediate because they must be experienced and believed to convey reality at the same time as they sustain human interaction.

The first chapter engages with the notion of "reality", how it is that our modern understanding legitimises reality as "objectivity", and I argue that this understanding can be expanded to include other "views of reality". "Objectivity" I will argue, is not without its sacred roots for claims of validity. These claims are rooted in an a prioristic connection of the human being with her/his transcendental identity and with the "universal" level of reality; as well as in belief on a mechanistic

cosmos of entities that lie outside of each other. This analytical critique is organised around Kantian metaphysics in his *Critique of Pure Reason* and the interpretive methodology of Max Weber (1949, 1958, 1965, 1987), and based on theoretical developments in Physics (Bohm 1980, Capra 1982, 1983, Prigogine 1984, 1997) that have transformed the Newtonian cosmos on which Kant based his reflections on science. The second chapter defines the different ideal types of time and language and their relationship to legitimate "reality". Here I will refer to Northrop Frye's literary study on the Bible (1982) as one of the main sources of inspiration towards a critique of the Western tradition of knowledge. As I have said before, the ideal types of views of reality that I propose are defined from the perspective of the Western culture on "other cultures", and so, the third and fourth chapters engage in contrasting the Western/Christian ideal type of view of reality with the pagan/primitive one and the Eastern/mystic one respectively. The third chapter describes the difference between the formation of historical reality through empire and the mythical reality of the primary experience of cosmos, but also the structure of their convergence, which I argue that can only be described in synchronic terms. Eric Voegelin's study, *Order and History* (1957, 1974), is an essential reference; and so are the phenomenologists of religion, especially Mircea Eliade (1955, 1967), both of which coincide in their portrayal of sacred reality as a dimension of experience in human consciousness. The fourth chapter aims at disclosing the common characteristics of the Eastern and Western traditions as well as pointing at their differences in terms of their legitimate notion of time. Their common grounds are based on the discovery and symbolisation of a transcendental transhistorical realm; their differences are expressed here in terms of the human notion of fault and the conception of transcendence with respect to human consciousness. In this chapter I rely mainly on the work of Paul Ricoeur (1967, 1967a, 1981) --the most important living representative of phenomenology in France-- and on Keiji Nishitani's *Religion and Nothingness* (1982) --the leading figure in the Kyoto School of Philosophy. Through the structure of the differences between Eastern and Western conceptions of transcendence and a phenomenological approach to observation, a synchronic methodology for the observation of self and order in interaction is pondered. This synchretic intention though, realises that any account of such observation will be

unavoidably based on some type of primary mythology that we must bring to awareness.

The second part of the thesis derives from the critique of the notion of "objectivity" in the Western tradition of knowledge. The opposition subject/object in scientific observation discloses a deeper opposition between s/he who does the observation and his/her object of study. In the natural sciences this opposition shows a straight-forward cosmological difference between human and nature; in the social sciences this opposition is more nuanced, mainly through the neo-Kantian critique of positivism (Delanty 1997); but a strict realism still takes on board a positivist differentiation between s/he who knows and s/he who is known as a social phenomenon, but unknowable as a consciousness. And so, the second instance of *hybridity* to be considered methodologically in this thesis is the general condition of embodied humanity: we are animal at the same time as we are human and the radical differentiation between our humanity and our animality is a product of our imaginary cosmologies. What this means is to point at the experienced notion that our humanity is intricately entwined with nature, and so is our consciousness --the phenomenon that we cannot extricate ourselves from while we are alive and embodied. This is why this second instance of *hybridity* is approached in this thesis as an existential predicament that stands on the consciousness of its own "groundlessness" (Varela *et al.* 1991) and unavoidable death.

From this perspective of existential observation, then, consciousness is posed essentially as an undifferentiated phenomenon. From here, any hierarchy of forms of consciousness cannot be regarded as an essential characteristic of "reality", but only as a useful 'utopia' to approach the undifferentiated reality that we must face to produce meaning. In this work I speak of theoretical utopias, as Weber did, or of fantastic imaginary myths and not to actual portrayal of the true essence of reality. Our imagined categories produce certainties that effectively become systematically enacted. This includes human factual interaction at all levels of experience (personal, family, tribal, local, national, global...), but it also includes consciousness of humanity's interaction with nature: the Cartesian "automaton" that functions along universal mechanical laws and is supposed to be devoid of consciousness. In this thesis I have conceptually radicalised an opposition to this view of nature by looking

at it as a conscious whole, and not only to "concede" consciousness to bits of it (like non-human animals). Nature's consciousness implies that our assumption of "objectivity" be regarded as a useful myth upon which we depend to produce (sometimes excessive) order and wealth. While regarding nature as conscious may look like an adventurous move, I believe that it must be attempted --if only as a thought-experiment-- in order to explore the possibilities that human beings can legitimately experience consciousness of collective existence and spiritual union, even while remaining embodied and conscious in a human/animal way.

The second part of the thesis is about similarity among human beings, which in factual reality, is also total diversity. While the first part is engaged with defining the differences between three identified human types of forms of symbolising legitimate reality; these three ideal types of humanly symbolised reality are three forms of common human possibilities for experiencing reality at the same time. Part two concentrates on how it is that these "different" forms of experiencing reality (for heuristic purposes) are also organisationally present for all of human beings. That is, from a modern (global) "objective" perspective, it is possible to formulate how all human beings are, simultaneously, equal to each other in experiential potentiality and absolutely different from each other in their embodied and conscious uniqueness. Nevertheless, we must bear in mind that, as we point to similarities between humans (their need to live in culture being one of them), we must also point at how human beings are different from other forms of beings with whom we may come across in everyday life experience. We concede that nature is conscious as a whole, but from our cultural inheritance --our scientific discipline-- we must also factually be able to observe that in "objective" experience human consciousness can be differentiated from other species of consciousness as well as being embodied differently. However, this means to point at difference and not hierarchy: the consciousness of animals, plants, and even 'inanimate' matter is not necessarily 'inferior' to human consciousness. "Objective" reality can be regarded as *only* a partial idea of what embodied human beings are able to experience and symbolise.

In order to conceive of "objectivity" as useful myth, a methodology that is based in the experience of time as simultaneity (as opposed to sequentiality) is proposed. Chapter five is engaged in describing the *present moment of meaningful*

experience, a perspective from which to study human order that attempts to extricate itself from traditional Western assumptions about the primacy of human individuality. This is done through the inclusion of the Eastern notion a collective self that lies beyond embodiment. This perspective is based on the emerging paradigm of complexity in interdisciplinary studies, and on the theoretical insights about structure and organisation proposed by the biologist Humberto Maturana (1970, 1990, 1992). The model that I propose is mainly based on the simultaneous presence and heuristic difference between discipline and spontaneity, which I consider as analogous to the notions of discursive and practical consciousness as described by the anthropologist Tim Ingold (1986, 1989). The sixth chapter comprises a critique of Western Darwinian cosmology as characterised by the adaptationist research program, mainly from the theoretical standpoint of both Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela (1987) and Varela, Thompson, and Rosch (1991); and a description of my organic ideal type of human organisation. The latter is mostly based in these sources, and also on the study on love and play by Maturana in collaboration with the child psychologist Gerda Verden-Zöler (1995), and in the historical new-institutionalist notion of past "path dependencies" (Hall & Taylor 1996) which is congenial with biological theory of life and cognition described by Maturana and Varela. The seventh chapter comprises a critique of the formalist approach to "objectivist" linguistics and a "cognitivist" approach to intelligence, here I rely mainly on the work of George Lakoff (1987, 1988) and of Varela *et al.* (1991). This chapter also includes a description of my artificial type of human organisation, based on a transformed version of Niklas Luhmann's theory of meaning (1984, 1995), while I attempt a brief critique of his theory of social systems. In a nutshell, what the sixth and seventh chapters attempt to emphasise, is the aspect of simultaneity inherent in human life and cognition as trust and order, whose complex dynamic whole should learn to deal with uncertainty in an appreciation of its inherent creativity.

And so, in this work, human beings can be regarded as simultaneously equal but different to each other while being equal but different from animals in particular and nature in general. This sounds like a riddle, but it only illustrates the paradox of life, consciousness, and diversity. This theoretical construct also helps to illustrate

how the "West" and the "non-West" cannot be considered at the same level of human consciousness unless our Western tradition of knowledge concedes to share its absolute inequality, its uniqueness --in which we are all very much delighted-- with every other tradition of knowledge --however rudimentary in appearance. Our Western cultural inheritance helps us to produce relevant borders for a useful understanding of "objective" reality... but we would remain trapped by these borders if we did not have to engage in the business of constant interpretation and reinterpretation of their present relevance for all embodied humanity right now. In this sense, all human groups and their culture are regarded as engaged in this constant activity of interpretation in simultaneity with perception and disciplined practice; but our own intellectual tradition has turned a half of this quite spontaneous activity (discursive interpretation) into a purposeful and descriptive discipline, an art-form. This discipline produces relevant and useful (even dangerous) borders between phenomenal domains; but it is important to consider that symbols themselves may become rigid if seen as carriers of absolute aspects of reality. Imagined and enacted borders can be either useful or terrible, and the subtlety of this difference can only be grasped ethically in the awareness of our ongoing imaginative and emotional involvement with them.

1. *Ch'ien/ The Creative*

above CH'IEN THE CREATIVE, HEAVEN

below CH'IEN THE CREATIVE, HEAVEN

The first hexagram is made up of six unbroken lines. These unbroken lines stand for the primal power, which is light-giving, active, strong, and of the spirit. The hexagram is consistently strong in character, and since it is without weakness, its essence is power and energy. Its image is heaven. Its energy is represented as unrestricted by any fixed conditions in space and is therefore conceived of as motion. Time is regarded as the basis of this motion. Thus the hexagram includes also the power of time, that is, duration.

-- The Book of Changes (I Ching)

PART ONE:

Institutions and Legitimation

Chapter I.
The Subjective and the Cultural Bases of "Reality"

In its self-interpretation, Modernity set itself in motion and change after an emphatic rejection of religious dogma during the age of reason. This produced the habit of modern culture and interpretation as self-interpretation, within a field of private ownness that is ideally conceived of as individual. But this ideal has already become part of our experienced reality: We perceive ourselves as individual in modernity. However, the embodied human longing for spiritual unity is nowhere less explicit than in nihilism --itself a product of *advanced* modernity. But is this "advancement" *actually* happening or is it only a part of our imagined self-interpretation qua modern individuals? The answer to this question can only disclose a paradox that the critical discipline is unable to solve in a "once and for all" manner, or this would mean the "end of history". My argument is that modern progress is already part of our imagined and emotionally cognised self-interpretation qua modern individuals --but this is already part of our *actuality*. That is, we are only *ideally* modern or *Modernity* is only a myth --yet already one that is relevant for the modern global culture and for the contemporary disciplined and global interaction. Modernity is only an ideal, but this ideal is not 'unreal' because it is already part of our modern self-interpretation of reality.

This is the basis to say that the culture where we abide is created and already creative of the human self; or of the human conception of self. In the vast diversity of forms that human beings conceive of themselves in the world today; the human self as individual personality is only one ideal typical way of conceiving the human self. There are cultures in the world today where it is legitimate to consider the notion of human self as a collective self. But it is important to say that this alternative notion of self is observed as eminently collective from our individualised perspective of observation; and if it looks 'unreal' and imagined, it is due partly to our own individual and constant disciplined self-interpretation. It is therefore possible to say that both a notion of collective self and of individual self are relevant elements of different views of reality and that it is important to distinguish them theoretically. I will propose three ideal types of views of reality that theoretically

"guide" the formation of a notion of human self, one that is produced and sustained by human emotion, imagination, experience and practice all at the same time.

I. 1. "Objective" Knowledge and Sacred Belief

Kant's essay on the Enlightenment (1991) defined it as man's realisation of the power of his rationality in order to leave his "self-caused immaturity". "*Sapere aude*!", was Kant's proposed slogan; which had already been adopted from Horace by Gassendi (Wade 1971:20) and it involved courage. Such determination to leave the guidance of others in individual life specifically meant that people should stop the blind belief in religious dogma and use their reason and intelligence to lead a free life. The Enlightenment --or awakening to reason-- implied a logical division of categories that, from then onwards, would be developed to differentiate the "enlightened" understanding of the world from the traditional acceptance of religious dogma. The historical moment in which a few Western philosophers had the realisation of the power of their own individual rationality was charged with an epic sense of emotion in leading mankind to truth and freedom. I will argue that any search of this nature is based on faith and has an intrinsic spiritual stature. Science can be regarded as a discipline for contemplation of the self; a ritual or a tool to expand consciousness and create knowledge that can be intellectually shared and agreed upon. Although this search became secular in the enlightened worldview, it may work as an alternative *faith* that is capable of producing a belief system analogous to a religious one, which defines its own dogma --a veiled one under assumptions and aspirations of truth.

The history of the Enlightenment is unavoidably linked with the history of Christianity; it represents a stage in the transformation of one of the most rationalised, organised, and expanded orthodox religions in the world (Baillie 1945, Harnak 1904, 1910, Tellenbach 1940, Green 1996, Davies 1997). Modernity emanated from the historical transformations that took place in pre-eminently Christian peoples, who remained mostly Christian and whose Christian conception of reality produced scientific thought. The European Enlightenment is the expression of the highest deification of reason in the known history of humankind, which currently shapes our perception of the world through political supremacy and the authority of science. This work will attempt to unearth the values that create the current academic assumption that the Eurocentric scientific discipline for the creation of knowledge is

superior to any other discipline with similar aims in the world. Although modern science is a major achievement of the human mind, I will regard it as a disciplinary achievement within an expanded spectrum of disciplined human creativity, which also includes our animal-primary link to embodiment and our spirituality. I will suggest that assumptions of superiority have dogmatic roots and that, whoever subscribes to them, also believes in an essential division of the universe that has no logical solution and that condemns humankind to suffer an eternal "unrest" of the soul --and thus of their bodies and mind(s) while in the world.

Nevertheless, this work is grounded on the Western tradition of knowledge and is ideally based in its view of reality. What this means is that it is written within the Western cultural inheritance of the author and her disciplined perception of reality; that is, within the discipline of modern self-interpretation. The Western secular tradition of knowledge has an in-built mechanism of self-observation and interpretation that assumes progress as a principle of reality. And so, progress is lived as a disciplinary chore of secular purification whereby humanity is stripped of its emotivity through the disciplined practice of rigorous "objectivity". The "hard" positivistic sciences have "progressed" through a disciplined negation of human emotions as a negligible aspect of consciousness. In modern social life, this progress is lived and experienced, on the one hand, as alienation from nature (urban life); and on the other, as the separation between the private and the public realms: our emotional aspect is hidden from the public realm --where the scientific inquiry takes place-- and kept private.

Other traditions of knowledge give no such symbolic importance to a notion of collective progress or of separation to organise what is lived as "public life" and are in fact more preoccupied with what our tradition regards as negligible aspects of being human. This thesis is a theoretical attempt to reconcile our intellectual preoccupation of what it is to be human with those of different traditions of knowledge, within which this concern might not be formulated in the same intellectual manner, but that are nevertheless commensurable with the Western perception of the predicament, because they also come from human practice and experience. However, I use the intellectual descriptive symbols of our tradition and our type of "language of truth" while I simultaneously cancel the intellectual

presupposition of a hierarchy of forms of human representations of reality (with the Western one at the top). What we differentiate and compartmentalise as intellectual and emotional ("animal", "spiritual") qualities of being human are in this work considered as complementary characteristics that are present in us here and now as well as at all times. It is a basic assumption of this work that, ultimately, the intellectual perspective (the Western hypertrophy) can only be seen as a useful tool for concept formation, a disciplined means towards the knowledge of self; but the latter should dare to look beyond the limits of what we call "objective" reality.

The main difference between science and any other form of ritualised religion is that science breaks down the traditional realm of the collective-sacred into the modern realm of the individual-sacred. Hierophany or theophany --an experience of interaction with the divine-- produces the definition and clear conception of other-worldly reality as transcendence --beyond and above the world-- which in turn opens the possibility of institutionalised disciplines and religions that strive for reaching transcendence (or salvation) and for living in the world according to the principles that emanate from the conception of the "higher" kind of reality. But after the age of reason in Europe, transcendence was equated with freedom and liberation from dogmatic bondage. Truth and knowledge were sought for as individual rational prerogatives, following reformed Christianity, which were eventually taken from the hands and texts of organised religion. Voltaire's famous promise to defend with his life somebody else's right to an opinion even if he himself did not share it, is an illustration of the enlightened ideal according to which universal individual human freedom transcends particular opinions. In the European enlightened social theodicy, tolerance would be "grounded on the brotherhood of man and the right to err" (Wade 1971:27), for universal human consciousness --conceived as reason in modernity-- is believed and perceived to be based on the individual person. Yet this European achievement created a systematised impersonal scientific discipline with no precedence in the known history of humankind.

According to Max Weber, science is "unique [...] in the provision of concepts and judgements which are neither empirical reality nor reproductions of it but which facilitate its analytical ordering in a valid manner" (1949:111). What Weber means by *valid* here explains his enlightened attempt at grounding modern social science on

objective basis. Following the neo-Kantian Heinrich Rickert, Weber developed his notion of objectivity for the social sciences at a moment when natural sciences appeared to be unquestionably objectively grounded. However, in the light of relatively recent empirically based theories of physics --Einstein's "relativity" and "quantum" theories-- the Kantian conclusions must be revised, as they are based on the empirical observation of the classical mechanistic assumptions of Newtonian cosmology. Under the light of this discussion I will argue that the Weberian methodology for the social sciences becomes relevant to the methodology of science in general; that is, including the "hard" natural sciences.

I believe that the Weberian philosophy of science has such relevance today because Weber put into practice his scientific attempt at grounding knowledge both on empirical facts and "objective" judgement; but this objectivity is also based on personal awareness of one's own subjectivity, which only after having made it conscious, can be regarded as "objective". Weber realised that there was no ontological divide between the subject and her/his object of cognition in the social sciences. His methodology in investigating social (cultural) phenomena turned him into one of the the founding parents of sociology as a scientifically valid discipline. Although his methodological writings must be considered within the historical context in which they were produced[1], they convey a clear manifesto of the scientist as a philosopher. Jaspers regards Weber as a philosopher because he embodied in his life and scientific practice a certain kind of philosophy. "All philosophers," says Jaspers, "have one thing in common: they are what they know; every philosopher is the lucidity of an unconditional being" (Jaspers 1964:195). Weber's 'being' goes beyond his work as a scientist, and if his controversial figure inspired the wealth of publications that it did, I believe that this is related to his uncompromising and honest search for truth which is reflected in his work. But this search is imbued in the Christian-enlightened attitude towards truth *par excellence*: It fetters its finding in imminence, and creates the charming figure of the solitary hero who is engaged in

[1] There exists a "mountainous literature on the so-called 'reception' of Weber" (Hennis 1988:107), which Hennis compares in content to the "game of Chinese whispers". I will avoid elaborate interpretations of what Weber 'really meant' and will concentrate on literature about Weber's background and methodological sources and elaborations which, according to Roth and Schluchter, "on the level of historical inquiry the articulation of Weber's substantive theories and practised methodology" have not been paid much attention (Roth and Schluchter 1979:1).

an eternal battle with the world. Weber refused to find refuge in abstraction and this turned him into one of the most charismatic scientists of our time.

In the present times of postmodern and poststructuralist assertion, beyond Weber's personal epic, and beyond the personal epic of every sacred individuality of the modern theodicy, the current state of extremely differentiated and clashing conceptions of the social science leaves us perplexed with an equally extreme amount of lose ends. I believe that the present postmodern condition and the atomisation of identities and interests in contemporary modernity is a clear symptom of what might come as a solution to the solitary, yet inwardly fragmented, 'I': Extreme subjectivity can only be solved in finding the universe within. But not in a relativist fashion, which can only create parallel, divided, fragmented and clashing universes; this extreme subjectivity calls for the search of ultimate union, which can only be sought for if the reality of the world is bracketed and seen as mere appearance, as in Husserl's phenomenological *epoché* (Ricoeur 1967a, 1981, Hammond *et al.* 1991). Weber did not do this, he was not a phenomenologist; he was a social scientist which made him demand experienced empirical evidence --the one that we can perceive and observe with disciplined "objectivity". But he remained 'between worlds', demanding conceptual clarity and never quite achieving it himself in his work; maybe realising that the world's infinite diversity could only be partially captured by a margin of ambiguity; but always putting a conscious fight against this realisation. His most lucid conclusions always ended up locating the reality of ethical-abstract conceptualisations (theoretical valuation) in the realm of the private individual consciousness:

> We know of no scientifically ascertainable ideals. To be sure that makes our efforts more arduous than those of the past, since we are expected to create our ideals from within our breast in the very age of subjectivist culture; but we must not and cannot promise a fool's paradise and an easy street, neither in thought nor in action. It is the stigma of our human dignity that the peace of our souls cannot be as great as the peace of one who dreams of such paradise (Weber 1909)[2]

The modern-Christian-scientific unrest, I will argue, is identified with the impossibility that Weber contemplates and criticises in this quotation: the illusion of extreme reliance on abstraction as a possible reproduction of reality. Nevertheless, as

[2] Quoted by (Roth and Schluchter 1979) on the cover page.

Wilhelm Hennis has argued, Weber's basic concern was that of "the 'fate of humanity' under conditions of modernity" (Hennis 1988:108), or the development of "those characteristics we think constitute the greatness and nobility of our human nature" (Weber "National State")[3]. But the universalistic assumptions made by Weber in the latter quotation find themselves located in worldly existence "under conditions of modernity" with its particular cultural inheritance and its view of reality, which bases human consciousness on the individual person and in the belief in a transcendental self that exists within every individual. The Weberian approach to sociological investigation embraces this belief (human consciousness based on the individual) in its conception of reality, and consequently, in its methodology to analyse cultural phenomena:

> The social-scientific interest has its point of departure, of course, in the *real*, i.e., concrete, individually structured configuration of our cultural life in its universal relationships which are themselves no less individually-structured, and in its development out of other social cultural conditions, which themselves are obviously likewise individually structured. (Weber 1949:74)

Weber's methodology of concept formation is therefore situated in the modern consciousness of the thinking transcendental 'I' whose existence amid an infinite diversity of phenomena gives meaning and relevance to the particular ones which it chooses to consider conceptually. The creation of such concepts in the social sciences, therefore, gives us knowledge about specific value relations in human beings, but tells us nothing objective (in the traditional natural science sense) about the pre-eminence of values related to the studied object. "If one", Weber says, "perceives the implications of the fundamental ideas of modern epistemology which ultimately derives from Kant; namely, that concepts are primarily analytical instruments for the intellectual mastery of empirical data and can be only that, the fact that precise genetic concepts are necessarily ideal types will not cause him to desist from constructing them" (1949:106). To Weber, concept formation would be useful only when backed by empirical investigation; but the knowledge created by the investigation as a whole would be grounded on knowledge of the self. And here the relationship between theoretical values and practical valuation becomes clear: the transcendental subject must be also an embodied personality at the same time. We

[3] Quoted by Hennis 1988:123.

can say that the scientific discipline can be a Husserlian "intermonadological community of subjectivities" who reach intersubjective understanding, *only* through common belief in and contemplation of the transcendental subject that knows the universe; that is, the traditional concept of intersubjectivity is an important belief in scientific discipline, but it necessarily remains a spiritual experience and an intellectual ideal type.

Kantian epistemology requires that the transcendental self be found by the scientist in her/himself in order to produce universal knowledge. Kant said that it is impossible for us to accept the unity between the object of knowledge and the universe unless we also accept the unifying function of the knowing subject, the 'I' and its *a priori* relationship to the universe. The object of knowledge must appear to us as a certain unity which might become problematic because it contains a multiplicity of elements and functions; but their unity is their origin i. e. the awareness of the knowing subject. The thinking 'I' or transcendental subject must *be* the universe through intuition in order to project it into an ordered unity of concepts. Nevertheless, Kant does not believe that these concepts can convey the transcendental meaning of the universe, he sets limits to the human creation of knowledge. This stemmed out of his enquiries into the possibility of traditional metaphysics. The possibility of physical science and mathematics implies that understanding can only make an empirical use of its concepts and not a transcendental one. When the knowing subject conceives of the super-sensible as a given object, "he gets entangled in what Kant calls a transcendental illusion" (Luijpen 1964:27). This is the kind of illusion that produces dogma in religious environments, which Kant encouraged men to escape in order to lead their own lives by the use of their own reason (Kant 1991).

According to Kant, therefore, the scientific creation of knowledge could only refer to empirical appearances, to phenomenal occurrences, they cannot describe the "thing in itself" or the *noumenon*. Objects are given to concepts in intuition during the receptivity of impressions. Kant believed that the only kind of intuition available for the human mind was sense-intuition which allowed for the spontaneity of the production of concepts while receiving impressions through experience. According to Kant, intellectual-intuition which would allow us to have access to the knowledge

of the *noumenon* is beyond humans. For the subject to reach scientific knowledge about the world, it must assume the pure ideas of reason: "God", the "I", and the "world" (a secular kind of "Holy Trinity" that involves the human self). These ideas are not really *known*, but in order to strive for the universality of science, we must out of necessity *think* them. They are the "pure concepts of reason" (Kant 1929:316) and serve the function of directing understanding towards the universe.

However, the Kantian enthusiasm about achieving universal empirical knowledge through science and reason was tempered by the conclusions of the Scottish Enlightenment, which relied more heavily on the receptivity of impressions. Hume's most important point against the enlightened enthusiasm, was that the concept of causality is only a subjective expectation aroused by the mechanism of association (Luijpen 1964:10). This subjective expectation lies on beliefs.

If we attempt to harmonise --if it is possible at all-- the Kantian and Humean contributions to the philosophy of science, we could say that Kant contributed the imperative importance of contemplating the universe when doing science, and Hume pointed at the --often ignored-- principle of subjectivity involved in the confirmation of causality. Confirmation only means that there are bases for explanatory principles which can either help us agree about intellectual knowledge or be useful in our material everyday life. But our scientific contemplation of the universe is based on the faith that we are mysteriously linked to it from within. Our conceptual explanations might prove to be useful practically only in the specific domain of experience where they are applied. Technology and functionality derive from this; but never precise intellectual knowledge about the "workings" of the universe.

According to the Kantian model of knowledge, belief in the universal integration of the knowing self in the transcendental subject, provides access to *a priori* conceptual constructions given us by intuition. Nevertheless, it is a scientific principle that there always be a margin of error (or distance between the conceptual *a priori* construction and the empirical observation). Even if the error tends to be negligible with respect to the domain of experience in which we apply our theoretical abstraction, it can be mathematically shown that infinity still exists within that margin of error. There are an infinite amount of numbers between two points in any straight line and therefore we can break a line in two forever into infinity. But there

are physical limits to perception of infinity in the world of sense-experience, so it is scientifically correct to reduce the error to the minimum possible range, and make it negligible in the domain of experience where it is applied. But the scientist should not forget that to make it negligible in a specific domain of experience is no justification to ignore the infinity that it contains. Ever shrinking margins of error allow for further precision, but the significance of a decreasing margin of error also decreases marginally --the error cannot be cancelled. Beyond the concept lies the diverse infinity of a universe that will not be apprehended by mere conceptual abstraction.

This might not have seemed relevant at the time when Kant wrote because, to him, the confirmation of the possibility of universal sciences lay on the then obvious universality of Newtonian physics, based on the precise functioning of a mechanical universe. Although Kant had been trained within the dogmatic rationalism of Wolff (Luijpen 1964:9), he opposed the idea that pure conceptual operations of logic could describe reality. But he also ended up rejecting the Humean idea that knowledge was based solely on changeable and concrete impressions, although this made him look into empiricism. Kant needed a source of necessary and universal judgements, and that was *a priori* knowledge, but the concrete experience which gave him an upper hand over the sceptics and impressionists was the apparent universal validity of the physics of Newton. This appearance has been challenged in Einstein's relativity theory and in quantum physics, both of which have shown that Newton's physics apply only in a specific domain of experience: that of body-sized matter that moves slowlier than light (Bohm 1980, Capra 1982). "Universal validity" of intellectual knowledge can be regarded as a myth that carries fantastic imaginative assumptions in its very structure. However, these assumptions should not be seen as necessarily 'unreal' because they point at what is important for the society that sustains the discipline, the order-producing ritual.

One such useful but fantastic assumption in the modern cosmos is the ontological assumption of a mechanical universe formed by discrete entities. Newton's physics are wholly based on what David Bohm calls the "mechanistic order" in his book *Wholeness and the Implicate Order*; which has been challenged

by Einstein's relativity theory and also by quantum theory, but which has remained at the centre of the scientific cosmos and imagination:

> [T]he principal feature of this [mechanistic] order is that the world is regarded as constituted of entities which are *outside of each other*, in the sense that they exist independently in different regions of space (and time) and interact through forces that do not bring about any changes in their essential natures. The machine gives a typical illustration of such a system of order. (Bohm 1980:173)

The entities are supposed to be formed of separately existent indivisible and unchangeable "elementary particles", atoms originally; that later were divided into electrons, protons and neutrons; and then into hundreds of different kinds of unstable particles, "and now even smaller ones" says Bohm "like 'quarks' and 'partons' have been postulated to explain these transformations. Though these have not yet been isolated there appears to be an unshakeable *faith* among physicists that either such particles, or some other kind yet to be discovered, will eventually make possible a complete and coherent explanation of everything" (1980:173 my italics).

According to Bohm, the theory of relativity was the first indication towards the need to question the assumed mechanistic order of the universe. Einstein's relativity implied that the concept of independently existent particles was impossible, and he proposed to give a secondary importance to the idea of discrete particles. According to Einstein, reality should be regarded as constituted of "fields", whose behaviour is consistent with the requirements of the theory of relativity. "A key new idea", says Bohm, "of this 'unified field theory' of Einstein is that the field equations are *non-linear* [which] could have solutions in the form of localised pulses, consisting of a region of intense field that could move through space stably as a whole, and that could thus provide a model of the 'particle'" (1980:174). But if any two 'pulses' come close together they alter each other so radically, that the idea of independent and discrete particles is thus challenged as the essence of physical reality; a particle is thus seen as a useful abstraction furnishing valid approximations in a limited domain. However, Bohm says that Einstein's 'field' concept still keeps the essential features of a mechanistic universe for being based on pulse-like entities that still reside outside each other, and for considering that only those separated by an infinitesimally small distance can affect each other. Einstein was never able to provide an ultimate mechanistic basis for physics in terms of a generally coherent

and satisfactory formulation of his unified field theory; but Bohm says that it provided the basic intuition that the concept of particle is a useful abstraction from an unbroken and undivided universe (Bohm 1980:174).

According to Bohm, the more serious challenge to a mechanistic order came from quantum theory in the form of non-continuity, non-causality, and non-locality. The laws of quantum mechanics are not determinist, they are statistical, and so, future individual events cannot be predicted uniquely and precisely. But according to Bohm, this feature does not essentially challenge the mechanistic order because independently existent elements are still seen as lying outside each other and connected by external relationships:

> The fact that (as in a pinball machine) such elements are related by the rule of chance (expressed mathematically in terms of the theory of probability) does not change the basic externality of the elements and so does not essentially affect the question of whether the fundamental order is mechanistic or not. (Bohm 1980:175)

But Bohm isolates and refers to the three key features of quantum mechanics that do challenge the ontology of a classical mechanistic conception of cosmos and order on which the practice of science is based. **Non-continuity** at a quantum level means that action is seen as an *indivisible quanta*, a whole that remains as such throughout changes of state; "it has no meaning to say that a system passes through a continuous series of intermediate states, similar to initial and final states" (Bohm 1980:128); movement is discontinuous and the observed pulse-like entity can go from one state to another without passing through any states in between. **Non-causality** is based on the absence of determinism in quantum experiments and on the nature of experimental observation: "in the quantum context", says Bohm, "one can regard terms like 'observed object', 'observing instrument', 'link electron', 'experimental results', etc., as aspects of a single overall 'pattern' that are in effect abstracted or 'pointed out' by our mode of description. Thus to speak of interaction of 'observing instrument' and 'observed object' has no meaning" (1980:134). Further, the observer is also part of the pattern of the experiment as pulse-like entities "can show different properties (e.g., particle-like, wave-like, or something in between), depending on the environmental context within which they exist and are subject to observation" (Bohm 1980:175). **Non-locality** is based on the peculiar non-local relationship

between two entities that are far apart, such as electrons, which have separated after having initially combined into a molecule; that is, very small pulse-like entities affect one another at an indefinite distance after having interacted. What is remarkable about these discoveries is that they highlight the need to see physical reality as something that has no ontological division and that if there is any separation between the objects that we observe, it is mainly epistemological, based on our perspective and scientific style of observation.

Bohm problematises this further and asks if instead of the typical attitude of looking at the mechanistic consistencies and applications of the relativity and quantum theories, their intuitions can be used to produce a qualitatively new perspective of observation of physical order, "from which both relativity and quantum theory are to be derived as abstractions, approximations and limiting cases" (Bohm 1980:176). This new perspective would require a serious questioning of the Cartesian mechanistic cosmos and a different attitude towards our own thinking process, nature, and the 'other':

> Though physics has changed radically in many ways, the Cartesian grid (with minor modifications, such as the use of curvilinear coordinates) has remained the one key feature that has not changed. Evidently, it is not easy to change this, because our notions of order are pervasive, for not only do they involve our thinking but also our senses, our feelings, our intuitions, our physical movement, our relationships with other people and with society as a whole and, indeed, every phase of our lives. (Bohm 1980:176)

Bohm suggests that we become aware of an unbroken continuum of reality, where distinctions should be seen as abstracted from that whole, in a similar way in which he highlights the oneness of the thinking process and its content. He believes that questions about the nature of consciousness cannot be properly expressed if we are caught up in the principle of a presumed essential separation of the elements of reality. He expresses this perspective in what he calls the "implicate order":

> We proposed that a new notion of order is involved here, which we called the *implicate order* (from a Latin root meaning 'to enfold' or 'to fold inward'). In terms of the implicate order one may say that everything is enfolded into everything. This contrasts with the *explicate order* now dominant in physics in which things are *unfolded* in the sense that each thing lies only in its own particular region of space (and time) and outside the regions belonging to other things. (Bohm 1980:177)

But both implicate and explicate orders should be seen as perspectives on an intellectual contemplation of universal order which remains rooted in the belief on an essential human transcendental connection to that order. Both perspectives keep a transcendental connection to the Kantian views on the philosophy of science.

Science and philosophy differentiate or unify the universe artificially to indulge reason into observing a coherent kind of order in the world, but whatever it is that we call 'universe' remains a relevant category for our intellectual contemplation of reality. Kant realised that physical sciences do not regard nature as a mere conglomeration of data, but as an interconnected whole that we can think of by means of concepts. Kant conceived intuitions and concepts as the elements of our intellectual knowledge, but he also thought that each intuition needed to be supported by a concept --and each concept by an intuition-- to yield knowledge of the nature of the physical sciences (Kant 1929:92). In order for this to be possible, the propositions that we formulate must *come* to us before sensible experience. In his "Transcendental Aesthetic", Kant accepts *a priori* forms of understanding that are impressed on the manifold data of intuition, which are reduced to a conceptual unity. For Kant, the possibility of the existence of physical sciences is only explained if we accept that this kind of knowledge about the world which obeys determinable physical laws, cannot possibly come solely from experience. Nature, which is the sum of all appearances, is made an ordered whole through the intellectual discovery of *a priori* laws in the form of categories and concepts. Weber shares with the neo-Kantian school the idea that "it can be logically demonstrated that the reality confronting us in our daily lives is the structured version of something immediate and boundless" (Bruun 1972:99). Bearing in mind our believed internal link to the transcendental subject and to universal aprioristic knowledge, it is important to contemplate this knowledge as synthetic, and our artificial process of differentiating it into concepts will unavoidably yield a model of reality that remains an imaginative model, an ideal type, a utopia.

As a consequence, the idea that we are intrinsically linked to the universe through Kantian aprioristic intuition is really only an act of faith: the certainty that humankind has an inner open window into the universe that can become conscious. And this faith may be regarded to be of identical nature to that of any other spiritual

search. The difference of the Western enlightened discipline is that the scientist or philosopher can allow him/herself to *be* the wholeness of the universe through subjective intuition, but then s/he must translate the product of her/his contemplation into conceptual theory or explanatory systems that can be understood intellectually, and reproduced and verified empirically and publicly. This practice (or ritual), with demands of functionality (as a modern value) gives the scientist an environment of certainty within which an attitude of "rational domination of the world" thrives. But the *universal* validity of intellectual knowledge is a myth that derives from the disciplinary belief in an individual human relationship with 'universe', which is originally spiritual as will be discussed below.

The essential Weberian scientific concern is to find out the subjective roots of practical valuation that gave rise to the development of the Western society in the direction of rational world domination. He found those roots in his sociology of religion, which he built in the shape of ideal typical formations. This brought him into sociology at a time when there was a need for a methodology of concept formation so that the discipline as a whole would gain the reputation of science (Hennis 1988). Thomas Burger argues that Weber was pushed into methodological argumentation "as a result of external circumstances"[4] and "left off as soon as he could", and that his major methodological questions had been answered already by the neo-Kantian Heinrich Rickert (Burger 1976:5). However, it is possible to argue with Bruun that Weber went beyond Rickert's purely philosophical argumentation and logical categories by his use of his interpretive sociology and the close relationship between theoretical value relation and practical valuation: "Weber's attitude to the problem of value relation seems far more flexible [than Rickert's]. Of course scientific propositions and value judgements are two entirely different things; but in pointing to [practical] valuations as a frequent, and legitimate, condition of value relation, Weber hints at the possibility of a more extensive, if still controlled, interplay of practice and theory, interest and perception" (Bruun 1972:106-107).

[4] Thomas Burger argues that Weber's involvement with methodological issues is related to the dispute (*Methodenstreit*) that took place between the economists in the German Historical School (mainly Gustav Schmoller, Wilhelm Roscher, Bruno Hildebrand, and Karl Knies) and the Austrian Classical School of Economics (founded by Carl Menger). For both sides of this dispute, "scientific knowledge constituted a mental picture of the empirical phenomena in question; it was conceived as a replica of

However, the Rickertian influence on Weber is clearly recognisable and Weber himself says that his incursions in methodology are bound up with Rickert's work (Weber 1949) and that of other neo-Kantians. According to Oakes, "in the philosophy of history developed by Windelband, Rickert, and Lask, Weber found an epistemology of the cultural sciences which, in his view, established the conditions under which knowledge of the historical individual is possible" (Oakes 1987:436). Rickert's logic created the possibility of contemplating history as a science with the objective stature of the natural sciences, but with a legitimacy of its own based on the individual uniqueness of the historically relevant events. Just what gives individual events their relevance is related to a valuation process :

> To attribute importance to the individuality of certain phenomena [...] means connecting them with some value in relation to which they acquire their importance [...] only this relation permits a selection from the infinite multiplicity of reality which respects the individual character of the phenomena selected, while being rooted in a firm criterion (viz., the value in question). (Bruun 1972:88)

But, according to Rickert, the value in question would be relevant to everybody, meaning by this not "just anybody", but everybody in a *Gemeinschaft*. This brings to mind the idea of intersubjectivity in a scientific community. But without the scientific belief in the possibility of collectively invoking the transcendental subject in everyone in the community, the view of reality formed according to these principles is unable to overcome its particularistic, locally structured nature.

Weber's ideas on value freedom in science accept that "a person may enter into two roles, being the source (or the recipient) of, alternately, scientific and valuational propositions, [...] the social scientist will often have to pass through a phase of practical valuation in order to be able to assume his theoretical role" (Bruun 1972:106). The Rickertian "careful and deliberate" distinction between the object level and the research level is not found in Weber, who is more an empiricist practitioner that a logician. He therefore established a scientific practice according to which the scientist would look straight into her/his personal practical valuation; but that would also make him/her contemplate the universe, and project her/his transcendental self-consciousness into the creation of proper theoretical value

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the object in the mind. Consequently, the question which was fundamental to the whole controversy was: What counts as a satisfactory replica?" (Burger 1976:141).

relations in order to create systematically correct scientific proof. In his essay on "objectivity", Weber considers the latter as correct if its empirical relation to the world could be recognised as such "even by a Chinese". He immediately realises this might be too broad a generalisation and corrects himself by stating this more precisely, saying that scientific proof "must constantly *strive* to attain this goal, which perhaps may not be completely attainable due to faulty data" (Weber 1949:58 my italics).

Nevertheless, theoretical value relations tell us nothing about individual perception of reality in itself due to the established principle that immediate individual perception is a boundless infinite diversity of phenomena. Weberian methodology is rooted in a view of reality that divides the universe into real worldly phenomena and real transcendence, and whose only ground to make an objective claim stands is the conscious self-experience. To Weber, the relation between the concept and the object of study is always mediated by this conscious self-experience, through valuation. Lask explored the relationship between the concept and its object and concluded that concrete reality cannot be derived from its conceptualisation (as in what he called the emanationist Hegelian logic); but that it is lived in individual existence as the sole reality, and that its unique and unfathomable nature precludes the possibility of complete clear conceptualisation. Therefore, the relationship between object and its concept is purely artificial as an "intellectual construct, reality [individual perception] is ontologically richer than the concept" (Oakes 1987:439).

The relatively recent possibility of observation of physical phenomena at a quantum size has brought about similar conclusions: a different theoretical approach was needed at that level, because Newtonian all-encompassing theoretical physics described a more "local" kind of universe --one adapted to our body-dimensional experience of solid objects (Bohm 1980, Capra 1982). Therefore a broader theory was created which allowed for greater flexibility in measurement --through Heisenberg's uncertainty principle-- instead of the discovery of numerical constants in the universe (or in the logic of the theory). According to Windelband, the natural sciences' *nomothetic* knowledge abstracts from the uniqueness of particular phenomena in order to concentrate on the patterns of behaviour that govern the similarities of particular events, thus creating general laws, and cancelling their

uniqueness. In his view, historical science's kind of knowledge is *idiographic*, where "the purpose of knowledge is to comprehend the distinctive properties of the unique event itself" (Oakes 1987:437). In history, those distinctive properties would be chosen according to general values that the scientist represents; in quantum physics, the phenomenon that the scientist decides to observe changes in (conceptual) nature according to the theoretical expectation that the scientist assumes in his/her experimental setting.

In the light of the scientific discoveries of our now theoretically "expanded" universe, we can say that both social and natural sciences have nomological characteristics, and that their tendencies to observe idiographic uniqueness is ruled by how close the object of study becomes either the conscious self (social science and philosophy) or is consciously influenced by the individual scientific "observer" (participator in quantum experiments). We can now say that, what Weber pointed out to be the basis for objectivity in the social sciences, applies to any kind of science natural or social. What the current academia agrees to see as relevant and desirable for the expansion of intellectual knowledge, and what the initiated ones teach and accept as the leading paradigm has its basis in this intersubjective legitimacy. In this conception of reality, an intersubjective agreement --based on the strength of a rational abstract theory and evidence-- is the basis for what we call "objectivity".

Nevertheless, considering its basis on the individual conscious self, "objectivity" should always be regarded as an act of faith. This does not mean that objectivity is therefore faulty or impossible, it only means that the blind belief in absolute certainty through objective knowledge is a cultural scientific by-product of modernity that, in practice, may acquire a dogmatic nature. In his defence of value-freedom in the social sciences, Weber always opposed the formation of "scientific" dogma of this nature. To him, this was reflected in the confusion that science would be able to elucidate the actual validity of knowledge, which he strove to differentiate through keeping a clear distinction between empirical science and value-judgements. "For even the knowledge of the most certain proposition of our theoretical sciences --e.g., the exact natural sciences or mathematics, is, like the cultivation and refinement of the conscience, a product of culture" (Weber 1949:55).

If sociology is to remain a science on Weberian grounds, it needs the Kantian scientific unifying principle of contemplation of the universe --even if only as a transcendental belief which realises that any intellectual knowledge achieved in this manner remains a partial view of reality, with particular (local) significance. The social sciences should take seriously into account the possibility of everything being enfolded into everything else at the same time as we are able to distinguish discrete differences; mainly because individual intention at the centre of human action follows the principles of an atomistic Cartesian universe, one whose ontology has already been empirically challenged by contemporary physics. The ideal Western self that we experience as an individual self can also be brought to conscious experience as a collective self imaginatively and emotionally. Other cultures represent this collectivity as legitimate "reality" without having to resort to an individual principle of order based on an atomistic and mechanistic world-view. If we accept that human consciousness may have imaginative and emotional ways of experiencing itself as a united whole with other human beings; there is no reason why a collective self cannot be posed in order to describe a human self-experience that can produce knowledge; without needing to consider it necessarily "illegitimate" on the basis of our own Western-scientific terms.

It is in this spirit that I build three ideal typical views of reality as fictions or utopias that cannot be observed in their abstract purity, but that complement each other in human interaction. The ideal types dealt with in this first part of the thesis are given names of recognisable cultures when they have been identified as such from the Western perspective (pagan, Christian, Western, Eastern); but also the names of characteristics of those practices that have been identified as such by the Western culture (primitive, mystic). Therefore, the centre for intellectual self-knowledge is the Western tradition of knowledge itself; the perspective of the observer. My ideal types are metaphors that I consider useful for heuristic purposes and --at best-- they may be valid (Western) approximations in the observation of human interaction. Their validity is justified in terms of a point of intersection between practical valuation and theoretical valuation: the practice of science and its ideal aspirations of truth. But we should be aware that the latter are based on belief of the sacred type, spelt out by Kantian philosophy of knowledge, which is not

without its fantastic imaginative roots. These roots are nonetheless reproduced by human interaction in social reality, sustained by the contemporary political world order and global interaction, and by the disciplined practice of scientific observation --which according to Weber, should be essentially practised as self-observation.

I. 2. Three Ideal-Typical Views of Reality

The basic premise of this work is that the ability to conceive and represent a 'view of reality' makes *human interaction* different from any other phenomenon that an observer may call 'interaction'; and the 'substance' where a view of reality is carved is the experience of time and language in disciplined practice. Nevertheless, an observer is already necessarily human and is also her/himself already situated within a view of reality and cultural inheritance that s/he identifies with through his/her own embodied interaction and experience of time and language. Currently, our Western tradition construes reality as organised around the notions of a subject and an object that are separate from each other. "Objectivity" depends on the disciplined distance that a subject may take from her/his object of study and this may be based on the belief that the object and subject are essentially separate from each other. But to take on board such assumptions as the only source of reality is analogous with assuming sacred or religious belief as absolute truth; belief and legitimate reality are based on cosmological myths and on disciplined practice simultaneously.

I suggest that what has been traditionally construed as difference between religion and institutions (however rational) can also be construed as a continuum. This continuum has been identified by (New-) forms of institutionalism[5] as 'path dependencies', this is an image of social causation that "rejects the traditional postulate that the same operative forces will generate the same results everywhere in favour of the view that the effect of such forces will be mediated by the contextual features of a given situation often inherited from the past" (Hall & Taylor 1996:941). From this perspective the sharp differences between tradition and modernity become blurred, but can still be considered as differences of *degree*. This follows the experience that, while modernity emanates from the West, the non-West is also already a part of it through currently sustained global interaction; that is, the non-West is also the West. At the same time, there is a popularly sustained myth --of the cosmological primary type-- that modernity progressively wipes out tradition; a suggestion that produces optimistic projections of a possibly *better* future as much as

[5] This is the New Institutionalism that concentrates on organisational analysis. See (Powell and DiMaggio 1991 and Hall and Taylor 1996)

terrifying visions of administrated and utterly rationalised worlds. My own position here is to take fully on board Bruno Latour's claim that *We Have Never Been Modern*, a claim that comes from a person who is unquestionably situated in the West[6]; and that contends that the project of modernity is both suspended and sustained by its own inner paradoxes and contradictions (Latour 1993). I would add that the Western tradition of knowledge is also traditional in its need for mythical assumptions of the cosmological type about reality. So nobody has ever been modern, yet modernity is already the ideal basis of a global culture.

The difference in degree between what has traditionally been called the West and the non-West, or contemporary modern and traditional interaction cannot be fully appreciated through a dialogical relationship between them where the non-West is regarded as the 'other' and tradition is assumed to precede modernity in a sequential manner in *universal* history, mainly because tradition is part of the present social experience of both West and non-West simultaneously. This is the reason why this relationship should be brought to the contemporary world scenario in identifying various current cosmological beliefs, regardless of their pre-eminence or not in our own tradition of knowledge about reality and culture. I suggest a theoretical construction that contemplates three ideal types of reality; the structure of this ideal difference is essentially organised around the dialogical relationship between 'world' and 'transcendence' and the notions of time and language that derive from each cosmology and that give shape to the principles of discipline --to institutions as defined in this work. But this perspective assumes that all of the elements of the three ideal types of reality are complementary; that is, they depend conceptually on each other to be defined at all (this will become clearer organisationally in the second part of the thesis).

In his book *The Interpretation of Cultures,* Clifford Geertz speaks about a pair of complementary concepts that he defines as ethos and world view: "the ethos is made intellectually reasonable by being shown to represent a way of life implied by the actual state of affairs which the world view describes, and the world view is made emotionally acceptable by being presented as an image of an actual state of

[6] But if uttered in a peripheric country, it would most probably be taken to express either an obvious fact or an exclamation of desperate and repeated failure in the face of the expectations of the IMF or similar supranational entities.

affairs of which such a way of life is an authentic expression" (Geertz 1973:127). What Geertz calls an "actual state of affairs" depends on whatever it is that a specific culture regards as real. "What all sacred symbols assert is that the good for man is to live realistically; where they differ is in the vision of reality they construct" (Geertz 1973:130). He considers that, "for various individuals and in various cultures", religion fuses ethos and world view and gives social values what he calls "an appearance of objectivity" (Geertz 1973:131), which is what he thinks ethos and world view most need to be successfully sustained.

Geertz's conclusions about social order help us clarify the organisational implications of a constructed vision of reality, but he uses the symbol of objectivity (one that is regarded as legitimate reality in the West) in order to convey his link between reality and another world view's experience of it. His general message is that another culture may hold an idea of reality that may not agree with ours, but that it is no less real to the bearers of the culture because of this. His is the relativistic Boasian stand-point in anthropology, where all cultures are seen as valuable in themselves (Bennet, 1996). It is only from this standpoint, that we can look at the Western tradition of analysis itself, and observe it as a culture, a worldview with a very particular type of *ethos*, which happens to be universalistic and factual. I will go briefly back to the discussion of the subject/object divide in order to illustrate the predicament of this Geertzian type of analysis, through which the observer positions himself in the privileged perspective of observation to produce intellectual knowledge, even while he does not claim superiority for his own cultural inheritance.

In order to carry out her/his analysis, the scientist must differentiate between subject and object as a methodological assumption. But, as has been discussed, this exercise of differentiation is itself based on a "myth" of separation at the very root of the Western tradition of knowledge. The methodological assumption of the clear divide between subject and object is an order-producing ritual in the world-view of science. Although recent scholars are more willing to see ritual in many Western practices, there is much resistance to identify ritual with the rationalised practices that produce secular knowledge and rational domination. Catherine Bell regards the generic concept of ritual as an analytical tool, based on the division between subject

and object, that helps to give social shape to the dichotomy thought/action "that runs particularly deep in the intellectual traditions of Western Culture" (Bell 1992:24):

> We do not see that we are wielding a particularly powerful analytical tool, nor do we see how our unconscious manipulation of it is driven not only by the need to resolve the dichotomy it establishes but also simultaneously to affirm *and* resolve the more fundamental opposition it poses --the opposition between the theoretician and the object of theoretical discourse. In other words, we do not see how such dichotomies contribute to the rational definition of a knower, a known, and a particular kind of knowledge. (Bell 1992:25)

In our Western tradition, the kind of knowledge produced by scientific method (or ritual) is the legitimate one. This knowledge is scientifically produced and coherently spelt out in the sequentiality of symbols that represent themselves and the world in the abstract possibilities of conceptual thought. But the critical Western discipline depends on the assumption of a vantage point (originally related to the Gaze of the Christian monotheistic God) that produces the rational ability to see the dichotomous relationships, which traditional cultures do not identify as the basis of reality. This vantage point belongs to the observer who is poised in a mimetic assimilation of the transcendental Gaze of God and who is able, from this vantage point of 'pure' objectivity, to project universal knowledge into the abstract, sequential, scientific descriptions of "objective" reality. Even if this standpoint has been questioned by the Western tradition of philosophy itself --and this legitimises the emergence of poststructuralist and postmodern theoretical constructs as well as various forms of existentialism and nihilism--, in the realm of everyday life modern interaction, the privileged standpoint cannot be disposed with. In the collective practice of science, however, the absolute gaze of the scientist is transformed into a social consensus where the 'objective' reality can be agreed upon:

> Hence the modern use of language has been driven increasingly to define the objective reality of the world, on the assumption that "objective" means real because it allows such consensus, and that "subjective" means unreal because it does not. The word "subject" in English means the observer of the objective, and it also has the political meaning of an individual subordinated to the authority of his society or its ruler, as in "British subject". It is not really possible, however, to separate the two meanings. The "subject" is subjected to the objective world, and not only subjected but almost crushed under it, like Atlas. (Frye 1982:21)

The Geertzian relativistic interpretation of other cultures points at a metonymic correspondence in our use of the term 'objective' and 'reality'; to us, it is not really possible to separate the meaning of these two concepts. However, a full exercise of relativism is impossible for an anthropologist who stands in the vantage point of an observer that is engaged in the activity of translation from the realm of the 'other' to the realm of the Western objective tradition of knowledge as it is practised today. This vantage point is sustained by contemporary cosmology, which implies a political order that is unavoidably entwined with the contemporary power structures of the world[7]. A full exercise of relativism is needed which would imply a turn of 180 degrees in order to analyse the 'otherness' of Western tradition itself. The problem is that, in this attempt, our own universalistic grounds would be removed from under the feet of the privileged observer. The question that springs to mind is if it is possible at all to realise this intellectual exercise, from the point of view of the observer, and regard the Western tradition as the 'other' and as 'oneself' at the same time. My own way of dealing with this predicament is to embrace the paradox and give intellectual knowledge only a metaphoric value, useful for understanding, yet mythical in its universalistic consequences.

According to Geertz, religion encompasses ethos and world view in a given culture. In the Western tradition though, it is the institutions (legal-rational) which substitute for religion (and give the latter a marginal function in the private realm of human life). It is important to stress at this point that the current realm of global interaction is also situated in culture and belief, and therefore it is also based on an ethos and a world-view. Our modern institutions encompass this ethos and world-view; but it is necessary to trace the ancestry of modern institutions all the way to the Christian religion, together with its own Judaic and Greek ancestries (Snell, 1953, Jaeger 1962, Voegelin 1974, Nisbet 1994). It is this ancestry, I will argue, that defines the present relevance of our contemporary use of the notions of a separate subject and object, the mechanistic cosmos that rules modern interaction, and our distinct sense for a factual type of history. The concept of *religion* is used in this

[7] It is experienced in the political hierarchies that go up, today past Europe, towards the United States. But the latter can always be cosmologically and mythologically related to the liberal ideals of the spirit of Reformation that remain in the syntax of the American constitution (and in the so-called Universal Declaration of the Human Rights).

work indistinctly from institution (legitimate belief), spiritual practice, or discipline, systematic form of worship, or social theodicy to describe the same phenomenon: the relationship between what Geertz describes as ethos and world-view of a culture, and their structural consequences in the cosmology that rules interaction. This relationship is necessarily ideal and therefore, institutions here are regarded as possessing an aura of distance that is analogous to the charismatic aura of organised religion[8].

An idea of reality, as portrayed in this work, may be couched in religions or (rational) institutions, cosmologies or the order of the world or the universe; it is rooted in what is really important for a given society, and in that sense, real. The concept of 'religion' is linked to Christianity as a spiritual discipline and practice -- and to the Judeo-Christian conception of God-- and although it has been used to speak about other spiritual disciplines in the world, it was not created as an analytical tool but as a descriptive symbol of Christian 'togetherness'. This is very relevant to this work because it attempts to show that the Western tradition has a mythological basis as much as any other known tradition of human knowledge. The Western view of reality is prevalent in global interaction, and therefore, we should be aware of its mythological basis. But this 'mythology', as I have called it, cannot be disclosed unless --at least-- other two stand-points are conceptually constructed and identified with 'other' world-cultures. But they must be built in the spirit of recognising that they are also aspects of our own culture as they are aspects of every other culture -- even if they are not culturally pre-eminent in ours. The problem is how to portray other generic views of reality that Westerners can identify themselves with, not qua Westerners, but qua human beings. This would produce an empirically plausible counterpoint to the Western world-view, formulated conceptually, which can at the same time be regarded as different but sharing its deepest existential concerns nonetheless.

I will construe three ideal-typical views of reality whose difference is essentially organised around an alternative dialogical relationship between 'world'

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[8] In this sense I disagree with the institutionalist tradition, which may have its origins with Thornsten Veblem, that considers institutions as mere habits. Even though I agree that these habits leave past dependencies and determine the shape of an organisation, the habits are materialisations of institutional arrangements, they are not the institution itself. Past habits and present organisations are to the institution what the Church is to the body of Christ.

and 'transcendence'. The three ideal types are called the Western/Christian, Eastern/mystic, and pagan/primitive types. Only the first one considers both world and transcendence as simultaneously real. The Eastern mystic type regards the 'world' as illusory in nature and only transcendence as real. The pagan/primitive type regards reality as the 'world'. Thus, while the Western/Christian type is based on the dialectical tension of an 'eternal' division, the Eastern/mystic and the pagan/primitive types conceive of reality as essentially whole and couched in either of the two poles whose tension the Western/Christian view inhabits. I am aware that this alternative is also shaped by Western dialectics, but I explicitly resort to our own traditional (sacred) Western roots to reality in order to place the 'other' within a perspective where it can also be 'oneself' simultaneously.

In our Western tradition, we divide reality into an opposition --however ideal-- between 'world' and 'transcendence'. The other two typically-ideal conceptions of reality that I propose are holistic in that reality is fettered either wholly in 'world' or wholly in 'transcendence', and the opposition between these two terms in those ideas of reality is either irrelevant or illusory. To an observer, the pagan/primitive conception regards reality as the 'world' and the Eastern mystic conception regards reality as 'transcendence'. We are left with three typically-ideal conceptions of reality whose empirical reference is linked with the prevailing spiritual practice in diverse cultural settings that, despite their diversity, can nonetheless be generally classified as pagan/primitive (reality as the 'world' only), Western/Christian (reality as the 'world' and 'transcendence' at the same time), and Eastern mystic (reality as 'transcendence' only). However it is important to clarify that, although these views of reality were conceived in an idealised symbology and lead to the (Western) classification of cultures mentioned above, the three notions of reality that they stress are empirically experienced in simultaneous and changing experiences of human consciousness in all kinds of cultures all over the world. These three ideal types of reality may be regarded as three types of prevalent cultures, but are not mutually exclusive, they are complementary in human experience: all cultures have recognisable organisational features of the three types (see part two).

It is important to point out that the transcendentalist views (Western/Christian and Eastern/mystic) legitimise the symmetrical opposite at the basis of their belief

systems: in the West the individual self is a value in itself, while in the East, the collective mind is sacred. The idea of self that is idealised and given an institutional aura in the different types of views of reality tends either towards the spiritual individuality of the human being (the Christ, the transcendental subject or the knowing Ego) or to humanity unified in awareness of an immanent kind collective entity that encompasses all, but that is not given a clear personality as in the God of the "religions of the Book". However, this 'clean' symmetrical differentiation is mediated by the idea of transcendence, which is clearly articulated in the Western/Christian and in the Eastern/mystic views of reality, but not in the pagan/primitive one. In the latter, oneness with the cosmos is a living experience of either collective or individual ritual, a sense of awe and veneration for the experienced mysterious characteristics of embodiment and the world, articulated in archaic symbols and myths and induced by their cyclical mimetic enactment in synchronic experience. These practices bring about experienced awareness and renewal of the symbols of spiritual-organic union of life and death.

It is also important to mention at this point that the only conceptual tension with further dichotomous consequences in this tripartite differentiation exists between the two views of reality that contemplate 'transcendence' as real. There is no conceptual tension between the transcendental views of reality and the pagan/primitive view of reality because the reality of the world is either repressed and controlled or engulfed by them --the more problematic tension is not conceptual but embodied in providing justification for colonialism. The conceptual tension between the transcendentalist views of reality is not experienced as such in global social interaction because while the Western conception of reality produces the practice of what Weber called 'rational domination' of *reality* (or experience), the Eastern mystic conception produces the practice of what I call 'intuitive submission' to experience. Rational domination creates material organisation that is most successful in coordinating world interaction; intuitive submission produces a type of peaceful quietism. Both kinds of transcendental practice are aimed at colonising the pagan/primitive idea of reality bringing it awareness of transcendence --without being able to abandon the grounds of embodiment and myth that wrap the mysteries of life and death-- that lies beyond the concreteness of this world: transcendence as

impersonated in the only God in Heaven, as infinity, as the eternal present mystic instant, or as universal humanity.

The pagan/primitive type conceives reality as only in the world, which due to diversity in nature, has created a huge range of stories (myths) where a mixture of human experience, emotional ties, and imagination speculate about the mysteries that keep the world alive and in constant renewal. But this is not an outward observation of phenomena, like science, it is an inquiry towards the inner life of the human group that needs the group organically to survive as an embodied animal. As we will see, this practical awareness may abandon human interaction only in extreme artificial circumstances (such as urban life). Nevertheless, the mythological realm of existence is a human characteristic of interaction and, even if it is left in the background of modern interaction as a source of the primeval root that links human to nature, it is still the foundation of social life:

> Mythology is not a *datum* but a *factum* of human existence: it belongs to the world of culture and civilisation that man has made and still inhabits. As a god is a metaphor identifying a personality as an element of nature, solar myths or star myths or vegetation myths may suggest something of a primitive form of science. But the real interest of myth is to draw a circumference around a human community and look inward toward that community, not [essentially] to inquire into the operations of nature. Naturally it will draw on elements from nature, just as a creative design in painting or sculpture would do. But mythology is not a direct response to the natural environment; it is part of the imaginative insulation that separates us from that environment. (Frye 1982:37)

It is pertinent to say with Frye that myth is never improved upon (as with the assumption that evolution is progress and therefore conceptual thinking is superior to myth), nor is it abolished in any society. Its primitivity is linked to its organic present relevance to human and not to the 'evolution of man' (where women are thought of as lagging behind --linked to moral and spiritual competence-- together with children and the peoples of the non-West).

At the historical period of the Western European enlightenment, what may be regarded as the historical origin of secular modernity --or the age of reason-- the Western/Christian conception of reality re-defined itself to reject the constraining dogma of the church. But the Christian dualistic and divided conception of reality in 'world' and 'transcendence' was kept in the rationally enlightened minds of the

Western philosophers who could not have thought in the void and were thus subject to their cultural past "path dependencies" (Hall & Taylor 1996). This differentiation of reality gives the Western conception an intellectual vantage point because it includes both world and transcendence as real; but at the same time it takes away the perspective of an experiential vantage point for other types of knowledge where these two categories lie undifferentiated. A disciplined rational domination of experience, along the Christian lines of time, eventually brought about science as a very powerful source of intellectual knowledge. However, there is a fundamentalist trap here which every scientist should learn to avoid: one may believe that the discipline produced by this view of reality is the only source of valid knowledge.

The discipline of rational domination of experience constantly re-defines itself to try to encompass intellectual knowledge of the infinite variation of phenomena that the world's constant change creates; while the discipline of intuitive submission to experience accepts the world as it is because its worldly nature as such is seen as illusion. These two attitudes characterise both 'transcendentalist' views of reality and consider as important intellectual and spiritual knowledge respectively. But a primitive type of (primary) knowledge rooted in the world and in myth is not only also relevant to human, but it is also the basis of any other type of knowledge; and, as will be argued mainly in the second part of the thesis below, it is the type of knowledge that human animals share with non-human animals. Knowledge in this work is not only conceptualised as intellectual knowledge; there are other two kinds of knowledge that should be taken into consideration when producing a model of human world-order: spiritual knowledge and the knowledge produced by a direct experience of the world --not mediated by any kind of explicit transcendentalism (primary knowledge).

Each of the three types of knowledge referred to correspond to each of the three types of views of reality and also have an ideal-typical nature in the sense that they are never pure, but manifest themselves as empirical mixtures in different symbolisations and degrees of relevance of the three types of knowledge. Even though primary and spiritual knowledge lack precision in discursive expression, the realm of experience where they are expressed is real in its 'actuality' for human interaction, in a way analogous to Mircea Eliade's idea that the sacred realm --where

the imagined (not necessarily imaginary) realms of magic, transcendence, and salvation lie-- is also 'objective reality' because it 'manifests itself' (Bennet 1996:118). Here, I would like to temper this position though, and accept the reality of primary and spiritual types of knowledge in as much as they organise experienced domains of present human interaction. Primary and spiritual knowledge are sources of organisation that are barely noticed or recorded as they are expressed through practice that is embodied and enacted practically; their discursiveness is limited and ambiguous, but their presence is lived nonetheless.

Human consciousness is **ideally** comprised by these three kinds of knowledge[9]. Intellectual knowledge is today represented through the scientific discipline of concept formation or factual knowledge, spiritual knowledge represents itself in universalistic revelation, the sacred "Word of God", Dahrma, philosophical disquisition, or spiritual practice of various disciplines; and the primary experience of reality represents itself through compact symbols of local, particular, and embodied experience. In order to be able to contemplate a wider scope of human creativity, it is necessary to give these kinds of knowledge a conceptual existence within the framework of consciousness. It is necessary to represent them because, to the best of our knowledge, human experience creates and dwells in these representations of reality (which may also be said to create human experience back) and they persist in human life to this day through what is peculiar to our species: human language and a human type of embodied interaction. The three kinds of knowledge constantly interact with each other in human language and embodied interaction. Here, we are dealing with the complex process of consciousness which in this work is regarded as inseparable from embodiment. Language and embodied

[9] Human consciousness is the most complex object of analysis; any conceptual description should be regarded as just a model that must be assumed to remain short of encompassing its vastness. This is not only the acknowledgement of a negligible margin of error between the model and the object of intellectual knowledge; it the realisation that this margin of error represents infinity itself.

interaction undergo constant transformation through time but they can also be observed at the same time to keep a general form which we can identify. In order to concretise the difference between these kinds of knowledge and to define how they are relevant to human life, we must define types of time and types of language (verbal structures) that are used by human experience in order to structure the immediate and boundless reality in front of us.

Chapter II.
Time and Language in Legitimate Reality

In this work, religions and institutions are regarded as analogous to each other because they dictate the notion of legitimate reality, and this is reflected in the ideal principles expressed by prevalent discipline. I will argue that in contemporary modern interaction, the quality of order is different from that of the order of what is explicitly sacred by virtue of its relationship with time and language. In the West this difference is traditionally construed through a relationship to time that is progressive and that contemplates a movement from the reality of the sacred order at the centre of human interaction to the reality of human rationality at the centre of human interaction as a positive and desired transformation. But this modern self-interpretation, in the rejection of the sacred roots to reality, refuses to see that this progressive construal itself is sustained in human action (or non-action), emotion, and imagination by those sacred (mythical) roots themselves (see appendix A).

My argument is that the locus of legitimation is the relevant experience of time and language for either of the three ideally typical views of reality and their *institutionalisation* as disciplines; even as the different types of time and language that are identified here are essential to the pragmatic *organisation* of any culture that can be identified as such empirically. This is the reason why in this work legitimation is related to institutions and not to organisation: institutions, like religions, portray the ideal 'form' of the discipline that human beings engage with in order to interact with experience; while organisations are a pragmatic mixture of that form with the unavoidable spontaneity of life. The ideal form of the discipline exists mainly in human emotion and imagination and this is related to the creation of belief in legitimate institutions and disciplined human interaction.

We come across a contemporary tale that has not been 'written' but which is told and enacted by the current structures of world interaction as soon as we watch television, open up a news paper or a magazine, or engage in meaningful and informed conversation about 'what is going on in the world', or what is the historically relevant order of things right now. My approach towards the "reality" of this tale is the same as Northrop Frye's approach to the Bible in his *The Great Code*; he does not use strict doctrinal or historical criteria, but imaginative criteria. To say it

with Frye, I realise that in doing this "I am not, of course, claiming that imaginative criteria have a monopoly of truth or relevance, only that they are the only ones consistent with my specific assumptions" (Frye 1982:xxii). From this standpoint, I hope to be able to direct a critique of the doctrinal (ontological) and historical-factual (epistemological) criteria generally used by our discipline to analyse present assumptions of knowledge[1].

This thesis is an exercise of analysis oriented towards the state of affairs in world interaction. This realm of interaction is lead or organised by the Western institutions which have already been assimilated and undergone synchretic transformation in every cultural setting where they have been placed, and so I make use of notions that are part of the cultural inheritance of the West[2]. We may all agree that humanity has a common inheritance (innate, organic, psychological, conscious); but, as Frye says, it is doubtful that a common inheritance of any kind can be reached by-passing the distinctive qualities of our own culture (1982:xviii). And so, I attempt an analysis of contemporary Western "mythology", through the Western tradition of knowledge[3].

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[1] I am aware that mine is a critique that bites its own tail because, in our tradition, fact and method are essential. Nevertheless, what I argue is that we should be aware that any form of knowledge cannot escape the myths of its own cultural tradition.

[2] This has to do with my own personal relationship to the dichotomy centre/periphery, according to which the Western world is generally assumed to be at the centre, and the non-Western world at the periphery. In the concrete world of interaction and in relation to this dichotomy, however, there is an 'in between' state of non-wholly-modern nations, which are already Western; the ones that Merquior called "the other Occident", and it is from this twilight realm of consciousness that this critique is launched.

[3] Following the intuition that the results may produce a lighter reception of this mythology in a country like Mexico, whose origin, fate and institutional transformation is already unavoidably tied to the Western world.

II. 1. Time: Synchrony and Diachrony

A 'view of reality' emerges in embodied experience, emotion, and imagination, from the immediate need of our human consciousness to interact with each other and with the world. Through consciousness and embodiment, this interaction produces knowledge of various kinds which may be differentiated, on the one hand, according to each view of reality, and on the other, according to the legitimate experience of time within that view of reality. In the two holistic views of reality, the relevant experience of time for the purpose of legitimation lies on simultaneity (synchronicity): the mimetic identification of ritual wholeness and the eternal present moment of mystic enlightenment. In the divided view of reality of the Western/Christian type, the relevant experience of time that legitimises expectation of eschatology or a constant 'not yet'[4] of the project of modernity is sequential and highlights past and future (diachrony): the means-ends sequence, the coherence of sequential, rational disquisition, and the consciousness of history as a domain of reality that is relevant for a universal humanity. We owe the original distinction between synchrony and diachrony to the Sassurean structuralist analysis of language: synchrony is his axis of simultaneities and diachrony that of successions (Wilden 1972:50, Merquior 1986). But here, I use the difference between synchrony and diachrony to be analogous with the difference between conscious and embodied awareness of simultaneity and the (human) experience of sequence either in natural events or in social ones. I will argue that while the Western tradition has succeeded in showing the importance of the legitimate experience of time as progress and history, it should also look into the relevance of simultaneity within the organisation of its own tradition. I will resort to Jaspers' (1953) construction of a historical axial age to illustrate this point.

[4] Quoted by Laurence Coupe from Frye's *Anatomy of Criticism* where he sees "the 'apocalyptic' vision as the permanent possibility which inspires the secular imagination. Thus by 'apocalyptic' he means, not the literal expectation of catastrophe, not even a religious doctrine, but the imaginative anticipation of the not yet" (Coupe 1997:166).

Time may be experienced as a continuum of simultaneity that is comparable to space (but not identical with it)[5] and which connects everything to everything else, but it may also be experienced as movement that is witnessed by the constant change and restlessness of everything that surrounds us. To human consciousness time is only identifiable through contrasts because otherwise its essence would be experienced as a mere flow of substances in nature: We need relevant marks that allow us to distinguish past from future in that endless flow. Human marks on time are produced in relevant experience of simultaneity that establish meaningful points of reference in the flow of occurrences in the otherwise undifferentiated continuum. This makes us aware of two realms of time: synchrony and diachrony, the former denotes simultaneity and the latter, the movement from past to future. Synchrony is rooted in the present instant of human consciousness and diachrony is related to the relevant realms of past and future interaction with each other, with the world, with the sacred realm, or with eternity (transcendence).

This distinction is held by the three types of view of reality, in the sense that they are three types of human experience that we can distinguish currently. The Western tradition of legitimate knowledge is attached to a representation of time as (diachronic) progress and this displaces it from considering the synchronic realm of experience as a realm that can be legitimately considered as time-like[6]. Nevertheless, in order to clarify their realms of application to our concrete experience and perception, the opposition between synchrony and diachrony may be regarded as analogous to the opposition between being and becoming; but not as the Hegelian categories of Absolute reality, but as the position in which ordinary human self may find him/herself with respect to her/his experience. My contention is that, in the Western idea of reality, the realm of ordinary being is not relevant in its suchness to our everyday living, we are mostly in chase of what it is that we are becoming (See

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[5] This is only a metonymic resource because to assume that the eternal present moment of time is the same as simultaneity in space is what Nishitani calls "bad infinity", or when the finite goes on infinitely.

[6] Synchrony has generally been considered as a kind of "stasis" artificially subtracted from the flow of time, like a photography, a view that was a source for the demise of structuralism (Merquior 1986). Here, synchrony is unavoidably linked to diachrony where both notions are seen as perspectives on time and both move and rest, in their own ways, at the same time. Yet the observer can only consider one of them at a time in a way that is analogous to the uncertainty principle of measuring the position and the momentum of microparticles in physics (see chapter V, section 2 below).

also Maturana & Verden- Zöler 1995).

In the previous chapter I spoke about the need to see the Western tradition in the position of the 'other'. I will argue that the only temporal grounds from which this can be done is the synchronic realm of present experience. This is because an intellectual enquiry into the validity of other types of knowledge, is couched on historical and evolutionary evidence that is itself already a structural feature of the Western tradition of legitimate knowledge. If we stop looking at diachrony, out of a methodological artifice, we realise that progress, evolution, universal history, and any other kind of diachronic tale, is constructed for the sake of the present moment of meaningful experience; for the possibility of present synchrony in functionality, in purpose, in understanding, in love. The only basis to launch a critique that unveils the Western mythology is to regard diachronic human history, progress, and evolution as disciplined explanations --based on evidence-- that we build in the present for the sake of present synchrony. This does not invalidate the diachronic tales themselves, but it allows us to contemplate their mythical aspects in their primary sense, which show what is really important for the culture under analysis, our Western globalised culture... which is already humanist.

And so, a synchronic perspective can help to create a space to point at the mythological assumptions entwined with the diachronic structure of time itself --like the modern obsession with a constant kind of change that is supposed to wipe out the past progressively and unavoidably. In global interaction, universal history is relevant to every nation in the world and even if it was originally produced by Western/Christian symbolism and empire, it is already part of the mythical conditioning of everyone that is in touch with the global realm of interaction. Historical relevance is organised and selected according to a specific set of values dictated by the prevalent conception of reality (see Weber 1949). Its source, the Christian view of reality, considers both world and transcendence real, but essentially separate, for the latter is fettered beyond the world. This is the root to a divided universe which would base interpretation of experience in a conceptual dichotomous relationship of opposite cosmological forces. This dual relationship in the Western tradition has been transformed into a methodological interplay of concepts that take place in an indefinite linear progression from the unknown to the

unknowable[7]. But it was originally based on belief in a circular cosmology that originated in Genesis and would end in Apocalypse.

The factual reality of the Bible myth here is irrelevant, because there remains a sense for a collective moral progress of humanity as a whole which, with all the potential beauty it holds, also makes cosmological assumptions that are relevant to the present idea of human consciousness, its *development* as a species and its *universal* history. In his monumental work *Order and History* Eric Voegelin suggests that modernity represents, as well as a break with its religious past, an unintended symbological continuum with Christianity in its notion of the unfolding of time in universal human history. This religion sets the institutional present for itself in a "once and for all" event --the coming of the Messiah and the interaction with the divinity (theophanic events). "We have not moved so far away from Christianity as the conflict between the church and modernity would suggest", says Voegelin (1974:269). Modernity sets the absolute originality of its own present in symbols that Voegelin considers as deformed versions of the original Christian symbols produced by the theophanic events.

Theophanic events take place at the level of experiencing consciousness simultaneously with divine consciousness, which reveal the "dynamics of transfiguration" from darkness into light. This spiritual transformation was already embedded in the emotional and imaginative sources of the philosophers of the European Enlightenment, and was used as an important symbol for a rationalistic *transfiguration* in the same kind of synchronic "once and for all" event: the age of reason. According to Foucault, in his 1784 text *What is Enlightenment?*, Kant regards the *Aufklärung* as an event where philosophy problematises its own discursive contemporaneity in whose meaning, value, and philosophical particularity it finds "both its own raison d'être and the grounds for what it says" (Foucault 1988:88). And yet, following Voegelin, I suggest that this construction of a contemporaneous (to Kant) rational self-awareness bases its "alternative" consciousness about historical reality and its progress on transformed symbols of the Christian reality, which it transforms and deforms in order to reject the religious undertones at same time (see appendix A). According to Voegelin, all the subsequent

[7] As Frye puts it: "The universe may have started off with a big bang billions of years ago, but the

efforts to ground a philosophy of history beyond the Pauline tale only succeed in deforming the theophanic symbols of transfiguration into what he calls "egophanic" symbols where the thinker engages in a narcissistic contemplation of his own sphere of ownness:

> The variations on the theme of transfiguration still move in the differentiated form of the eschatological myth that Paul has created. This is an insight of considerable importance, because it permits one to classify the ideological "philosophies of history" as variations of the Pauline myth in the mode of deformation. The symbols developed by the egophanic thinkers in the self-interpretation of their work, such as "*Wissenschaftslehre*", "system of science", "philosophy of history", "*philosophie positive*", or "*wissenschaftlicher Sozialismus*", cannot be taken at their face value; they are not engendered by bona fide analytical efforts in the noetic and pneumatic fields; they rather must be recognised as mythical symbols in a mode of degradation. The "history" of the egophanic thinkers does not unfold in the Metaxy, i.e., in the flux of divine presence, but in the Pauline Time of the Tale that has a beginning and an end. (Voegelin 1974:269)

The efforts around the construction of a unified world-church transformed the notion of transfiguration into collective expectation of an age of perfection, of the Spirit, one "beyond the establishment of church and empire" (Voegelin 1974:268). But the original Tale was conceived in contemplation of divine presence, and even if we concede to regard it as myth, it gives sense to our present secular conception of progress, evolution, history, and moral conscience.

The notion of the contemplation of divine presence is important here in order to establish its link to the realms of synchrony and diachrony. I have mentioned that Voegelin regards the Christian symbol of spiritual *transfiguration* from darkness into light as the root to Western dichotomous relationships. However, this symbol of transfiguration is also present in the other transcendentalist type of idea of reality (Eastern/mystic), and takes the shape of one or another symbol for spiritual Enlightenment, but it does not produce a philosophy of universal history in the Western sense. I will discuss some reasons for this in the chapter IV, below. Nevertheless, the specifically Christian symbol of transfiguration serves as an axis that gives sense to diachrony in the Western world-view of a before and an after; but the transfiguration itself is a symbol that grounds its importance in synchronic experience and leaves a mark in time for centuries to come. The Christian tale of

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question of what happened before that goes on nagging" (Frye 1982:71).

beginning and beyond describes a full cycle in the construction of spiritual consciousness, that was contemplated as a historical cycle for all of humanity. But this Christian cycle rotates around the synchronic figure of the Son of God who is also the historical figure of Jesus of Nazareth.

In order to see how the above symbol organises the whole conception of history and humanity throughout the ages, diachrony and synchrony must be placed in a relationship of direction with respect to each other. Synchrony is centripetal, establishing simultaneous relationships in human experience; diachrony is centrifugal determining relevant difference (Frye 1982). The human experience of simultaneity contains the possibilities of symbolising relatedness, and therefore, the ability to establish relevant marks in a continuum of flowing time that would otherwise remain undifferentiated. Synchrony and diachrony remain two aspects of the phenomenon of time as experienced by human beings. But even though these two dimensions of time depend on each other to be distinguished (experientially), they cannot be thought of at the same time (analytically). Going back to the typology of ideas of reality and types of knowledge outlined above, it is clear that the holistic views of reality (pagan/primitive and Eastern/mystic) legitimise themselves in a continuous experience of the synchronic aspect of time and the Western/Christian idea of reality legitimises its divided view of cosmos in diachronic experience that unifies its divided idea of reality. "This is the basis", says Frye, "for the common place that Biblical religions have a distinctive sense of history" (1982:83). Primary and spiritual knowledge are legitimised at the same time as they are experienced in synchrony; intellectual knowledge, that depends on the sequentiality of the symbols that disclose it, is legitimised in diachrony. It could be said that the (primary) mythical tale has a sequentiality of its own, but as it is not engaged in faithfully describing objective and factual knowledge; but in directing mimetic experience, synchronicity is kept through simultaneous human engagement of emotion, imagination, and embodiment with the tale at the moment of its enactment.

Nevertheless, the basis for a symbol of transfiguration (Christian or otherwise) remains an idealised synchronic moment in time according to which the rest of the events --historical or irrelevant-- may be organised in our factual idea of reality. It is an axis that the Western view of reality displays in religion, but that is

necessarily hidden in the privacy of one's own mind in secular reality. The centripetal pull of the synchronic symbol defines sameness with transcendence, the divine example of the spiritual master, or sameness among human beings, and the centrifugal push defines difference and lays down a series of examples that spell out its doctrine and disciplinary precepts. Historically, this axis is the coming of the Messiah in Christian cosmology, and the age of reason in European Enlightenment in the cosmology of modernity. But the need for a historical axis is also exemplified in useful constructions like that of the "axial age" proposed by Karl Jaspers who in his *Origin and Goal of History* transformed the particular Christian symbol of transfiguration into a historical age of spiritual enlightenment and discovery of transcendence which unavoidably kept the Christian shape of the Pauline tale. In order for the historical time perspective to acquire dimensions of universal human history, an event or an age serve to organise its unfolding in a meaningful manner. This is where the axis of historical universality lies: it encompasses everyone on earth and gives each soul and nation a place in a cosmos that maybe spiritual and eternal, or secular and constantly changing, supposedly subject to human agency but also to human fallibility.

According to Jaspers, it was not until the axial age that diverse cultures in the world discovered the universe. What this means is that these cultures --or specific individuals scattered around these cultures-- managed to conceive transcendence, not only as a symbol or an intellectual concept, but as a certainty. Certainty is understanding as well as faith; this discovery therefore founded and laid the foundations for the great transcendentalist religions of the world whose practice survives to this day. After this age, various kinds of practices developed that strove for spiritual transcendence. The axial age contains the seeds of "humanity as we know it today" (Jaspers 1953:2); when individual human beings developed the possibility of consciousness about 'being' in universal union with the rest of humankind; when, faced with their own material and physical limitations, they strove for redemption and transcendence. The axial age that Jaspers speaks about is a period around 500 BC:

> The most extraordinary events are concentrated in this period. Confucius and Lao-tse were living in China, all the schools of Chinese Philosophy came into being, including those of Mo-ti, Chuang-tse, Lieh-tsu and a host of others;

> India produced the Upanishads and Buddha and, like China, ran the whole gamut of philosophical possibilities down to scepticism, to materialism, sophism, and nihilism; in Iran Zarathustra taught a challenging view of the world as a struggle between good and evil; in Palestine the prophets made their appearance, from Elijah, by way of Isaiah and Jeremiah to Deutero-Isaiah; Greece witnessed the appearance of Homer, of the philosophers -- Parmenides, Heraclitus and Plato--, of the tragedians, Thucydides and Archimedes. (Jaspers 1953:2)

However, this historical construction organised around the human conception of transcendence ignores other major epochal spiritual outbursts which are relevant specifically to the Judeo-Christian tradition. Toynbee criticised Jaspers' conception of an axial age saying that to be able to regard this era as determinant he had to leave the stories of Moses and of Jesus out (Voegelin 1974:4-5). Nevertheless, while Jaspers embraces the shape of the Pauline tale and finds a spiritual axis that is common to all humanity (or a good proportion of it), Toynbee points at Judeo-Christian elements that have been displaced by Jaspers' construction and should not be left out for their importance. Both authors are preoccupied with either the form or the content of the Judeo-Christian relationship to historical facticity. In contrast to this, Voegelin's critique conceives Jaspers' "axial age" as an attempt to force the operations of the spirit into one historical line within what he calls the historiogenetic function of "speculation on the origin and cause of social order" (Voegelin 1974:60); in this case, a world-social order based on Jaspers' humanism, with Christian shape and ancestry.

We should be able to acknowledge that in all attempts at grounding any kind of chronology (tribal, imperial, or global), the origin and cause is inevitably linked to some form of divine realisation, even in the global secular realm. Jaspers' type of historiogenetic speculation ignores the symbolic importance of the Pauline projection of the cycle of spiritual realisation onto the historical cycle of collective humanity. "Both Jaspers and Toynbee", says Voegelin, "treated hierophantic [*sic*] events on the level of phenomena in time, not letting their argument reach into the structure of experiencing consciousness" (1974:5). Therefore, in this work I refer to the consequences of an *axial age* in order to highlight the importance of hierophany in the construction of universal forms of social interaction, even though the shape of the tale of an axial age is already determined by the Western/Christian symbolisation

of an essential division between 'world' and 'transcendence'. The relevance of the axial age in human history and the relative simultaneity of the hierophanic events that comprise it --which Jaspers highlights-- lies in the discovery (or invention) of transcendence in its original sacred relationship to human beings.

Nevertheless, experiencing consciousness is an activity that remains in the synchronic realm of human life, we can relate to diachronic representations only from the fleeting present instant of meaningful experience. For example, the story of the life-cycle of the spiritual master is generally raised as universal example in religion, because of present interaction with divine experience in hierophany. In it, historical time, or any kind of chronology, is suspended for reality to be re-interpreted in various symbological efforts that will generally promise to inaugurate new eras of wider consciousness of the spirit through discipline, as explained by the master and the followers. It is important to bear in mind, though, both the mythopoietic potential of symbolic systems, but also the universal possibilities of the hierophanies that ground them for teaching transcendence. Myths, stories, and explanations may create doctrinal enslavement, but the symbol of transcendence gives grounds to civilised social interaction through the creation of what Voegelin calls a "language of truth" that tends to universality. As will be discussed below, this language takes various shapes in its prevalent verbal structures.

Voegelin warns us to take "meditative precautions" in order for a "doctrinization of symbols" not to "interrupt the process of experiential reactivation and linguistic renewal"(Voegelin 1974:56). Our Western tradition of scientific knowledge has the mechanism of constantly doubting itself as an in-built defence against such doctrinization; but one of its effects is that it constantly breaks the intellectual disciplines down into a wide range of specialities. This produces a centrifugal movement of scientific 'progress', which is already part of the scientific discipline itself, whose explanations of 'aspects' of reality become diluted in the atomisation of a cosmos that is supposed to work along perfectly universal lines. "When the symbol separates from its source in the experiential Metaxy, the Word of God can degenerate into a word of man that one can believe or not" (Voegelin 1974:56). Universal human history is situated within a language of truth that finds it very difficult to question its own grounds because they are veiled by the European

enlightenment's drive to re-invent social collective reality rejecting the doctrinal symbolic assumptions of Christianity, but inadvertently also embracing the divided cosmology that was its source.

Nevertheless, a "language of truth" in consciousness of transcendence is at the basis of the development of creeds, which in social interaction bring about religions, disciplines, and institutions as stable sets of rules with general, and so, ideal applicability. In a pragmatic sense, though, the universalistic or otherwise spiritual institutions (rituals and religions) and their practices produce a common material *milieu* within which they can flourish; this *milieu* is the material organisation, experienced within the spontaneity of everyday life[8]. The major transformation in various societies that underwent spiritual outbursts of the kind described in the Jasperian axial age is related to "the emergence, conceptualisation and institutionalisation of a basic tension between the transcendental and mundane orders" (Eisenstadt 1982:294). This tension is equivalent to the tension between mind and body in our secular tradition and therefore the analytical difference between institution and organisation is equivalent to that between consciousness and embodiment. The co-creative relationship that exists between these two human characteristics will be clarified in the second part of this work. It is enough to say at this stage that the relevance of the hierophanic events in human experience is revealed by their effects on the immediate institutional and organisational settings of several major civilisations.

Our own Western civilisation, with its love of intellectual knowledge, has produced a diachronic cosmology that describes, or attempts the description, of our origin, our nature, our history and evolution, and in some constructions, the fate of humanity. Western cosmology though strives to its completion but is never completed, because its own structure leaves space to infinite speculation for the progress and advance of science and knowledge. This realisation may strike us as the positive consequence of an infinite openness of society, in Popper's sense (1962, 1966). However, as Erikson argues, "the values associated with indefinite progress, just because it strains orientation as well as imagination, are often tied to unbelievably old-fashioned ideas" (1968:33-4). An infinite type of openness can also

[8] Or what could be regarded as parallel to the more modern concept of bureaucracy.

render negative consequences when it is dissociated from transcendence because of its unavoidable nihilistic consequences. According to Nishitani, "to be infinitely finite, or in other words, for the finite to continue on infinitely, is "bad infinity" (*schlechte Unendlichkeit*, as Hegel calls it), a concept that logic usually treats as a stepchild" (1982:170); but this type of infinity is often resorted to when experiencing factuality (see Block *et al.* 1997). The linear diachronic time of Western cosmology was produced by assuming the universe to be a mechanical whole with interconnected laws. This is a cosmology that is relevant to the way in which we interact today and, even if it has been questioned by academic intelligentsia, its nihilist doubts have only marginally reached the functional realm of world interaction, if at all. Western notions about evolution and historical and economic progress are embedded in the culture and cosmology of contemporary global interaction.

From a contemporary perspective of world interaction then, the elements of progressive betterment have already been transformed from being laws of nature, to being purposive goals of humanity. The latter assumption is inscribed in the structures and practice of science and of economic and moral interaction in the world. While situating ourselves in the cosmology of cur own tradition, and assuming the deepest concerns of our academic discipline, one can only evade the importance of these issues either through naive optimism or cynicism. This is one of the reasons for pointing at other two possible views of reality from our own cultural perspective in order to expand it towards awareness of a wider spectrum of human experience *for the Western tradition of knowledge*[9]. In this work, these issues are taken on board as a matter of balance: progress as a law of nature is already regarded as a myth in the sense of it not being factually real to an informed observer, yet it is a myth that defines what is important for the modern mind in global interaction as a culture and should not be regarded as "not real" in the same sense as "not objectively real". Progress is a myth and also already objectively real in our experience, because we have structured our interaction and disciplined practice around this notion and

[9] The epistemological basis of this work assumes that this kind of expansion cannot ever complete a *full* spectrum; as will be discussed in the seccond part of the thesis, one of the most remarkable aspects of the emerging paradigm of complexity is that we must learn to live with paradox and deal with uncertainty.

reproduced it socially for ourselves. Nevertheless, it is important to bear in mind that this grand Western cosmology also rationalises primitivity as its own past --present today either in *unconscious* and wrong (dark) psychological fixations or in distant lands-- and spirituality as a private business. This perspective fails to grasp from a synchronic perspective that primitivity and spirituality are also alive in the midst of the civilised Western culture itself and in the embodiment and personal development of the disciplined observer her/himself.

However, the notions of progress and diachronic movement in time that we can record in human history are part and parcel of the way in which the world interacts currently. In the scientific tradition itself it is next to impossible to escape them, basically due to the way in which this tradition is structured. We "stand on the shoulders of giants" to borrow one of Sir Isaac Newton's favourite quotations. This means that while we refute some aspect of this tradition's vast assumptions, we must also take on board everything else that it considers as knowledge. The latter in our tradition is intellectual knowledge and is therefore faithfully described by conceptual language as a requisite of the discipline. This product is essentially diachronic, even if in producing it there are essential synchronic elements. This is the reason why, throughout this work, historical accounts of the way *universal humanity* has developed and "progressed" in consciousness are resorted to. This does not mean that this is the direction that it necessarily followed in their original synchronicity, but that this is the direction for the present order of things that it was important to realise that it followed. Synchronic interaction is a boundless maze of happenings which history orders in sequence according to their order of relevance in the observer's conscious subjectivity; but also according to the order of relevance of the happenings in the observed society. The historian's evidence is tied to this autonomous order and it therefore describes something that is relevant to our discipline. On the grounds that they are relevant to a our present construction of reality, I will therefore use diachronic accounts of "what happened" under the light of the above considerations and also taking into account that both synchrony and diachrony may be regarded as separate legitimate bases for institutional discipline, but their distinction depends on each other and therefore they are inseparable in any type of reality that we may construe and experience.

The three ideal types of views of reality outlined in the first chapter manifest themselves empirically in both immensely diverse and converging ways of representing the experience of time in its simultaneity and its sequentiality. However, for the sake of construing useful analytical tools, we will say that both synchrony and diachrony are *organisational* aspects of *any* belief system, while the *institution* and discipline practice is legitimised in only one of the two ideal aspects of time identified here (either synchrony or diachrony): The **pagan/primitive** legitimate type of time contemplates the cyclical essence of natural environment, tied to the earth's fertility, human calendars, and the myths that produced various versions of ritual repetition of the act of creation in *illo tempore* (Eliade 1955), at the origin of the world. This type of time frames the experience of duration of human events and their cyclical renewal; duration is sequential and diachronic, renovation is synchronic and the producer of legitimate authority[10]. The **Western/Christian** legitimate type of time is progressive, in contemplation of the past, but with a qualitative difference based on an axial event --a transcendental jump in consciousness-- which projects the life of humanity as a collective "body" towards its future perfection in history. In Christianity, the synchronic Divine moment is represented as God's presence in Genesis and Apocalypse, and in factual *real* history, as the axial events of Revelation or the coming of the Messiah; time is experienced as a tension between the Creation, the origin of history in sin, one's own deeds, and imminent Judgement; and the legitimate essence of this experience is diachronic. In a secular world-view, the realm of legitimate reality and authority is also diachronic experience as human history; here, individual personality is essential, and creates the disciplined habit of contemplating the history of human personalities as *responsible agents*. The **Eastern/mystic type** of legitimate time is the eternal present of the "here and now", the moment of Grace or Spiritual Enlightenment whence perfect union with the Divine collective mind is accomplished: the synchronic source of authoritative legitimacy. In the practice of the spiritual path, though, diachrony is represented as the duration of the path to Enlightenment, always regarded as an illusion of the world of forms, but nonetheless seen as an important organisational

[10] I. M. Lewis follows R. A. Knox (1950) to say that in contemporary studies of Shamanic and primitive religions, it has been observed that "religious leaders turn to ecstasy when they seek to strengthen and legitimise their authority" (Lewis 1989:29).

notion in the practice of spiritual discipline. In the Eastern/mystic view of reality, mundane time is seen as a burden of cosmological debt in an eternal wheel of rebirth which can only be escaped through spiritual Enlightenment[11]. All three types of reality represent both types of time organisationally and cosmologically, but only one of them is legitimate in authoritative institutions and disciplined practice.

[11] I will discuss this Eastern notion of *karma* in chapter IV, section 2 below. About it Nishitani says: "Being obligated to the infinite drive from the homeground of the self itself to be constantly engaged in doing something and consequently being obligated also to keep entering into relation with others and co-determining the self with others endlessly, but yet remaining forever incapable of taking leave of the self that presses onerously down upon us--this, it seems to me, is by and large the state of affairs that has arisen to awareness through the concept of karma. It can be termed a self-awareness of the essence of existence in time, conceived as a dynamic nexus of being, doing, and becoming" (Nishitani 1982:242).

II. 2. Language: Metaphor, Metonymy, and Description

Besides the embodied and conscious experience of time, human beings also interact in language. But language is structured as an identifiable nexus of references in synchrony, yet in constant change in diachrony. Northrop Frye follows Giambattista Vico in order to attempt a classification of verbal structures which are observed to rise and fall through history --diachronically--, which can also be regarded as prevalent in different degrees of cultural ascendancy in different human forms of interaction in the world right now --or synchronically. Nevertheless, these verbal structures cannot exist in isolation from each other even as they characterise different historical stages or different present particular cultures. Frye identifies (diachronically) three different stages of cultural ascendancy of specific verbal structures: the hieroglyphic stage, dominated by metaphoric verbal structures; the hieratic stage, dominated by metonymic verbal structures; and the demotic stage where the descriptive verbal structures are dominant. My own perspective concentrates on the synchronic (contemporaneous) aspect of language in the sense that it contemplates all three types of verbal structures as present and relevant for the organisation of language in any experienced culture right now. I will argue that each of the types of verbal structures described by Frye (Vico), ideally, corresponds to legitimate language in the three views of reality proposed: metaphoric language is legitimate in the pagan/primitive view; metonymic language in the Eastern/mystic view; and demotic language in the Western/Christian view. Empirically, though, either of them can be observed to be only prevalently legitimate in various cultural settings, as they co-exist in mutual complementarity and dependence on each other.

Following Vico's typology of distinct ages in a conception of history that is cyclical, Frye describes a typology of prevalent verbal structures throughout Western history which has already dropped Vico's historicist structure. Nevertheless, while Frye's idea of history is not cyclical in a determinist fashion he borrows Vico's notion of *ricorso* to describe renewed ascendancy of any of the types of language that he describes:

> According to Vico, there are three ages in a cycle of history: a mythical age, or age of the gods; a heroic age, or age of an aristocracy; and an age of the people, after which there comes a *ricorso* or return that starts the whole

> process over again. Each age produces its own kind of *langage*, giving us three types of verbal expression that Vico calls, respectively, the poetic, the heroic or noble, and the vulgar, and which I shall call the hieroglyphic, the hieratic, and the demotic. (Frye 1982:5)

What Frye means by the use of this "cyclical" typology of pre-eminent language is to say that these types of verbal structures are always present in any community of human beings, and that the particular life of the group brings either of them to ascendancy in their cultural relevant exchanges. Even though Frye regards progressive accounts of history as the mythical expectation that "contemporary events are proceeding towards their own antitypes in the future, toward a state of human existence that will make what is now happening intelligible as a series of signposts pointing in that direction" (1982:86); he cannot evade to take on board a similar Spencerian view of progress as gradual differentiation and complexification when it comes to the issue of the gradual emergence of human consciousness and communication. Even if history and nature cannot be mixed in our tradition, there is a cosmological point in the past when they are supposed to have bifurcated. This point will be dealt with at length in the second part of the thesis. As I have argued, though, the idea of evolution and progress is so persistent because it is already a constitutive aspect of our conception of how history unfolds and it is also confirmed in the empirical observation of biological development.

Nevertheless, Frye also assumes that people live in mythology even now and have done so since the beginning of times, or since there has been discernible human interaction and communication. "In its early stages", says Frye, "it is difficult to separate or distinguish the various aspects of mythology, but as society becomes more complex, different areas of culture --literature, religion, philosophy, history, science, art-- become increasingly distinct from one another" (1982:51). From a synchronic standpoint, though, we can say that it is important for our modern culture to separate and record in a discursive and descriptive fashion all these different areas of interaction and so we look for this differentiated feature in the past and we do not find it because it might not have been important to our ancestors. When we look at the past to find out what was relevant for people then, we always have to do it through what is relevant for us now. The sense in which Frye refers to mythology, in a generic manner is as *mythos*, narrative, plot, or the general sequential ordering of

words; but he also distinguishes the more archaic type of myth, (story or tale) from history:

> In our culture, some narrative dealing with personalities run parallel to a sequence of events external to themselves; others are based on a sequence of events that seem to be constructed for its own sake. This distinction is reflected in the difference between the words "history" and "story". The word "myth" [...] has tended to become attached only to the latter, and hence to mean "not really true". This is a vulgarism for many reasons, apart from the fact that it so often assumes a judgement on factuality long before we are in any position to make one. (Frye 1982:32)

Frye also considers that, in history, the sequence of events is only partly external to the narrative about personalities --its account obeys a factuality sanctioned by discipline practice-- but it is also linked to substantive rationality, to values, to what is important for the discipline to know (see Weber 1949). Data must be selected and arranged subjectively by a historian and therefore the shape of the sequence does not wholly come from outside. According to Frye, to think that it does is "an illusion of projection".

Going back to Frye's typology of verbal structures, then, I will say that our particular contemporary modern "mythology" compels us to interact through objective reality. In this reality, the separation of object and subject is relevant to our culture and our discipline in scientific disquisition and it is therefore a relevant category in order to investigate verbal structures in other mythologies (where the factual may have a degree of relevance that may not be pre-eminent). However, in the synchronic awareness that a complete separation between subject and object is impossible, the clear divide between subject and object becomes an illusion of abstraction that lacks factuality. This does not make it into a myth in Frye's story-for-its-own- sake sense, but it makes us aware that it is a principle of disciplined observation for the sake of the discipline. The myth of objectivity is an unattainable ideal that sets the whole discipline rolling in its structurally progressive fashion: its progress depends on the human impossibility of achieving complete objectivity. However, the subject/object divide is our cultural inheritance and our cosmological basis to access other types of cultural inheritances. From the present perspective of an observer who stands on uncertainty in the synchronic moment of meaningful interaction, objectivity and subjectivity are entwined experiences that cannot be

differentiated at the same time as they are experienced: according to the phenomenological approach, they can only be differentiated one at a time in diachronic sequence.

Nevertheless, sequential signification (diachrony) achieves its meaning through the simultaneous presence of an essential net of references (synchrony) with paradigmatic and syntactic functions. Within this Sassurean framework, Anthony Wilden (1972) describes the difference between analog and digital communication: the former conveys the message through an operation of similarity or contiguity, while the latter conveys the message through arbitrary signifiers based on custom and convention. Analog and digital communication are cybernetic terms that illustrate the difference between synchrony and diachrony: analog implies a continuum and digital involves yes/no computations (conveyed in the binary code of one and zero in computers). In analog communication the message is concretely 'performed', the distinction flows from the centre of the meaningful object of communication and therefore its borders are not identifiable; in digital communication the message is 'signified' this requires discrete and clearly defined boundaries at the borders of the objects of communication. This is the basis for Wilden's distinction between *meaning* and *signification*: analog communication is engaged with *meaning* through similarity and contiguity, and digital communication is engaged in factual *signification* through abstract identity. Nevertheless, digital communication is useless on its own, signification depends on meaning through similarity and contiguity of signifiers --their paradigmatic and syntactic synchronic functions. Wilden believes that the analog/digital distinction helps us clarify scientifically the difference between meaning and signification: He gives a mathematical example, where 2/3 and 4/6 are identical in signification whereas their meaning is necessarily different due to the distinct referents used. Meaning is thus related to concrete interaction between embodied entities in the domain of symbolic exchange, while signification belongs to the realm of pure abstraction. Nevertheless, while the distinction is useful, it is never complete except in imagination or in the abstract world of digital diachronic communication. This is illustrated by the difficulty that Wilden expresses in order to define a line between analog and digital signification; thus, he allows for *signals* and *signs* in analog communication and for

signs and *signifiers* in digital communication (Wilden 1972:184). Here, *signals* refer to physical and embodied messages that may be symbolic of concrete referents; *signs* are symbolic, but related to relevant referents that may be concrete or abstract; and *signifiers* are wholly abstract and arbitrary, and correspond to the world described as an image in a mirror corresponds to what is reflected.

Analog and digital communication are similar to the synchronic and diachronic realms of time in that they refer to the distinction between simultaneity and sequentiality; but this is a convenient distinction for heuristic reasons in abstract explanation. In abstract explanation, though, the borders of the objects of communication are clearly defined, but in phenomenological observation, these borders are blurry and not really there. This paradoxical predicament will arise all through this work in order to highlight the synchronic realm of experience, and it is a structural feature of the way in which I use Frye's typology of verbal structures; which he means to extend throughout Western history (diachronically) and I mean to map onto ideal types of contemporary views of reality (synchronically). Frye's hieroglyphic, hieratic, and demotic periods are relevant in Western/Christian diachronic history; which I identify with my ideal-typical views of reality that are relevant to contemporary synchronic world interaction right now: pagan/primitive, Eastern/mystic, and Western/Christian respectively.

Frye identifies a clear hieroglyphic (pagan/primitive) period in the poetic language of most Greek literature before Plato, in the pre-Biblical cultures of the Near East, and in much of the Old Testament. He uses the term "hieroglyphic",

> not in the sense of sign-writing, but in the sense of using words as particular kinds of signs. In this period there is relatively little emphasis on a clear separation between subject and object: the emphasis falls rather on the feeling that subject and object are linked by a common power or energy. Many "primitive" societies have words expressing this common energy of human personality and natural environment, which are untranslatable into our normal categories of thought but are very pervasive in theirs: the best known is the Melanesian word *mana*. (Frye 1982:6)

But words refer to concrete things, to physical and emotional involvement with them in imaginative production of stories that, on their own, are a human mimicry of relevant experience in connection to embodiment and the world. The relevant feature

of this type of verbal structure is the metaphor that we recognise as such from our own cultural perspective.

> As we think of words, it is only metaphor that can express in language the sense of energy common to subject and object. The central expression of metaphor is the "god", the being who, as sun-god, war-god, sea-god, or whatever, identifies a form of personality with an aspect of nature. (Frye 1982:7)

Metaphors work by similarities and, in factual language, they are analogous to Wilden's linguistic *signals*; where the message is contained in what is physically done and concretely experienced.

Frye's second phase of language is hieratic, whose verbal structures are congenial with those in my Eastern/mystic ideal type. The hieratic phase starts with Plato and its name comes from the explicit assumption that this language is produced by an enlightened elite of the post-axial age type and is therefore given a special authority by its society. Here, subject and object become more clearly separated, not necessarily with respect to factuality, but with respect to a separation between emotion and imagination. In Western culture, this gradually lead to the ascendancy of intellectual and rational imagination, tied to observation of the phenomenal world; but the Eastern hieratic forms of verbal expression are structurally displaced from conceiving the world as a reliable source of evidence. In hieratic verbal structures, abstraction becomes possible through separation between feelings and imagination and this defines clear distinction between valid and invalid relationships between them:

> What Homeric heroes revolve in their bosoms is an inseparable mixture of thought and feeling; what Socrates demonstrates, more especially in his death, is the superior penetration of thought when it is in command of feeling. (Frye 1982:7)

This separation is produced by awareness of a reality that lies above and beyond mundane life; the emergence of hieratic verbal structures is determined by symbolisation of transcendence. This symbolisation depends on language that is mainly metonymic to define distinction, in contrast to metaphor which defines identity. Words must convey an order that cannot be described through identity of a common energy between things and the inner reality of human, but through a transcendent order that is above and beyond. "Thus", says Frye, "metonymic

language is, or tends to become, analogical language, a verbal imitation of a reality beyond itself that can be conveyed most directly by words" (1982:8). Nevertheless, hieratic language benefits from the use of metaphoric structures, already embedded in people's emotion and imagination, in order to perform relevant metonymic distinctions where the latter have primary authority, as in the use of fables, parables, or allegory; or in synchretic assimilation of local goddesses and gods into a transcendental cosmology. Metonymy is analogous to Wilden's portrayal of *signs*.

The present phase of culturally ascendant demotic language --Frye's third phase-- contains the whole development of Western verbal structures up to our modern present: the paradigmatic and syntactic need of both metaphor and metonymy to describe and demonstrate factual 'objective' knowledge. Mathematics, Frye tells us, has obvious metonymic features: when we draw a line, "which necessarily has some breath" (1982:9), we are really only putting a drawing in the place of the conceptual line, which cannot 'exist' in concrete physical reality because it represents the concept of length without breadth.

> One feels that some of the pre-Socratic and atomic philosophers, such as Anaxagoras or Democritus, were moving more directly from metaphor toward what we should think of as science, from gods to the operations of nature, and that Plato turns away from this direction, toward a transcendent world rather than an objective one. (Frye 1982:9)

But objectivity is a mixture of both of these sources (metaphorical and metonymic) that only needed the Aristotelian theory of multiple causation to produce a technique "for arranging words to make a conquering march across reality, subjects pursuing objects through all the obstacles of predicates, as the Macedonian phalanxes of his pupil, Alexander, marched across Asia" (Frye 1982:9). Plato's sense for a superior transcendental order which could only be conveyed by words was identified as *logos* in the later Classical period. In Christianity *logos* was seen as the means to unite humanity both 'spiritually and temporally', which gave shape to its institutional structure. A distinct sense of history in Biblical cultures is inherited from the importance of historical interpretation in Judaism, which merged with the power of sequential disquisition based on legitimate evidence of 'compelling assent'. This is the basis for the legitimacy of diachronic symbols in the Western/Christian idea of reality.

In distinguishing symbols phenomenologically, we may say that Eastern/mystic and pagan/primitive symbols have an intrinsic sense of immediateness: metaphor and metonymy work through similarity and contiguity respectively. The metaphorical function is analogous to that of a *signal*, where what is done is what is meant. The degree of abstraction that the metonymic function acquires is directly related to an ordering of thoughts and emotions through categories of validity; it is analogous to linguistic *signs*: the message itself is what is meant. There are metonymic elements in Habermas's love for perlocutions, where all affectual tendencies to falseness and manipulation should be firmly controlled by rationality (Habermas 1989, 1990); but also in the Buddhist use of contradictory statements (*koans*), which should effect a spontaneous dissolution of emotional attachment to concepts in the pupil. Both metaphor and metonymy imply the involvement of physical, emotional, and imaginary human experience in the conveying meaning; but in factual description, the word used has only an imaginary relationship to the denoted thing. The degree of abstraction in the descriptive function is complete: the *signifier* is an arbitrary symbol that stands wholly for the signified (Wilden 1972, Merquior 1986). Objectivity depends on the pre-eminence of this function of language where the absence of emotional involvement is compensated by the factuality rendered by concrete evidence and sequential argumentation. It is less evident, though, that objectivity also depends on metaphoric and metonymic verbal structures to be grounded in anything at all (see Lakoff & Johnson 1980).

Our current responsiveness to factual reality, however, is firmly based on the belief that, in descriptive-demotic language, isolated words are signifiers, or pure arbitrary abstractions that have no *magic* power of their own or a shared substance with the signified. The scientific factual and functional power, to us, lies in the internal coherence of substantiated rational disquisition, where the substance is concrete experience of effective functionality. One of the premises of scientific disquisition is that the isolated word has no power to be anything but a word; but the verbal structure that is built through them must convey the order of nature. The inner coherence in scientific explanation must map onto, or 'mirror', what we can experience physically (see Rorty 1980). Its *magic* is the confirmation of the proposed

scientific mechanism through repetitive testing. Poetry embraces the emotional role of *magic* in the Western tradition of knowledge, but it is based on novelty, contrary to the repetitive essence of the magic spell[12]. "Poetry", says Frye, "does not really lose its magical power thereby [through novelty], but merely transfers it from an action on nature to an action on the reader or the hearer" (1982:25). Thus scientific factual *magic* is based in systems of words of coherent explanation that may be reproduced, and not in repetition of isolated *magic* words[13]. Frye gives the example that in Biblical metonymic language, where we assume that the Word is analogous to God or His power, John's statement "And the *logos* became flesh", according to the internal structure of Christian assumptions, is "an intelligible statement of the type "And the boy became a man", or "And the ice became water". But within a descriptive framework of language it can be only an unintelligible statement of the type "And the apple became an orange"." (Frye 1982:18-9).

Nevertheless, as I have argued above, even if the descriptive type of verbal structure is accorded pre-eminent objective validity because of effective explanation of sequential diachronic causality, the inner coherence of the scientific account itself depends on the analogical functions of metaphor and metonymy, which are eminently synchronic. In the hieroglyphic phase (pagan/primitive), words and things are entwined by a common powerful 'substance' or energy inherent in the natural order, miming that order in ritual produces relevant synchronic enacted events according to which order is 'mapped' and produced at the same time. In the hieratic phase (Eastern/mystic), the sense for a synchronic experienced awe for divinity becomes part of the cosmological account of a higher reality as transcendence, and how the inner coherence of a verbal structure can convey this reality.

> Hence the medieval fascination with the syllogism and the great medieval dream of deducing all knowledge from the premises of revelation. Later we have the "I think therefore I am" of Descartes, where the operative word is

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[12] Some socially detrimental effects of the dark side of a perverted kind of poetry are generally abducted by the industry of entertainment/advertisement, which, through sheer mechanical repetition --equivalent to the 'evil eye' of the primitive spell-- contemporarily engrave our vulnerable minds that run after desire with patterns that may enslave and obsess. In transcendentalist spiritual disciplines the *magic* repetitive power is 'purified' in the direction of transcendence by its invocation in mantras and prayers.

[13] Although science has revealed the wonders of the natural world, Frye says that "there is a curious restiveness about this kind of revelation, some feeling of what Blake calls "the same dull round, even of a universe". What is dull is not the universe but the mental operations prescribed for us in observing it" (1982:21).

> "therefore", because before we can accept the proposition we must accept the cogency and reality of therefores. (Frye 1982:11)

Non-verbal oriental Mysticism and the Western mystic tradition emphasise the inadequacies of any type of verbal account to convey the experience of transcendence in hierophany (Sogyal 1992, Kulananda 1997, Underhill 1995). According to Frye, in the Dawning of European culture transcendental metonymy, or hieratic language, remained culturally ascendant[14] due to the cultural and political necessity of preserving authority "down to the time of Kant and Hegel, after which it became increasingly specialised and academic. One of its culminating points is the metonymic universe of Kant, where the phenomenal world is "put for" the world of things in themselves" (Frye 1982:12). Our sense for descriptive factual reality is rooted in the metaphoric and the metonymic functions of language, and is also rooted in the physical and psychological involvement of the observer.

As described above, the cultural ascendancy of any of the three types of verbal structures --metaphoric, metonymic, descriptive-- are shown to coincide with Vico's and Frye's three phases of language in Western history of development; but also with their pre-eminence in my three types of ideas of reality --pagan/primitive, Eastern/mystic, Western/Christian-- in contemporary interaction in the world. Nevertheless, as in the ideas of reality, the verbal structures are complementary with each other and do not exist purely on their own --at least in current world-interaction. To say that either of the functions emerged earlier that any other, I believe, is an illusion of the idea of 'progress' in its teleological story-myth mode. But this myth is already relevant to our way of knowing and of doing history and, in this factual way of knowing, even if we concede that the other verbal structures were already functionally present in human language from the beginning, their cultural ascendancy is liable to be traced historically. This does not mean that there is necessarily a linear progress, or a cyclical one like in Vico, but to use Vico's figure of *ricorso* as Frye does, shows that they achieve different degrees of pre-eminence in different distinctive times throughout history. It also depends on what culture we are analysing and what the verbal structure expresses in the particular social hierarchy of

[14] In spite of the simultaneous rise of a vernacular *ricorso* of metaphoric verbal structures in popular rhyme and alliteration.

that culture. On this point, Frye's phases refer to the view of order that emanates from the centres of legitimate authority that both discover and produce knowledge about 'reality' at the same time; from my synchronic perspective, these verbal structures refer to the view of order that may emanate from any group of people in the simultaneous process of creating and being created by their culture (family, team, tribal, organisational, national, continental, global).

Legitimation, therefore, is linked to the culturally ascendant idea of reality in that the latter determines the type of verbal structures that produce the authoritative shape of concrete human organisation. Institutions (religion, spirituality, ritual, discipline, moral principles) acquire an aura of distance from concrete organisation in that institutions dictate an authoritative idea about patterns of behaviour for the human self (human identity). With respect to my three ideal types of reality, the culturally ascendant institutions dictate an idea of self that is ideally collective for the pagan/primitive and the Eastern/mystic type, and one that is ideally individual for the Western/Christian type. This is due to the feature that both the pagan/primitive and Eastern/mystic views are based on an idea of reality that is whole: *either* the world *or* transcendence are the locus of holistic reality respectively; while in the Western/Christian view *both* the world *and* transcendence are real simultaneously and therefore reality is conceived as essentially divided and in a quest for unification with a beginning and an end in Christianity, but that becomes linear and indefinite progress in the secular West. *Institutionally*, then, the locus of legitimacy lies on the synchronic realm of time for the pagan/primitive and Eastern/mystic views of reality, while the locus of legitimacy for the Western/Christian view lies on the diachronic realm. Nevertheless, *organisationally*, in concrete human experience, both synchrony and diachrony are given sense and representation and, as I will argue in the second part of the thesis, are mutually dependent features of concrete human life (even if either of them is seen as irrelevant or illusory in the domain of institutional legitimacy).

The centripetal/synchronic organisational functions are expressed in metaphor and metonymy --the paradigmatic and syntactic functions of language (Jakobson 1956, Wilden 1972)--, the centrifugal/diachronic organisational functions are expressed in the descriptive function of language. Frye illustrates the two

functions in language through two ways of half-reading or misunderstanding a subject, a technical treatise, or a cultural *Gestalt*. One is through incomplete knowledge of referents, as when reading in a language that we know imperfectly; the other is when the organised effort to unify the referents syntactically is poor: "Failure to grasp centrifugal meaning is incomplete reading; failure to grasp centripetal meaning is incompetent reading" (Frye 1982:58). This is an example of pure types with heuristic objectives, in experience, incomplete and incompetent reading are obviously linked to each other. Nevertheless, it shows a relevant relationship between linguistic functions that also applies to the centripetal and centrifugal features of synchrony and diachrony in human order, or in the organisation of particular ideas of reality.

Organisationally speaking then, I have said that in the Western/Christian view of reality there are clear synchronic symbols of centripetal function, like the life of Jesus or the figure of transfiguration from darkness into light, or a distinctive sense for a human type of consciousness. But it is also true that, in this organisational sense, in the pagan/primitive and Eastern mystic views there are also diachronic symbols of centrifugal function, like sequence of events in the mythical tales and the spiritual progress of the mystic initiate. I will therefore argue that, beyond the institutional legitimacy of either of these kinds of symbols, it is necessary to consider the organisational factuality of both of them in a scientific spirit of enquiry. It would seem like this is an attempt that may be contradictory with the structure of our own discipline; but it will not be so from a present perspective that attempts to give legitimacy to the synchronic symbols that produce a distinct sense of ethos in the ideas of reality that are not culturally ascendant in world interaction today. It is only through an imaginative effort that this can be achieved in language; and its significance to global interaction lies precisely in highlighting how this distinctive ethos may contribute to the contemporary problematic and limitations of the modern sense of morality in global interaction. I believe that this effort is also substantiated by relatively recent scientific evidence (in this century's physics, mainly) that, after all, subject and object are not factually divided.

> The thought suggests itself that we may have completed a gigantic cycle of language from Homer's time, where the word evokes the thing, to our own day, where the thing evokes the word, and are now about to go around the

> cycle again, as we seem now to be confronted once again with an energy common to subject and object which can be expressed verbally only through some form of metaphor. (Frye 1982:15)

In the Western/Christian view of diachronic collective progress as cycles and "leaps of being", this image is very suggestive; but in the pagan/primitive and Eastern/mystic view of synchronic consciousness that legitimises itself in an ecstatic continuum of life/death or spiritual enlightenment, the thought suggests itself that collective progress might be a relevant myth as an illusion of factuality.

Chapter III.
Mythos and Historical Consciousness

This chapter explains the theoretical relationship between the pagan/primitive view of reality and the Western/Christian view of reality as well as the structure of their difference. In the Western tradition, it is generally assumed that progress takes place from primitivity to a *higher* form of Western civilised awareness; but it is not as common to consider how the Western development of a historical consciousness also depends on the emotional relevance of mythical reality, or *mythos*, as plot or narrative (Frye 1982). The Western idea of progress is related to myth as much as it is to transcendence within the Christian cosmos of reality. In secular history, myth remains the shape of sequential facticity, while transcendence is transformed into the eternal 'not yet' of the project of modernity. Their difference lies in the primitive awareness of the wholeness of the world (where 'beyond' is construed in terms of the world or 'other-world') and in its identification of life with death in a seamless flow, a continuum. In contrast to this, the Western view considers the beyond as a transcendence that exists in constant tension with the world within which a universal humanity progressively moves. Its cosmology, according to Eric Voegelin (1974), emerged through an imperial thrust that encompasses several cultures and is forced to discover or create its own sacred roots to existence (historiogenesis). I argue that, from a diachronic perspective, historical reality and mythical reality do not converge as their pre-eminent verbal structures cannot establish a dialogue: they are incommensurable with respect to each other in their sequential coherence, as is illustrated by the historical and fictional genres. Nevertheless, from a synchronic perspective (the present moment of awareness), they can be observed to overlap and complement each other in the course of interaction at a local level as well as at a global one.

Contemporary Western legitimate reality is structured by diachronic descriptive and factual symbols that embrace an emotional detachment from experience while pagan/primitive legitimate reality is structured imaginatively and emotionally in synchronic symbology, metaphorically expressed. There is a contrast between the modern production of artificiality and the primitive one: the former is

materially embodied in the city and its mechanical dependencies while the latter is embodied in cyclical ritual and cosmological dependencies. In modern Western experience, artificiality is construed as an actual and material distance from nature (to the extent to which human and nature may become estranged from each other), while in primitive experience nature is enacted as a container of human life. In what follows, I will contrast the origin of ideally-typical Western/Christian diachronic symbols leading to factual representation of universal human history with those of the ideally-typical pagan/primitive synchronic symbols that lead to diverse metaphoric representations of the embodied human relationship with the mysteries of life, sex, and death.

III. 1. Historical Reality

Both the Western/Christian and Eastern/mystic views of reality articulate and represent transcendence while the pagan/primitive one is articulated only with respect to the world, transcendence remains unexpressed explicitly. The symbolisation of transcendence conveyed a cosmological transformation as well as an organisational one where human order was to be aligned with the reality of the imagined transcendental realm. But this transformation took place alongside the need to justify imperial rule which, in the Western tradition is seen as historically transformed from cosmological kingdoms into the Christian ecumene. The immediacy of Apocalypse was solved institutionally by the church while its symbolisation of humanity as one "body" in faith produced the awareness and possible inclusion of other peoples through conversion. Both the Western and Eastern views of reality contemplate a transhistorical perspective from which an awareness of historicity may arise (discussed in the next chapter). But the pagan/primitive view of reality lacks such explicit realm, which is nevertheless 'lived' as an intuition in its ritual mimetic oneness with the cosmos. Historical reality is thus here portrayed as a consequence of the symbolisation of an experience of transcendence, which secular reality transforms into relevant symbols of individual consciousness and value.

The modern mind regards the primitive kind of tales as 'unreal' myths, and this is because lived experience of modern life does not confirm them as real:

> For us moderns, a myth is only a myth because we can no longer connect that time with the time of history as we write it, employing the critical method, nor can we connect mythical places with our geographical space. This is why the myth can no longer be an explanation; to exclude its etiological intention is the theme of all necessary demythologisation. But in losing its explanatory pretensions the myth reveals exploratory significance and its contribution to understanding, which we shall later call its symbolic function --that is to say, its power of discovering and revealing the bond of man and what he considers sacred. Paradoxical as it may seem, the myth when it is thus demythologised through contact with scientific history and elevated to the dignity of a symbol, is a dimension of modern thought. (Ricoeur 1967:5)

In other words, there is a dimension of modern thought that is also mythical, on which modern life is sustained. But the sequence of its story does not converge diachronically with any other particular myth --and yet it is an assumption of this thesis that various particular myths can only converge synchronically (in the present moment of awareness). Modern life, though, is sustained by taking an artificial distance from nature that can never be complete due to embodiment. As a matter of fact, most of the modern ethos is built on giving value to this distance which is also embedded in the secular Western view of reality and its accompanying rational myths, for example, that of objectivity. We have said before that any view of reality has its own cosmological myths and therefore, a mythical basis is not really the principle of differentiation between what I have called mythical reality and historical reality. Myths encompass whole universes which can only converge at present (in synchrony) because each tale follows the structural form allowed by the sequence of the tale (in diachrony) or by the particular cosmos that it shapes.

Therefore, what ideally differentiates the pagan/primitive view of reality from the Western/Christian and Eastern/mystic ones is that the former lacks a clear representation of transcendence. The cultures that managed to represent transcendence also produced a new axis on which social life would be organised. The explicit symbolisation of transcendence brought about organisational consequences in society. When the idea of transcendence was discovered (or created) a religious frame of order was set up, that would bring humanity closer to consciousness about this transcendental reality. In axial age civilisations, "there was a concomitant stress on the existence of a higher transcendental moral or metaphysical order which is beyond any given this- or other-worldly reality" (Eisenstadt 1982:296). The new awareness about universality and transcendence posed the problem of bridging the gap between the two levels of existence in human life, and therefore, also in the legitimate idea of social order. In post-axial age societies, the emergence of a new elite took place, the carrier of the new models of social order that institutionalised the perception of the basic tension between the transcendental and the mundane levels of existence. "Examples would include", says Eisenstadt, "the Jewish prophets and priests, the Greek philosophers and sophists, the Chinese Literati, the Hindu

Brahmins, the Buddhist Sangha [...]. It was the initial small nuclei of such groups of intellectuals that developed this new transcendental conceptions" (Eisenstadt 1982:298).

Cosmological kingdoms became empires in their drive to conquer. Their cosmology and emperor lied at their centre and organised them in an hierarchical imperial form, like the Chinese, Egyptian, Babylonian, and Assyrian empires. "A cosmological empire", says Voegelin, "is more than one type of political organisation among others. In its self-interpretation, imperial rule is the mediation of divine-cosmic order to the existence of man in society and history" (1974:93). This awareness of imperial order brought about the need to stabilise and legitimate its creation in historiogenesis, or historical speculation based on current pragmatic knowledge as well as in myths, symbols, beliefs, and values that contemplate an "extrapolation of pragmatic history toward its cosmic-divine point of origin" (Voegelin 1974:101). However, Voegelin also speaks about the role of imperial catastrophe, that produced the need to create order out of political chaos. According to him, the newer empires like the Persian, Macedonian, and Roman "originated, not in a ferocious will to conquer, but in the fatality of a power vacuum that attracted, and even sucked into itself, unused organisational force from the outside; it originated in circumstances beyond control rather than deliberate planning" (1974:117-8). The resulting society under empire held a mixture of values and beliefs that historiogenetic speculation had to take into account in order to base *ecumenic* history on a cosmic-divine origin[1]. This brought about what Voegelin calls *historiomachy* (See Voegelin 1974:109-113), the phenomenon of cultural

[1] Voegelin uses the term ecumene to signify humanity unified by awareness of each other through imperial expansion, which became a term to refer to unified humanity in the Christian cosmos. The imperial drive that is the root to Western supremacy is linked to an eclectic creation of human history that is based on pragmatic knowledge and evidence, but also on values and beliefs: "No single society, but the whole geographical and civilizational horizon of the Mediterranean and Near Eastern peoples, from the Atlantic to the Indus, becomes the theatre of pragmatic history. This new phenomenon requires a new terminology, for one can no longer speak of societies and their order when the events converge toward their destruction. What takes their place is the ecumene. The term ecumene, which originally means no more than the inhabited world in the sense of cultural geography, has received through Polybius the technical meaning of the peoples who are drawn into the process of imperial expansion. On this Polybian stratum of meaning could later be superimposed the meaning of the mankind under Roman Jurisdiction (Luke 2:1; Acts 17:6; 24:5), and ultimately of the messianic world to come (Heb. 2:5)" (Voegelin 1974:124).

competition for the historical tale that was most relevant for the human extended group now forming the ecumene:

> When the older cosmological empires were conquered by the ascending ecumenic empires, a new constellation of problems formed, for the older symbolisms, though they continued to be cultivated, were now forced into competition with one another for ecumenically representative rank. (Voegelin 1974:109)

These movements in social organisation transform the general understanding of human nature: The qualitative jumps from tribal society, to city-state, to empire produced a differentiated consciousness of the human self and the symbology of the sacred origin of a kind of order that is shared by all human beings. "Through the hard reality of empire, there begins to shine forth, as the subject of history, a universal mankind under God" (Voegelin 1974:95). The Greek philosophers had developed a new style of universal truth, on the one hand, through their differentiation of noetic symbols that made intellectual speculation and knowledge possible beyond the compact symbols of mythic tradition, and on the other, through a unique Hellenic interest in making the whole of humankind the subject of history. Israel's own history is based on the exodus of Yahweh's 'chosen people' from a historical setting that enslaved them, into freedom reified in a sacred covenant with God. This produced the possibility of seeing cosmic-divine order as a direct relationship between God and the believer, not mediated by a cosmological emperor, but by universal law. Christianity, in its institutional drive to world-conversion, appropriated both the Jewish and the Greek sources into its dogma and gave shape to an extended concept of ecumene that encompassed all peoples and all epochs in progress to an eternal Heaven through history and Apocalypse:

> Setting aside the fact that Christian faith is by far not the only root of Western philosophy of history --Israel and Hellas also have something to do with it-- there still remains the hard fact that philosophy of history has indeed arisen in the West and nowhere *but* in the West. There is no such thing as a non-western philosophy of history. For a philosophy of history can arise only where mankind has become historical through existence in the present under God. Leaps in being, to be sure, have occurred elsewhere; but a Chinese personal existence under the cosmic *tao*, or an Indian personal existence in acosmistic illumination, is not an Israelite or Christian existence under God. While the Chinese and Indian societies have certainly gained the

> consciousness of universal humanity, only the Judeo-Christian response to revelation has achieved historical consciousness. (Voegelin 1954:23)

What Voegelin calls a "leap in being" is what I have referred to as the discovery and symbolisation of transcendental reality in a Western "style". While in the East this discovery was embraced as the only level of reality, regarding the world as an illusory effect of consciousness, a dream from which one awakens in spiritual Enlightenment; the West took both the world and transcendence to be real and arranged them in a progressive order with a beginning and an end for the whole of humanity in Genesis and Apocalypse. Beyond Christianity though, the secular West has generally been the recipient of a mixture of symbolisms that have mixed synchretically (Nederveen Pieterse 1994) and have expanded the frontiers of a beginning and a beyond incommensurably by an embodied mind. The embodied mind, the one that lives the relevance of the subject-object divide, conceives of its vastness abstractly and imagines it through infinite space. But this is the kind of infinite finiteness that Nishitani calls "bad infinity"; an artifice achieved by separating space and time in abstraction to produce awareness about the factual level of reality in a mechanistic cosmos that does not end and that displaces awareness of transcendental infinity to oblivion.

The effect of the discovery of transcendence in the West --and its relationship with the world-- produced a symbolism of time that made possible a projection of human existential concerns into the future. "The typological structure and shape of the Bible", says Frye, "make its mythology diachronic in contrast to the synchronic mythology characteristic of most of the religions outside it" (Frye 1982:83). Following Frye, the idea of causality was transformed from having effects horizontally, on the same temporal level of duration with respect to the past and renovation in the synchronic moment of the cyclical ritual; to a movement that was both horizontal and vertical in a diachronic "leap" that brought about the progressivist perspective of the development of collective embodied humanity as a *universal* humanity. But this "mechanism" could only come about in a culture that considered both the world and transcendence to be real in the present before God, while assuming that there was an imminent end of the world. This imminence in

primitive Christianity produced an everyday life expectation of death as an event that would be organised within a wider frame of the personal place in the sacred history of the human progress towards spiritual perfection.

The idea of imminent collective death through the horrors of Apocalypse was eventually "solved" or postponed by the Augustinian institutionalisation of the sacraments and their absorption and administration by the church as the "body" of Christ. Modernity transformed this Christian belief into progress towards ideal rational understanding and peaceful interaction between all human beings, and it framed this progress in universal human history with civilised rational interaction at the apex of the historical tale that it was creating. But the modern version of progress is in line with the Augustinian tale of collective spiritual progress:

> In Augustine, intellectual child of the Greeks as well as of the Jews, to this day preeminent theologian in Christian history, there are all the essential ingredients of the modern idea of progress: the vision of an unfolding cumulative advancement of the human race in time --a unified, single human race, be it emphasised-- a single time frame for all the peoples and epochs of the past and present, the conception of time as linear, single flow, the use of evolving stages and epochs in the history of humanity, belief in the necessary, as well as sacred character of mankind's history as set forth in the Old Testament, and, finally the envisagement of a future, distinctly utopian end of history when the saved would go to eternal heaven (Nisbet 1994:xiii).

However, various secular versions of this tale got rid of the spiritual element and found their own sense of reality in factual historicity. They situate their past and future in a purely mundane setting, ignoring that the qualitative jump into conception of human history was brought about by contrast to the discovery (or invention) of transcendence. The originally Christian idea of progress of humanity as one "body" towards spiritual perfection in history and Apocalypse became transformed into an experienced unfolding of time as "natural" evolution and indefinite linear factual history; as well as deformed into material capitalist and political *progress* of the nations with respect to the *Enlightened* ideals of modernity.

> The Gnosis of progress toward the reason of the eighteenth-century bourgeoisie, which Voltaire tried to substitute for the Augustinian *historia sacra*, could be applied to the interpretation of phenomena only under the condition that nobody would raise the fundamental question where and how the symbolism of an historical mankind had originated. (Voegelin 1954:16)

Modern universal human history kept the same shape of the Christian symbology without explicitly acknowledging it due to its rationalistic rejection of religion. It also kept its basic cosmological divide between world and transcendence that fetters the latter in superior imminence and relegates the world to an inferior kind of reality, as chaos that must be controlled.

III. 2. Mythical Reality

A kind of experience with various consequences for social order is the experience of being embodied as a specimen of the human race, either male or female, with a cultural personal story attached to embodiment. We differentiate this experience from mere animal experience through consciousness of the self; although there is no intellectual way of knowing the kind of consciousness that the other animal species (and living entities in general) have. But even though it may seem to us that our degree of consciousness about the self is more articulate than that of the rest of the animal kingdom, human beings are also animals. The contemplation of the self must take this into account in order to attempt a model of reality than can accommodate and value its own primitivity. From my contemporary synchronic perspective, the human being is seen as essentially primitive despite any level of civilisation. "[I]t apparently takes social scientists", says Frye, "much longer than poets or critics to realise that every mind is a primitive mind, whatever the varieties of social conditioning" (1982:37). I am using the Western concept, "primitivity", in order to point at a human characteristic that never left us, not even in modernity. Even if we either dress, trim, decorate and perfume our bodies, or deny them, we are still embodied. Sustaining our own embodied condition organises most of our activities throughout the day, and to abandon this mundane preoccupation is regarded as ascetic practice that seeks some kind of state where the body is not. The Western tradition assumes a bodiless kind of consciousness: abstraction that takes the position of the objective 'vantage point'; a necessary aspect of our methodology (ritual). But we must never overlook our own embodied existence --although this is easy in artificial environments-- because it is the source of our experience. Embodiment and the consciousness of self are intricately entwined, as expressed by cosmologies that have not symbolised transcendental reality explicitly.

The pagan/primitive view of reality, ideally fettered in the world, portrays synchronic time in the mimetic rituals of renovation and diachronic (sequential) time in the duration of the cycles that do not symbolise a transcendental "leap in being". The source of legitimation for this type of reality is synchronic cyclical renovation

where the entwinement of life and death are brought to practical consciousness (the kind of consciousness we share with animals, which will be discussed in the second part of this thesis). The primary experience of the cosmos is aware of an "intangible embracingness" that signals the simultaneous organic union of all things and is also practically aware of the dependence on collective human life for the integrity of individual embodiment. In this reality, the self that we relate to personally is thus conceived as a collective self. However, the synchronic experience of time is also an important organisational principle through contemporary modern interaction because its cosmology is sustained both in myth and in history at the same time and the people who interact through it are also already modern and still primitive simultaneously. Primitivity is closely related to the animality that the human animal embodies, even if the essence of human interaction is not conceived by us as purely animal. But, a human being cannot survive without primary knowledge; its practical consciousness about his/her own animality, which is here portrayed as the ideal-type pagan/primitive view of reality.

In the modern world, the quality of our daily life is quite dependent on the functionality of our urban artificial environments. Modern urban life may keep our attention from focusing on the extreme circumstances to which living in nature may produce; unless we observe nature as spectators within an artificial environment on which the modern person's life has come to depend (our cities, offices, houses, TV rooms). This life-style takes place within a view of reality of diachronic time and material 'progress' that modern people experience, but it is determined by the creation and maintenance of extreme artificial environments and descriptive factuality -- which can produce horror stories as well as naively optimistic ones. In the ideal-typical pagan/primitive view of reality, human life is *ideally* closer to the natural world and to embodiment, this also produces mythical tales and beliefs, yet their expression is eminently based on metaphoric verbal structures.

I will emphasise the notion of "death" as an experience that every embodied being can relate to as "certain fate", which is a cornerstone of social life in the primitive type of view of reality, and which the Western belief system *ideally* displaces from public life. My argument here will be that, although modernity has

managed to tame raw nature --to an extent-- in daily life, its dependence on the distance of human beings from nature displaces the immediate awareness of death from this way of living, and it becomes a neglected aspect of human reality in the realm of modern belief. Further, death becomes a dreaded ghost standing in the dark which modern people find quite difficult to incorporate into their view of reality. This contrasts with the pagan/primitive ability to incorporate this notion in everyday life through its extended pool of primary knowledge. Pagan/primitive archetypes and the cyclical conception of time as duration and renovation are based on the experience and contemplation of raw nature and embodiment, where life and death are intimately bound to each other[2]. Death, as the end of a life-cycle of an individually embodied human being, is one of the clearest situations in which a person --modern or primitive-- must unavoidably face raw nature, and it is important to consider how this experience (that of dying as well as that of seeing someone die) affects human consciousness and therefore, how it affects cultural creations or different kinds of knowledge. In order to do this it is important to clarify first how it is that time is conceived of, prior to a clear symbological representation of transcendence.

The conception of time in the ideal pagan/primitive view of reality is here organised around the idea of duration and renovation, following Mircea Eliade. He has argued that the primitive (he calls it archaic) idea of reality is manifested "as force, effectiveness, and duration. Hence the outstanding reality is the sacred; for only the sacred is in an absolute fashion, acts effectively, creates things, and makes them endure" (Eliade 1955:11). This accounts for what has been regarded as the pragmatic character of the primitive mind (see Radin 1953, Mumford 1967). Although the effect of sacred ritual is experienced as finite, its reality is rooted in the constancy of the natural cycles that are symbolised in an enacted renewal and repetition of cosmogony. The temporal duration of experienced effectiveness is made

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[2] These archetypes have been related to fertility rituals of Neolithic origin (see Levy 1948). But the primitive roots of symbology in the shape of the cycle of life and death remain present in transcendental notions: a Beginning and a Beyond in Christianity or the endless circle of birth and rebirth in the East. The transcendental "leap in being" is organised either around the notion of a collective humanity or with respect to that of the individual life-span of a human being that seeks spiritual Enlightenment (see chapter IV below)

real by the lived and enacted ritual of renovation. In a social context, this acquires the ritual cyclical characteristics of constant renewal of life in the world, which cannot make do without constant representation of death as a necessary step for renovation of life.

However, as Ricoeur has argued (1967), before symbolisation of transcendence, primitivity must also have already been physically conscious of separation. To Ricoeur, their myths signified a plenitude that was only "*aimed at*" in symbolical intention, to him, in symbology, unity is only an intuition "from which man is not separated" (1967:167); while the phenomenologists of religion (Ricoeur mentions Eliade, Van der Leeuw and Leenhardt) believe that primitivity is an experience of indivisible plenitude where nature and psyche have not yet been separated. I will argue that Ricoeur's point must be considered seriously because primitivity, as undifferentiated experience, is a kind of 'unconsciousness' that is given a romantic essence of continuous harmony and plenitude. However, moving away from Ricoeur's line of argumentation, I will also argue that while the collective union in plenitude is not a constant experience, it *is* experienced in primitive mimetic ritual, and this experience and its symbolisation informs the rest of the diachronic experience of time as duration (with no explicit "leap in being"). In primitivity, it is transcendence which is only an intuition, plenitude (embodied and enacted awareness of simultaneity) is cyclically lived in mimesis with the environment during sacred festivity, and in the experience of magic.

Magic may be construed as real only in myth or explained away by an observer as sham or as contingent coincidence of ritual with expected events; but it is experienced as real by the participants and this experience informs their daily view of reality. The ideally-typical pagan/primitive view of reality is experientially linked to both sides of temporality: one of duration where everyday life and functionality takes place, and one of renovation and unity in the psychological and mimetic effect of natural cycles in bodily rhythms (life, sex, death), magic, festivities, and sacred ritual in the participant. According to Paz, the religious festivity is much more than just a date or an anniversary: "It does not celebrate, but reproduces an event: it opens up into two the chronometrical time so that, during some incommensurable hours, the

eternal present reinstates itself. The festivity makes time creative. Repetition becomes the act of conceiving" (Paz 1993:228)[3], and he compares this primitive instant to that of poetic creativity. Legitimation for this view of reality lies on the realm of unity, experienced as collective meaningful synchronic pauses in the continuum of time[4]. In primary accounts of reality, life and death are not as clearly differentiated from each other as in the modern perspective, they are entwined: life gives rise to death and death to life. This is one of the most important pragmatic teachings that the moderns can obtain from the pagan/primitive world-view: the experience of being alive as an individual embodied entity is also the constant experience and contemplation of death in public interaction around the mysterious experience of life/sex/death.

In a primary awareness of reality, the individual entity is not regarded as important as in the Western one. As transcendence is not made articulate, the abstract-ideal individuality of a living human on his/her own is not as relevant. Awareness of the cycles of life and death of the whole group sustains awareness of the relevance of an extended collective self. But this collective self emerges from individual consciousness, which is an important side of the constant creation of culture. Following Anthony Cohen, individuality (as opposed to individualism) is a biological and psychological fact, it is a pragmatic feature of being alive and embodied; but in primary awareness of self, individuality is endured: survival of individual entities depends on the survival of the group --and this is a human fact that often escapes the awareness of the individualistic modern mind. In ideal primitive reality, a cyclical relationship is established between individual self and collective

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[3] "*La Fiesta es algo más que una fecha o un aniversario. No celebra, sino reproduce un suceso: abre en dos al tiempo cronométrico para que, por espacio de unas breves horas inconmesurables, el presente eterno se reinstale. La fiesta vuelve creador al tiempo. La repetición se vuelve concepción*" (Paz 1993:228)

[4] Yet it is important to stress at this point the need to contemplate the pagan/primitive view of reality also as part of present modern life in a colonised fashion. I have said that it is a myth of our times --of the cosmological kind-- that the modern person has left her/his primitivity behind. Primitivity is not part of our irretrievable past. It may have manifestations that may appear to be crude and horrible to conceptions of reality that conceive of transcendence or morality; but it also constantly manifests itself in beautiful and fresh creativity and spontaneity, one that has not been tamed by the rigours of formality. In colonised primitivity, the sacred rituals of renovation may become systematic and trivial breaks in the continuity of time, or mere chores of non-sacred, disenchanted functionality --especially in highly artificial environments--, but they nonetheless mark the rhythms of life and reality.

self, the former providing spontaneity and creativity, and the latter providing experience of the cosmic reality[5]. The collective life of the human group compensates for the embodied separation of the living entity. The inner longing for wholeness of human existence is not translated consciously into transcendence, but into ritual worship that brings about awareness of organic union between the members of the collectivity and of the constant flow of the cycles of life and death.

In the pagan/primitive view of reality, there is an experienced relationship between life and death and the discipline of enduring embodiment through a kind of work that crude natural circumstances impose[6]. We, as modern individuals, can afford to ignore the need for this kind of existence in extreme natural circumstances because we have created artificial environments (cities) that help us forget about (or deny) our embodied condition (and gives us a vantage point from which a typically Western intention arises to save less fortunate human beings from their primitive condition). However, nature catches up with us at the moment of individual death: it reminds us of our own embodied individual existence, our futility in human history.

> In the progressivist intoxication of the eighteenth century Kant raised the sober question what interest a generation of man at any given time could have in the progress of mankind toward a cosmopolitan realm of reason. Even if a man should consider the labors of his life a step of mankind toward perfection, the fruits of his labors would be enjoyed by men of a distant future. Hence, the meaning of history is not the answer to the question of meaning in the life of man (Voegelin 1954:4)

The symbolism of personal efforts in the modern view of reality is either framed within the Western myth of personal success (Berman 1992, Maturana and Verden-

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[5] In his book *Self Consciousness,* Cohen argues that there is a common anthropological mistake in assuming that cultures determine the individual selves of their members, and he suggests that it is more like a dance: "I think of society and the self", says Cohen, "as dancing an improvised *pas de deux*: each tries to cover the moves of the other; sometimes they merge, at others they separate" (Cohen1994:71).

[6] Although modern life in the cities is artificial enough for us to be able to ignore the natural cycles of the earth (besides, maybe, concern about the weather), and this artificiality may also dull perception of the personal cycles of being embodied; perception of the need for work to survive is very much alive. Yet the need for work is perceived to be created by the social system, which organises work in the most differentiated environments. But when an intricate social system is absent, raw nature demands work and constantly improvised creativity for the human collectivities to survive. An important part of the Marxist cosmology is based on observation of this pragmatic feature of human experience.

Zöler 1995) and diluted in human history, or denied a place in any kind of cultural representation of togetherness beyond the family circle (which tends to shrink in the West). In these cultural circumstances a late awareness of death in the moment of personally facing it may be faced with horror after a life-time of individual assertion.

Primitive experience of embodiment organises social interaction around perception of the natural cycles (of the earth as well as of the human self: birth, sex, and death), and represents them in metaphorical stories, symbols, and myths. These stories have human archetypes that belong to the collectivity; they portray collective emotion --attraction and aversion-- and, at the same time, are part of every embodied human in awareness of the collective self. The power contained in both greatness and lowliness of these archetypes symbolises cyclical movements of constant creation, destruction, and renewal, which finds its prototypical perfection in the imagined very first act of creation in *illo tempore* (Eliade 1955:4). Octavio Paz, evoking Van der Leeuw (1940), says that this prototypical beginning, "contains all beginnings and introduces us in the time that is alive, where everything really begins at every instant. By virtue of the ritual that realises and reproduces the mythical tale, that of poetry and of fairy tales, man enters a world where all the contraries merge into each other" (Paz 1993:229)[7]. But this kind of power is also contained in human awareness of creativity, of collective life that produces symbols as a means of self-representation. In primitive awareness this self is collective, and therefore its power of creation belongs to every embodied entity alike. The link between the unborn, the living, and the dead is an organic and spiritual continuum; and therefore, also the link between the mortals and the gods. In this view of reality, history –the realm of the past and the future beyond the life-death cycle-- is unimportant. As Paz says:

> Mythical time, contrary [to chronometric time], is not a homogeneous succession of equal quantities, rather, it is impregnated with all the particularities of our life: it is as long as eternity or as brief as a sigh, inauspicious or propitious, fertile or barren. This notion admits the existence

[7] *"contiene todos los principios y nos introduce en el tiempo vivo, en donde deveras todo principia todos los instantes. Por virtud del rito que realiza y reproduce el relato mítico, de la poesía y del cuento de hadas, el hombre accede a un mundo donde los contrarios se funden"* (Paz 1993:229).

> of a plurality of times. Time and life merge and form a single block, a unity, impossible to split. (Paz 1993:228)[8]

Ritual sacred celebrations --and the mysteries they bring to the fore (sex, life, death)-- make it possible in this ideal view to produce human awareness organised around the celebration itself. Human imagination constantly portrays this consciousness emotionally in immensely diverse and particular tales and myths that "stand for" somatic mundane human experience. The pre-eminent feature of the tales is their metaphoric verbal structure that express synchronic similarities between emotion and imagination in ecstatic ritual and somatic exploration of the mysteries of consciousness; here Frye's hieroglyphic language is culturally ascendant[9]. "The intracosmic areas of reality, one may say, provide one another with analogies of being whose cosmological validity derives from the experience of an underlying intangible embracingness, from a something that can provide existence, consubstantiality, and order to all areas of reality even though it does not itself belong as an existent thing to any one of these areas" (Voegelin 1974:72). The absence of an explicit representation of "universe" allows these representations to coexist, merge, and reinvent themselves constantly in what in the West we would call a cross-cultural manner.

Although the principle of universality is not articulated explicitly in the primary experience of the cosmos, the experience of an "underlying intangible embracingness" accounts for its presence as intuition, in an "embryonic" form, even if it has not been differentiated and given a unifying symbol to represent it. Only when consciousness of transcendence has become a differentiated experience, then 'universe' is represented in abstraction.

> Obviously, the metaphysical concepts of the archaic world were not always formulated in theoretical language; but the symbol, the myth, the rite,

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[8] *"El tiempo mítico, al contrario [del tiempo cronométrico], no es una sucesión homogénea de cantidades iguales, sino que se halla impregnado de todas las particularidades de nuestra vida: es largo como una eternidad, o breve como un soplo, nefasto o propicio, fecundo o estéril. Esta noción admite la existencia de una pluralidad de tiempos. Tiempo y vida se funden y forman un solo bloque, una unidad imposible de escindir"* (Paz 1993:228).

[9] Synchronically speaking, from a contemporary perspective, this is observable in modern societies as pop sub-cultures, with the prefix 'sub-' because they lack legitimacy to order interaction. And yet, they inform the majority of people's cosmology in urban everyday life, or a vernacular view of reality, through the "not-really-true-life" realm of the industry of entertainment/advertisement.

> express, on different planes and through means proper to them, a complex system of coherent affirmations about the ultimate reality of things, a system that can be regarded as constituting a metaphysics. [...] It is useless to search archaic languages for the terms so laboriously created by the great philosophical traditions. [...] But if the word is lacking, the thing is present, only it is "said" --that is, revealed in a coherent fashion-- through symbols and myths (Eliade 1955:3).

In the absence of an explicit symbol for the human transcendental identity, 'universe' is not symbolised discursively but it is lived as an enactment of the organic union of everything that is alive and dies in ritual representations of the cosmos.

The best term that represents this kind of 'lived' ritual symbolisation is *mimesis*. This has generally been translated as 'imitation', but this notion does not wholly convey the unification in perception of symbol and experience in pagan/primitive ritual. "The term mimesis is chosen by Plato as the one most adequate to describe both re-enactment and also identification, and as one most applicable to the common psychology shared both by artist and by audience" (Havelock 1963:60). In his book *Preface to Plato*, Eric Havelock explains why it is that Plato in the *Republic* directed such an aggressive attack on the Greek tradition of poetic representation. Plato's axial hierophanic experience made him point the way to transcendent reality and, as discussed in the previous chapter, opened the door to what Frye describes as the hieratic phase of a culturally ascendant language dominated by metonymic verbal structures. Their pagan present was being rejected as a means of public education due to its inherent inability to represent universality; its inability to teach the discipline of separating emotion and imagination from lived experience to arrange them in an order that is congenial to the reality of transcendence. "Changes [in the cosmogony created by the 'primary experience of the cosmos']", says Voegelin, "can come only through noetic advances which let more compact symbols appear inadequate in the light of more differentiated experiences of reality and their symbolisation" (1974:71). From a contemporary perspective, the disciplined ability to perceive reality through a sophisticated system of differentiated symbols eventually brought about the 'observer' of the Western tradition: the capacity to appreciate art and religion as subjective aesthetic experience and science as an objective search for truth. This transformed Hesiod and the Homeric classical tales

into 'literature'; and yet they were produced by an oral and mimetic pagan cosmos of ritual; "Homer", says Auerbach "[...] knows no background. What he narrates is for the time being the only present, and fills both the stage and the reader's mind completely" (1953:4-5)

Mircea Eliade has argued that this kind of mimetic fusion of symbolisation and experience of cosmos is an archaic defence against the irreversibility of historical time:

> Insofar as he allows himself to be influenced by history, modern man feels himself diminished by the possibility of this impersonal survival. But interest in the "irreversible" and the "new" in history is a recent discovery in the life of humanity. On the contrary archaic humanity [...] defended itself to the utmost of its powers against all the novelty and irreversibility which history entails (Eliade 1955:48).

However, novelty and irreversibility can only be conceived of in an experience of time as progression towards some kind of transcendence; where the somatic experience of cyclical renovation is already irrelevant. This is either through spiritual experience of a different higher domain of eternal reality that lies beyond the changing nature of the earth and the body, or through abstract mythology. The former takes shape of faith and spiritual discipline, and the latter has created artificial environments --abstract and material-- of interaction, *systems*, that absorb the cyclical side of time and produce linear-time progression.

We have said that the transformation of Western cosmology into history has the same shape as the Augustinian cosmic tale with a beginning and a beyond through Apocalypse that has been secularised into social indefinite progress, either through the mythical consequences of 'social revolution', or through the myth of purposive human construction of rational institutions. However the transformed modern tale, based on global wealth expansion, has pushed aside the primitive fullness of life (but also consciousness about transcendence) without realising that its view of reality is based on the Christian displacement of transcendental reality into an eternally imminent realm that produces the linear time-progression. This produces an artificial reliance on descriptive abstraction as the only source of knowledge and relegates the organic root of human existence to a second-hand kind of reality.

In contrast to this, primitive awareness of the close relationship between life and death is sustained in collective synchronicity in mimetic ritual of an experienced organic background, and this produces an inarticulate trust in the union of all things. According to Voegelin, in this view of reality, "the cosmos is not a thing among others; it is the background of reality against which all existent things exist; it has reality in the mode of non-existence" (Voegelin 1974:72). But this trust in cosmology is not articulated as faith, it is an experienced reality that is lived in organic 'awareness', it is intuitively known as a characteristic of embodied humanity. Voegelin calls this knowledge the "primary experience of the cosmos", which embodied existence is unable to leave behind and which is often rediscovered in the midst of unspoilt nature:

> The cosmos of the primary experience is neither the external world of objects given to a subject of cognition, nor is it the world that has been created by a world-transcendent God. Rather, it is the whole, *to pan*, of an earth below and a heaven above --of celestial bodies and their movements; of seasonal changes; of fertility rhythms in plant and animal life; of human life, birth and death; and above all, as Thales still knew, it is a cosmos full of gods. [...] This togetherness and one-in-anotherness is the primary experience that must be called cosmic in the pregnant sense (Voegelin 1974:68-9).

It is quite significant that Voegelin uses the figure of pregnancy to describe the primary experience of the world of conscious humanity. The original human experience of wholeness, although inarticulate, can be described as the life of the foetus in the womb in organic union with the mother. Morris Berman says that "much of what we call mysticism today could be no more than a kind of bodily memory [of the time spent in the womb]" (1992:9).

The pagan/primitive view of reality conceives of this cyclical wholeness as the sacred provider of existence, and worships it accordingly. If we allow ourselves to slip into our modern --legitimate-diachronic-- and progressive conception of time, in the Spencerian sociological idea of progress as development from compact symbolism into differentiation (discussed in part two below); we can arbitrarily imagine how the primary experience of cosmos without factual representations would bring awareness of 'self' as the human community, and the 'other' as what lies outside it. Berman says that the original source of the contrast between the self and

the 'other' was animal otherness, and this awareness produced a sacred celebration of this relationship in the form of worshipping of totems (1992:49-90). The Palaeolithic representations that combine hunter's and artist's knowledge united the primary consciousness of those human groups with their whole body of ritual which brought the participant "to an exaltation of the ideal species unattainable by individual experience" (Levy 1948:42).

The archaic representation of the mysterious provision of life, sustenance, and death has been traced as evolving from totemic into anthropomorphic symbolisation (Levy 1949, Berman 1992). The divine source as human --divine human identity and experience-- has some initial representations as female, the life-provider, biologically based in the motherly womb; but also as scary warner-redeemer through death and the natural forces of destruction (Levy 1948, Clendinnen 1991, Leeming & Page 1994). An emotional and personal relationship is established with physically enjoyed care from the hands of a mother; but also with the suffered blemishes of infectious evil, the messengers of death --the initial symbolisations of defilement, according to Ricoeur (1967). Representations of the human divine source of embodiment are initially expressed as the female:

> It seems reasonable to imagine that the makers of those statuettes [female images of fertility] had also passed beyond the stage of localised relationship with the archetypal beasts [totems], to the conception of a pervading principle, not in this case their own creative power, but a life-substance through which that power could act, conceived already in the human form of maternal fecundity (Levy 1949:62).

The relationship with totems expanded and goddesses emerged in their human shape as sacred symbols of the experienced source of birth and embodiment --the mysterious "container" of human life. Embodiment can be seen as endured in awareness of bodily separation from one another, but also lived as organic-collective union with the world and experienced in mimetic ritual and social order (however small to our cosmopolitan awareness --the family, the tribe).

A primitive type of social order can be seen as a nexus between the unborn, the living, and the dead. In primary awareness, social order and embodiment are inextricably entwined, and in retrospective, we can give this concept (embodiment)

to the realisation of female as life-provider (and therefore also linked to death); inarticulate as such, yet explicit in the ritual worship of the female deity and in their metaphorical representations. "This anthropomorphic shape", says Levy, "marks a further stage in the clarifying of human personality, for before men can raise themselves above the animals they must perceive the divine in human form" (1948:63). In the collective consciousness of embodiment in the primary experience of the cosmos, the creative powers of the world and nature itself are acknowledged and lived as exalted characteristics of human experience.

> We must assume in principle that in the remote past the processes considered imitable included those in the sky. In dance, on other cultic occasions, such imitation could be produced, such similarity manipulated. But if the mimetic genius was really a life-determining force for ancients, it is not difficult to imagine that the new-born child was thought to be in full possession of this gift, and in particular to be perfectly moulded on the structure of cosmic being (Benjamin 1979:161)

It is important to bear in mind that, as Levy's portrayal highlights, we are dealing with personality and this is a particularly important Western symbol as it is used in our discipline of knowledge. The reality of the human personality is relevant as a source of legitimate factuality and responsible agency --the one that makes historical factuality possible at all. Factual personality is relevant to our discipline because this notion is an experienced feature of our view of reality, it is essential to our Western tradition of intellectual knowledge in order to organise references and factual evidence, it is moreover, an important feature of our consciousness of self. This does not mean that personality is not an experienced reality in other views of reality or other cultures and traditions, but that its individual factuality is not as relevant for those traditions; their (primary or spiritual) traditions of knowledge survive quite comfortably within the ambiguous verbal structures of prevalent metaphor and metonymy. As argued in the preceding chapter, it is important to appresent that the roots to our own discipline are tied to a mythology of progress if we are to produce an analytical methodology that is critical of itself. But this mythology is built around the importance conferred to diachronic experience of factual personality, the one that also organises legitimate rational institutions and political life.

What is gained by this type of mythology is an abstract unification of all peoples as "humanity" and its universal history. But if symbolisation of time as history and linear progression is the only one allowed, a sense of the spiritual value of the particular embodied individual existence is lost in factuality. This is why Eliade (1955) perceives the pagan/primitive synchronic conception of time as a 'defence' against the experience of diachrony in time. An ordered representation of history as factuality is part of the Christian tradition, which allows for disciplined perception of the irreversible and the new, the past and the future, and what it is that we keep selectively as relevant history (personal or universal). As we will see in the next chapter, this exercise entails a whole array of values that have evolved from Judaic-Christian dogma to modern principles and its sense for a universal kind of morality.

Chapter IV.
The "Leap in Being": Consciousness of Transcendence

In this chapter I explain the theoretical relationship between the Western/Christian view of reality and the Eastern/mystic view of reality as well as the structure of their difference. Their relationship is posed as the common awareness of a transhistorical realm that is conceived as transcendence. It is through this realm that consciousness of factual historicity is possible in both transcendentalist views of reality. Nevertheless, the structure of their difference is relevant to understand why the Eastern awareness of historical facticity never developed into a full philosophy of history, or into what the West conceives of as the historical consciousness of a universal humanity. Both types of cosmology contemplate the reality of a transhistorical realm, but while the Western tradition situates it in a "far side", a beyond, where the personality of God abides, the Eastern one places it in a "near side", a here-and-now, where the divine essence of human abides.

The difference between the Eastern, primitive, and Western views of reality can also be expressed in terms of different types of fault experienced which lead to an idealised self that tends either to the collective self (mystic and primitive), or to the individual self (Western). But the idealised individual self is logically displaced from reaching the "far side" transhistorical realm and the importance of personality and individuality is emphasised in the nihilistic awareness of this displacement. In contrast to this, the Eastern spiritual notion of Absolute emptiness provides a useful perspective in order to organise a methodology of phenomenological observation of different views of reality that are present at the same time, that is, synchronically. This can only be organised by consideration of a "near side" transhistorical realm as an ideal type of perspective --also present in our own Christian tradition-- that is equivalent to the typical God's eye view of the "far side" perspective. It is only through this that love and compassion as religious love can be brought to the fore at the same level of universalistic importance as the principle of a transcendental subject that is an end in itself. Following Keiji Nishitani, I will argue that it is only from a radicalised experience of emptiness --Absolute emptiness or *sunyata*-- that the transhistorical realms become one and the same. This pure synchronic perspective

though is essentially spiritual and cannot be described except ideally, yet it is only here that the transhistorical "near side" and "far side" realms can be made to overlap.

IV. 1. The Transhistorical Realm of Historicity

It is in the transhistorical realm of historicity that the two transcendentalist views of reality converge, even if in Christianity this realm depends on a personal relationship with God, while in the East, it depends on a relationship with the universe within human. In his book *Religion and Nothingness*, Keiji Nishitani formulates this difference in terms of a Western "far side" and an Eastern "near side" transhistorical realms. In Christianity, this transhistorical far side is the abode of God, the Father, towards whom a continual spiritual progression of humanity is attempted through the Christian institution of the church. In secular reality, the rational institution inherits the mission of organising human progress, even if it is not conceived as a spiritual type of progress. In contrast to this, the Eastern tradition is aware of newness and impermanence from a transhistorical perspective that is situated in an absolute near side which discloses historical facticity (a kind of diachrony that *does* symbolise a transcendental "leap in being"). But Eastern disciplines of spiritual enlightenment set this historical consciousness aside as an immediate illusion, in favour of a distinct notion of progress towards transcendence in the present moment of disciplined practice. According to Nishitani, the Western schools of thought that have been closer to bringing the transhistorical "far side" to the "near side" are the existential and nihilistic ones, but have failed due to an extended relationship with the personal and individual ego, regarded as the root to reality.

As has already been discussed, in this work, *transcendence* is regarded as a spiritual discovery that takes place when a human being merges in consciousness with her/his divine root to existence. The notion of *universality* is conceived drawing from *particular* symbolisation and experience of what has come to be regarded as hierophany. I will argue that the difference between the sacred and the non-sacred defines the structure of legitimate human order, even if in secular interaction the sacred realm loses its synchronic essence and becomes diachronic and rational. Nevertheless, as has already been suggested, one of the main assumptions of this work is that the notion of legitimacy is imaginatively and emotionally cognised. Ideas about reality are legitimate because they structure the experience and habits of

the ones who interact in them and whose interaction is engaged in imagined and emotional relationships with people, things, principles, missions, gods, values: They are like *highways* of interaction at the same time as they are experienced in an intimate relationship to the self that is cognised emotionally. In the previous chapter I discussed how legitimacy of authority lies in the synchronic moment of renovation for the pagan/primitive idea of reality as opposed to the diachronic one of the Western historical perspective. Now I will discuss how legitimacy of moral authority differs in the two transcendentalist views of reality and why it is important that they be allowed an area of convergence if the Western tradition is to remain loyal to the spirit of tolerance that made a necessity for intellectual knowledge to become estranged from Christianity. Our Western cultural development concentrated on the spiritual importance of a personal relationship with God, which was then secularised on the basis of the importance of human personality and of the history of a unified universal humanity. The Eastern tradition concentrated on the universe within human --which lies both *within* and *beyond* time simultaneously. Moral authority in the Western tradition lies on diachronic experience of time, and in the Eastern one, on a synchronic experience of spiritual Enlightenment.

In the divided universe of Western reality --between world and transcendence-- boundaries are defined with respect to typical Judeo-Christian categorisations of good and evil. This structure of belief is based on the Christian collective spiritual practice as one body in the 'church' (*ekklesia*)[1]. The political organisation of the church was very powerful in a universal world-order because, as opposed to all other empires based on cosmological kingdoms, it empowered an impersonal organisation to act for God through the people in its ranks.

> The central royal metaphor --that we are all members of one body-- was expressed in terms of unity and integration, as the unity of a social body into which the individual is absorbed. The Church claimed to be the continuing Body of Christ in history, and as early as the letters of Ignatius we are completely in the atmosphere of the Church Militant, with its emphasis on

[1] The concept of church belongs to the Christian tradition and describes a form of religious communal life, inherited from Hellenic political organisation. "The ideals of the political philosophy of the ancient Greek city-state entered the discussion of the new Christian type of human community, now called the church, but in Greek *ekklesia*[...] originally meant the assembly of the citizens of a Greek polis" (Jaeger 1962:15).

> military analogies and its disciplined organization, where no authority is to be followed except what comes through the bishop. (Frye 1982:99)

When this organisational principle became secularised and put into the hands of liberal democracy, an aura of distance, congenial with the idea of a gaze from the "far side", was given to the institution of the 'State' in the continental political tradition, or of the 'Law', in the Anglo-Saxon one. The transcendental origin of this aura makes the Western figure of the 'institution' a very powerful one in terms of producing social order. The way in which the globalised order of today conceives of institutions is tied up with the Augustinian institutional arrangement. The Augustinian tale, however, in its transcendentalist implications foresaw a city of God of perfect justice; this tale was transformed into a secular one in which the spiritual quest is out of sight. In its place, there remains the discipline of a modern ethos that poses the individual human self as an end in itself and organises morality as a private quest for a personal prehension of the self.

However, as has been mentioned, the modern mind rejects the Christian tale that is the root of modern institutions and exchanges it for a new tale of eternal linear progress in domination of the material world through morality in universal history and knowledge in science. In its rejection of Christian dogma, the Western enlightened rational discipline downplays the fact that its intellectual notion of infinity is rooted in the Christian notion of an omnipotent and transhistorical God. "Although the views of history found in Christianity and in the Enlightenment represent diametrically opposed points of view", says Nishitani, "they both concur in recognising a meaning in history" (1982:211). A universal historical consciousness cannot escape the element of infinity opened up at the very root of being in the world. As will be discussed, this is illustrated by how the predicament of nihilism haunts the modern contemporary mind.

Nishitani calls the infinity of historical consciousness the "transhistorical view" needed for a history that can be truly universal, and he says that it is unavoidably linked to a "religious prehension of history" (1982:213). In this prehension, the transcendental realm of existence (eternity, infinity) comes about as a certainty and may be said to be analogous with hierophany, or interaction with the

divine root of existence. Certainty is religious faith and it comes about in the life of human as what Nishitani calls the Great Reality:

> To be sure, this reality is not something merely objective and separate from ourselves; if it were, we should still be on the field of consciousness[2]. When we ourselves are thrown into the reality of evil or faith in such a way as to become ourselves the realization of their realness, a conversion takes place within reality itself with us at the hinge: we have a *real* change of heart. (Nishitani 1982:30)

The transhistorical view is analogous to the synchronic sacred moment of renovation of the natural cycle celebrated in archaic ritual; but here it is of a "higher order" that moves symbologically (and not only intuitively and experientially) in the direction of transcendence; it is the awareness and explicit representation of the new and the irreversible that contemplates infinity and therefore the uniqueness of the present moment:

> The idea of a stratified formation of simultaneous time systems necessitates the idea of an infinite openness at the bottom of time, like a great expanse of vast, sky like emptiness that cannot be confined to any systematic enclosure. Having such an openness at its bottom, each and every now, even as it belongs to each of the various layers accumulated through the total system, is itself something new and admits of no repetition in any sense. The sequence of "nows" is really irreversible. Accordingly, in the true sense, each now passes away and comes into being at each fleeting instant. (Nishitani 1982:219)

Nishitani observes that this transhistorical realm lies at the centre of the Eastern notion of time and, while it produces an immediate kind of historical consciousness --the present view that history has no beginning and no end--, it does not unfold into the *mature* science of factual and descriptive history as it does in the West. Nishitani's discussion shows that the transhistorical is itself radicalised in the East as Absolute emptiness as the root to reality which discloses facticity as illusion; while in the West it is radicalised as the human transcendental identity in personality, initially, in a personal relationship with God conceived as a wilful "being" in a

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[2] Nishitani refers to the field of consciousness as the perspective where we relate to objects *without* from a position *within* the subject, where "self and things remain fundamentally separated from one another. This standpoint of separation of subject and object, or opposition between within and without is what we call the field of "consciousness". And it is from this field that we ordinarily relate to things by means of concepts and representations" (Nishitani 1982:9).

transhistorical dimension; and then transformed into a secular relationship between the *universal* human self and human personality, its freedom, and its will.

Here, it is important to pay attention to the culturally ascendant verbal structures of both traditions: While the Eastern/mystic realm of transhistorical time defines a domain of synchrony that legitimises the notion of a collective mind; the Western/Christian realm of historicity and its relationship with the Will of God defines a domain of diachrony that legitimises the notion of universal humanity as a collectivity advancing towards the end of times or towards moral awareness which legitimises the notion of an individual mind; its uniqueness being a feature of infinity, an end in itself. In both views of reality, and in awareness of a religious prehension of history, the dominant verbal structures are metonymic as either synchronic or diachronic legitimate symbols of time that are "put for" a transcendence that is both immanent and imminent.

Nishitani argues that in the Western tradition, the legitimate realm of transhistorical reality is placed at the "far side" of ordinary consciousness;

> when Plato conceives of a world of Ideas as the far side of this sensible world, the *beyond* he has in mind is only beyond to the extent that it is something like a celestial world. It is a far side viewed perpendicularly from the earth upward. [...] Similarly a personal God who is thought to reveal himself vertically from heaven down to earth, as commonly represented in Christianity, is considered to be seated beyond, on the far side. Since in this case we speak of a revelation from beyond, the far side is more to the far side than it was with Plato. (Nishitani 1982:104)

The distance placed between God and human is meaningfully represented in diachrony and, as we will see, also in the notion of sin as an anthropological root to human existence. But this absolute breach between God and human can be represented as a metonymic "unrelatedness" in a rational philosophical plane of dialectical thought: "an unrelatedness can be represented as a sort of relationship of "unrelatedness", that is, as a "dialectical" relationship" (Nishitani 1982:105). In secular facticity, this unrelatedness is translated into a cognising subject and its object of analysis; but here, the prevalent verbal structures are descriptive. The object/subject relationship enfolds both the Western occularcentric tradition of

science and the Western moral mission of knowing the self who does the cognising; always keeping the diachronic division that allows for cause and effect to be clearly seen and for sequential explanation to be performed by the discipline. It could be said that secular history attempts to shift the "far side" of the transhistorical realm to the "near side" of the cognising subject --and as Nishitani argues, this was best achieved by the nihilists in the West-- but we will see that it fails to accomplish the absolute near side because it is still couched in, and determined by, the duality of a divided reality. In contrast to this, in the Eastern tradition, the legitimate realm of transhistorical reality is placed at an absolute "near side", one of Absolute emptiness from which being emerges, where "both the abyss of nihility and the personal relationship of God and man can come about [...] and be represented" (Nishitani 1982:105).

To be sure, the absolute near side of the Eastern tradition is also metonymic and is put for immanent transcendence; but one that enfolds salvation and nihility, heaven and hell, and that is displaced from judgmental reason and distinction between absolute good and absolute evil. What Nishitani calls religious Love (*agape*) or Compassion (*karuna*) illustrates this notion of the near side --also present in the religious Western tradition-- where love is absolute and impersonal as in the Buddhist "Great Compassionate Heart [*maha-karuna*], the essential equivalent of the biblical analogy that tells us there is no such thing as a selfish or selective sunshine" (Nishitani 1982:60). Similarly with Jesus' injunction to love one's enemies as one's friends and the Buddhist virtue of "non-differentiating love beyond enmity and friendship" (Nishitani 1982:58). This is the prevalent absolute near side of transhistorical reality in the Eastern tradition. Discursively, its compact metonymic symbolism of experience allows for factual ambiguity, and fails to organise a descriptive sense for universal history; but in disciplined practice, a factual historical awareness is organisationally necessary in an immediate sense with respect to one's own present life and situation, one's own particular emotional attachments and lived predicaments. This is a near side that becomes personally pressing and, according to Nishitani, must break through the field of nihility which lies beyond the horizon of the field of consciousness; or that of self as cognising subject, ego, or personality.

Nishitani's considerations on a philosophy of being "take their stand at the point that traditional philosophies of religion have been broken down or been broken through. In that sense they may be said to go along with contemporary existential philosophies, all of which include a standpoint of "transcendence" in one sort or another" (1982:xlix). Nishitani considers the nihilistic philosophies of Sartre, Heiddeger, and Nietzsche, as well as the religious existentialism of Kierkegaard, in order to find a Western common ground with Eastern concerns about nothingness. But he also considers how, even these Western existentialist problematics are still very much couched within the assumptions of the traditional philosophy of Christianity. A radical change of heart in these cultural conditions, in the sense of conversion to a "Great Reality" (discussed above), has produced either the negation of the existence of God as a wilful personality (an atheistic humanism), or in the case of Kierkegaard, a philosophical-spiritual vocation.

Traditional Western thought is based on the reality of the personal self, and therefore, on the reality of its division from the world 'outside' itself. The Cartesian "*cogito, ergo sum* expressed the mode of being of that ego as a self-centred assertion of its own realness" (Nishitani 1982:11). But according to Nishitani it is an ego that seeks its own realness and mirrors itself in what it finds at every turn. This kind of self-centredness is displaced from looking at itself beyond the actual fact that it considers itself as real. As I will argue in the second part of this thesis below, this has to do with the multiple emotional interactions in which the ego is engaged; which gives shape and consubstantiality, *objective reality*, to the "integument of culture" where it lives. But according to Nishitani this field of consciousness must go through an existential doubt in order to contemplate its own non-reality as impermanence, and experience the grounds on which it stands as emptiness.

> Only when the self breaks through the field of consciousness, the field of *beings*, and stands on the ground of nihility is it able to achieve a subjectivity that can in no way be objectivized (Nishitani 1982:16)

This "standing" though is existential as well as intellectual knowing. According to Nishitani, this is the only comprehensive standpoint for modern human because, in

every other standpoint contemporary human is shattered into little abstract pieces that separate consciousness from mortality, the unavoidable return to nihility (death).

According to Nishitani, the problem for this existential modern position is that it does not radicalise the experience of emptiness, but remains couched in its intellectually cognising discipline that depends on the reality of the subject itself. This is why the Great Reality of Western existential nihilism does not perform a complete conversion into a religious quest, even if it is seems closely related to it in its certainty about the absence of a Presence --atheism-- a certainty that is, paradoxically, analogous to a faith. Nothingness as the ground of existence in nihilism still sees the self as poised on some kind of objective grounds:

> [T]he nothingness that means "there is no ground" positions itself like a wall to block one's path and turns itself into a kind of ground so we can still say that "there is a ground". Only absolute emptiness is the true no-ground (*Ungrund*). Here all things --from a flower to a stone to stellar nebulae and galactic systems, and even life and death themselves-- become present as bottomless realities. They disclose their bottomless suchness. True freedom lies in this no-ground. Sartre's freedom is still a bondage, a kind of hole that has the ego projected into it like a stake driven into the ground for the self to be tied to. (Nishitani 1982:34)

In atheistic nihilism, individual human selfhood is defended with religious zeal as the source of freedom and autonomous will. In the Western forms of existential nihilism, the "far side" transhistorical realm is attempted to be brought to the "near side" by the transcendental identity of human, but it fails to do so because this identity is couched in the personality of the cognising self who is displaced from prehending infinity existentially.

To say it with Nishitani, an excessive identification of the Self (collective or individual) with the particular personal selfhood or ego is precisely the predicament in which modern culture finds itself: "If we grant that Cartesian philosophy is the prime illustration of the mode of being of modern man, we may also say that it represents the fundamental problem lurking within that mode" (Nishitani 1982:19). The abyss of nihility that opens up at the bottom of self brings out infinite nothingness that human personality on its own is unable to deal with because of its own inherent finiteness. A tension between a transcendental identity (infinity) and

the individual personality (finiteness) of human arises in the symbolism of the Western tradition, and this tension organises the legitimate factuality of universal history; in contrast to the East where individual personality is not so sharply defined and infinity does not appear divided into individualisms. Nevertheless, in the East infinity itself produces awareness of a universality, not only with respect to other human beings, but with respect to any type of consciousness. This fails to produce universal symbolism of factual *human* historicity because the infinite vastness of time for all forms of consciousness (animals, plants, even objects!) cannot possibly be represented factually, but it can be understood (and represented in metonymy) in the search for the present mystical moment of Absolute emptiness, where it is apprehended. Nihilistic nothingness still shows the bias of objectification in which the self, cognised as an ego, regards nothingness as a kind of objective "thing".

In contrast to this, the Eastern standpoint of Absolute emptiness is the immanent "near side" of the transhistorical realm needed for consciousness of infinity with no beginning and no end. But this is not simply a cyclical predicament because in cyclical time, recurrence signals finiteness, and the beginning and end can be organisationally arranged according to that finiteness. Nevertheless, the "once and for all" essence of factual reality, that which cannot be repeated and is therefore unique, can only be expressed in realisation that the beginning and end are contained in the present moment of existence:

> Kierkegaard speaks of a "transcendence" in the "moment" and along with that of a "simultaneity" coming to be in the "moment". In fact, past and present can be simultaneous without "destroying" the temporal sequence of before and after. Without such a field of simultaneity not even culture, let alone religion, could come into being. We can encounter Sakyamuni and Jesus, Basho and Beethoven in the present. That religion and culture can arise within and be handed down historically through time points to the very essence of time. (Nishitani 1982:161)

We will say for now that the Eastern "near side" transhistorical realm of absolute emptiness, conceives of an immediate kind of factual historicity based on the simultaneity of newness and impermanence experienced in time. From that point of experience, self is simultaneously non-self; it is one with emptiness and therefore

free of all horizons of objective cognition, where emptiness is identical with being. I will attempt a clarification these notions further below.

We are now in a position to say that the development of a historical consciousness depends on the symbolisation of the notion of universality. Historicity therefore depends on a symbological dimension that is transcendental or transhistorical either on a "far side" or on a "near side" with respect to the human self. But while the legitimacy of the Eastern "near side" as Absolute emptiness remains synchronic and a present spiritual dimension, as it seeks personal morality to point metonymically towards the experiential reality of what Nishitani calls 'religious love' (*agape*) or 'great compassion' (*Maha-karuna*); the legitimacy of the Western "far side" embodies the metonymic dialectical symbol of a divided reality between world and transcendence arranged diachronically with respect to each other. This was originally expressed in our Western tradition as the Tale of Genesis and Apocalypse, and later in secular historicity, as the division between subject and object where the former is an end in itself and seeks factual knowledge and causal explanation about the latter. As we have said, the transhistorical or transcendental realm in the Western tradition is positioned in the "far side" or the 'not yet', and through this, diachronic factual historicity acquires its institutional importance. To be sure, this experience of movement in time is also represented organisationally in an ideal Eastern/mystic view of reality, but it does not acquire institutional legitimacy as reality; immediate facticity (*samsara*) is contemplated as an illusion and as a burden that is given up in spiritual Enlightenment (*nirvana*).

As we shall see in the next section, in Christianity, legitimacy of diachronic time comes from the institutionalisation of both a group relationship and a personal relationship with God; which in secular reality becomes a universal kind of morality (or the Western values) that should be internalised through history by all rationally *enlightened* individual selves. The ancestry of this kind of legitimacy goes from religious exegesis, to a personal conscience, to academic factual analysis. In the East the organisational role of diachrony is to regard the phenomenal world as mere illusion of forms and is therefore not engaged with its factual analysis as if it were legitimate reality. But it does produce interrogative thought about the factual

relationship between past intentions, the present personal situation, and future expectations. Therefore, historicity as a relevant category for the realm of human order is better disclosed for our purposes in the notion of human fault. In their diachronic and synchronic considerations of a transhistorical (transcendental) realm the Western and Eastern symbolisations of fault can illustrate the tension between, on the one hand, sinful humanity and a personal relationship with God, and on the other, worldly suffering and the transcendental realm of *nirvana*.

IV. 2. The Notion of Human Fault

It is in the formation of distinctive types of ethos that the notion of fault becomes a relevant object of analysis. Following Paul Ricoeur's study of the Judeo-Christian symbolism of evil and Nishitani's considerations of the Eastern notion of fault, I have distinguished three types of fault to which the human self can relate for each view of reality: the pagan/primitive view conceives of fault as defilement; the Western/Christian view as sin and guilt; and the Eastern/mystic as karma and worldly suffering (*karma*). The notion of fault is constant in any cosmology and it clarifies how each view of reality tends towards an ideal individual self or to a collective self. Defilement and *karma* highlight the importance of a collective self, either embodied in community or conceived as a sacred collective mind, while the Western/Christian notion of fault (especially in guilt) tends towards individuality as the locus of self conceived as the responsible agent either in the religious imputation of fault or in the secular one. Symbologies of fault can only be overlapped and compared from a phenomenological perspective, in present awareness, because their prevalent verbal structures produce imaginary paths that do not converge symbologically through time conceived as past and future: they unfold into the shape of the relevant mythical tale, the transmigration of souls beyond the individual life-time (the wheel of birth and rebirth), or factual history. From this perspective, guilt and sin are observed to open up an unavoidable abyss between the self and the "far side" realm of transhistorical reality; while the Eastern notion of emptiness reconciles the self with the transhistorical realm in an absolute "near side" of spiritual love.

In his *Symbolism of Evil*, Paul Ricoeur carries out a phenomenological analysis of the experience of fault. His three stages --defilement, sin, guilt-- represent the symbolic evolution of the West towards deeper awareness about the responsible individual self. But I will take his first stage, that of defilement, to be an ideal type of symbolism of fault for my pagan/primitive ideal-type view of reality, one that is lived and cognised right now as a mixture of emotion and imagination and expressed in metaphoric-poetic language. From defilement, the phenomenological path towards sin and guilt defines the symbological development of the Western/Christian view of

reality; while the notion of fault as karma defines that of the Eastern/mystic apprehension of a "leap in being" towards transcendence. Ricoeur identifies the symbolic evolution of the West that goes from the experience of defilement, to sin, to guilt:

> "Guilt", in the precise sense of a feeling of the unworthiness at the core of one's personal being, is only the advanced point of a radically individualised and interiorized experience. This feeling of guilt points to a more fundamental experience, the experience of "sin", which includes *all* men and indicates the *real* situation of man before God, whether man knows it or not. It is this sin of which the myth of the fall recounts the entry into the world and which speculation on original sin attempts to erect into a doctrine. But sin, in its turn, is a correction and even a revolution with respect to a more archaic concept of fault --the notion of "defilement" conceived in the guise of a stain or a blemish that infects from without. Guilt, sin, and defilement thus constitute a primitive diversity in experience. Hence the feeling involved is not only blind in virtue of being emotional; it is also equivocal, laden with a multiplicity of meanings. This is why language is needed a second time to elucidate the subterranean crises of the consciousness of fault. (Ricoeur 1967:7-8)

In this symbolism of fault, Ricoeur also identifies a movement in language, from an elementary language of confession (metaphorical), to the elaborated language of gnosis and counter-gnosis (metonymic). He also says that there is a heavy emotional involvement every time there is explicit description of the personal or collective experience of fault; which is therefore emotionally cognised. Ricoeur's three categories are thus a typology that is determined by emotional response to the Western relationship with God's interdiction who has a personality and a divine Will.

The most archaic or basic type of fault, that of defilement, is generally expressed in metaphorical verbal structures of disease and pestilence in order to point towards exclusion from the human group, originally constituting the human self. In synchronic legitimation of time and reality, the locus of the self is the known human group and its verbal structures are arranged as artistic representations of reality cognised physically and emotionally. Defilement is seen as offence against the human group, the collective self, human personality represented as gods and goddesses who engage in cosmic dance and play and produce the experienced reality of newness and impermanence, and is expressed in compact symbolism of mixed

emotion and imagination. This dance and play is the most archaic form of divine human identity as lying beyond the world in the shape of absolute joy; but in a similar manner, this other-worldliness is also lived emotionally in an absolute manner in the despair and experienced physical pain reified in the symbols of defilement. Our embodied experience constantly conveys the nuances between extreme joy and extreme pain, going through boredom and indifference, but that are physical or emotional --or both-- and that most strongly express the relationship between what is allowed and what is forbidden, what is expected and what is a necessity for individual embodiment to be and to produce. The human emotional development through ontogeny[3] carries the most basic and archaic relationship to self as goddesses and gods, even if these symbols become emotionally and intellectually differentiated and transformed into legitimate self as personality couched in a transcendental identity or into self as Absolute emptiness.

Defilement is related to the boundaries of permissiveness; "we have to transport ourselves", says Ricoeur, "into a consciousness for which impurity is measured not by imputation to a responsible agent but by the objective violation of an interdict" (1967:27). Under this regime, the list of faults is vast while it is poor when it comes to considering the intentions of the agent. Here, evil and misfortune are still associated; "the ethical order of doing ill has not been distinguished from the cosmobiological order of faring ill" (Ricoeur 1967:27). To us, this lack of differentiation on the side of intentionality is irrational because it connects physical contingency with fault. Defilement is typically symbolised as a form of impurity by contagion that infects from without, "but this infectious contact is experienced subjectively in a specific feeling which is of the order of Dread" (Ricoeur 1967:28). Taboos, which define primitive boundaries of permissiveness, are basically punishments emotionally anticipated in transgress of cosmological interdicts. There is an archaic relationship between defilement and vengeance which, according to

[3] Ontogeny is a concept that I borrow from biology which means: "The course of growth and development of an individual to maturity" (Lincoln, Boxshall & Clark 1982:174). The domain of facticity to which awareness of a transhistorical "near side" realm gives birth is essentially related to the particularity of a human life-time. As I will discuss in Chapter V below, this is relevant for a synchronic perspective of an observer who is aware of his/her own embodiment.

Ricoeur, is the oldest and most primitive form of representation of fault. From a primitive need for vengeance emerged the first human modes of expression of order in the language of retribution.

When this expression discovers the symbolic direction of transcendence, verbal structures become preeminently metonymic to point towards transcendental infinite joy and freedom, but at the same time, to the infinite abyss of despair and nihility; also generally used to point to divine punishment or cosmic debt that is also eternal, and so, absolutely terrifying. This is the reason why the symbolism of defilement is actually never left behind because it is the most explicit one in physical analogies and metaphors, and it is resorted to in every type of symbolism of fault.

> It is because the symbolism of defilement still clings by its manifold root hairs to the cosmic sacralizations, because defilement adheres to everything unusual, everything terrifying in the world, attractive and repellent at the same time, that this symbolism is ultimately inexhaustible and inerradicable. As we shall see, the more historical and less cosmic symbolism of sin and guilt makes up for the poverty and abstractness of its imagery only by a series of revivals and transpositions of the more archaic, but more highly surcharged symbolism of defilement. The richness of the symbolism of defilement even when this symbolism is fully interiorized, is the corollary of its cosmic roots. (Ricoeur 1967:12)

The kind of language used to represent fault appears in mixed symbology, so the difference between the categories of fault is phenomenological rather than linguistic or historical; and it is progressive only in the sense that it points to the discovery and representation of transcendence in human social order.

The Eastern notion of karma keeps the connection to the primitive language of vengeance and retribution, but transforms it into a cosmic burden of infinite embodied debt in pain and attachment that can only be absolutely paid through spiritual Enlightenment. It keeps the archaic relationship between doing ill and faring ill, but gives it an ethical arrangement that trusts in fate as a "learning device" that arises as the product of our own actions:

> This force of destiny is not a destiny in the ordinary sense of something that simply rules over us and controls us from without. Nor is it merely something like blind will. It is a destiny that appears only in the shape of the acts we ourselves perform, only as one with our own actions. (Nishitani 1982:104)

This is why the realm of historicity that this notion of fault discloses is immediately related to factual consciousness of individual self ontogenetically; and not to any legitimate realm of universal human history. The notion of karma transforms the archaic trust in cosmology towards the direction of transcendence as a trust in contingency as fate. This Eastern trust in contingency as fate is displaced from the critical discipline of factual historical analysis, it defines an intuitive attitude of submission to experience and contemplation of the cosmobiological links between all things in the particularity of the present situation.

The Western opposition to this kind of trust may be said to lie in personal responsibility about acts and the cosmological impossibility of the notion of samsaric "transmigration" (eternal birth and death), which is secularised as a "once and for all" unique individual life. However, it can be argued that the root of this attitude originally lies in the personal relationship with a God that dwells in a transhistorical "far side" and that relates to His chosen people through prophetic indignation and historical exegesis as the expression of His Will. This is illustrated in the anthropological myth of the fall and the figure of the serpent, which is told as an event that took place "springing up from an unknown source, it furnishes anthropology with a key concept: the *contingency* of that radical evil which the penitent is always on the point of calling his evil nature. Thereby the myth proclaims the purely "historical" character of that radical evil" (Ricoeur 1967:252). In the Christian view, radical evil is contingent in history, in the world, even in the flesh but it is not the sole nature of human, and humanity's only mission is to overcome evil through its transcendental identity. Under this circumstances of reality, it would be irrational to trust in contingency, as radical evil may at any time spring out of nowhere in the course of historical time. This defines an attitude that must be intentionally active, dominating evil, controlling circumstances and finding proof of success in the world.

The Hebrew representation of an avenging God is rooted in an archaic representation of order. The emergence of Yahweh as the only God of the universe with a "chosen people" was originally symbolised as a collective relationship with a local sacred entity who would lead them to historical success. "What there is in the

first place", says Ricoeur, "is not essence but presence; and the commandment is a modality of the presence, namely, the expression of a holy will. Thus sin is a religious dimension before being ethical; it is not the transgression of an abstract rule --of a value-- but the violation of a personal bond" (1967:53). Revelation transformed this localistic relationship into the figure of the Covenant, and gave it its transcendental possibilities. It is with respect to the Covenant that the notion of sin is defined: sin is an unavoidable human characteristic according to the myth of the fall, the awareness of which unites the chosen people before God's judgement. But this judgement is expressed as an infinite distance between God and man, between His transcendental power and the deeply rooted human evil. This distance is expressed in the form of prophetic accusation, indignation, and the wrath of God:

> The initial situation of man as God's prey can enter into the universe of discourse because it is itself analysable into an utterance of God and an utterance of man, into the reciprocity of a vocation and an invocation. Thus this initial situation, which plunges into the darkness of the power and violence of the Spirit, also emerges into the light of the Word. It is in this exchange between vocation and invocation that the whole experience of sin is found. (Ricoeur 1967:51-52)

The figure of the Covenant, of unlimited demand and finite commandment, defines a dialogue between God and man from which an unavoidable collective experience of sin emerges. The law teaches man how he is already a sinner and this accusation deepens the experience of being oneself, but alienated from oneself: "Sin, as alienation from oneself, is an experience even more astonishing, disconcerting, scandalous, perhaps, than the spectacle of nature, and for this reason it is the richest source of interrogative thought" (Ricoeur 1967:8). While alienation from oneself in defilement --the primary experience of the cosmos-- is alienation from the community; in sin, this kind of alienation is related to exile from the transcendental realm symbolised in Paradise: it defines the worldly human condition that must struggle to defeat evil till the end of times. Sin is thus universalised as a condition that, as it were, unifies humankind. This condition is symbolised in the terror that the prophets experience when they must face God:

> [T]he religion of Israel is imbued with this conviction that man cannot see God without dying. Moses at Horeb, Isaiah in the temple, Ezekiel face to face

> with the glory of God, are terror-stricken; they experience in the name of the whole people the incompatibility of God and man. This terror expresses the situation of sinful man. (Ricoeur 1967:63)

The infinite demand of God and the finite command of the ritual codes create a tension with which the sinner is never finished. When there is pardon as deliverance, it is symbolised in a theology of history for the whole of the people of Israel; otherwise pardon is never reached in actual personal deliverance. It is, however, lived in the punishment that the ritual codes prescribe because, in it, sin loses its aspect of irrevocable condemnation: "pardon does not abolish suffering but grants a respite which is interpreted as a horizon determined by divine patience" (Ricoeur 1967:79). In the language of the confession of sins, this symbolism of fault provides the grounds for interrogative thought in the personal relationship with God, which is symbolised as a whole in the Covenant:

> [I]n addition to mitigation of the punishment, pardon appears as the transformation of an obstacle into a test; punishment becomes the instrument of awareness, the path of confession. Pardon is already fully evident in this restore capacity of knowing oneself in one's true situation in the bosom of the Covenant. (Ricoeur 1967:79)

Sin is therefore individual and communal at the same time, and it is entwined with the "Day of Yahweh", the historical events, and their penal interpretation by the prophets. Prophecy joins the promise of salvation to the threat of calamities, there is a double imminence of catastrophe and deliverance. "This double oracle", says Ricoeur, "keeps up the temporal tension characteristic of the Covenant" (1967:68).

Ricoeur speaks of a crisis that came about due to the deepening of the feeling of sin. The experience of evil in the self as a deeply rooted human characteristic, symbolised in the fall, produced constant contemplation of the individual self in obeisance to the Law of God. But this relationship to ritual finite law is always experienced as emotionally attached to the infinite demand of God himself. This is the symbology of historical time of man *before* God, or the root to the experience of being seen by God:

> [T]he primordial significance of this seeing [being-seen-by-God] is to constitute the *truth* of my situation, the justness and the justice of the ethical judgement that can be passed on my existence. That is why this seeing, far

> from preventing the birth of the Self, gives rise to self-awareness; it enters into the field of subjectivity as the *task* of knowing oneself better; this seeing, which *is*, lays the foundation for the ought-to-be of self-awareness. (Ricoeur 1967:85)

The emergence of personal guilt occurs when sinful man interiorises and personalises the experience of fault, not only as responsibility in being the cause of a violation of interdiction, but now as being the author of ethically wrong deeds in the eyes of the divine gaze. "That is why", says Ricoeur, "the consciousness of guilt constitutes a veritable revolution in the experience of evil: that which is primary is no longer the reality of defilement, the objective violation of the Interdict, or the Vengeance let loose by that violation, but the evil use of liberty, felt as an internal diminution of the value of the self" (1967:102).

When interdiction is not only ritual but becomes ethical, human beings are radically called to a perfection that goes beyond their *objective* obligations, it becomes a *subjective* assumption of responsibility. It is in this internalisation of fault and in this awareness of being seen by God that man faces the alternative "God or Nothing" (Ricoeur 1967:103). When all possibilities are reduced to this simple alternative, human beings must look at themselves as the authors of their acts together with the motives of their acts; this "raises up, over against itself, a subjective pole, a respondent, no longer in the sense of a bearer of punishment, but in the sense of an existent capable of embracing his whole life and consider it as one undivided destiny, hanging upon a simple alternative" (Ricoeur 1967:103).

According to Ricoeur, at the time of the Jewish prophets of the Exile, when Jerusalem had fallen to Babylon, a historical situation took place which corresponds to the change from communal sin to individual guilt:

> The preaching of sin had represented a mode of prophetic summons in which the whole people was exhorted to remember a collective deliverance, that of the Exodus, and to fear a collective threat, that of the Day of Yahweh. But now that the evil hour has arrived, now that the national state is destroyed and the people deported, the same preaching which had been able to appeal for a collective reform has become a cause for despair; it has lost all the force of a summons and become nihilistic in its import. (Ricoeur 1967:105)

Ezekiel, who had been brought captive into Babylon before Jerusalem was taken, preached for the individual responsibility of fault. No communal choice was open, collective sin had become a symbol of failure according to which the wrath of God had already condemned a whole people. Hope could therefore only be found on the individual side of sin; this took place in the same kind of preaching as accusation, which produced a solitary experience in the form of individual guilt. Nevertheless, if sin was now individual, so would salvation be: "Even if the Exodus from Egypt could not be repeated in an exodus from Babylon, even if the Return was to be indefinitely postponed, there would still be hope for each man" (Ricoeur 1967:105).

It is in the subjective emergence of the experience and symbolisation of fault, that the notion of "conscience" as individual and solitary conscience emerges in the Western tradition. As a religious experience, and in an intimate relationship to sin, it is lived in the presence of a higher spiritual order on the "far side" of transhistorical reality from which the human being is displaced, and which observes him/her. However, it is in the assumption of a transcendental identity that human makes the ethical choice to take the side of this divine presence and judge her/his own deeds. The experience of a complete cleavage between sin and guilt can be, then, formulated in the emergence of an individual conscience that judges the doings of the mundane self from a *transcendental* standpoint of either the Law or the personal 'law' or principles, one's own judgement and critical mind; which in secular reality may no longer be transcendental qua God, but it is still transcendental qua *part* of the human identity.

> Let the "I" be emphasised more than the "before thee", let the "before thee" be even *forgotten*, and the consciousness of fault becomes guilt and no longer sin at all; it is "conscience" that now becomes the *measure* of evil in a completely solitary experience. It is not by accident that in many languages the same word designates moral consciousness (*conscience morale*), and psychological and reflective consciousness; guilt expresses above all the promotion of "conscience" as supreme. (Ricoeur 1967:104)

In the Western tradition, the basis for this "conscience" is individual due to the fragmentation of symbolism of the human self. Self is conceived as pre-eminently collective in primitive fault as defilement; in the Judeo-Christian tradition, it is alternatively collective and individual in consciousness of fault through original sin

and the personal relationship with God; and ends up being constructed as pre-eminently individual in the hope for salvation and the reality of mundane evil as guilt. In secular modern reality and moral behaviour it is conscience as guilt --either projected or assumed-- that shapes morality, which becomes a supreme entity liable to be worshipped in the temple of personal individuality and the private realm: the transcendental identity of a subject who is cosmologically divided from its object of cognition and holds an emotional relationship and attachment to that division.

In contrast to this, the notion of karma is emotionally grounded in a view of reality that situates itself wholly in transcendence, which does not lie in a "far side" but that becomes radicalised, especially in Buddhism, as an absolute "near side" of emptiness. Karma is existentially cognised as the worldly field of causality that ties human action to human fate indissolubly and that is identified as taking place in an "endless sea of suffering", *samsara*, which is ultimately illusory, but which is "grasped in a keenly existential fashion" (Nishitani 1982:169). This experienced suffering is described as ontologically illusory for the practitioner who seeks absolute redemption or liberation exemplified by the Enlightened masters; diachrony is "aspirationally" illusory for the seeker.

> [W]hen we speak of illusory appearance, we do not mean that there are real beings in addition that merely happen to adopt illusory guises to appear in. Precisely because it is *appearance* and not *something* that appears, this appearance is illusory at an elemental level in its very reality, and real in its very illusoriness. (Nishitani 1982:129)

Here, the realm of history is unimportant as an institutional program that would embrace the whole of humanity in a universal tale of a beginning and an end.

Nevertheless, the notion of factual historicity is an important organisational principle in Eastern cosmology, that each particular embodied individual contemplates as a personal story of causality. As has been said before, Eastern apprehension of the universal realm of being concentrates on the universe within, and therefore, every practitioner who strives for redemption from the sea of suffering does so, not only for his/her own benefit, but primarily for every other "sentient being". To seek redemption for one-private-self, is still regarded as a form of slavery to the illusory nature of embodiment in *samsara*, when the universe within, in

identity with every conscious being, has not yet been apprehended. In order to grasp the ontological priority of universal wholeness, an apprehension of Absolute emptiness is required through experience; where any notion of individual human identity or self is dissolved into the infinite ocean of non-being. This transhistorical realm of being-non-being is the absolute "near side" that discloses a universality that goes beyond the boundaries of Self as human self, it apprehends existence as non-existence and merges in consciousness with the universe itself. It is the absolute emptiness that in Mahayana Buddhism, Nagarjuna calls *sunyata* (Absolute emptiness) which must be experienced to be known.

IV. 3. Absolute Emptiness

Even if Absolute emptiness cannot be described, here I refer to it as a useful "sign post" to organise a universally relevant realm of morality as compassion and care, which to be authentic must have a concrete manifestation in particular experience to be known. Absolute emptiness or *sunyata* is a spiritual vivid existential experience that takes place, through the field of nihility (the awareness of nothingness as the root to existence), into the idea that a radicalised emptiness is the root source of newness and impermanence, of both the positive and negative aspects of life. While in the West evil is wilfully expelled through repression into a mythical realm of eternal damnation, in the East evil is appropriated in the midst of the transcendental source of experience. Here, the self is not related to the embodied personality, but to the collective human sacred mind --the essence of Eastern selflessness or non-ego. While in the Western tradition, oneness is the negation of multiplicity and differentiation is a dialectical opposition of concepts; in the Eastern tradition oneness and multiplicity are enfolded in an absolutely empty unity which must be cognised existentially through the field of nihility. In Absolute emptiness infinity is conceived as the spiritual entwinement of all things, where things are contemplated in their suchness. If we move from Absolute emptiness to the Cartesian 'field of consciousness' where things are cognised qua objects; we realise that *sunyata* can still be considered in the present moment of meaningful experience as an ideal signpost of a "near side" transhistorical realm to organise experience, just like the Western "far side" transhistorical realm. In this manner, the Eastern historical consciousness can be seen to organise an "ontogenetic" type of historical facticity (close to our own particular life path), while the Western historical consciousness can be seen to organise a "phylogenetic"[4] type of historical facticity (the life path of a universal humanity).

The Indian philosophical duality that precedes the notion of absolute emptiness is couched in the oneness of *Brahman* and *atman*, which could be

[4] Similarly to ontogeny, phylogeny is a biological concept that means: "The evolutionary history of a group or a lineage" or "The origin and evolution of higher taxa" (Lincoln, Boxshall & Clark 1982:192).

considered as analogous to the Western notions of Divine Being and the self, but where the oneness of *Brahman* and *atman* is expressed only in negative terms "as the seer who cannot be seen and the knower who cannot be known" (Abe 1985:125). The Western duality is symbolised by Plato in the "mystery of *being* as existence between the poles of the One (*hen*) and the Unlimited (A*peiron*)" (Voegelin 1974:184). But in Greek philosophy, non-being is merely a privation of being (Abe 1985:122); Christianity took over this idea and saw in it the Godly Being from which everything emerges in all its multiplicity. Western secular philosophy kept the clear divide between absolute or *a priori* reason as the knower and the phenomenal world as the object of cognition. In any case, the positive side of being is stressed and the negative is expelled to oblivion or to a realm of 'wrongness', which effectively constitutes a domain of darkness that human is engaged in dissolving through intellectual knowledge and substantial rationality:

> To sum up, in the West such positive principles as being, life, and the good have ontological priority over negative principles such as non-being, death, and evil. In this sense, negative principles are always apprehended as something secondary. By contrast, in the East, especially in Taoism and Buddhism, negative principles are not secondary but co-equal to the positive principles and even may be said to be primary and central. This is so in the sense that the realization of negativity is crucial to reveal ultimate Reality, and in the sense that the nameless Tao or Emptiness is realised as the root-source of both positive and negative principles in their relative sense. (Abe 1985:133)

Emptiness at the root of both positive and negative principles discloses a realm of historicity that does not constitute itself as a factual universal program for the union of humanity; but that produces a fertile ground for personal contemplation of fault in present suffering and about redemption in the experience of legitimate present compassion.

The field of *sunyata* is displaced from description, but a field of immediate ontogenetic historicity --regarded as *illusory*-- is disclosed around this transhistorical realm of legitimate reality, situated in the absolute "near side" of self (or no-self). It therefore discloses a realm of morality that the secular universal program of human historicity expels to oblivion in its institutional and factual diachronic structures, but which is present in the religious Western tradition as *agape* or Divine love. In karma,

the immediateness of personal involvement with everything else that is, with one's own factual fate but also with that of all other beings --which involves one's own constant actions, emotions, and thoughts-- puts emphasis in a factual universal historicity, that nevertheless, is not legitimate reality. This realm of immediate factual historicity, however, acquires consubstantiality with respect to Absolute emptiness as the ultimate legitimate reality; the source of all that we experience and that carries the universe within, where ego or personality are experienced as unreal: "In the Existenz of non-ego, non-ego does not mean simply that self is not ego. It has also to mean at the same time that non-ego is the self" (Nishitani 1982:251); or that "I am the universe" where "I am" is not "me" qua ego. This experience is therefore absolutely humbling and absolutely empowering. Experience is therefore real in its existential *realness*; but its source is the universe itself, not mediated by a sacred personality or a monotheistic God, and even less by subjective or objective cognition of the individual self. Experience as universe is also experience as particularity at the same time and this simultaneity can only be lived in the hierophanic discovery of transcendence, the mystic moment of union to the divine root of existence, or Absolute emptiness (*sunyata*); all of which are essentially the same thing. According to Nishitani, this is illustrated in the mysticism of Meister Eckhart: "Absolute nothingness signals, for Eckhart, the point at which all modes of being are transcended, at which not only the various modes of created being but even the modes of divine being --such as Creator or Divine Love-- are transcended" (Nishitani 1982:61).

The Eastern "near side" of a transhistorical realm as Absolute emptiness and legitimate reality in non-objectifiable, as it transcends the "subjectivistic nihility" of Western existential nihilism (Nishitani 1982:98) and acquires the dimensions of what can only be considered as an ideal type of pure subjectivity from an objectivist discipline like ours. This pure type of subjectivity cannot be found in empirical reality, not because it not be actually experienced or lived by humans, but because it is displaced ontologically from being observed scientifically, just like love. It can nevertheless function as an ideal type, a "middle path" that is unachievable through

an objectivist discipline, but that should be considered conceptually as an ideal-type axis between legitimate views of reality.

Absolute emptiness as *sunyata* or as the point where all modes of being are transcended is an absolute abyss, "an abyss for the abyss of nihility" (Nishitani 1982:98). In that field the self as ego is unreal, and therefore we could use a metonymic verbal structure to say that *self* in sunyata is analogous, but not identical, to being essentially a collective self. This notion is manifested in the experienced actuality and connection of all things. But sunyata is a spiritual realm immanent to the world, where difference is unreal, yet experienced in its substantial manifestation --the degrees of diversity of things is irrelevant. This is how self is collective: in connection with all other things. This is not only an anthropomorphic self as personality, but one for whom experience and universe are the same thing and so are multiplicity and oneness. To illustrate this position in the Western tradition, Nishitani resorts to the figure of St. Francis of Assisi:

> The case of St. Francis may be rather exceptional in Christianity, but it serves us with at least one example of religious Love overstepping the boundaries of the human to reach out to all things. (Nishitani 1982:281)

For the anthropomorphic self the end in itself is the human self, the transcendental subject, the one that lives in historical *universal* human time. This standpoint defines the limits of the integument of culture with respect to nature (and inadvertently also with respect to other less "civilised" cultures), with the intention of excluding nature. It corresponds to the archaic metonymic definition of borders between the sacred and the profane, only in the shape of the human and the natural -- or culture and nature-- in secular reality. This movement defines for Nishitani an essentially dogmatic point of view that shelters a self-contradiction in the relationship between the "thing in it self" and objective "reality":

> [T]he Kantian critique with its split between two completely irreconcilable modes of being, phenomenon and noumenon, came to be advocated. On the standpoint of *sunyata*, where these two irreconcilable modes of being are pushed to their limits, they are both seen to come about as one and the same mode of being of the thing. (Nishitani 1982:138-9)

As discussed above, oneness in the Western tradition is defined as the negation of multiplicity and differentiation is defined as a dialectical opposition; while the Eastern tradition enfolds both oneness and multiplicity in an absolutely empty unity. What this means is that before uniting them in an intellectual relationship, oneness and multiplicity must be cognised existentially through the field of nihility. This involves the knower into questioning her/his own existence, and moves from the realm of intellectual knowledge or historicity to that of spiritual knowledge:

> The questions brought up by nihilism, at first heeded by only a few gifted thinkers, have since come to haunt us in modern life. In Nietzsche, and in more contemporary figures like Heidegger, for instance, nihilism is dealt with on the horizon of the so-called "history of being".
> This sort of situation does not exist in the East. Still, the East has achieved a conversion from the standpoint of nihility to the standpoint of sunyata. (Nishitani 1982:168)

This is a spiritual realm because it is directly related to the prehension of one's own death or of one's own self as standing on nihility, leading to what Nishitani calls a conversion to "Great Reality". It depends on a "religious quest" that awakens in human beings when tragedy, disillusion, or even closeness to death *quicken* one's awareness and preoccupation with things religious; "when death, nihility or sin [...] become pressing personal problems for us" (Nishitani 1982:3).

Only from the field of nihility can the ego be posed as non-ego, and then be reassumed as the spiritual knowing of non-knowing; where there is absolute autonomy (freedom) as the absence of autonomous identity. In the mystic Christian tradition, this nihility is spoken of as the "dark night of the soul", the existential detachment from ego experienced as "the whole being's surrender to the All" (Underhill 1995:400). Nihility is an essential step to Absolute emptiness of the self because, even if we may posit objective things as independent of our own immediate consciousness, they cannot be seen as independent of nihility:

> No thing, whatever it be, can be divested of nihility. Sooner or later all things return to nihility. Things cannot be actual without being deactualized; things cannot really exist except as unreal. Indeed it is in their very unreality that things are originally real. Moreover, in nihility the existence of existing things is able to be revealed, questioned, perceived. (Nishitani 1982:109).

Only from a nihility that can only be known existentially, is self able to move on to an Absolute emptiness that is also known existentially, where self can contemplate itself at one with the universe. It is in this contemplation that infinity can be apprehended. "True infinity as reality", says Nishitani, "refuses to be encountered anywhere but along the path of Existenz" (1982:177).

Sunyata, then, is described as a "field" of absolute emptiness only metonymically and for heuristic purposes, because it is experienced as having its centre everywhere and its circumference nowhere:

> For multiplicity and differentiation to become truly meaningful, then, the system of being is seen as something that opens up *nihilitiy* as its ground, and not merely as a system of *being*. The circle must not be looked at from within the circle itself, but as something that includes tangents at all points on the circumference. In so doing, it becomes apparent that all those points imply an absolute negation of the orientation to return to oneness at the center (the orientation given to them as properties of a circle), such that each point implies an orientation toward infinite dispersion. They then cease to be merely the defined loci of points situated equidistant from a common center. Of themselves, these points are not merely uniform and undifferentiated. They do not sink into a One that has had all multiplicity and differentiation extracted from it. Instead, each of them displays an orientation toward pluriformity that absolutely denies such a reduction to oneness, an orientation toward infinite tangential dispersion. And these orientations, showing up as they do in a unique manner at each particular point, as belonging only to that point, bring about an infinite differentiation. (Nishitani 1982:144)

This kind of infinity refers to the entwinement of all things qua *objects* in time both simultaneously and sequentially; and to their spiritual entwinement with each other. This does not include only embodied humans, but all the orders of things great and seemingly insignificant.

Even if the field of sunyata describes its discoveries with respect to the substantial things that we posit as such from the field of consciousness, things are not experienced as having the same kind of substantiality as they do in objective reality because here the self is still a subject. Substance becomes a measure of reality when things are grasped eidetically, according to Nishitani, the field of objective reality; "on the one hand, it is the field on which *things* come to display what they are in themselves; and on the other, the field on which *we* grasp what things are in

themselves. Such are the distinguishing features of the field of *logos* or reason" (1982:113). From the field of Absolute emptiness, though, knowledge and praxis are indistinguishable, this is where things are known in their absolute suchness. Here, the existence of things is not cognised as how they appear to us; rather, it is experienced as the mode of being of things as they are in themselves, which means to say, how they are in their own "home-ground".

To give us an idea about the notion of the home-ground of things, their suchness, from the standpoint of sunyata, Nishitani resorts to the metonymic language used in Buddhism to point towards the emptiness that entails the knowledge of non-knowing. He refers to the old sayings according to which 'fire does not burn fire', 'water does not wet water', and 'the eye does not see the eye'; and goes on to argue that these things sustain their own being in their intrinsic suchness by not being able to overstep themselves: being is sustained by non-being.

> Just as the essential function of the eye, to see things, is possible by virtue of the selfness of the eye, whereby the eye does not see the eye itself; and just as the fact that fire burns things is possible by virtue of the selfness of fire, whereby the fire does not burn itself; so, too, the knowing of the subject is rendered possible by the not-knowing of the self in itself. Thus we can say in general that the self in itself makes the existence of the self as a subject possible, and that this not-knowing constitutes the essential possibility of knowing. (Nishitani 1982:156)

It is only in this field that the self can be experienced as absolutely subjective and free from objectifying reality. But this does not mean that the substantial manifestation of things disappears, only that our existence in time becomes radicalised as a synchronic awareness of things in themselves because we identify with them at their home-ground, in a negation of being that is no mere nihility; but an Absolute emptiness that is an absolute fullness at the same time. Such is spiritual knowledge, which is essentially non-discursive, since verbal structures can only point at such knowledge but may never aspire to convey it on their own.

In the field of consciousness though, which is the field where science dwells, sunyata may be posed as the "near side" transhistorical realm needed for any form of historicity in the form of an ideal type that cannot be experienced from the field of consciousness; but that can nevertheless be posed as an aspirational ideal. This

discloses an immediate personal historicity in awareness of synchronicity with the existence of all other things and beings in a deeper way than that that of the Western tradition, where the self separates itself ontologically from the object of cognition to produce its own judgement; just like its "far side" transhistorical realm. Nevertheless, the subject-object divide is an important principle of our objectivist discipline and should still be considered as relevant in order to produce intellectual knowledge; but this is done in a recognition that this disciplinary principle must be based on some form of *mythos*, just like that of any other discipline. What we are left with is two disciplinary realms that are helpful to establish the relationship between synchrony and diachrony from the present moment of meaningful experience.

Two concepts that emerge from evolutionary biology are useful to illustrate the kind of historicity that emerges from the Eastern and Western transhistorical realms: ontogeny and phylogeny. Ontogeny denotes the individual lifetime of living beings, and phylogeny, the evolution of their species through time. If we translate these biological concepts into historical ones, giving them the relationship between personal history and universal human history respectively, we could relate ontogeny to our embodied present as living beings and phylogeny to the known history of humanity. We could also say that the historical facticity of the Eastern tradition tends towards ontogeny; while that of the Western tradition tends towards phylogeny. Nevertheless, this arrangement can only be done phenomenologically and synchronically, that is, from the present moment of meaningful experience. The whole organisational symbology of both traditions cannot be overlapped diachronically onto each other because they follow divergent symbological paths in human imagination.

IV. 4. True Equality

The contemplation of the "near side" perspective as a transhistorical realm overcomes the typically Western attitude of necessary objectification of the 'other' sustained in a postcolonial world-order (where the master objectifies the slave through exploitation and the slave objectifies the master through desire). The relationship between the self and the 'other' is complementary from a synchronic perspective of phenomenological observation. It is in this sense that Luce Irigaray considers that only the gaze of the Buddah in a "selfless, nurturant relation to the world" escapes the dialectics of domination (Jay 1993:538). These dialectics are framed in a diachrony of progress towards the unified goals of "universal" humanity. The contemporary modern crisis of an 'end of history' is unable to unify those goals beyond wealth expansion without resorting to a Judeo-Christian kind of morality as judgement. This kind of morality can be very self-destructive when it comes to the question of blame. The Western peoples inherit their view of reality and, paradoxically enough, collective allocation of blame simply extends the primitive belief in cosmobiological tribal responsibility and inheritance of either virtue or disgrace, and worse, the drive to vengeance and retribution. This same attitude also perpetuates belief in the 'delayed' quality of the underdeveloped peoples as the collective 'other'. So it is important not to be too ready to fall for the typically Western 'guilt trip' for its ancestors having colonised and oppressed the rest of the world systematically. Allocation of historical responsibility is useless beyond telling the historical tale, which has already been told. From this perspective, one can only reconsider one's own belief system... unless it is one's own chosen path to engage in endless critical struggle with the world.

An alternative to this is the synchronic perspective that includes an absolute "near side" of transhistorical reality as *agape* (Love) and *karuna* (Compassion); regarded as able to forgive and let go of blame. Nevertheless, in our intellectual tradition --even from this synchronic perspective-- the diachronic tendencies of the "far side" transhistorical realm are also needed for a work of differentiation of phenomenal domains. There is a need to expand our objectivist view

methodologically in order to portray all views of reality that we can conceive of as relevant to human interaction and life. Through this exercise of convergence, scientific observation may learn to overcome its own fundamentalist claims over the legitimate nature of reality. Nevertheless, the Western tradition has created the possibilities of contemporary global coordination and, while this "achievement" is not without its terrible vices, it is also a tangible outcome of the Western tradition and culture which is already a global tradition and culture.

The Western/Christian view of reality and its supremacy over the world in globalisation, today effectively divides nations by their progress in the Western scientific cosmological tale (first world/third world, developed/underdeveloped); which after secularisation and mechanisation in the global capitalist market, has become progress in wealth expansion. However, there is a need to take a closer look at this tale and its accompanying "rational" *mythos*. For example, the "laws of the market", which are seen as natural and set free by omnipotent and rational processes; yet the liberal thrust of globalisation has proved to have had devastating consequences for the poor of the world. State protectionism struggles with this side of the mechanisms of "wealth expansion"; but even if neo-liberal national-States commit themselves to keep an eye on the interests of the people, they stick to the liberal future promises of wealth expansion for all; while present existence before the "invisible hand" makes the rich richer. The rich take advantage of the cheap human labour and resources coming from those who lack power in the world-order, while the prevalent contemporary discourse sustains that the poor must modernise themselves (work harder) to have access to the *wealth* that is claimed to be expanding. In this way, the Western/Christian perception of time as a future 'not yet' is very helpful to the political arbitrariness of the powerful. But mythical tales of this sort, like that of social Revolution, may also become quite useful for organised opposition to the establishment which at the same time as being critical, may also become very destructive.

In the Western cosmology 'universality' is conceived of as an intellectual abstract category, not as experienced actuality. This means that scientific intellectual knowledge has in-built limitations due to its dependence on local and particular (in

space and time) empirical evidence. Although it must keep the concept of universality as a disciplinary constant, the models of reality that science produces are only statistical truths, or mere approximations to universal reality that only succeed in explaining local phenomena. In the embodied existence and at a local level, these models have proved to be very powerful... but the borderline between powerful and destructive can be crossed --and has been crossed-- especially in the contemporary abstract linear scientific and technological incrementally progressive race that clashes with the earth's organic cycles. Also, the divided universe of the Christian cosmology that science inherits is unable to conceive of universal union with the 'other' because it sees the realm of wrongness as real, and its existence is regarded as a border horizon with 'otherness' --even if there is an assumption, in the notion of progress, that this horizon will eventually disappear. It is important to bear in mind that this division came by through a 'particular' cosmological *mythos* and a culturally determined vivid awareness of individual responsibility.

To lose faith in the divided universe of Western science is a movement similar to losing faith in the universality of Newtonian physics: a unified universe is able to see the practical usefulness of the latter, but does not see universal truth in them (even as the methodological principle of contemplating the universe is sustained). The relevance of Apocalypse in this work is seen as a spiritual symbol that signals the end of history in Absolute emptiness (forgiveness in Love and Compassion), the absolute "near side" of transhistorical reality with respect to the self (individual or collective) is seen as an ideal-type signpost around which the synchronic perspective of phenomenological observation can be organised. This synchronic perspective is built here with respect to the "near side" as well as "far side" transhistorical realms, which as we will ƽee in the next part of the thesis, can be regarded as principles of methodological observation, or as ideal-typical signposts that mark different perspectives of a tendency to 'universe'. The "far side" tendency describes complex multiplicity following the disciplinary mandates of factuality; the "near side" tendency points towards transcending physical separation and regards human mind as an ideally collective spiritual universe. It is only in the wholeness of that collectivity that the divided modern self of humanity may be healed, yet will

remain infinitely diverse in its embodied character. In the intentional union of the 'I' and the 'other' particular experience can reflect universality in its uniqueness; however, this is a spiritual union that does not take place discursively --but it leaves its marks on ordinary human interaction, in the synchronic figures of forgiveness and trust. The latter are human emotions pointing to the ideal transhistorical "near side" beyond existential nihility; that of Divine love (*agape*) and compassion (*karuna*). This is what Nishitani calls the structure of religious love:

> Here the absolute self-negation that sees the *telos* of the self not in the self but in all things and the absolute self-affirmation that sees the original selfness of the self in all things are one. (Nishitani 1982:277)

When Absolute emptiness is an ideal of disciplined interaction, one sees oneself in everyone else, each conscious self becomes a monad that will reflect oneself in the constant expansion of consciousness: the 'other' is everyone that I perceive as an embodied self and interaction should lead me to the realisation of the illusion of 'otherness'.

In a phenomenological manner, awareness of embodiment allows for diversity in the modality of "appearance", as the world becomes the "world-perceived-in-the-reflective-life":

> The descriptive spirit and the requirement of constitution tend to meet but fail to blend into each other for according to the idealistic requirement of constitution, the Other must be a modification of my Ego and according to the realistic character of description, the Other never ceases to exclude himself from the sphere of "my monad". (Ricoeur 1967a:130)

This work is therefore an exercise where science is regarded as a discipline that should learn to overcome its fundamentalist claims over reality. It attempts to reach out to the two sources of universality in the transhistorical realms that tend to the directions of the "far side" and the "near side". And yet, this theory does not claim universal application; its validity rests --like in the pagan traditions-- on a trust in cosmology: the symbological links that various human experiences of order may produce between the three cosmologies. They produce symbols that organise human perception of reality and therefore, determine the shape of its social order. Unlike postmodern theoretical constructs, that deny existence to this universal dimension,

this theory for organisational analysis considers that universality is a symbol that conveys a spiritual-human value that cannot be ignored or taken as illusion in the contemplation of 'world views'. If the realm of the universal is rejected, the link between particular experience and any claim of further validity is lost. And yet the claims for validity of this theoretical framework can only be seen in its usefulness as an analytical tool for a narrative approach to the qualitative analysis of human order.

It is important to say that, despite this work's critique of the Western tradition, I am aware that this belief system has created the possibility of global coordination through the figure of the secular institution. This figure might inherit a charismatic aura from its sacred ancestors, but in the practice of a spiritual discipline of self-reflection and awareness, it can be observed that institutions sustain and coordinate global interaction by the synchronic organisational notion of trust (a kind of intuitive submission to experience), just like this same notion sustains the practice of the scientific discipline (Shapin 1994). However, it is important to stress that the Western symbolisation of its view of reality is an essential step in the development of human creativity. The moral individual, even if produced by contrast to evil, is a gem of the Western tradition in its universalistic responsibility towards the rest of humanity, in its ideal clarity about intentionality, in its intellectual discipline, and in its formal organisational possibilities. The Western possibility of internalising the concept of 'universe', even as an abstract conception, creates awareness of a shared ideal as the basis of civilised interaction that is able to transcend nations and creeds. This kind of refined interaction is produced by belief in this universal ideal; but it is only through synchronic trust that the ideal can be reified in experience. Its new disciplinary chore is to stop judgement upon the 'other', which according to phenomenological metaphysics, is only a constant judgement upon the 'I'; if the 'I' and the 'other' are not embraced as one, the moral individual remains a nihilistic, solitary "unhappy consciousness".

"History symbolically ends," says Frye, "at the point at which master and servant become the same person, and represent the same thing" (Frye 1982:91). In the Christian historical symbolism, this possibility has a "once and for all" quality in the life of Jesus Christ, the perfect Son of God, who took the form of a historical

character and walked the earth; but it is based on the expectation of an end of times (and the world) in Apocalypse. From a synchronic perspective, it is possible to conceive of this kind of love without the need of a factual Second coming; yet with a symbological one in the acceptance of a transhistorical realm located on the "near side" of the self. From this standpoint, every object of historicity has its origin in Absolute emptiness and the notion of self is extended to everything and everyone. From this standpoint, no intellectual or positive criteria may be defined in order to rule interaction and equality. This is why it still needs the "far side" transhistorical realm to differentiate human rules and agreements that change constantly. Nevertheless, the "near side" is an ideal realm of self from which the most authentic kind of morality emanates without falling into the problems of legalism, it is an ideal realm of true equality:

> True equality is not simply a matter of an equality of human rights and the ownership of property. Such equality concerns man as the subject of desires and rights and comes down, in the final analysis, to the self-centered mode of being of man himself. It has yet to depart fundamentally from the principles of self-love. And therein the roots of discord and strife lie ever concealed. True equality, on the contrary, comes about in what we might call the reciprocal interchange of absolute inequality, such that the self and the other stand simultaneously in the position of absolute master and absolute servant with regard to one another. It is an equality in love. (Nishitani 1982:285)

If they ask you, 'From where have you originated?' Say to them, 'We have come from the light, where the light has originated through itself.' If they ask you, 'Who are you?' Say to them, 'We are His sons, and we are the elect of the living Father. 'If they ask you, 'What is the sign of your Father in you?' Say to them, 'It is a movement and a rest'.

--Gnostic Gospel according to Thomas

PART TWO:

Organisation and Structure

Chapter V.
The Present Moment of Meaningful Experience: A Synchronic Perspective on the Study of Human Order

This chapter describes a theoretical perspective that is based on both the Western and Eastern notions of transcendence in order to try to overcome, from a synchronic and phenomenological perspective of observation, the traditional objectification of people and their beliefs. This is achieved by taking into account the spiritual dimension of human consciousness at the background of present observation, in a constant awareness of the transcendental roots to the discipline of scientific observation. The perspective makes use of the two transcendentalist notions of transhistorical "realms" in order to embrace the Western intention of contemplating the universe; but this is done in the awareness that, if *universe* or *infinity* is apprehended, this is a spiritual experience that can never be fully described. Nevertheless, our Western tradition of knowledge is based on description from a transhistorical "vantage point" of observation, deeply rooted in the construction of traditional scientific generalisations. I will propose an imaginary "vantage point" of observation, which is related to the emerging paradigm of complexity, in order to organise useful scientific generalisations that can accommodate views of reality other than the strictly Western one at the same level of significance to human life.

As has been argued, an intellectual description from this perspective cannot be done without resorting to metaphoric structures that are linked to the emotional attachment and knowledge of existing symbols with mythical grounds. This is the reason why, even if our theoretical perspective is engaged in describing reality with respect to ideally transcendental or transhistorical realms, the mundane scene of methodological application should be aware that theory is essentially based on myth, and constitutes at best a useful metaphor for understanding. From this awareness, the Eastern insights about transcendence are taken on loan in order to expand the Western intellectual tradition towards the direction where 'oneself' and the 'other' cannot be clearly distinguished in phenomenological observation. And so, the "present moment of meaningful experience" is one that lies within a synchronic conscious area of overlap between the three ideally typical views of reality. However,

it is important to bear in mind that this centre of consciousness is imagined from the Western tradition of knowledge and cultural inheritance, and so, its universalising theoretical conclusions should be regarded --at best-- as useful impositions of ideal *essences* on empirical reality.

V. 1. Complexity and Phenomenology

From a "present moment" perspective, the outcome of observation is recorded through phenomenological observation, which through eidetic reduction, embarks upon the intellectual discovery of the unfolding of a richly textured complexity. Nevertheless, I assume that the perspective of spiritual simplicity is always present with the observer, its experience is part of her/his own moral and/or spiritual path -- necessarily silent. The "present moment" perspective discloses simultaneity, and so, its essence is synchronicity. Complexity in this work is defined as a way of looking at any phenomenon that can also be experienced and observed in its sheer simplicity and that, as such, can be the source of any kind of knowledge. Nevertheless, for there to be knowledge, there must also exist the possibility of convergence among human beings, which our scientific tradition of knowledge symbolises as intersubjectivity. I consider the much debated notion of "intersubjectivity" as an ideal type of perfect communication that is unachievable intellectually in its absolute purity. Nevertheless, intellectual intersubjectivity may be empirically observed as an area of convergence that is experienced in interaction and that is defined practically and culturally. In order to disclose this complex intersubjective realm of interaction, a methodological area of convergence between the Western "far side", the Eastern "near side", and primitive mythology (the resulting tale) is proposed for the three types of knowledge (intellectual, spiritual, primary) to coexist theoretically. It is possible to define this area only synchronically because, as has been pointed out in previous chapters, these three areas of experience do not converge symbologically in diachrony. The area of simultaneous convergence is defined through a phenomenological approach to observation of complexity in human interaction as an analytical tool that "stands for" the boundless immediacy of experience. Within this area, complexity coexists and overlaps with simplicity.

This is a methodological way to deal with what has recently been identified as "complexity" in embodied human interaction, which is not the same as "complicated". Complication arises within abstraction itself in its often intricate patterns of explanation. The notion of complexity found in cognitive sciences and

physics is regarded more as a perspective on world phenomena than a visible feature of the world; and I argue that this perspective allows a more dynamic analysis of social structures of order. This perspective arises as an alternative to deterministic views of the world, which only managed to portray very complicated solutions to problems of scientific observation. The "complicated" is already a product of human conceptual representation, while, as Le Moigne puts it, "the surprising part of complexity is the invisibility of its content. [...] The 'very complicated' may not be 'very complex', and the 'very simple', such as a grain of matter, may prove to be very complex" (Le Moigne 1984:37). This is clarified when we consider that complexity is a perspective to observe phenomena that are posed as elements of systemic interaction. As Edgar Morin puts it:

> If we could imagine a paradigm of complexity, it would be a paradigm uniting distinction, which is necessary to grasp objects or phenomena with conjunction, which is necessary to establish links and interrelations. It would not reduce the complex to the simple, but would integrate the simple within the complex. A paradigm of complexity would be a paradigm where thought would not be controlled by logic, but logic would be controlled by thought. More specifically it would be a dialogical principle. The word dialogical itself establishes the limitations and possibilities of knowledge. Why limitations? Dialogical means it is impossible to reach a sole principle, or master a word, whatever it is; there will always be something irreducible to a single principle, be it chance, uncertainty, contradiction, or organisation. But at the same time, dialogics, while it contains an intrinsic limitation, also includes the possibility of bringing concepts into play among themselves. (Morin 1984:65-6)

In the observation of complexity, the observer finds him/herself within the phenomenon that s/he observes, in interaction with it, in the same social environment: S/he finds him/herself in a position where every interaction with the object of observation transforms the object of observation itself. Subjectivity is therefore identified with individual present awareness of meaningful order, while objectivity can be regarded as a discursive social construction of causality in past and (possibly) future (planned) interaction which allows the observers to have conversations with each other and build a factual cosmology, map our scientific view

of reality with respect to the world, 'touch the elephant'[1]. According to Jean-Pierre Dupuy, in complex theory, "the law which governs phenomena may itself be the product of the phenomena, without, however, ceasing to be the law" (1984:257). The observation of complexity assumes an intertwining of cause and effect which is particularly relevant in the study of human social phenomena: In this work the latter is regarded as both discursively created by embodied humans and practically creative of the consciousness of self of every individual human; and both realms are dimensions of human consciousness.

The *present moment of meaningful experience* that I propose, in contrast to the ideal transhistorical realms of the "near side" and the "far side", is lived in the immediate environment of present consciousness. This environment is lived subjectively and functionally by the individual self who finds her/himself in the field of consciousness. Here, environment refers to an area of reality that our tradition identifies as the objective 'outside' realm that embodied people enact and perceive and can agree about as being (our notion of) the immediate "objective" reality in which we interact; one that we can describe with a degree of precision, the realm where science is most effective (to the point of being dangerous). In what we call "objective reality" particular people interact through common elements of their views of reality through which interaction is structured and in which interaction structures itself. This simultaneous created and creative realm of interaction is experienced as the realm of potential agreement between human beings. The concept of intersubjectivity can be useful in this kind of constructivist practical manifestation of experienced agreement.

The traditional ideal realm of intersubjectivity for the "objective" mind is an ideal of collective perfect interaction on the basis of intellectual knowledge. But intersubjectivity is unachievable qua intellectual ideal because, on the one hand, it

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[1] The fable of the blind men attempting to describe an elephant is a favourite metaphor resorted to in order to describe the efforts of making sense of organisations (see Waldo 1961). This is also the case in interdisciplinary research groups. In his book *Understanding Religion*, Eric Sharpe uses it in order to illustrate how the different definitions of religion come to be; the elephant being the complex phenomenon under analysis: "One touches its trunk and describes it as a snake; another touches its ear and describes it as a winnowing-fan; another touches its leg and describes it as a tree; another its tail and describes it as a broom" (Quoted by Bennett 1996:13).

implies perfect cognition of what goes on in the head of the human other, which is contradictory with the idea that what goes on in subjective experience cannot be fully expressed discursively; and on the other, its transcendental symbological source is situated in the transhistorical realm of the "far side", inaccessible to the embodied particular person. But the realm of intersubjectivity may be posed here as a cultural realm, as the experienced area of agreement for synchronic functionality of the present moment of interaction. Nevertheless this work does not pose a mere constructivist idea of intersubjectivity, because I consider it here as bootstrapped back to the people who generate their view of social reality, which generates their consciousness of self back. And so, we constantly 'grasp' what we are and 'get caught' by this grasping simultaneously.

However, even though intersubjectivity is unachievable in its intellectual ideal purity, assumption of an 'ideal' intersubjective realm is essential to our discipline. It is important to bear in mind though, that the symbological roots of intersubjectivity are transcendental: when Husserl has to bring the intermonadological intersubjectivity back to the *res cogitans*, he falls into the same Cartesian trap and fails to convince us that intersubjectivity remains transcendental in our embodied experience of intellectuality (see Luhmann 1995). It points to transcendence and is therefore a realm of spiritual experience, not of intellectual experience. The intersubjective realm, then, can be posed for the purposes of theory as an ideal type that can only be achieved imperfectly through constantly changing culture and/or through the abstract tools of intellectual knowledge. But it is through this intersubjective realm of collective discipline that we can agree as observers on what is "objective" and factual experienced reality.

And so, within this created and creative notion of disciplined observation, "objectivity" is based on factual (legitimate) evidence that can be organised as a pull towards one's personal and embodied present consciousness and a push towards a tale of beginning and beyond that may be cyclical or linear, or a combination of both. The factual historicity of the *present moment of meaningful experience* needs to consider both of the transhistorical realms described in chapter IV above. They can be considered as ideal "sign-posts", with the "near side" at the centre (the ideal and

radical subjectivity of Absolute emptiness) and the "far side" at an infinite distance from it (the ideal and radical objectivity of God's eye-view), to organise itself as either individual particular life span (ontogeny) or universal history (phylogeny). The 'pull' towards personal consciousness is necessary in order for the observer to be continually aware that her/his own realm of experienced awareness is conditioned by his/her own personal life-story and cultural inheritance for interpretation of reality. The resulting story that the observer tells "objectively" about reality, even as it must be couched in honest observation of factual evidence, is nevertheless only a useful mythological tale: the descriptive symbols of intellectuality are displaced from being able to apprehend the diverse infinity of complex phenomena that lie between the transhistorical "near side" and the infinitely distant "far side". I regard this as congenial with the Weberian epistemological tradition according to which, on the one hand, "objectivity" in the social sciences is constantly tied to our own subjectivity (Weber 1949); and on the other, ideal-typical constructions should always be measured against relevant empirical reality because they in themselves are mere utopia (Weber 1987).

This perspective is proposed here for the phenomenological observer of complex order to construct her/his eidetic explanations. My theoretical construction implies that complexity and simplicity are intimately bound to each other and are experienced simultaneously; yet can only be distinguished intellectually from each other from different perspectives, and one at a time. The relationship between the spiritual and synchronic "near side" and the intellectual diachronic "far side" perspectives is mediated by a sea of complexity that is also simplicity at the same time; the "far side" organises a centrifugal tendency of diachronic complexity and intellectual differentiation while the "near side" organises a centripetal tendency of synchronic simplicity and spiritual convergence of consciousness. The difference between this construction and the relationship between the Western notions of the One (*Hen*) and the many (*Apeiron*) lies in that the complex perspective does not emanate from convergence of multiplicity in homogeneous simplicity. That is, complexity and simplicity do not emanate from each other; rather, they emanate from human consciousness: the centrifugal push of intellectuality or the centripetal pull of

spirituality, and constitute *possible* transhistorical perspectives that coexist simultaneously. The complex intellectual perspective defines what it is that differentiates the borders (or circumference) of observed *things* (even as they overlap with one another), while at the same time, their centres converge in spiritual and silent simplicity. In this sense, both complexity (intellectual) and simplicity (spiritual) are observational perspectives and not "objective" characteristics of the described reality; and so, the notion of complexity is no more (and no less) than an 'ideal' and a useful analytical tool.

It is important for this work to emphasise that complexity and simplicity are only perspectives of observation and that, in our intellectual tradition of knowledge, simplicity remains silent. This is an necessary point for a change in perspective from diachrony to synchrony, because in organisational theory, complex organisation is identified with the "advanced" type of modern organisation in contemporary post-industrial service-based economy (Giarini 1984), whose immediately previous form of conception was defined around the Weberian legal-rational type of domination (Morgan 1986, Czarniawska-Joerges 1992). In the next chapter, I will point at the past "path dependency" of this traditional notion of complexity on the Victorian progressivist assumption that complexity gradually emanates from simplicity through differentiation and specialisation. While it is true that this movement can be observed in present "post-industrial" societies, it is misleading to consider that more traditional societies are "simple" or lacking in the complexity of social interaction and meaning formation and interpretation. It could even be argued that the service-based economy type of complexity observed today could be seen as a "return" to spontaneous interaction after the original rigid formality of legal-rational ("scientific") or industry-based organisations failed to adapt to changing circumstances[2]. Besides, this view of complexity is necessarily diachronic, set in human history, and displaced from converging with other traditions of knowledge and cultural imagination. What in traditional organisational theory is identified as a diachronic tendency of modernity

[2] For a discussion on how "complex" organisations are a combination of the bureaucratic paradigm and traditional practices and how this contributes to their complexity, see (Czarniawska-Joerges 1992).

towards "complexity", can be regarded as a mere consequence of the "complication" of modern life from the synchronic perspective. From this perspective, or the present moment of meaningful experience, complexity is necessarily a transhistorical perspective of observation; that is, an analytical tool of observation that should not be imposed as an aspect of the reality that we observe.

We must take into account that the observer him/herself is culturally situated. This is the perspective of a phenomenological analysis where the observer also observes her/himself and his/her own embodied condition. From this perspective, subjectivity is seen as a universal experience of consciousness while objectivity is particular to a specific kind of group, a socially constructed view of reality (see Berger and Luckmann 1966, Czarniawska-Joerges 1992, Searle 1995). The observer must situate her/himself in the scientific world view and be aware that only couched in its cosmological language, can s/he have a conversation with other observers. It is only by being aware of his/her own discursive intention that the observer can achieve any kind of "objectivity": The disciplined practice of the observer not only includes the contemplation of her/himself but, as Weber (1949) insisted, it is directed by this contemplation. Objectivity in the social sciences (as well as that of any other kind) is based on trust in the honesty about factuality of the observer as a synchronic principle of practice, but also on the collective nature of the scientific discipline (Shapin 1994, see also Czarniawska 1998). And so, in this discipline, the notion of observation itself bears past path dependencies on cultural understandings.

According to Martin Jay, the Greek philosophical tradition favoured the sense of vision in order to achieve knowledge which was conceived as "the state of having seen" (Snell 1953:198)[3], and this permeated the subsequent Western philosophical history. He follows Hans Jonas (1982) to say that sight may be considered as the noblest of the senses because it is pre-eminently perceived as the sense of simultaneity:

> Intrinsically less temporal than other senses such as hearing or touch, it thus tends to elevate static Being over dynamic Becoming, fixed essences over

[3] Quoted by (Jay 1993:24).

> ephemeral appearances. Greek philosophy from Parmenides through to Plato accordingly emphasized an unchanging and eternal presence. (Jay 1993:24)

In modern epistemology, it was the French philosophical tradition, Jay tells us, that produced an explicit shared suspicion of sight as a supposedly privileged sense for knowledge:

> In the case of philosophy, three changes must be singled out for special mention. The first concerns what can be termed the detranscendentalization of perspective; the second, the recorporealization of the cognitive subject; and the third, the revalorization of time over space. (Jay 1993:187)

However, even if perspective is not seen as eternal Presence, being disenchanted and given to an embodied observer in time, it is still linked to the original symbolisation of transcendence in the Western tradition of knowledge. And yet, perspective can also become a disenchanted conceptual aid to separate phenomenal domains. The perceptual phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty as opposed to the transcendental one of Husserl poses just this alternative; phenomenology could "mean something besides searching for pure essences through eidetic intuition; it could mean as well exploring impure existence, which resisted reduction to the object of a gaze, phenomenological or otherwise" (Jay 1993:268). And so the division of the continuum of time is set against the differentiation between static absolute perspective and movement; which can be described as two realms of our experience of time.

And so, in our scientific tradition, nature is observed in its most minute detail and recorded in descriptive symbols that demonstrate an *objective* "world" order, or a natural order. But for us to be able to conceive of the world as a measurable and observable entity, transcendence was displaced beyond this world as an omnipotent gaze which set the human observer (and worshipper of truth) in a mimetic discipline of objective observation in the place of God as an Absolute Observer. Hierophany is not a meaningful symbol or activity within science, but it is important to remain aware that in the practice of disciplined observation, Divine Presence never really disappears entirely as a structural assumption of the discipline. Divine Presence is then projected on the world as the perfect mechanics of the universe --that was originally a celebration of Divine Creation-- and *embodied* by the transcendental identity of the scientist, and even if this transformation and mimesis of divine

Presence is not currently necessarily regarded as symbolic of the Divine --it is more readily ignored and assumed as a disenchanted mechanism-- it produces an environment for objective observation. The original philosophical fervour of this transformation is left without representation in current science though, and therefore, its transcendentally divine essence becomes trivial. What is left for the scientist is the joy of adventure and discovery once the world is disenchanted, and even this eventually becomes trivial too. But the symbolisation of transcendence itself within the structure of the scientific belief system is not trivial methodologically, and the practice of disciplined observation which this cosmology requires shapes many of the instances in which modern people perceive the world today. Throughout this century in the European academic circles, it is true, this perspectivalism has been challenged; but it is only challenged on the basis of its own cosmological assumptions, and therefore, the demolition of cosmology is never complete (as in the main myth of modern rational "enlightenment" and in all of its subsequent "post" rejections and critiques), it is only reinvented along the same lines according to what is important contemporarily.

In my theoretical model, the phenomenological embodied observer stands at the centre of her/his own subjectivity and observes his/her own present situation with respect to past and future. And yet s/he is aware that this perspective is perfectly subjective and may only be shared intellectually as imperfect intersubjectivity (particular and culturally determined objectivity). Synchrony and diachrony are two ways of symbolising the experience of time, but are not absolute categories. They are useful, as in literary criticism, to differentiate between simultaneity and sequence and also point towards perceived spatial domains of closeness and distance. Synchrony's tendency is centripetal while diachrony's movement defines a centrifugal direction. They are categories of time that make sense both within our scientific belief system and our embodied experience, and are thus useful conceptual tools... but their symbological relationship to transcendence and to an essential divide between the latter and the world in our tradition of knowledge cannot be obliterated. *Myhtos* is always the basis for discipline.

Bearing this in mind , and from a synchronic perspective, then, the method of observation is necessarily phenomenological and its eidetic constructions from observation have the symbolic orientation of descriptive complex factuality. In phenomenological analysis, the reality of the world remains bracketed as appearance (eidetic reduction); and if combined with a transhistorical "near side" of simplicity, particular personal experience can be seen as reflecting the universal level of things. Even if this experience of seeing universality in particularity cannot be described for being spiritual; it can be posed as a relevant ideal type to guide observation. Reduction in phenomenology is a state of mind that suspends the abstract assumption that there is an outside reality as opposed to the Kantian assumption that can never know the thing in itself, but that is based on the ontology of an outside reality (the subject/object divide). Reduction is, of course, an artificial resource that allows for reflective contemplation of the sphere of ownness, insulated from anything other than itself, where "any apparent relation between oneself and anything else [is construed] as solely a property of one's own subjective experience, a 'mirroring' of what is included in one's monad and not a perceiving of something outside" (Hammond *et al.* 1991:211). Although Husserl's use of the concept of 'monad' is methodological, and not essentially endorsing Leibniz's metaphysical notion[4], the use of his methodology always involves a metaphysical decision.

> When distinguishing between the method practised and the philosophical interpretation of this method, in no way do I mean to exclude the well-known phenomenological reduction. To do so would be to reduce phenomenology to a rhapsody of lived experiences and to baptise as "phenomenology" any concern for the curiosities of human life, as is too often the case. The reduction is the straight gate to phenomenology. But in the very act of reduction a methodological conversion and a metaphysical decision intersect, and just at that point one must distinguish between them (Ricoeur 1967a:176).

I explain the metaphysical decision as the need to include the transhistorical realm of the "near side" together with that of the "far side". As eidetic judgement poses no individual essence as the basis for existence, this phenomenological artifice can be

[4] Husserl explicitly rejects the Leibnizian interpretation of the concept of 'monad' in the section 62 of his *Cartesian Meditations* "as the ultimate constituents of reality" (Hammond *et al.* 1991:211)

considered as analogous to the ideal "collective" spiritual realm of the "near side" transhistorical perspective. This spiritual "near side" gives balance to an excess reliability on the occularcentric perspective of an ideal transcendental subject at the "far side", inaccessible to the particular and embodied person, and incompatible with the worldly *res cogitans.* And yet, at the same time as the observer uses this transhistorical imaginary "tools" for observation s/he is also aware that, in present synchrony, the observer is only (but not merely) a particular and embodied person. But this person's identity lives in the cultural tradition (discipline) and personal scientific vocation to observe human structures of perception, which constantly change, but which are (agreed to be) experienced as constantly human at the same time. I argue that it is only through this metaphysical decision that particularity can acquire the same level of relevance as universality in observation of human experience. But even as this relevance is realised emotionally, it should be brought to embodied awareness and to the experienced impossibility of sharing absolute truth through *any* kind of symbolisation of reality.

And so in the *present moment of meaningful experience* the divide between subject and object is never complete through consideration of both transhistorical and necessarily ideal (mythical) realms. In simultaneity, object and subject are unavoidably entwined and create each other, and the awareness of this, in turn, produces degrees of uncertainty that science should consider theoretically. As Morin said, complex thought appears when "knowledge has to negotiate and deal with uncertainty" (1984:64); which is cut off in the mutilating types of thought that he calls simplifiers. But he believes that complex thought is not about *complete* accounts of reality, knowledge is never complete, but about accounts of reality that refuse to resort to simplifying mutilations of the reality that they try to describe:

> For example, if we think of the fact that we are physical, biological, social, cultural, psychic, and spiritual beings, complexity is obviously that which attempts to link or identify these aspects by highlighting the differences between them, whereas simplified thought either separates these different aspects or unifies them through a mutilating reduction. (Morin 1984:63)

Resistance to take on board a full analytical division between subject and object is related to the closeness between human interaction and human life. The former

would commonly be related to the social sciences and the latter to biology and thus be separated by different scientific disciplines. And so, I argue that to deal with human interaction, a paradigm of complexity requires a symbological synthesis of the traditionally divided grounds of social sciences and natural sciences: the division can be regarded as artificial, or as a useful epistemic principle of scientific discipline. Nevertheless, a synthesising perspective is necessary in order to throw some light on the much ignored realm of synchronicity (where we all are are both natural as well as social beings at the same time), and on the symbols of unity and trust, as essential features of human order and life. This synchronic perspective aims at disclosing the relevance of simultaneity as an essential feature of the practice of our intellectual discipline in the effort of knowing ourselves... which includes *knowing* our cultural inheritance as well as *knowing through* our cultural inheritance.

V. 2. Structure and Organisation

Following the theory of life and cognition developed by Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela, the model that I propose from the synchronic perspective of observation (the present moment of meaningful experience), is organised around two complementary aspects of order: structure and organisation. This is because, here, organisations are considered as living entities which are kept alive by their being regarded as legitimately real --even while they might not be regarded as legitimate politically-- by human conscious involvement of embodiment, emotion, and imagination[5]. Thus, the 'living' quality of organisations is analogous to their being operational --not necessarily functional or efficient--, and so, organisations depend on human life. In this work, organisation is defined as any kind of human spontaneous or disciplined activity in order to produce social order, which in turn produces human perception of actuality. This view of organisations is partly based on a relatively recent interpretative trend for organisational analysis; according to which "[p]eople", says Czarniawska-Joerges, "not only are *in* organisations (which both functionalist and critical theorists assume), but they also *create* organizations" (1992:11). Yet, this is only half of the story because while any form of human order and culture is created by human beings, it is at the same time creative of the human self: We create order and our interaction with it creates us as persons. This model for human organisation takes into account how our consciousness and our embodiment are sustained by each other; while individual embodiment is only a pure type of organic organisation it is sustained by consciousness of self (the pure type of human social artificial creation), at the same time as organic embodiment sustains this consciousness. And so, while the point of observation is the present moment of meaningful experience, this centre

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[5] This perspective is not based on a purely cognitive anthropology, which Barbara Czarniawska considers a form of solipsism: "Far from the objectivity of functionalism, past the intersubjectivity of social constructivism, on the solipsist pole, resides cognitive anthropology, which claims that culture is located in human kind's hearts and minds, and only there" (Czarniawska-Joerges 1992:117). My perspective includes emotion (heart), imagination (mind); but also, embodiment and conscious enactment. As Czarniawska says, then, organisations are "socially constructed --and reconstructed-- in everyday actions. Organisations can be also desconstructed by action, but it would again be a case of social deconstruction. This does not mean that organisations exist only in

of synchronic actuality is not necessarily only individual, it also includes collective realms of consciousness of self that emanate from primary and spiritual human knowledge.

In Maturana and Varela's observations on life, structure is defined as the changing aspect of the system --as opposed to traditional structuralism--, while organisation is the "permanent" aspect[6]. To explain the conceptual difference between these two notions (organisation and structure), Maturana uses a non-living (and therefore non-autopoietic) system --a chair-- as a straight forward example (1992:68-69). The variability of chairs in the world depends on the diversity in *structures* that there can be, and yet the particular form of *organisation* of materials is the one recognised as a chair by an observer. Even if you take a chair and paint it or drill holes in it, the structure is changed, but if the chair is not destroyed -- operationally "killed"-- its organisation remains the same. In interaction, we can observe the dynamic structural aspect of the entities that we interact with, which is constantly changing, accommodating itself to the environment and to the needs of the moment, moving to satisfy its own needs as well as those that it must satisfy for the other entities that it is related to. But we can also observe the organisational "permanent" side of this order: a number of qualities that we distinguish as the identity of the entity that we observe in interaction, or that we interact with; the organisation of a living entity is only "permanent" during its life-time.

The changing aspect of this model of organisational analysis is constituted by two structural organic axis and two artificial ones (see Figs. 1, 2, and 3 at the end of this chapter). In order to describe the "permanent" organic and artificial ideal types of *organisation* (see Fig. 4 below), it is necessary first to pay attention at how the model is structured by the complex perspective in that its *structure* changes constantly and

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our imagination. But if nobody came to work anymore, a factory would become "that old factory building" " (1992:34).

[6] The "permanent" aspect of the model is in inverted commas because this is only an indicative permanence, which helps us identify difference between entities, yet the changing structure of the model necessarily produces a changing "permanent" organisation. For example, an individual human being will be "organised" as a human being all her/his life, this is a permanent aspect of this entity, yet his/her structure is bound to change throughout her/his life; s/he won't be the same human being all his/her life. And so organisation allows us to identify permanence while structure allows us to observe change.

must necessarily deal with uncertainty. This (changing) structure has two dialogical and entwined aspects: organic and artificial. The organic aspect of the structure produces the basis for the observer's awareness of the union of humankind as a species; the artificial aspect of the structure produces the basis for the observer to ponder how the human animal is different from the non-human animal. The two poles of each structural axis constitute a binary opposition of complementary elements that are indistinguishable from each other without disciplined observation. If we observe a humanly organised living 'entity' (human consciousness and embodiment, personal relationships, families, tribes, organisations, nations...) as being ideally typically organic and artificial at the same time, both aspects can be observed and described through a sociological kind of "uncertainty principle".

Heisenberg posed this principle in quantum mechanics to solve the paradox whereby two "canonically conjugate variables" (such as position and speed) "can be defined more precisely only in an experimental situation in which the other must become correspondingly less precisely defined. In a certain sense, each of the variables then opposes the other" (Bohm 1980:74). So in a similar manner, the different pair of otherwise "canonically conjugated variables" (such as structure and organisation, the organic and the artificial aspects of human organisation, or any of the pairs at the ends of each axis in the structure of this model) can be observed as opposed to each other in the sense that one of them cannot be observed while looking at the other. A phenomenological observer situated in the present moment of meaningful experience would distinguish them as two different perspectives while looking at the same thing. But the observer cannot see them simultaneously, but only one at a time. They can only be differentiated through the moving perspective of sequence in the diachronic tale described by the observer (structure, and ultimately also organisation, are perceived as changing). In the model that I propose, the vertical and horizontal axis constitute the changing organic structure of the system and the two diagonal axis constitute the changing artificial structure of the system (see Fig. 1 at the end of this chapter). I will engage in describing the organic structure first, and then I will proceed to complete the structure of the model by describing its artificial components.

In the organic structure, the vertical axis is formed by the dichotomy imagination/emotion, and the horizontal axis is constituted by consciousness of self/embodiment (see Fig. 2 at the end of this chapter). The vertical axis represents individual subjectivity governed by imagination and emotion, which cannot be measured, and is a blind spot or an asymptote for this kind of organisational analysis, but its existence must be assumed. It represents the subjectivity of the observer him/herself, which Weber (1949) postulated as the only source of "objectivity" in the social sciences. The consideration of this dichotomy, and its logistics within the model, indicates personal tendencies that the observer should clarify: only the observer has access to her/his own subjectivity, to the observer's perfectly particular perspective. But also, only through this subjectivity does the observer have access to experience and perception of any kind of order. The axis emotion/imagination can be seen as the representation of a mirror, where the axis of embodiment/consciousness of self are seen as the person and his/her own reflection in the observed world. From the perspective of the consciousness of self, imagination and emotion are seen as psychological categories of mind-like energy. From the perspective of embodiment, imagination and emotion are related to the physiology of the brain, as it has been observed that emotional activity (music and poetry) is localised in the right side of the brain hemisphere, and intellectual imagination (conceptual thought and speech), is localised in the left side (Dunbar 1996:139). The difference between embodiment and consciousness of self is regarded as a difference that can only be construed in artificial terms, and yet, those aspects together with emotion and imagination are inextricable aspects of being human that all observers find themselves with. Thus, the vertical and horizontal axis remain the organic structure of the model.

Our embodiment and consciousness constitute two changing aspects of our organic human structure that here will be organised along the mind-body divide. However, this organisation obeys heuristic reasons and is not proposed in a way in which embodiment is equal to body and consciousness of self equal to mind, they are not seen as two 'things', assumed to be separate. Rather, consciousness and embodiment will be seen as simultaneous indistinguishable phenomena. They can only be observed separately in phenomenological reduction, when the observer

chooses not to see one of them. Structure is the changing aspect of the system, but this is not random change or deterministic transformation, it is somewhere 'in between' randomness and determination and has therefore a complex *stochastic* nature whose tendencies can be observed (see Le Moigne 1984, Morin 1984).

In a different heuristic representation, it is useful to visualise the two sides of the dichotomy embodiment/consciousness of self as two moving concentric circles: at birth, the circle of human consciousness is already at work in a practical unreflective manner, but during her/his infancy and early childhood, s/he learns to differentiate his/her own embodied self with respect to the realm of social collective human interaction where s/he develops, and becomes discursive and reflexive. To an observer, it takes the child's development into her/his own consciousness of self and bodily functionality --according to the particular culture in which s/he grows up--, to become an adult. In order for this to happen, human consciousness constantly "spills" beyond the confines of the physical body through *imagination* --while staying with it at the same time. But this is not necessarily a purely random "spilling", it is more generally experienced in every day life (the Husserlian life-world) as guided by our *emotional* involvement with the objects that entertain our *imagination* (either spontaneously induced or chosen by disciplined practice).

Imagination and emotions are just as natural to us in our everyday operational life as is our body and the consciousness of ourselves. In this theoretical formulation, I consider the realms of imagination and emotion as the distinctly human innate creative aspects of consciousness --the depth of our subjectivity-- and it is through them, in an organic interaction between consciousness and embodiment, that humans naturally build an "imaginary shelter", or "integument of culture", that protects them from the environment; which in turn serves as a self-referential environment for the human self to produce his/her own identity. As Tim Ingold puts it, "human beings are *not* simply instruments for the replication of culture; rather they *use* their culture (including architecture, costume and language) as a vehicle for living, for the mutual creation of themselves" (1986:319).The four structural organic aspects of this model that have been outlined (imagination, emotion, consciousness

of self, and embodiment) create the basis for the unity of the human self to the fellow humans of her/his species.

However, as has been said above, the difference between embodiment and consciousness can only be construed in artificial terms (see Fig. 3 at the end of this chapter). There are four structural artificial aspects of this model --spontaneity, discipline, path dependencies, and potentiality-- which create the basis for the difference between the human self and the rest of the living entities that we can "objectively" distinguish as such. The two artificial axes are arranged orthogonally with respect to each other, holding the binary oppositions of spontaneity/discipline and path dependencies/potentiality at their extremes. But these two artificial axes are arranged diagonally with respect to the organic structure. Thus, the differentiation of the artificial elements of the structure from the central perspective of the model is also twofold. Following Tim Ingold (1986), to differentiate the pair spontaneity/discipline I suggest **a** phenomenological distinction between practical and discursive intention. Path dependencies/potentiality are differentiated as past and future interaction within a present contemplation of the flow of time. In other words, from the present phenomenological perspective --the central point of the model-- spontaneity and discipline (practice) are manifested and observed in the synchronic plane of interaction while path dependencies and potentiality are construed in a diachronic plane, which nevertheless has the present moment of meaningful actuality at its centre. While it is fairly straight forward to deal with past (path dependencies), present (observation), and future (potentiality) diachronically, the synchronic relationship between spontaneity and discipline is not so clearly defined. This brings the need to discuss the relationship between time and experience as it is conceived in this work. After considering the synchronic relationship between spontaneity and discipline, I will go back to that between past path dependencies and potentiality. The following discussion derives mainly from a perspectival disagreement with Tim Ingold, whose analysis is framed in a strictly diachronic view of time in his book *Evolution and Social Life*. However, I find his notions of practical and discursive intentionality very useful in order to differentiate spontaneous from disciplined behaviour synchronically, and will therefore integrate them to my model: The

dichotomy spontaneity/discipline can be dealt with by the observation of Ingold's practical (spontaneous) and discursive (disciplined) "intentionality".

Tim Ingold situates his analysis temporally in what he calls "real time", or Bergsonian *duration*[7], to escape the complications of structuralist analysis. The problem of temporality in Ingold's analysis is linked to the perspective of a second-order observer. He situates himself outside the phenomenon of the flow of consciousness, and so, in observing a perpetual 'natural' continuum, the difference between synchrony and diachrony becomes irrelevant:

> [R]eal time --Bergsonian duration-- inheres in practical consciousness, which is one reason why this form of consciousness cannot be comprehended within the structuralist paradigm, constructed as it is on the abstract axes of synchrony and diachrony. Discursive consciousness, revelatory of synchronic structure, is played out in a motionless, extended present and has no essential time component. (Ingold 1986:301-2)

However, in situating himself outside the flow of consciousness, in the position of a second-order observer, Ingold ceases to contemplate himself within his own intellectual discursive awareness of his argumentation, one that is sequential and necessarily flows. From the perspective of the present moment of meaningful experience, discursiveness is inherently diachronic in that it needs the sequentiality of language and tale in order to be reified. But from Ingold's outside perspective and structuralist frame of mind, the synchronic aspect of experience in discourse is comparable to static a vessel "a mapping of the regions of the mind as though it were a container, private to each individual" (Ingold 1986:301).

In contrast to this, inside the experience of consciousness, from a phenomenological perspective of present observation, discursive (disciplined) consciousness becomes diachronic while practical (spontaneous) consciousness is synchronic. From this perspective, the realm of synchronicity is given symbols of a "permanent" essence that mark relevant simultaneity (spiritual unity, understanding,

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[7] Moore prefers to translate *durée* as 'durance', even though its translation into 'duration' had Bergson's authorisation. "But it seems to me", says Moore, "that the most natural use of this word in English is to refer to a measurable period of time during which something happens. It is perfectly true that the French word '*durée*' also has this meaning. However, my sense is that the French word can more readily be applied to *the fact or property of going through time* than the English 'duration'." (Moore 1996:58)

trust, empathy, relevant borders in relationships or functional coordination, autopoiesis, structural coupling...), but discursiveness is experienced together with the flow of time as movement and sequence --it could even be said that it is our discursive consciousness that organises this flow as sequentiality. From Ingold's perspective, one cannot see that a human discursive (disciplined) aspect is already embedded in the description of practical (spontaneous) consciousness, which from his second-order observer --outside-- perspective, is conceived essentially as a perpetually unfolding continuum (of diachronic essence). But in the present instant of the consciousness of being alive, there is a synchronic realm of simultaneity which was the one that Bergson was trying to point to, but to an extent, failed due to the diachronic nature of the conceptual and argumentative tools that he was using -- necessarily coherent and sequential. The present instant cannot be symbolised discursively because it loses its practical (spontaneous) synchronic quality and becomes absorbed by the sequentiality of tale, language, or description. The only way that I can find through which its simultaneity can be symbolised within the diachrony of explanation, is through a sociological type of "uncertainty principle": As has been said, through this, only one side of the dichotomy can be observed at a time while the other aspect fades away in observation, but is postulated as wholly present simultaneously nonetheless.

The problem of a second-order observer perspective is solved by Ingold in synthesising synchrony and diachrony in a Bergsonian construction of time as a continuum of the flow of experience; and so favouring indirectly a representation of time that is strictly diachronic. However, Bergson himself is opposed to this kind of characterisation in his book *Duration and Simultaneity* (1922), where, according to Moore, he celebrates Einstein's theory of general relativity where the abolition of absolute properties should be "complemented by the kind of absolute awareness of simultaneity which could flow from [Bergson's] earlier work" (Moore 1996:11). Bergson's *durée* was a reaction against abstract constructions of reality that were "not sensitive enough to that vital substratum of concrete, lived reality available only to the holistic understanding of the intuition" (Jay 1993:194). His main claim was that the discreteness of events --somehow "threaded together like beads on a string of

consciousness" (Moore 1996:55)-- is not real, that time is a continuing flow of experience. However, even if one would feel inclined to agree with Bergson's view of time as a synthesis of synchronic perception, in observation of complex simultaneity where everything is related to everything else, we should take into account just how this view is constructed.

As a reaction against abstract absolutism, Bergson opposes a perceptual absolutism and condemns the relevant symbols of his tradition to unreality because they deny embodied perception. Even though his philosophy has been heavily criticised due to its lack of formal precision, Bergson contended that his notion of precision rooted philosophy in the concrete experienced world, otherwise the formal trappings of precision were vain (Moore 1996:17). The philosophical trap for Bergson was that the Western tradition of knowledge relies on abstraction, and so does Bergson's own philosophy; thus, through abstraction, an absolutism of perception is not wholly apprehensible. In the representation of time as *durée*, Bergson opted for a representation of time beyond human history, the bodily-animal, the one that Darwin gave to nature in general but not to human beings (see the discussion on Darwin in section VI. 1. below). In this construction of time, he seems to regard the domain of relevant human events (historical, cultural, mythical, or otherwise) as unreal. But in the realm of relevant social events, we are emotionally and imaginatively linked to --created and creating-- historical and cultural domains, or the "beads" on the string of consciousness. However, one could argue that these realms are unreal in as much as they are emotionally imagined, discrete events may disappear once they become trivial for cosmology; but they are real to the social sciences as they constitute relevant domains for concrete experience of interaction among human beings. Events become symbolised in different types of language in personal and collective imagination, even if they are illusory, emotionally sustained, non-concrete ideological and abstract 'things'. Nevertheless, for human beings as animals, Bergson's construction of time as *durée* is a real aspect of experience that traditional philosophy until then had chosen to ignore; mainly because of an absolutist abstract-transcendental-human-(Western) identity.

It is posed by Ingold, and convincingly sustained by empirical evidence (see Ingold 1986), that human and non-human animals share this "animal" aspect of time in practical (spontaneous) consciousness which, until Bergson, was not considered as a realm of legitimate experience for human beings. Ingold regards practical consciousness as "a process, a creative good, which works through a whole series of fabrications and observations in the course of its unfolding" (1986:298). However, as I have argued, Ingold's view stands from an outside perspective. From an inside perspective within the experience of practical consciousness though, the notion of simultaneity is always present and this amounts to Ingold's own characterisation of practical consciousness as "the notion of mind as the enfolding of an intersubjective process" (1986:301). Beyond the problem of perspective, however, Ingold is engaged in differentiating discursive (disciplined) from practical (spontaneous) consciousness. In doing so, he surprisingly finds the locus of creativity in the latter, which we share with non-human animals, thus regarding them as co-creators with nature of their own business of living and not just as mere Cartesian 'automatons'.

In order to see this, Ingold deals with the "intrusion" of the contrastive term 'the unconscious' which, he notices, is rarely referred to as 'unconsciousness' (Ingold 1986:298); it denotes passivity and is therefore essentially non-creative. In order to clarify the ambiguity that the unconscious introduces in any discussion about consciousness, he contrasts Ricoeur's notion of the unconscious to that of Levi-Strauss': The former sees the unconscious as pulling us back to 'the order of the primordial' --the Christian inheritance of the tradition of consciousness as a struggle for light--, and the latter as "the task that cultural human beings live to execute [which] is itself inscribed in the unconscious" (Ingold 1986:299). This is a very useful contrast in order to illustrate how the unconscious can become a "catch all" principle of explanation when it comes to find a place for the spontaneous manifestations of human life, seen as either negative or positive. This is the reason why, following Ingold, I reject the notion of 'the unconscious' as a possible realm of explanation for cognition because it either gets the shape of a deterministic 'black box' or of a realm of darkness that holds the keys to conscious life:

> The realm of the unconscious, no matter how deeply it reaches into the strata underlying consciousness, remains after all continuous with the realm of consciousness and on a dimension where, together with consciousness, it can become the subject matter of psychology. (Nishitani 1982:153)

I find it more useful to consider the two notions of practical (spontaneous) and discursive (disciplined) consciousness as complementary realms of the human conscious life.

Ingold poses the difference between practical and discursive consciousness as the difference between 'knowing *how*' and 'knowing *that*'. A practical kind of consciousness is clearly shared by human and non-human animals, but even if non-human animals may know *that* they cannot reflect on their knowing *that* --and we might not always do. 'Knowing how' is the kind of knowing that Maturana and Varela refer to when they say that "to live is to know" (1987:174) in organic autopoietic interaction with the environment. The basis of the difference between the two kinds of consciousness is generally seen as the distinctively human capacity for symbolic thought. However, Ingold reviews various studies of non-human animal 'communicative' behaviour and arrives at the conclusion that symbolic thought is no absolute difference between animals and humans and that whether intermediate stages cannot be admitted "remains a legitimate subject of speculation" (Ingold 1986:303).

However, he goes on to describe how the identifiably distinctive human symbolic ability is different from an animal kind of communicative behaviour. Verbal symbols, Ingold argues, do not only *announce* an object but rather lead the subject to *conceive* it (1986:304). Animals continually emit and receive a dense amount of signals which "correspond to bodily states and not to concepts" (Ingold 1986:309). In contrast to this, the human kind of symbolic imagination enables us to speak and think about remote things in space and time, and also about deception, fantasy, speculation, and hypothetical thought. However, this ability does not guide our behaviour all the time, we also act spontaneously, in impulsive and systematic, unpremeditated manners --and this may be destructive, but it is also, and most importantly, the main source of creativity. This is illustrated by Ingold's examples

that portray practical consciousness as the one that interacts and has the ability to disclose disciplined action without discursive deliberation:

> Anyone who has learned to speak a foreign language or to ride a bicycle knows that in the former case, complete fluency comes when the application of syntactical rules becomes as automatic as for a native speaker, and that in the latter case, a perfect balance is achieved only when one ceases to deliberate on the correct way to go about it. (Ingold 1986:300)

This examples serve to illustrate how practical human consciousness has already assimilated the discursive intention of discipline and has become fluent practice. But there are also pre-eminently spontaneous human behaviours that are disclosed without the need for prior articulation of discursive intention and rules, like baby play, or learning to speak one's native tongue, and to walk (these behaviours also take place only within an environment that *does* have articulated discursive intentions and embodies and enacts the different disciplined practices that are learnt).

The above rationale leads Ingold to consider practical intention, which is traditionally located in the discursive realm of rational deliberation and only present as articulated thought before action. Following Searle (1979), Ingold distinguishes between prior intention and intention in action. "A prior intention", says Ingold, "is an imaginative *re*presentation of a future state that it is desired to bring about, and differs from memory only in that it precedes rather than succeeds the objective realisation of that state [...]. The intention in action, by contrast, corresponds to the experience of actually doing; in that sense it is *presentational* rather that *re*presentational" (1986:312). According to this, then, intention in action is not necessarily discursive, nor is it necessarily only human; non-human animals have a spontaneous presentational intention in the realisation of the acts of living; even if they do not construct a stable representational notion of self that is aware of realising them, one that is taken to be only a human experience based on our discursive ability. The confusion of the categories practical and discursive in consciousness may lead to denying both consciousness and intention to animals, while at the same time it

ascribes them a representational quality built inside the mechanics of their brain about which they are supposed to be unaware or *unconscious*[8].

The axis discipline/spontaneity of the artificial structure of my model represent the discussed duality of discursive intention and practical intention in human interaction, which in the present moment, are experienced at the same time -- in synchrony-- but in phenomenological observation, are divided into their synchronic and diachronic consequences for human behaviour and interaction. Speaking from the point of view of discipline, intention is always construed discursively either before or after the action, and it therefore has an in-built diachronic quality. Yet, in practice, discipline is a manifest aspect of the present moment of consciousness, which is also ruled by spontaneity. In human experience, the present moment is neither only spontaneity or discipline; it is the immediate human life-world that needs both to be produced and to produce human identity at the same time.

Humberto Maturana and the psychologist Gerda Verden-Zöler in their book *Amor y juego* (*Love and Play* 1995), locate the emotional construction of the imaginary realm of culture in the spontaneous process of development of the child, in play, while it grows up (discussed in section VI. 2. below). However, during its development, the child is also simultaneously disciplined by its interpersonal relationships and emotional ties to move adequately in the social imaginary particular world in which it develops. As it grows up, the child learns to master disciplined behaviours as well as physiologically determined ones. The disciplinary training involves bodily behaviour as well as learning the language used for communication in its particular cultural environment --and it may involve training in many languages. This training takes place both spontaneously and in a disciplined manner at the same time, and these two kinds of behaviours are indistinguishable from each other in the present moment of experience. But in phenomenological observation and description, *spontaneity* can be seen as the familiarisation of the child with its own

[8] I will consider Varela's critique of cognitivism --which equates mind and therefore the function of the brain with an internal representation of the world-- in the first section of chapter VII.

organic structural sounds and bodily rhythms in play, and *discipline* is observed as the learnt patterns of behaviour in language and culture.

We are now in the position to go back to the diachronic structural axis of the model (path dependencies/potentiality) which is disclosed in the relationship that takes place between the present moment of experience and the diachronic aspect of time that continually shapes interaction (see Fig. 3). According to Maturana and Verden-Zöler, the organic unity between consciousness and embodiment produces an imaginary and enacted "social relational space" grounded in emotional ties (1995:94). In the development of the individual human being, his/her relational space keeps growing and producing both a personal identity and a story with respect to the relationships that s/he gets involved with throughout her/his life time (personal, functional, and cultural)[9]. This relevant personal story includes the development of our own embodiment, and is also embedded in a series of relationships with concrete objects and embodied people (or disembodied personalities who either have died or were never born as embodied people) as well as distinctive collective practices in constant transformation that have a degree of permanence in their systematicity and in the collective belief in them.

Path dependencies are construed as the structure of past interactions that has formed the present organisation of embodiment. Non-human and human animals' perception of the world is structurally determined by their actual embodiment, even as it engages in its own conscious production through practical intention. But humans also produce a notion of self attached both to embodiment (physical development) and to the cultural groups where we belong to (families, tribes, nations, governments, clans, empires, organisations). Human path dependencies are built from a present perspective that has been determined by past interactions. It looks on the past to organise its relevant features according to present necessities, which for humans, are both organic and artificial. Here is where the human identity that is produced by our

[9] This imaginary "relational space" may expand to include transcendental concepts and experiences which might even overcome the initial local quality of the space in the notions of "universality", "eternal", "infinity" or "divine". Whole life times may be dedicated to apprehend, through disciplined spontaneity, these kind of concepts as experience and justify their existence as meaningful symbols.

relational space is able to consider its own potentiality as well as that of the relevant group that it belongs to. Potentiality takes over to organise present discursive intention which is projected into the future. The pair path dependencies/potentiality is therefore essentially diachronic, but it is built on the basis of present meaningful experience. From the present perspective, this meaning is reified symbologically and sequentially, and makes the phenomenological observer possible at all with her/his discursive and particular distinctions. It is important to stress yet again that this observer is necessarily human, but most importantly, s/he is a human person shaped by the Western tradition of knowledge and cultural inheritance.

Human embodiment and organisation are both passive creations and active producers of actuality in a spontaneous organic dance that can only be spoken about by stopping it provisionally by artificial discipline and its human marks on time. The unfolding of its continuous simultaneity and flow would otherwise be experienced, but would remain without description. *Autopoiesis* is a term that comes from the biological theory of Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela that contemplates all living entities as conscious and creative in experiential practical (spontaneous) intention --the production of themselves in an intelligent manner. It finds intelligence as an intrinsic characteristic of nature and this takes the place of the classical Darwinian creative 'natural selection' that would direct and select the *unconscious* organisms, outside human time, towards their evolution and fitness. This is the basis for Maturana and Varela's disagreement with the current *adaptationist* program of biological research, based on the modern neo-Darwinian synthesis (discussed in section VI. 1. below). But we would forget to look at ourselves if we did not consider that as we speak of organic autopoiesis, we are also living in a discursive, very human, integument that other animals cannot perceive in the same way. They might participate practically and even be involved in the disciplinary human order, but this involvement is never wholly autopoietically discursive.

What this means is that the human identity is discursively involved both in being created by and in creating the "conversation" (Maturana 1990) or the meaningful and legitimate present order, which can then be projected unto the past and future. The term autopoiesis was adopted by Niklas Luhmann (1995) in his

theory of meaning in order to describe how social systems are involved in the process of producing themselves. But he does not consider how it is that these systems also contribute in creating the individual identity of the embodied people who interact through these systems. People in Luhmann's theory are construed as "psychic systems", who are linguistic entities, collections of varying conscious states with no emotional involvement, dysfunctional morality, and an imagination that randomly jumps from state to state of consciousness. While Luhmann succeeds in describing the post-modern condition of Western life, and also of theory --with no symbology for transcendence and universality-- he downplays the importance of human consciousness for the social sciences and its theoretical absence cannot be sustained empirically. He believes that social systems are self-creating and self-sustaining, without realising that their functioning and existence depend on human practical (spontaneous) and discursive (disciplined) consciousness; human life.

Nevertheless, his theory of meaning is very useful in order to illustrate the structure of the human discursive kind of consciousness as it is experienced by an observer. This is because Luhmann's perspective is situated phenomenologically in the subjective experience of meaning. He does not consider how this perspective may shape the consciousness of self, because he speaks about social systems, without taking into account that they can only be produced by the human presence that is in the position to operate and live in them, describe them, and be defined by them. The autopoiesis of linguistic social systems is bootstrapped to the organic autopoiesis of embodied human beings, not located apart from the consciousness of embodied human beings as Luhmann would have it. We are left with the idea that human beings or persons are both producers and products of our environment in discursive consciousness; but it is also important to consider that at the same time, in practical consciousness, we are engaged in the process of producing ourselves and are already the embodied organic product of this process simultaneously. In this second type of immediate synchronic practical intentionality, the diachronic discursive one intervenes only through the conscious practice of a meaningful discipline, which is a human trait.

The following chapters are organised around two ideal types of order, *organic* and *artificial*, that are seen as two manifestations of the same phenomenon. The construction of two ideal types of human order is based in a phenomenologically transformed version of the subject-object divide: synchronically, in the conscious present moment, these two realms cannot be distinguished from each other; but diachronically, in the sequential, time of discursivity, they are clearly --yet arbitrarily-- differentiated. This is the reason why they are ideal types, they cannot be found in absolute purity in empirical reality and cannot be differentiated in present synchronic experience, only in discursive diachronic explanation. But this differentiation is always imaginary, descriptions are only possible in the sequential experience of time as duration or as past and future. Language and sequential explanations are therefore displaced from being able to convey the meaning of what I call the *present subjective moment of meaningful experience*, which is an existential experience. From this moment we may look into the past history of meaningful interaction that produces the structure of our path dependencies; and towards the future of plausible meaningful interaction that produces the structure of our potentiality; but both instances are manners of describing the present moment, and cannot be seen at the same time but must be considered alternatively. These two realms are produced through meaningful mental images, grounded in emotional energy, that are constructed both collectively and individually, and that we can describe. But access to the present subjective moment of meaningful experience is perfectly confined to each individual self. And yet, as we will see, human beings engage in sharing the present moment of subjectivity socially and culturally in order to produce an identity of self. This sharing takes place both spontaneously and in a disciplined manner, even if humans must translate subjectivity into symbols and gestures, and share it imperfectly. In these terms, intersubjectivity, as has been said, is never perfect or complete, but is always present in human interaction; "objectivity" is therefore a particular social construction.

And so, it is important to stress that the abstract essence of any method of observation is wholly discursive: the present moment of meaningful experience is not

located in Absolute emptiness (*sunyata*) or in a moment of eternal Being[10]. Even if the present moment where the observer locates him/herself must consider the transhistorical realms as ideals or "sign posts", as discussed in the previous chapter, from this present moment the observer should be able to describe her/his surroundings and describe him/herself and is therefore aware of her/his own embodiment and of nihility as his/her source and destination. This observer is conscious of her/himself in a discursive manner, but also in a practical one. If we attempt a disciplinary artifice through which to provisionally stop looking at the moving and changing structure of the suggested model, we see two symmetric parts that both reflect and complement each other, which constitute the model's organisation (see Fig. 4 at the end of this chapter). Both parts are ideal types because, in human interaction, they cannot exist on their own. The two ideal types of organisation represent tendencies of human order that is both expressed in an organic one that we share with animals and in an artificial one that is a particular feature of our species, part of our human way of living. But it is an excess of abstraction to think that through the powers of the intellect alone, or through some inherent process of complexifization, we could be without either of them or 'advancing' from one to the other.

[10] Unless spiritual Enlightenment had dawned on consciousness in complete apprehension of the transhistorical realm, in which case the observer would not be in the position to describe anything qua observer.

THE (CHANGING) STRUCTURE OF THE MODEL



Organic Structure: ————
Artificial Structure: ┈┈┈┈
Present moment of meaningful experience,
somewhere inside: ⊙

Fig. 1

THE ORGANIC STRUCTURE



Present moment of meaningful experience, somewhere inside: ⊙

Fig. 2

THE ARTIFICIAL STRUCTURE



Present moment of meaningful experience,
somewhere inside: O

Fig. 3



Organic Structure: ————

Artificial Structure: ·····

Present moment of meaningful experience, somewhere inside: O

Fig. 4

Chapter VI.
The Organic Ideal Type of Human Organisation

In this chapter, I will go back to the cosmological implications of the two experienced notions of human time. However, while in the first part of the thesis, the two notions of time defined the prevalent and legitimate type of view of reality; here, I will consider that both of them are already part of the organisation of cosmology in any view of reality. I situate this work within the Western/Christian cosmology and its transformation into the Darwinian factual cosmology that prevails today when considering the origins of life and of the human kind of consciousness. I will argue that this scientific cosmology has a path dependency on the Christian symbol of transfiguration from darkness into light to explain the emergence of human consciousness in diachronic explanation, and it also depends on its traditional assumption of human patronage over the rest of nature. Nevertheless, in the adoption of a synchronic perspective of observation, we can realise that these explanations -- just like any other kind of cosmological tales-- are produced for the sake of present contemplation of the human notion of self and of its place in the universe. From a present perspective, a more viable way of basing an observed difference between the human animal and the non-human animal (or the rest of the living beings on earth) is that the human species develops a belief system and relates to it, and to fellow human beings, through imaginative and emotional personal relationships. That is, human beings develop a belief system, as a shelter or "integument" of vast plasticity, within which to live as a species. Nevertheless, the modern mind has deepened its awareness of this "shelter" to the extent to which it has become "alienated" from nature (only in an emotionally imagined sense though, experientially, we do remain made of organic and natural substances and dependencies); and it holds an ontological divide between human and nature (the modern city is its most dramatic experience) that is analogous to the subject-object divide for scientific observation. Only by seeing the lack of factuality in this divide but by using it as a useful metaphor can we assume a constant co-determination between the embodied observer and her/his environment; that is, the subject-object divide is ontologically false but epistemologically useful.

The problem of the diachronic shape of the Darwinian cosmological tale is that it discloses the division between human beings and other animals in a hierarchical and moral dimension, which includes an automatic assumption of patronage of civilised man over the savage entity that lags behind in this tale of evolution as optimisation. In the present contemplation of this cosmology, this assumption is only implied and hidden behind heavy veils of political correctness that assume the currently relevant humanist principle of equality among human beings. Yet, the abyss of conscience that is perceived between humanity and any other kind of consciousness remains as an ontological principle of observation. The Hegelian "peoples without history" remain encased in the chase for an ideal modern progress and a present 'not yet'; within a consciousness that is simultaneously regarded as already human, but underdeveloped. It is only from a synchronic perspective that the abyss of consciousness between humans and non-humans (or underdeveloped humans) can be obliterated in order to liberate the necessary stage of savagery for humanity, and realise that civilised humanity is also animal and primitive at the same time as it is historically aware and "civilised". If we regard human beings as animals and the rest of the living entities as conscious in an equivalent way to human consciousness, we can start to set the basis for what it is that makes humanity different from the rest of the natural world without assuming a necessary human patronage over it. To be sure, this is an arbitrary move, but no less arbitrary that the traditional assumption of a separation between humanity and nature.

I will attempt a brief explanation of an alternative notion of evolution by Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela as "natural drift" which postulates the classical Darwinian continuity with our animal ancestors, but also a present organic continuity with, and dependence on, the natural world. The notion of "natural drift" embraces the idea of evolution but tempers its deterministic conclusions (most clearly expressed by the adaptationist program, based on the modern neo-Darwinian synthesis with Mendelian genetics). Rather, evolution as "natural drift" is posed as a stochastic complex process that is not wholly random and not wholly deterministic, but something in between. The division between humanity and nature is displaced by the synchronic awareness of a division between system and environment, based on

the subject-object divide as an epistemological principle. From this perspective, living organisms --embodied humans included-- are *organisationally closed* to the environment but *structurally coupled* to it at the same time. This simultaneity is expressed by Maturana and Varela's notion of *autopoiesis* that guides the idea of evolution as "natural drift", but also the cognitive involvement of the living organism in its practical conscious business of maintaining itself alive.

And so, the organic ideal type of human organisation is related to the human biology and its evolutive specialisation on a big brain and a particularly expanded nervous system. In this sense, human embodiment determines a stochastic human dependence on living within what Maturana and Varela call "conversations", which I consider commensurable with particular cosmologies, or even views of reality. This structure of interaction is determined by the "phylogenetic" path dependencies of the species as well as by the "ontogenetic" particular path dependencies of human lives that simultaneously sustain the view of reality in which they live. In the organic ideal type of organisation this animal-practical consciousness and intentionality of human beings is highlighted, together with the spontaneity in which it is produced. Maturana and his psychologist collaborator Gerda Verden-Zöler, locate the basis of spontaneous human life in learning to live in conversation through the spontaneity of play since infancy. This in turn produces an imaginative and emotional involvement into the production of persons through relationships, which they regard together with Tim Ingold, as the organic essence of a human conception of self.

VI. 1. Cosmology and the Human Animal

We can recall that the construction of three ideally typical views of reality --or legitimate belief systems-- in the first part of this thesis was based on the distinction between two kinds of temporality experienced by human beings where the legitimacy of a conceived 'reality' is located: past-future diachrony and present synchrony. However, beyond institutions (religions and disciplines), all three views of reality consider these two dimensions of time (sequentiality and simultaneity) *organisationally* because they are dimensions of human experience. In the belief systems of my theoretical construction, synchrony is *construed* as unity, but it may be *experienced* as plenitude in the sacred moment of renovation, or as the eternal mystic present moment, or as harmonious coordination, and symbolised as trust, Grace, or Being. Diachrony is *construed* as separation, but it is *experienced* as movement and flow, in the duration of cycles, or towards spiritual progress; it may be symbolised as teleology: divine future purpose which at the same time points at divine origin, or as past and future in the general process of becoming, or as universal human history. I have argued that, while the locus of legitimacy for the pagan/primitive and the Eastern/mystic ideal type views of reality lies on synchronic experience and symbology; that of the Western/Christian type lies on diachronic symbology and experience. However, any view of reality always contemplates both realms organisationally, as two aspects of the same humanly experienced phenomenon. As I will argue below, Western secular cosmology has transformed the realm of spiritual unity and synchrony into a realm of morality where all human beings are expected, ideally, to converge. This is what in this construction is regarded as the synchronic realm of trust which, due to the legitimacy of time as diachronic movement in the West, is not legitimately regarded as time-like and it is hard to describe its synchronic essence.

Nevertheless, both realms of temporality are organisationally represented and experienced in the life and practice of all three ideas of reality. Pagan/primitive time as duration and renovation is cyclical, but for the cycles to be meaningful, it must distinguish experientially between the duration of the cycles where everyday life

takes place, and the sacred moment of ritual renovation. The latter synchronises in mimesis the perception of time in order to produce an experience of collective beginning that legitimises the meaningful realm of reality or 'cosmos'. This is the reason why cosmological tales describe a mythical beginning of time that, according to Voegelin, transcendentalist representations of the Beyond cannot dispense with (1974:10). Its experience of time as duration may not be symbolised in a clear conception of a "leap in being" as transcendence (Voegelin 1957:3), and does not produce a diachronic idea of progress (spiritual, teleological, or historical), but it is part of the organisation of human primitive experience as a sequential continuum that expresses itself in mythical tale.

Eastern/mystic synchronic time as the eternal present moment of Oneness and reality does not regard duration as real. However, mystic practice contemplates diachronic time as a measure of progress towards individual spiritual enlightenment which, it is assumed, will contribute to awareness and spirituality of the ideal "collective" mind. The movement of individual progress through mystic practice is contemplated as an illusion of the world of forms or of the senses; when one is awakened to spiritual enlightenment one should realise one's own identity with the universe. In this view of reality, human beings are seen as already immanently enlightened and have only to remember their divine origin through discipline during their illusory worldly life. "It is as if one were born already knowing how to play the violin and had to practice with great exertion only to remove the habits that prevented one from displaying that virtuosity" (Varela *et al.* 1991:251). And so, mystic individual progress to spiritual enlightenment is also a kind of regress -- speaking strictly in terms of direction and not in terms of the transcendental "leap in being". But even if this kind of movement is not given legitimate substance in the mystic view of reality, it is organisationally acknowledged and represented in the discipline, in the methods of practice, simultaneously leading to an enlightened origin and destination. This is a kind of teleology that is nevertheless seen as a metaphor, in the Eastern/mystic view of reality, origin and destination can only be seen as such through the illusory nature of phenomenal time and life in the world.

The Christian spiritual conception of time conceives of the world as real and its Beginning and Beyond in Genesis and Apocalypse, as the extremes of real historical time from divine origin and fall, through suffering and Atonement, to progress towards salvation. Humanity as one *body*, represented by the church, should move through conversion and pious life towards the end of times where the elect ought to be differentiated from the non-elect. But both world and transcendence are conceived as real at the same time, the latter being displaced to a higher realm beyond the world, and the world constantly chasing after it. In a comparison with the other belief systems, the Christian time of progress contemplates both the sacred pagan/primitive circularity --made universal and real for all peoples at all times-- combined with a mystic representation of the only God at the beginning and the end of times as well as His appearance (contingent to His Will) through Grace on earth. The highest point of hierophany in Christianity is, of course, the coming of Jesus Christ; which works as an axial symbol of transfiguration from darkness into light -- when God Himself walked the earth-- or a universal *point d'appui* to move the lever of world history.

However, in the Western tradition, spiritual progress was eventually substituted by scientific progress, which, it was assumed, would produce a more "truthful" --rather, more legitimate-- description of reality through rational disquisition and observation. The creationist story of the book of Genesis was eventually substituted by a legitimate scientific theory based on observation and factuality. The secular visions of reality in the Western tradition displace the sacred personality of God from the centre of attention with 'natural laws' or mechanisms which expand the circle of divine origin and destination into infinite dimensions. This turns the circle into a straight line of progress, which may or may not pack transcendence in hypothetical moral teleology that substitutes for Grace (seen as either possible or impossible), or in some kind of deformed symbolism[1]. Along this

[1] I will use the idea of "deformed" symbolism in the same way as Voegelin (1974) uses it to mean sacred symbolism that has been transformed into some material counterpart that is taken to be more plausible within a transformed view of reality (see Appendix A).

secular line of eternal becoming, the experience of time becomes diachronic and, for humans, its legitimacy is represented as human time in universal human history; and for the rest of the natural universe, as a perpetual continuum of transformation. This diachronic view of time and events is clearly sequential; its experience and explanation is produced by an observer (the scientist or the historian), which may prevent him/her from noticing and symbolising the synchronic realm of experience in a legitimate and meaningful way. In supporting a Heideggerian critique of Jasper's present moment of "unclarified" eternity, in a strict diachronic conception of time, Farrellkrell states that the present moment "preserves its authentic present from complete dispersal precisely by holding onto its past and future" (1986:23).

However, in the Western tradition, even as the sacred circle of beginning and end is transformed into a secular line of perpetual becoming, this formulation cannot help to remain symbologically faithful to the mystery of the idea of Christian transfiguration from darkness into light mentioned above and needs an axial point (or a period of time) of unity in world synchrony: a Messiah, an axial age, or the gradual emergence of human consciousness from animal consciousness. In secular cosmological accounts, the mystery of transfiguration is particularly clear when it comes to explain how our ancestors became humanly conscious... as opposed to conscious in a mere animal way. To scientists, the dawning of the human kind of consciousness remains a mysterious feature of life. It is held beyond doubt that, gradually, throughout evolution our species woke up to human consciousness, making it essentially different from all other species of animals. But the essence of this different consciousness is not easily grasped. It has been generally posed in our Western tradition as the human capacity for intellect, language, and for making tools --*homo sapiens and homo faber*. But, as Tim Ingold argues (1986:303-332), these criteria are problematic when it comes to define a clear difference between the non-human and human animal kinds of consciousness. I will engage in a discussion of his arguments in the next section of this chapter.

I will now concentrate on the conceptual problems related to the definition of a human kind of consciousness that is not merely animal as the basis of our cosmology. These problems are related, on the one hand, to our scientific zeal for

precision; but on the other --and most importantly for the present discussion-- to the problem of cosmology created by Christian baggage that determines assumption of human patronage over the rest of nature. The basis for this type of differentiation between the human and non-human animal lies in a secular view of the universe that defines itself by rejecting --and is engaged in the effort of forgetting-- the roots of its own sacred origins. Distinctively, human beings do represent reality in a discursive way, but before their own representations become intellectual and trivial and before their ideas of reality give them a sense of mastery over nature; human naked consciousness --like that of a newly born baby-- needs to produce for itself a coherent view of the environment (social and natural) in which it finds itself, amid a sense of awe about it --about its horror and its beauty. The difference between human and non-human consciousness may be posed in terms of intellectual ability (highly valued in the West), consciousness *per se*, intention, or mere functional artificiality; however, as I will argue below, the difference is better posed in that humans develop a system of beliefs in order to engage in interaction, either social or with the environment (Frye 1982, Maturana 1990). This is a characteristic of the human species, the constant creation of a sense of self either individual, spiritual, or collective, and it is basic to sustain our human biology. This characteristic is only a characteristic, and not the proof of human superiority.

I will argue that belief systems have an organic function, they are like surrogate "wombs" that receive human babies, which are born as embryos -- completely vulnerable-- and they remain as such for the first nine months of life (Gould 1977:72)[2]. I use metonymic language when referring to belief system or world view as a protective "womb", "shell", or "cultural integument" (Frye 1982) for human life, because it is qualitatively different from any material kind of non-human animal protection. Its plasticity is such that it may be expanded to include experiences and perceptions that produce concepts such as infinity or universe; and this is related to how our evolutionary specialisation --the human brain and nervous

[2] According to Gould, the reason for our being born as embryos is related to our evolutionary specialisation on a rather large brain: "Human brains [..] are so large that another strategy must be added for successful birth --gestation must be shortened relative to general development, and birth must occur when the brain is only one fourth its final size" (Gould 1977:75).

system-- operates according to Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela[3]. In the emotional cognition of environment and in the continual construction of ideas of reality in which humans interact among themselves, meaning and legitimacy are linked to each other; and therefore, symbols and beliefs converge to represent the view of reality's sacred or ethical realm as posing the relevant or legitimate dimensions that produce our reality (even in the scientific discipline). And so, the relevant "tales" that we tell about reality have the very important organic function of sustaining human life in every different tradition of knowledge.

In our scientific tradition, the Darwinian theory of evolution (a legitimate "tale" about reality) dominates the discussion of probable explanations about the origins of the human species; which, to us, remains evidently different from non-human animal species. Darwin postulated a universe of observable natural laws: "If Darwin needed to invoke a Creator it was only (as for Newton and Hutton) to set the ball rolling, after which He could leave His Creation to look after itself" (Ingold 1986:132). Tim Ingold (1986) argues that, in his *Origin of Species*, Darwin decidedly rejected teleology in nature. However, it can be deduced from Ingold's discussion that at the same time as Darwin rejected a telos in nature, he saw it in culture. In Darwin's less celebrated and Eurocentric work *The Descent of Man*, a moral telos was situated in human history in the faculties of intellect and culture and he "was convinced that their improvement could be judged on an absolute scale, that natural selection would inevitably generate progress along this scale, and that this underlies a universal movement of mankind from savagery to civilization" (Ingold 1986: 51). Even if the terms of this movement have greatly changed in academic circles, to this day, the best explanations about the difference between the human animal and the non-human animal remain linked to human culture and the intergenerational transmission of culture --even if there is still no consensus about the mechanisms of transmission (Ingold 1986, 1989; Varela *et al.* 1991, Sober 1993). Darwin separated his biology from his "socio-anthropology" in two books; while one of them failed in

[3] This specialisation is regarded as the product of a "natural drift" as formulated by Maturana and Varela, and not that of an adaptationist conception of evolution. The difference between these two notions of evolution will be clarified throughout this first section of the chapter.

giving him a name in sociology and anthropology, his biology remains today a founding theory that dominates any serious scientific discussion about the origins of life.

It is useful at this stage to consider the basic postulates of Classical Darwinism. According to Varela *et al.*, they are:

> 1. Evolution occurs as a gradual modification of organisms by descent; that is, there is reproduction with *heredity*.
> 2. This hereditary material constantly undergoes *diversification* (mutation, recombination).
> 3. There is a central mechanism to explain how these modifications occur: the mechanism of *natural selection*. This mechanism operates by picking the designs (phenotypes[4]) that cope with the current environment most efficiently. (1991:185 my italics)

The scientific and measurable principle of natural selection substituted the archaic idea of a sacred cosmic telos of creation; yet even though the principle depends on diversification that feeds on variability and chance, its essence remains linked to the theistic idea of an 'invisible hand' doing the selection[5]. However, this is not, in Darwinian terms, a divine involvement in the selection of fit organisms[6]. It was only through the replacement of this kind of involvement for a mechanical principle that the study of life could be withdrawn from the realm of Creation and be studied systematically by the scientific method.

The term evolution was popularised by Herbert Spencer and not by Darwin. According to Ingold, in 1857, Herbert Spencer published an article entitled: "Progress: Its Law and Cause", where progress is seen as an organic law that rules all nature:

> With one sweep of his cosmic pen, everything from the earth through all forms of life to man and human society was brought within the scope of a

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[4] Physical characteristics.

[5] According to Hodgson, the dominant Political Economy of Darwin's times in general and Adam Smith in particular influenced him in the elaboration of a principle of order that emerged spontaneously from chance and diversity: "Essentially Smith and the Scottish School gave Darwin the idea of order and regularity being based on a chaotic multitude of individual units, and emerging without common intention or conscious design" (Hodgson 1993:58).

[6] According to Waters (1986:207-8), Herbert Spencer was the one who invented the slogan 'survival of the fittest', not Darwin. After the first edition of the *Origin of Species* had been published in 1866, Darwin's friend, Alfred Russel Wallace, persuaded him to use Spencer's phrase in key parts of the work, rather than 'natural selection'. "The word 'selection', Wallace argued, implied the existence of an agent doing the selecting, and some could take this agent to be God" (Hodgson 1993:81-2).

> single principle of epigenetic development, as applicable in astronomy and geology as in biology, psychology and sociology. Shortly after the appearance of this article, Spencer decided to substitute 'evolution' for 'progress' on the grounds that the latter entailed too anthropocentric a vision. His celebrated definition of evolution, appearing in *First Principles* (1892), ran as follows: 'Evolution is definable as a change from incoherent homogeneity to a coherent heterogeneity, accompanying the dissipation of motion and dissipation of matter'. The grandeur of this conception captured the Victorian imagination. Before long, Spencer had a considerable following, and evolution had become a catchword. It still is, yet Spencer and his voluminous works are today all but forgotten. (Ingold 1986:4)

It is generally believed that his works on biology are forgotten mostly because his teleological theory of evolution lacks an adequate explanation of the evolutionary process and its transmission mechanisms, and is described as a matter of dogma (Hodgson 1993:92). But it can also be argued, following Ingold, that his view of the universe was too unified along a 'cosmic' telos for science to embrace it legitimately. Spencer did not have the good sense to separate his biology from his social sciences. Nevertheless, he was giving expression to the belief of his times, and the kind of Victorian progressivism that he championed was also present in Darwin as a 'social scientist'.

It has been argued rather insistently that Darwin resisted the term 'evolution' due to its teleological implications in nature. "Whatever the substance of these arguments", says Hodgson after a brief consideration of their assumptions, "it is a fact that Darwin did not introduce the word until the sixth edition of the *Origin of Species*, and then only sparingly. Darwin preferred phrases like 'descent with modification' to 'evolution' " (1993:81). Besides the scientific need to displace the divine telos from nature, it can also be posed that Darwin's resistance to the term evolution in Spencerian optimistic progressive tones might have been due both to the influence of Malthus's *Essay*[7] and to his observation of conflict and death as the source of indeterminate variability, which constitutes the basis for an infinite unfolding of life on earth with no limiting telos in nature. "Although the precise

[7] The complete title is: *An Essay on the Principle of Population, as it Affects the Future Improvement of Society, with remarks on the Speculations of Mr. Godwin, M. Condorcet and other Writers.* (Hodgson 1993:66)

extent of Malthus's influence is open to dispute", says Hodgson, "it is rash and relatively rare to ignore it entirely" (1993:63). According to Hodgson, many of the interpreters of Darwin's notebooks agree that Malthus provided him with a vivid picture of "crowding and struggle" as the motor of natural selection. Through this observable fact of nature, natural selection was not teleological; it was a principle of order that fed from chance.

However it is important to consider what lied behind this mechanism because, as Hodgson puts it, there is much more to Malthus than a mere mechanism of the divergence between arithmetic and geometric series of reproduction of food and people; and the source of his sordid image of scarcity lies in his natural theology and his critique of the 'invisible hand' ideas of equilibrium and harmony of the political economy of his day. According to Malthus's natural theology, the loving and righteous God allowed the existence of suffering and constant struggle on earth in order for humanity to always strive for virtuosity: "the intended role of evil is to energise us for the struggle for good" (Hodgson 1993:65). Without diversity and struggle there would be no force impelling God's creation to constantly improve itself; and therefore, for Malthus, the idea of a progressive natural teleology was out of the question, and the *laissez faire* assumptions that the market forces should be left to themselves for an overall good was mere utopia: "for Malthus, neither self interest nor the invisible hand had unqualified virtue" (Hodgson 1993:67). Death and suffering remained a natural feature of life, this natural "evil" that should be resisted was a divine test on Creation. Some echoes of this view, not without moral transformation, persist in recent Darwinism. George Williams, one of the most important theorists of social Darwinism has tried to disclaim this kind of theory's logical conservative conclusions by speaking of natural selection as "an "evil" process, so great is the pain and death it thrives on, so deep is the selfishness it engenders" (Wright 1994:40). Darwin's cosmology takes into account both the contingent side of the transformation of life in struggle and death, and its ordered output in heredity, diversification, and natural selection.

According to Hodgson, Darwin's scientific esteem reached a low ebb around 1900 mostly, it has been claimed, because a synthesis between the Mendelian

mechanisms of genetic inheritance and Darwin's theory was produced later (the modern neo-Darwinian synthesis) (Hodgson 1993:281). However a measurable scientific mechanism is a criterion for the superiority of a scientific theory if it is produced at the same time as the mechanism is producing explanations. It is more relevant to consider that, at the beginning of the century, the popularity of Spencer's progressivist alternative to Darwin's unpopular view of life as struggle had been grounded on its agreement with the belief system of those times (which nevertheless today continues to be progressivist in many areas of Western social and political imagination) (see Trigger 1998). But Spencer's most enduring contributions to science in general and to social science in particular are his views on what may be identified with the modern idea of progress in society, which he called evolution. To Spencer, "evolution meant a tendency towards increasing specialisation and differentiation, combined with sufficient functional integration to ensure the coherence of the system" (Hodgson 1993:83). Spencer lost all repute as a biologist with the creation of the modern neo-Darwinian syntheses of evolutionary biology, even if he remained influential in the social sciences; as can be seen, for example, in the current use of the term "complexity" as applied to large modern organisations (see Perrow 1979, Morgan 1986, Czarniawska-Joerges 1992).

From the perspective of legitimacy, however, the superiority of Darwin's theory over that of Spencer about the evolution of life, lies on their different cosmology. Darwin's theory achieves a better separation of the scientific endeavour (legitimated by the scientific ethos), from the Christian view of reality. Spencer's symbolism about nature remains too clearly linked to Christian symbolism, where a pre-planned perfection of nature and society as the objective of progress is known from the outset. This, theoretically, leads progress to an eventual stand still; and while this has been admissible in theories of future political harmony in the social sciences[8], in nature, this kind of teleology is not sustained by empirical grounds. This

[8] Teleology has taken the shape, to name a few examples, of historicism in Hegel, of communism through revolution in Marx, or of progress towards the ideal speech situation in Habermas. In the social sciences, though, the persisting symbol of telos has been transformed from a telos of God into a telos of Man (one that is seen as possible but not deterministic): purposive intentionality, the need for substantive rationality, morality, and the modern value of freedom.

difference can be seen as linked to the idea that, in modernity, humanity is considered as the producer of its social order, while nature is characterised by the absence of history and moral values. History and moral values are only human --or legitimate realms of social reality for the Western mind-- and take place **only** in diachronic human time.

> Where Kant saw everywhere the creative hand of time bringing forth new forms and configurations in nature, for Darwin time was merely a backdrop against which things happened. In Kantian cosmology, as in Lamarckian transformism, time was immanent in the evolutionary process; in Darwinian descent with modification it was wholly extraneous to it. The difference is of course related to Darwin's rejection of teleology in nature: Each individual is construed to exist only in and for the present, not as a moment of purposive conveyance of past into future. (Ingold 1986:131-2)

To be sure, Darwin's cosmology is also linked to the Christian tradition, but it subtracts nature from divine teleology by substituting this symbol of origin and destination by a simultaneous double awareness of mechanical principles of contingency --death, struggle and variability-- as well as principles of order --the survival of the fittest and natural selection. Maybe Darwin had a clearer scientific grasp of the need to separate the phenomenal domains of nature and society in order to pose a proper scientific natural non-teleological mechanism of transformation of life. But it is important to bear in mind that this division of phenomenal domains is related to a hypothetical clear divide between humankind and the rest of nature. And even if it is clearly arbitrary to us to ascribe teleology to nature, the arbitrariness of separating humanity from nature in the scientific discipline is not always clearly seen in its full arbitrariness, mainly because it has been a legitimate separation in our belief system for a long time.

However, it is important to consider that the disciplined observer is a living organism at the same time as s/he observes. From the synchronic perspective of observation, this is not only an intellectual or biological kind of awareness, it is an existential awareness of the predicament of being embodied at the same time as one is trying to observe the business of human life "objectively"[9]. This issue is linked

[9] This existential predicament will come to a closer scrutiny in the description of the artificial type of organisation, which is the one in which human beings tell relevant "tales" or explanations about

with a number of questions that have been posed in the various disciplines of our Western tradition that study human directly (religion, philosophy, social sciences), and indirectly in the human-observer perspective that the "hard" natural sciences hide in their anthropocentric-universalistic assumptions: The question of what is the human self and what is its place in the universe. Christian cosmology has an answer to this question that is stated in its myth of creation: God created the world for man to dominate and govern. This is the symbological origin of the Western identity, which has now permeated and merged with local symbols all over the world; and even if it has been transformed through the emergence of what Voegelin calls historiogenesis[10], the discursive shape of the Western identity was formed by its symbological past "path dependencies". One of the most celebrated American child psychologists, on whose work Anthony Giddens bases his reflections on trust (Giddens 1990, see also Misztal 1996), Erik H. Erikson, wrote:

> How did man's need for individual identity evolve? Before Darwin, the answer was clear: because God created Adam in His own image, as a counterplayer of His identity, and thus bequeathed to all man the glory and the despair of individuation and faith. I admit to not having come up with any better explanation. The Garden of Eden, of course has had many utopian transformations since that expulsion from the unity of creation --an expulsion which tied man's identity forever to the manner of his toil and of his co-operation with others, and with technical and communal pride. (Erikson 1968:40)

The Western scientific pursuit of knowledge eventually rejected the mythic language as a literal explanation for the origin of the human kind of consciousness; even if as a principle of differentiation from animals in world cosmology it kept a kind of globalised (more by Christianity than by modernity) communal pride about the

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reality. An "existential" observer is needed as a principle of methodology because this observer is engaged in producing explanations about the existence of explanations, and so the grounds for him/her to explain anything are those of the field of nihility or of "groundlessness" (see chapter VII, section 2. below).

[10] "If historiogenesis is a speculation on the origin and cause of social order, it must be considered a member of the class to which also belong theogony, anthropogony and cosmogony. All the varieties of the class have in common the quest of the ground. As from the experiences of participation in the divine, human, and cosmic areas of reality there arise questions concerning the origin of the gods, man, and the cosmos, so from the experience of the social realm there arise questions concerning the origin of society and its order; besides symbolisms expressing the mystery of existence that puzzles the explorer of divine, human, and cosmic reality, there develops a symbolism that expresses the same mystery with regard to the existence of society" (Voegelin 1974:60).

human (Western) transcendental ability to be moral. This pride has justified many atrocities, from genocide to systematic pain for sentient beings on the grounds that they are not conscious in the same way as we are. Today, science still assumes methodological principles of domination and control over its object of analysis. This century, however, the scientific discipline has started to question the human upper hand over the rest of the natural world. In contemporary 'green' rhetoric, this has happened most notoriously in an evident critique construed as the destructive environmental consequences of untempered technological control over nature. But also in political economy, methodologically, due to the growing margins of uncertainty observed in the global arenas of interaction (Giarini 1984).

On the basis of a critique of cosmology, I will argue that the emerging paradigm of complexity should not be regarded as the product of any kind of progress, but as the corollary of simplicity, one that is able to escape the cosmological mechanics --and oppressive mythological consequences-- of the movement of time as diachronic sequence of events. This century's physical discoveries about the smallest known elements of matter bear witness to a new convergence between human time and natural time --one that Bergson described as *real* time (or *durée*) to stress its relevance for human beings, and which Darwin managed to separate from human time to the specialising advantage of biology. What this means is that the realm of Western morality and values is moving towards our relationship with the natural environment, observable in the growth of 'green' movements and parties. About this, Gerard Delanty says:

> [N]ature has remerged as a new theme in natural and social sciences in recent years in response to the ecological crisis. Nature is increasingly being seen as a social construction. Social science can no longer suppose the objectivity of nature as an unchanging essence. In other words, the ontological distinction between humans and nature is breaking down. Both nature and society can no longer be conceived in terms of a model of time. (Delanty 1997:5)

This model entailed an ontological divide between animal and human time. But the convergence between them also means that, in the synchronic realm of Bergsonian time as simultaneity, human beings themselves may be regarded as pre-historic (primitive) entities as well as transhistoric ones (spiritual) at the same time as

historical (intellectual) entities: the three ideal types of world views described at the beginning of this work also describe three plausible ways in which all human beings may experience reality legitimately.

From a synchronic perspective, Darwin's view of time as a backdrop against which life enfolded (evolved) implied an explanation of how human beings emerged from animality to civilised history. Civilised human beings are assumed to be 'conscious' as an ontological principle for the scientific observer to exist. In early modern historiogenesis, Western morality was clearly and experientially shown as a principle of differentiation from other human beings who were in the process of emerging from the primitive stage, which Europe regarded as its own past. Unfortunately, this principle of differentiation emerged at the same time as power relations *inadvertently* defined it. But today, modernity is a socially 'real' and legitimate realm of experience for the whole world through global interaction. There arises a cosmological problem of identity among the intelligentsia of the peoples who are shown a cosmological inferior place in a hierarchy of nations that was fixed as such by *universal* human history. In the present world scenario, this cosmology sometimes overlaps with local scenarios of deep emotional links to stories of pride and retribution that seem archaic --as in the ex-Yugoslavia-- but due to their visibility, are really more contemporary than ever before in the modern world. To this day, bootstrapped cause and explanation remain in place producing more empirical evidence that there is, in fact, a pre-modern world. But it is posed either as distant (in more archaic lands) or *unconscious* (in dysfunctional, evil-mad and angry *freaks* who live in our cities and are given serious attention in the public sphere). This righteous stance --which must be moral and judgmental-- explains uncertainty away but does not help us face it and deal with the deep human-animal fear that it produces. I believe that this is one of the deepest predicaments for the contemporary modern self, and the only way out is to contemplate the inherent creativity that also lies in uncertainty.

The creative aspect of uncertainty is necessary in the synchronic practice and experience of trust that lubricates power relationships and that sets wealth expansion rolling. It is clear that current world-power politics and its hierarchical order do not

disappear from this perspective, they remain an "objective" part of the social global environment. However, in Darwin's XIXth century's type of legitimate symbology, the changing social environment appeared to be naturally as it was observed (and therefore made) to be: It was only through the definition of the human 'other', the savages, that humanity could be reintegrated with nature, yet different from it in a hierarchical moral fashion[11]. If we accept that in the XXth century the human 'savage' other is no more a legitimate principle of differentiation, as anthropology is already succeeding in doing, human consciousness re-emerges as one of the most compelling mysteries that we must live with in the synchronic present moment of experience.

The present mystery of human consciousness can be placed in two distinctive dimensions of cosmology: It may be regarded as the problem of how it emerged in the human species in the evolution of the world; but it can also be posed as a recurrent phenomenon in the individual conscious lives of human beings, our birth, the development of the child into adulthood, and unavoidable death. As has been mentioned in the first part of the thesis, *ontogeny* is the development of a particular individual organism throughout its life time; and *phylogeny* is the ongoing evolutive history of a population, which includes changes in its genetic pool (Hodgson 1993:40) and the descent from ancestry that takes it back to the common point of origin of all living organisms, the present species forming a branch in the lineage of the common "tree of life" (Maturana and Varela 1987). And so, the mystery of consciousness can be observed as emerging in human phylogenetic evolution (traditional Darwinian cosmology), or as an ongoing phenomenon in present recurrent human ontogeny. Consciousness, then, involves the cosmological position of any human being with respect to the reality that s/he sees, or rather 'lives', and his/her social position in the community where s/he grows up: Her/his view of reality and his/her consciousness of self. But the two latter categories are reflections of the organic role of both the human collective social realm and the human embodied

[11] It is true that 'otherness' has been rebuilt symbologically to temper the racist undertones in the contrast between civilised and savage peoples. But the current difference modern/pre-modern is historically linked to the non-politically correct one civilised/savage. The difference is still artificial and attached to power relations: it is cultural and European in its modern origin, but in current differentiated and specialised interaction, modern culture has become global.

biology. I will now turn to a discussion of how, as opposed to Darwin's theory, Maturana and Varela's theory of life and evolution open the possibility to consider humanness as the present embodied experience that we share with other members of the our human species. But they pose this awareness of *humanness* while assuming that human beings share the gift of consciousness with other living organisms at the same time; we can be aware of difference without the need for a cultural cosmological-moral divide. This theoretical difference is based on the notions of time that are emphasised: Darwin's theory is eminently diachronic while Maturana and Varela's is couched in the synchronic temporal realm of what they call *autopoiesis*. As will be explained in the next section, autopoiesis means that living organisms are engaged in a practically conscious production of themselves. However, for the purposes of assimilating evolution from a synchronic perspective of observation, I will concentrate on *autopoiesis* as the simultaneous *organisational closure* of an organism with respect to its environment while it keeps a *structural coupling* with it. Through this synchronic perspective, the notion of evolution or history --or of any other kind of human cosmological tale-- is seen as a characteristic of our species which lives in myth or explanation, a way of our being in the world, analogous to the swimming of the fish and the flying of the bird.

It could be said that Darwin conceived his specific notion of secular evolution by postulating individual biological entities (assumed as already adult, i.e. being able to reproduce) and their contribution to the collective evolution of their species. Darwin set the model in motion through natural selection that fed from variability and chance fuelled by reproduction (sex) and death. In his theory of evolution, Darwin symbolised both the development of the individual organism (ontogeny) and the development of its species as a whole (phylogeny). It is useful to consider the concepts of ontogeny and phylogeny again in order to explain the distinctive contribution of Darwin's account of evolution to how it is debated today. The difference between ontogeny and phylogeny is marked by reproduction and death, and this is the reason why Herbert Spencer's view of evolution was a model based on the life and development of individual organisms, a mere kind of optimistic "ontogeny writ large" (Ingold 1986:14). However, even if Darwin set the basis to

differentiate between these two realms in the life of a species, his mechanisms for evolution related ontogeny merely to an organism's reproduction and death. The bigger cosmological picture of phylogenetic evolution and the image of the tree of life (that assumes the common ancestry of all living entities) are the most relevant aspects of Darwin's theory (Sober 1993:7). But the mystery of ontogeny is downplayed (Oyama 1985). Ontogeny and phylogeny are construed diachronically, even if nature is not regarded as historical in the human sense; and the modern neo-Darwinian synthesis organises a deterministic role for the principle of natural selection that cannot avoid but to produce a cosmology which, while not teleological, cannot avoid being deterministic. This will be illustrated by the explanation of the adaptationist perspective and research program that Maturana and Varela --together with other biologists-- criticise and oppose.

The account of evolution by Maturana and Varela differs from the Darwinian tradition in their perspective on time. It has been stressed that by producing a common evolutionary origin and a tree of life for all living organisms, Darwin put human beings and all other living organisms in the same family (Gould 1977:50, Maturana and Varela 1987)). He accepted strict organic continuity between our animal ancestors and human beings; but separated them again in the sociological and historical implications of the human ability to be moral --even if this morality was grounded in Darwin's uncompromising philosophical materialism. Moral capacity is necessarily construed as something that emerged along the diachronic tale, which held the 'savage' other as an intermediate stage between animal and human in the development of civilisation. In contrast to this, Maturana and Varela's emphasis on synchrony dispenses with past progressive stages and concentrates on the problem of consciousness as it is lived presently, assuming organic continuity with our animal ancestors as well as conscious continuity with the living organisms with which we share the earth right now. Any differences between human and non-human consciousness may be construed as distinct characteristics of our species and are liable to be studied as such.

This transfers the Western symbological split between human and animal, mediated by moral or cultural capacity, to one in which human stands on the same

temporal grounds as any other living organism, and the split is projected between the living entity and its environment. But this is not an alienating split, the organism is bootstrapped back to the environment through "structural coupling". Maturana and Varela's theoretical construction of evolution as natural drift is stochastic in that it does not pose an entirely random or entirely deterministic path for evolution, displaying the essence of complex uncertainty. It has been observed by them --and by a number of other biologists who also resist the neo-Darwinian authoritarian views on natural selection (Jacob 1977, Stearns 1982)-- that this "path" is more accurately situated somewhere in between deterministic laws and random drift. The alternative posed by Maturana and Varela includes the biological-cognitive involvement of the autopoietic living entity in its ontogenetic development and its structural coupling with an environment that triggers changes in it.

Maturana and Varela want to emphasise the synchronic and simultaneous essence of life. Darwinian natural history is relevant to the synchronic observer in order to explain how it is that the structural present came to be shaped, but a mechanical assumption along diachrony as to how evolutionary change takes place is seen by the two biologists as eminently deterministic. Maturana and Varela's theory differs from the Darwinian tradition in its perspective on time, which emphasises the cognitive involvement of the living autopoietic organism in its own ontogeny and development. In other words, while the Darwinian tradition emphasises the observation of change in diachrony and holds this transformation through time as the essence of evolution, Maturana and Varela hold that this is a construction that is convenient to explain the "history of interactions" that led to the present structural actuality of the organism[12]. But this history is only a construction for the sake of the observer, the essence of life is not its observed phylogenetic evolution but its present constant change. Nevertheless, Maturana and Varela's account of evolution as "natural drift" remains faithful to the Darwinian basic non-teleological formulation and incorporates the explanatory principle of 'natural selection' as portrayed in the

[12] A notion that is analogous to what I have called "path dependencies", following the historical neo-institutionalist insights about present dependence on context and particularity (see Hall and Taylor 1996).

modern neo-Darwinian synthesis. But this principle is regarded as only one of the factors that describes ongoing change in phylogenetic evolution among a number of other principles (mutation, migration, units of selection, random genetic drift, stasis, pleiotropy, genetic recombination) that should be considered in order to escape reductionist accounts of evolution (see Ingold 1989:213, Varela *et al.* 1991:188-193, Sober 1993:18-9).

The current discipline of biology is based on Darwinian non-teleological cosmology, which basically substituted creationist and teleological accounts. But it is important to stress at this point that modern (contemporary) evolutionary biology remains divided with respect to the role of Darwinian 'natural selection' and its modern synthesis with genetics, which has become --at least to the adaptationist school-- the single most important mechanism in explaining evolution. Maturana and Varela are engaged in a critique of the latter position mainly due to its deterministic implications about the phenomenon of life.

> [C]lassical Darwinism became neo-Darwinism during the 1930's as a result of the so-called modern synthesis between the Darwinian ideas based on zoology, botany, and systematics on the one hand and the rising knowledge in cellular and population genetics on the other. This synthesis established the basic view that modifications occur by small changes in organismic traits specified by heritable units, the genes. (Varela *et al.* 1991:185-6)

Through natural selection, the fit survivors are seen to contribute to the gene pool of the observed phylogenetic development of a population in constant change. It could be said that the Darwinian paradigm suppressed grand teleological claims about nature by naturalising teleology (Sober 1993:83). What this means, according to Sober, is that adaptation is analysed *a posteriori* as an effect of natural selection of advantageous traits in the ancestry of organisms. In other words, the telos is seen as the function of the observed trait, it is observed in the present adaptedness of fit organisms. Even if no grand teleological cosmic objective is posed, small local tendencies of optimising fitness selections are assumed. This feature of evolutionary biology, together with the modern neo-Darwinian synthesis, very often produces a deterministic attitude in the convinced adaptationist biologists about the creativity inherent in 'natural selection'.

This kind of neo-Darwinism is generally known as adaptationism (congenial with socio-biology) and, according to Sober, it is a thesis about the "power" of natural selection (1993:119). Adaptationism is not teleological because it speaks of fitness in terms of the fittest trait actually present in the observed population, and not the fittest of all the traits that we can imagine. But adaptationists adjudicate a creative force to natural selection that guarantees an optimising natural trend in that the fittest observable trait *will* evolve; their models explain phenotypic traits through natural selection and all other non-selective important evolutionary processes are ignored (see Varela's *et al.* discussion 1991:188-193). This is an extreme position that will serve to illustrate Maturana and Varela's objections to the general attitude of unquestioned determinism inherent in the assumption that the genetic make up and observed phenotype of an organism are the main vehicles of ontogenetic development and phylogenetic evolution[13]. This view is also being currently criticised in its most reductionist assumptions --by various other biologists[14]-- that tie phenotype to genotype through the 'creativity' of natural selection, where this principle keeps an aura of autonomy that is accepted *a priori*, in a similar fashion to the 'invisible hand' of Smith and von Hayek in political economy.

According to Maturana and Varela, this view misrepresents Darwin's celebrated non-teleological views on evolution.

> He [Darwin] states it was "as if" there were a natural selection, comparable in its separating effect to the artificial selection that a farmer makes of the varieties that interest him. Darwin himself was very clear in pointing out that he never intended to use that word as anything other than an apt metaphor. But soon after, as the theory of evolution began to spread, the notion of "natural selection" came to be interpreted as a source of instructive interactions from the environment. (Maturana and Varela 1987:101)

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[13] The first part of the next chapter will engage in a discussion of how the adaptationist program, central to most recent evolutionary biology, is related to the representationist paradigm of cognition that Maturana and Varela's theory of life criticises. Both adaptation in evolution and representation in cognition assume that nature "instructs" living entities according to a deterministic mechanism that implies some kind of *a priori* objectivity in nature and *unconscious* --yet precise-- mechanisms somehow engraved in living entities.

[14] "Although the reductionist tradition remains strong", says Hodgson, "there have been further moves against genetic reductionism in biology in recent years. These are found in the works of Niles Eldredge, Stephen Jay Gould, Richard Lewontin and Ernst Mayr, among others" (Hodgson 1993:244).

They consider the notion of selection as a metaphor or a productive mind exercise for the biologist (or interested scientist) who wants to understand the process of living; but not as an essential element of the process: "the whole body of changes that the observer sees as possible exist only in his mind, even though they are possible for different histories [of structural change]" (Maturana and Varela 1987:101). Darwinian descent with modification is still part of Maturana and Varela's theory of life, but it is essentially non-deterministic, as opposed to adaptationist accounts. Determinism still manages to apply to Darwin's metaphor of natural selection in adaptationist accounts of evolution because it is construed as a creative agent, a mechanism that feeds from chance and death, but that is able to display intelligent behaviour without being embodied by anything but the mystic corpus of a principle.

> It is commonly asserted by biologists of eminence and repute, that the truth of natural selection is now proven beyond any shadow of doubt, and that we can confidently expect the future of biology to consist of footnotes to *The Origin of Species*. Over the years these assertions have become increasingly strident and doctrinaire, as the thesis that Darwin modestly proposed to account for adaptive modification has been elevated into a total, all-embracing explanation for the phenomena of life. Alternatives that cannot be accommodated within the neo-Darwinian paradigm are consigned, along with creationism and other nonsense, to the waste-bin of what Dawkins calls 'doomed rivals'. (Ingold 1989:287)

It is an example of scientific dogmatism to claim that the neo-Darwinian paradigm has been proven beyond doubt, mainly because there remain many unanswered questions that the paradigm does not address on the grounds that the future ('not yet') advance of scientific theory and technology will eventually answer all questions (Varela *et al* 1991:189).

Maturana and Varela suppress deterministic principles in their complex theory of life by postulating a stochastic mechanism of transformation. The latter is not 'selected' in the general direction of optimisation, but it 'moves' or changes with life's dynamism. As I have briefly mentioned above, their theory postulates that living organisms are organisationally closed to the environment in their constant autopoiesis and structurally coupled with it at the same time[15]. This makes the

[15] The notions of autopoiesis and structural coupling and their proposed mechanisms through which they are sustained in conscious life will be dealt with at length in the next section of this chapter.

element of randomness an aspect of coupling, and the element of structural determinism[16] an aspect of closure; two aspects that act simultaneously and can only be separated artificially.

> [W]e have no unified picture of how the evolution of living beings occurs in all its aspects. There are many schools of thought that seriously question understanding evolution by natural selection; this view has prevailed in biology for more than sixty years. Whatever new ideas have been bruited about in terms of evolutive mechanisms, however, those ideas cannot discount the phenomenon of evolution. But they *will* free us from the popular view of evolution as a process in which there is an environmental world to which living beings adapt progressively, optimizing their use of it. What we propose here is that evolution occurs as a phenomenon of structural drift under ongoing phylogenic selection. In that phenomenon there is no progress or optimization of the use of the environment, but only conservation of adaptation and autopoiesis. It is a process in which organism and environment remain in a continuous structural coupling. (Maturana and Varela 1987:115)

In contrast to adaptationist diachronic accounts of phylogenetic evolution, living autopoietic systems preserve their integrity in organisational closure, the change of a system is determined by the structure of the system itself and not by the environment choosing anything "naturally". However, being structurally coupled to the environment, random changes in the latter "trigger" changes in the organism that are nonetheless determined by its own structure. "To an observer", says Mingers, "it may appear that an event in the environment has brought about a structural change, but in reality, the structural change will have been concerned with maintaining autopoiesis" (1991:320).

From this perspective, the observer is in the position to make an artificial distinction between two independent organisations: the organism and the environment; which can be construed as independent only by an observer who separates them artificially, as they remain structurally coupled. Only through their actual unity, can the organism keep its own internal dynamics and its autopoietic

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[16] "The fact that a structure-determined system is deterministic", says Maturana, "does not mean that an observer should be able to predict the course of its structural changes. Determinism and predictability pertain to different operational domains in the praxis of living of the observer. Determinism is a feature that characterises a system in terms of the operational coherences that constitute it, and in terms of its domain of existence as it is brought forth in the operations of distinction of the observer. Accordingly, there are as many different domains of determinism as

integrity. This integrity depends on the organisational closure of the organism with respect to the environment, but the unity of environment and organism in autopoiesis depends in their keeping structural congruence, or the unity disintegrates. This congruence is not "instructive", but it illustrates how the organism is simultaneously closed and coupled to the environment while there is autopoiesis:

> In the interactions between the living being and the environment within this structural congruence the perturbations of the environment do not determine what happens to the living being; rather, it is the structure of the living being that determines what change occurs in it. This interaction is not instructive, for it does not determine what its effects are going to be. Therefore we have used the expression "to trigger" an effect. In this way we refer to the fact that the changes that result from the interaction between the living being and its environment are brought about by the disturbing agent but *determined by the structure of the disturbed system.* The same holds true for the environment: the living being is a source of perturbations and not of instructions. (Maturana & Varela 1987:95-6)

Both notions of autopoietic closure and structural coupling have consequences for the transgenerational level of interaction, that of phylogeny, where evolution leaves its marks.

Structural coupling and autopoietic closure make chance and variability feasible in an analogous way to how the notions of competition (struggle) and death made it in Darwin's theory. However, without the deterministic undertones of the neo-Darwinian synthesis, they claim to favour a view that is more congenial with Darwin's own non-teleological principle of descent with modification (see Maturana and Varela 1987). Heredity and variation are two corollaries of the sequential phenomena of reproduction and death, but also of the synchronic moment of reproduction through simultaneous autopoietic closure from, and structural coupling with, the environment and the parents.

> Those aspects of the initial structure of the new unity which we evaluate as identical to the original unity are called *heredity*; those aspects of the initial structure of the new unity which we evaluate as different from the original unity are called reproductive *variation.* For this reason, each new unity invariably begins its individual history with structural similarities and differences in respect to its forbears. (Maturana & Varela 1987:68)

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domains of different operational coherences the observer brings forth in her or his domain of experiences" (Maturana 1990:70).

Reproduction is described as a living unity that experiences a fracture that results in two unities of the same class: "In order for a fracture to result in reproduction, the structure of the unity must be organized in a *distributed* and non-compartmentalized way. Thus, the plane of fracture separates fragments with structures capable of embodying independently the same original organization" (Maturana and Varela 1987:61-2). The closure of autopoietic systems makes that the reproductive "fracture" between two organisms of the same class preserve organisation during ontogeny while giving rise to structural variation through reproduction and death in phylogeny.

Phylogenetic evolution or "natural drift" is described as a longer history of interactions (constructed by the observer with respect to evidence) defined by death and reproduction. "A phylogeny is a succession of organic forms sequentially generated by reproductive relationships. The changes experienced throughout the phylogeny constitute phylogenetic or evolutionary change" (Maturana and Varela 1987:103-4). Phylogeny describes the most common and accepted (scientifically justified) speculation that explains how life started on earth through unicellularity[17]. From the perspective of the observer, though, interaction, variation, heredity, and structural change is perceived as sequential in a diachronic temporal dimension that stops in death for the individual organism, but that goes on through reproduction for the species. But this sequentiality is necessarily artificial and constructed for the sake of the observer: "Living beings (with and without a nervous system) [...] function always in their structural present. The past as a reference to interactions gone by and the future as a reference to interactions yet to come are valuable dimensions for us to communicate with each other as observers; however, they do not operate in the

[17] "[C]ellular reproduction", say Maturana and Varela, "presents a special phenomenon: autopoietic dynamics is what makes cellular fracture take place in the reproductive plane. No external agent or force is needed. We can presume that such was not the case with the first autopoietic unities and that, in fact, reproduction was first a fragmentation that resulted from the bumping of these unities with other externalities. In the historical networks thus produced, some odd cells underwent reproductive fracture as a result of their internal dynamics. These variants possessed a dividing mechanism from which derived a lineage or stable historical succession. It is not clear how this occurred. These origins are probably forever lost to us. But this does not invalidate the fact that cell division is a special case of reproduction that we can legitimately call self-reproduction" (1987:66)

structural determinism of the organism at every moment" (Maturana and Varela 1987:124). This type of structural determinism is embodied by the organism's structural actuality or "path dependencies", it is an important realm of explanation for the observer to base her/his observations; but it is not congenial with the determinism of the adaptationist program: it is simultaneously structurally coupled to the environment and this illustrates an organism's unavoidable existence within ongoing uncertainty. Structural determinism in Maturana and Varela's theory is rather an illustration of how organisms keep their integrity in a closed autopoiesis that is coupled to the environment. Living organisms practically and consciously *determine* themselves through engaging in the natural business of keeping organically whole. This happens simultaneously in the ontogenies and co-ontogenies of living entities; and the disciplined observer positioned in a synchronic perspective should be existentially aware of his/her own practical involvement with the production of her/himself at this organic and biological level.

According to the biological theory of autopoiesis, "to live is to know" (Maturana & Varela 1987:174). As will be explained in the next section of this chapter, this cognitive bottom line is meant to illustrate that living beings are structurally involved in the production of themselves with practical (spontaneous) intention, and human beings share this structure.

> That living beings have an organization, of course, is proper not only to them but also to everything we can analyse as a system. What is distinctive about them, however, is that their organization is such that their only products is themselves, with no separation between producer and product. The being and doing of an autopoietic unity are inseparable, and this is their specific mode of organization. (Maturana & Varela 1987:48-9)

Every system with organisation that cannot be seen as organically created, is distinctively an artificial human creation, an allopoietic system (a machine). By the same token, it is important to remember that everything that can be distinguished as a "living system" has received the projection of an in-built human ability to distinguish order. For example, a cat will have its cattish life independently of a human scientific observer identifying it as a living system or not. It is the observer who creates the representation with systemic characteristics; while at the same time the observer

engages in the embodied practical enactment of a mutual co-determination between him/herself as the subject and her/his object of study.

It is important to regard the ontological separation between humanity and nature as a useful fiction, an artifice for scientific observation; while simultaneously making it a tempered basis for epistemology and heuristic objectives. Along the same lines of argumentation, the subject-object divide may be seen as a useful metaphor while bearing in mind that it is an ontological illusion of "objective" actuality. This divide can be reclaimed on the grounds that it defines a legitimate and meaningful realm of scientific disciplined practice and phenomenal experience. But it is impossible to take the divide on board again without tempering its ability to describe reality to us: it is eminently sequential, and in the exercise of concentrating its descriptive powers of precise explanation of --so-called-- universal natural laws, it ceases to look on the rest of the universe. Scientific explanation may be functional in an observational specific way, and very useful as a consequence of this principle, but it remains limited and displaced from explaining reality without imposing arbitrary and totalitarian assumptions about the universe that it intends to explain --just like any other type of universalistic view of reality. It is in this sense that scientific explanation remains a very powerful cosmological tale; mainly because it produces the methodological means for a provisional consensus, which is always only potentially universal. According to the arguments used throughout this work, consensus is culturally constructed, and cannot be but provisional.

VI. 2. Spontaneity, Embodiment, and Path Dependencies

It is clear that knowledge is constantly produced by discipline; but it is not always apparent to us that spontaneity plays an equally important role in the production of human knowledge. It seems like discipline is easier to pin down because it is set out sequentially in the formal descriptions of its methodology and in the principles of its systematic application in practice. Yet the synchronic works of spontaneity are already as embedded in the formal description of the discipline, as in the actual application of the principles of order. In the present moment of experience, spontaneity and discipline are inextricably entwined. Just how spontaneity constantly shapes discipline is a question that begs for attention[18]. But it is important to realise that even if we cannot uncover a systematic mechanism by which to pin down spontaneity (the attempt itself would kill it), we can observe it in the present moment of experience even if only by contrast to discipline --and intricately entwined with it. This entwining is analogous to that between life and death in the pagan/primitive world view. In their own way, both dichotomies constantly produce experiences of power and vulnerability, and, while we are alive and embodied, perception throws our notion of self either way. This might make some people strive for an ideal middle path of permanent metaphysical trust; however, even in the more mundane realms of functionality and organisation, the spontaneity of trust holds in the background the systematicity of human interaction. I will argue that this systematic, unreflective type of trust in human interaction comes from awareness of a present structure shaped by "path dependencies"[19]; or how the particularity of past interaction inheres in present perception and interpretation of reality that are analogous to biological mechanisms for the development of organic structures. The organic ideal type of organisation

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[18] Especially in the contemporary kind of awareness about the globalised arena of interaction: It is becoming increasingly apparent that the more integrated the transnational systems, the more vulnerable to spontaneous transformations due to global contingencies.

[19] As has been pointed out, the term "path dependencies" emerges from the new institutionalist historical approach to the study of social phenomena (see Hall & Taylor 1996). Here, I take this term and make it analogous to the organic "history of past interactions" that determines the structural actuality of a living entity in Maturana and Varela's (1987) theory of life, evolution (natural drift), and cognition.

theoretically described here considers the **spontaneity** of human **embodiment**, and the structure of its **path dependencies** (see Fig 4 above).

We can identify a trusting behaviour in the present moment of experience, even if displayed by an animal. But in the latter case this is only spoken of metaphorically, for trust is a human emotion related to our way of interacting with each other. New born babies trust completely in a way in which only a human kind of environment allows them to; they are born from the organic womb into the "womb" of relationships that allows the baby to produce a notion of self. The process of creation of this notion of self is far from safe in the same sense as a womb is to the foetus (and we do not know if the foetus feels as *safe* as it appears to us). The human baby faces both the hardship and the comfort of dependence at the same time: From the moment that it leaves the womb it is immersed in a psychological relationship with its environment and the people in it; if there is no people in its environment, the baby dies (as it is born as an embryo, see Gould 1977). Barbara Misztal refers to Giddens's notion of 'basic trust' "which illustrates how the development of trust in infancy determines the core of our ego identity" (Misztal 1996:91, see Giddens 1990). This brings about the psychological need of security that is based on the formation of trust in human relationships.

In human interaction, from a present perspective, the experience of successful social coordination is based on trust, and even if we may refer to it in diachronic accounts of human life, its experiential substance lies in synchrony. Misztal also refers to a variation of trust in Giddens's discussion which seems to suggest that this variation, 'elementary trust', is more related to security in the social environments. The notion of trust that we are familiar with may be construed as an emotion or as a value that allows for vulnerability in interaction, depending on who *trusts* and if this entity is emotionally linked to a notion of self. It can be a personal kind of trust if people know each other and have a history of past interaction (basic trust). But it can also be impersonal, a kind of mechanical trust that goes to the traditions and institutions that sustain coordination (elementary trust); this type is congenial with

Luhmann's functional notion of trust that reduces complexity[20] (see Luhmann 1979). Trust is a human dimension of interaction because, while living entities other than human may at times seem to handle a distinct notion of self (mostly when they interact with humans or have complex forms of social life); the development of an emotional link with a notion of self requires a distinct domain of human coordination which may be observed as having the biological role of sustaining our way of staying alive. Maturana and Varela call this domain the domain of "language and self-consciousness" (1987:176).

The theory about life and cognition of Maturana and Varela, which has been described as having "potentially far-reaching consequences" (Mingers 1991:319), is couched in a synchronic perspective of time, and therefore, the observer identifies with her/his animal object of study: a living entity like one self. But from the perspective of this identification, differentiating principles are distinguished that help the observer explain how his/her own self differs from other living entities qua observer; that is, as a human being that is embodied and that also has an emotional link to her/his particular type of notion of self. This is a discursive ability which only human animals display to the extent to which not only do we develop a notion of self, but also an emotional relationship with that notion. Nevertheless, we should remain aware of our embodied condition, which brings us back to awareness that human beings are also animals, and therefore, that language is an organic aspect of human life.

The organic ideal type of order that I will describe is constituted by embodiment as its central axis, by the living entity's path dependencies in terms of its

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[20] According to Misztal, Luhmann's notion of trust is "roughly analogous to the idea of public good" because it "rests on a 'presentational' base. It ensures that everything seems in proper order, which, in turn, increases our 'trust in trust' " (1996:75). However, consciousness is not a relevant category to be considered in systemic interaction according to Luhmann (1995). And this is why it is only roughly analogous to a public good, because from the perspective of public goods we would be speaking about civil society with its accompanying assumptions about subjects, agency, and even rational choice. By the same token, Luhmann's notion of trust would seem roughly congenial with the type of consciousness that, following Ingold, I have here characterised as "practical consciousness", the one that we share with animals in its "presentational" nature instead of a "representational" discursive one. But as consciousness is not an issue in Luhmann, his notion of trust remains too conveniently couched in assumptions of functionality as a mechanistic and systemic phenomenon. We can argue with Misztal that his complexity reducing function for trust does not succeed in explaining the actual formation of trust (Misztal 1996:74).

past structural definition, and by its ability to improvise, or adapt itself and drift spontaneously as an entity that is structurally coupled to its environment. This describes the organic organisation of an ideal human entity which is ideal because, following Tim Ingold's discussion about intentionality, we will only consider its practical intention in the organic type. This allows us to contemplate the human animal at the same level of consciousness as the non-human animal; and realise that its language has a systematic every day life coordinatory use which, even in a discursive mode, displays practical (spontaneous) intention. For example, when one learns to speak fluently as a child, the discursive intention of speaking is not part of that learning; when, through conversation, one may unwittingly either inflict emotional pain as a consequence of careless speech, or provide emotional support without this being the explicit subject of conversation; these are all practical intentionalities that may become discursive only *a posteriori.* As observers, we might distinguish practical from discursive elements in the living entity or in the environment, but they cannot be distinguished presently from the perspective of the embodied human that lives them. And so, the purely organic human ideal-type does not represent the world discursively to itself, it already knows it structurally (by the embodied history of its past interactions, its present structure), it acts its practical intention and lives.

This is a kind of 'embodied knowledge' present in the synchronic theory about life that Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela have produced: It is a description of how living beings are constituted that defies the traditional assumptions of the biological discipline as it is currently taught. In this theory, even if they themselves do not formulate it in these terms, there is a symbological interplay of a dichotomy that describes the essential need of life to constantly move and constantly rest. In the sequentiality of time as movement, this is experienced as the unavoidable need of sleeping and waking, breathing in and out, living and dying; but in the perpetual present time --here and now-- there is a world-overall living mixture of individual particular events --which can only be seen as being constituted by discrete events in description. The simultaneity of life on earth is seen as sustained spontaneously with astounding intelligence by an immense variety of living organisms and a changing

environment right now, and this is the essence of a complex perspective of observation.

Maturana and Varela coined the term *autopoiesis* in order to describe how living beings are organised to engage in the process of the biological production of themselves. The order of things that they want to describe is framed in a basic conceptual dichotomy, which refers to two aspects of the same holistic phenomenon. In living organisms, one of its sides --organisation-- is "permanent", while the other --structure-- is in constant movement. The *organisation* of a living being is accompanied by its *structure* that engages in the constant dynamics of the processes that produce its integrity as a living entity. In explaining this kind of constitution in the cell, they speak of the relations that are established through chemical transformations:

> On the one hand , we see a network of dynamic transformations that produces its own components and that is essential for a boundary; on the other hand, we see a boundary that is essential for the operation of the network of transformations which produced it as a unity. Note that these are not sequential processes, but two different aspects of a unitary phenomenon. (Maturana & Varela 1987:46)

The integrity of these processes is sustained in living organisms as *operationally closed* systems; that is, their organisation is closed to the environment, but their structure is coupled to it. We could still see them as "open" in that they do interact with the environment, but their *closure* entails that they can only do it in their own particular structural ways.

The simplicity of the unitary cell allows us to identify organisation directly with a boundary that "contains" life; but in multicellular living beings organisation is not simply a boundary, it is the *form* of the structural relations in constant change which makes it possible for observers to distinguish living entities and classify them as diverse species[21]. Living beings differ from each other in their structure (which is always individual, a unique event) and they are alike in their organisation; but their structure is characterised by its constant dynamic processes. This incessant

[21] But this business of classification is not without its deep and unsolvable paradoxes (see Gould 1977).

movement, what Maturana and Varela call "the throbbing of al life" (1987:100), is the constant autopoiesis of living beings (without forgetting the equally constant presence of death or disintegration). Autopoiesis can be imagined as happening as sequential events that we can consider discrete and ordered in the passage of time in past and future; but also as simultaneous in living beings at this present moment in world synchrony.

However, what Maturana and Varela want to emphasise is that the production of life and autopoiesis is most importantly situated in this present synchrony, and that sequentiality is essential only to the present description of that condition of life:

> The fact remains that we are continuously immersed in this network of interactions, the results of which depend on history. Effective action leads to effective action: it is the cognitive circle that characterizes our becoming, as an expression of our manner of being autonomous living systems. Through this ongoing recursiveness, every world brought forth necessarily hides its origins. We exist in the present; past and future are manners of being now. Biologically there is no way we can put in front of us what happened to us in obtaining the regularities we have grown accustomed to: from values or preferences to color qualities and smells. The biologic mechanism tells us that an operational stabilization in the dynamics of the organism does not embody the manner in which it originated. The business of living keeps no records concerning origins. All we can do is generate explanations, through language, that reveal the mechanism of bringing forth a world. (Maturana and Varela 1987:241-2)

History is "hidden" in the organism, yet present in our form of explanation of the living phenomena. But the latter explanation is part of the discursive human dimension as a dimension of interaction that non-human animals do not display; what any living organism does display presently (including humans) is its actual structure acquired throughout its development from being born, and this structure has its own particular past path dependencies. The epistemological consequence of this assertion is to say that the present moment of life is all there is, past and future are structural characteristics of our way of explaining phenomena, of our way of knowing now (and of living in that explanation, using it as an imaginary shelter or an 'integument'). Explanations are only symbological human dimensions; they are not actual characteristics of experience qua explanations, only qua acquired structures through path dependencies.

This kind of explanation about life is a very useful change in perspective, because it dissolves the traditional subject-object divide in its 'given', matter-of-factual realist assumption. But this approach appropriates the divide again in a phenomenological fashion, where everything is appearance and one cannot distinguish between subject and object in simultaneous observation, but only in explanation. This predicament arises especially when the living being under inspection is the human being:

> If everything is ultimately specified through its appearance to us, then so is the knowing subject. Since the subject can represent itself to itself, it becomes an object for representation but is different from all other objects. Thus in the end the self becomes both an objectified subject and a subjectified object. This predicament discloses the shiftiness, the instability of the entire subjective/objective polarity. (Varela *et al.* 1991:242)

In this perspective, the living entity is no longer considered just as a passive object that 'lives' and that the scientist describes as a structure of sequential processes that 'happen' and give its object of study the quality of being alive. Rather, in autopoiesis, the living being is described as the producer and the product of such processes at the same time.

By differentiating the synchronic-present "time logistics", as it were, of all living entities from our human observer-like need to exist in sequential explanation, they point at what makes human beings different from the rest of living organisms -- the explanations themselves-- without allowing the observer to stop seeing him/herself as an embodied animal in her/his abstract reverie. The observer is also a living autopoietic system, and his/her manner of living, perceiving, and "bringing forth" the world is part of the human form of biologic organisation in general and her/his structure in particular, his/her physiology; which is also a product and a producer of the social realm of interaction where the observer finds her/himself at the same time:

> [O]ur experience is moored to our structure in a binding way. We do not see the "space" of the world; we live our field of vision. We do not see the "colors" of the world; we live our chromatic space. Doubtless [...] we are experiencing a world. But when we examine more closely how we get to know this world, we invariably find that we cannot separate our history of

> actions --biological and social-- from how this world appears to us. It is so obvious and close that it is very hard to see. (Maturana and Varela 1987:23)

For the sake of the observer, then, the living system is identified as an autopoietic embodied entity with a history of past path dependencies that constitute its structural actuality; and this means that its consciousness will give this entity the practical (spontaneous) intention to live its ontogeny.

This brings us back to the present moment of interaction and to the ontogeny of organisms, including us. Maturana and Varela see the relevance of speaking about phylogenetic evolution to explain the emergence of different lineages of living beings and their history of structural drift, their path dependencies. But this is an explanation that is relevant to the observer, in living experience, phylogeny takes place at the same time as ontogeny; and the latter is currently taken to be as unimportant to biology as the particular personal life-stories are unimportant to universal history. "The classical approach that is still alive in most textbooks," say Varela *et al.*, "simply jumps from genes and gene frequencies to phenotypes and reproductively able organisms" (1991:189). According to Sober, the area of ontogeny or development poses various problems which remain unsolved in biology (Sober 1993:22). As has been said before, Maturana and Varela's theory addresses just this area by highlighting ontogeny instead of phylogeny. Susan Oyama also engages with the problem of the *implied* biological assumption according to which some development follows genetic rules and some does not, an assumption that "undergrids the opposition of biological to cultural processes, the mare's nest of biological determinism and the whole nature-nurture complex" (Oyama 1985:11). According to Oyama, then, the form of the organism is not transmitted through genes or contained in the environment, it is constructed in developmental processes, in ontogeny.

There is an important commonality between ontogeny and phylogeny; the primeval unicellular point of origin for phylogenetic evolution is also the point of origin for the ontogeny of all multicellular living entities. The individual ontogenetic history of an autopoietic organism takes place as an epigenetic process.

> In spite of their amazing and apparent diversity, they all [multicellulars] conserve reproduction through a unicellular stage as a central feature of their identity as biologic systems [epigenesis]. This common element in their

> organization does not interfere with their great diversity, because this takes place in structural variation. This situation does permit us, however, to see that all this variation is a variation around a fundamental type, which results in different ways of being in the world, because it is the structure of the unity that determines its interaction in the environment and the world it lives in. (Maturana & Varela 1987:83-6)

Even though multicellularity represents variation around one type, it is a vast kind of variation. Multicellularity as a past path dependency opened the possibility of many different lineages, much more diverse than the unicellular ones. In the animal kingdom, the one that humanity belongs to, this variation is based on the organism's natural drift to acquiring motility (on which feeding and reproduction are based) and a nervous system[22].

Taking into account cognitive involvement in autopoiesis, new sources of variation are discovered in the synchronic dimension that Maturana and Varela want to emphasise:

> [T]he behaviour of living beings is not an invention of the nervous system and it is not exclusively associated with it [...]. What the nervous system does is *expand* the realm of possible behaviours by endowing the organism with a tremendously versatile and plastic structure. (Maturana & Varela 1987:138)

This versatile structure is related to movement and to a notion of behaviour that, in the more general use of cognition[23], is "assumed to be limited to organisms with a (fairly *advanced*[24]) nervous system" (Mingers 1991:321 my italics). What makes the nervous system so versatile is the physical nature of the connections that it establishes. On the one hand, they connect cells that are often distant from each other:

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[22] According to Maturana and Varela, behaviour and cognition can be observed in all living organisms, "for the observer will see behavior when he looks at any living being in its environment" (1987:138). As we have said before, in their theory, the "notion of cognition is extended to cover all the effective interactions that an organism has" (Mingers 1991:321). To Maturana and Varela, behaviour and cognition are not limited to second-order (multicellular) autopoietic organisms with a nervous system; but as human beings are this kind of organism, behaviour and cognition will be considered in this work only for multicellular autopoietic organisms with a nervous system.

[23] The more general use of cognition regards it as the process of acquiring and using knowledge by a nervous system whose role is generally taken to be the collection of information that will allow the organism to survive. This view is heavily criticised by the theory of Maturana and Varela, as will become clear later on in the discussion.

[24] 'Advanced' in the sense of 'closer' to the human nervous system.

> What distinguishes neurons is their cytoplasmatic ramifications in specific forms which extend for enormous distances, reaching tens of millimiters in the largest ones. This universal neuronal characteristic, present in all organisms with a nervous system, determines the specific way in which the nervous system participates in the second-order unities that it integrates by placing in contact cellular elements located in different parts of the body. (Maturana & Varela 1987:153)

On the other hand, neurons are seen as special cells that put in contact sensory and motor surfaces and, therefore, the nervous system is associated to movement and to behaviour in an animal sense[25]. The neuronal system is embedded in the organism and it works as a network of electric neuronal interactions with the cells of the surfaces of perception and movement. "Neurons couple, in many different ways, cellular groups which otherwise could be coupled only through the general circulation of internal substances of the organism" (Maturana & Varela 1987:153). Even though neurons are still affected by chemical changes, their universal means of interaction to establish connections with each other and with other cells is through electric impulses (Mingers 1991:322). Through this simple mechanism of distant coupling between sensory cell surfaces and motile effects, Maturana has found an extended source for possible diversity of behaviours according to the varied patterns of the impulses generated in relative neuronal states of activity that can be observed. However, it is important to stress that nerve cells in constant change respond with definite "transfer functions"[26], that arise synchronically and spontaneously within this continuous change, to classes of spatio-temporal *configurations* of impulses that also keep arising. These impulses are not recorded or engraved patterns in any part of the cell anatomy (Maturana 1970:23-4).

Another important characteristic of neurons must be outlined at this point, which has to do with the autopoietic closure of the nervous system and its plasticity.

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[25] Five kingdom of living beings have been differentiated: monera, proctitis, animals, plants and fungi (Margulis 1982). 'Behaviour' is generally associated to the animal kingdom, but Maturana and Varela find it hard to establish a clear basis for differentiating behaviour from observation of any living organism in its environment (see Maturana and Varela 1987, chapter 7).

[26] The transfer functions of the nerve cell involve the communication of impulses from its collector area (dendrites, and in some cases, also the cell body and part of the axon) through its distributive element (the axon, and in some cases, also the cell body and main dendrites) to its effector area (the terminal branching of the axon) (Maturana 1970:18).

The nervous system itself is engaged in its constant autopoiesis and this means that it is not a static highway of connections, but an active producer of itself. The body in which it is embedded is its environment and it responds to its "triggers" by modulating its internal structural dynamics. "[T]he nervous system does not "pick up information" from the environment as we often hear. On the contrary, it brings forth a world by specifying what patterns of the environment are perturbations and what changes trigger them in the organism" (Maturana & Varela 1987:169). As the neuronal system is in constant autopoietic activity, its collector and effector surfaces are coupled to its environment in interaction, this produces a structure of behaviour that we can observe, but the nervous system is not really connected to the environment organisationally (only coupled structurally and dynamically):

> The plasticity of the nervous system lies in the fact that neurons are not connected as though they were cables with their respective plugs. The points of interaction between the cells are zones of delicate dynamic balance modulated by a great number of elements that trigger local structural changes, and that are produced as a result of the activity of those cells and of other cells whose products are released into the blood flow and wash the neurons. (Maturana & Varela 1987:168)

These zones are the synapses, very small gaps "across which chemicals called neurotransmitters can flow, triggering an electrical exchange" (Mingers 1991:322). This characterisation of the nervous system will lead us to language and self-consciousness as the domains of interaction that are characteristic of human beings (Maturana 1990). They constitute the grounds for the artificial ideal type of human organisation that will be described in the next chapter. Nevertheless, as I have pointed out before, in Maturana and Varela's theory, language also has a biological dimension for human beings as embodied animals and autopoietic systems.

Mingers (1991) explains how, in the theory of Maturana and Varela, our practical interaction and our human type of language is a product of the continual structural change (plasticity) of the nervous system, its autopoiesis and its internal structure. The nervous system's generalised response to electrical impulses leads to the development of internal neurons that connect only to other neurons. "These interneurons are particularly important as they sever the direct relationship between sensor and effector and vastly expand the realm of possible behaviors of an

organism" (Mingers 1991:322) As the child grows up (or as the species drifts to its present state), the relations that take place in experience at the collector surface of its nervous system, are transferred by classes of spatio-temporal configurations of nervous activity that we can observe. However, interneurons grow and so, eventually, these configurations do not have a direct effect on the motor surface but are already part of the structure as a perturbation for the internal structure of the nervous system itself. It is important to stress, though, that these configurations of nervous activity are not 'instructions' for the patterns of behaviour themselves, this would entail a representationist view of cognition which Maturana and Varela criticise. They are configurations that emerge as classes of behaviour but that remain electric impulses that arise at every moment in a constantly changing environment. They describe the structural characteristic of the nervous system as expanding the system's domain of its changes of state. In synchrony, these changes follow a course contingent upon both its structure and the environmental triggers. As the nervous system puts in touch cells that are physically separate in the organism, the organism's changing structure displays behaviours that are coupled with the autopoietic nervous activity, one that is structurally able to establish relations between events[27].

When behaviour symbolises something other than itself, organisms 'orient' each other's behaviour in co-ontogeny; this is what Maturana calls 'languaging' that other social animals also display. The success of orientating behaviour depends on the common cognitive domain of the organisms which can be either physiologically specified, sustained by common experience, or sustained by a separate domain of language. Non-human animals 'language' only through physiologically determined traits or through a common cognitive domain based on experience. Human beings use both of the latter domains of coordination and the separate one of language as a characteristic of the species. In us, interneurons outnumber sensory/motor neurons by a factor of 100,000 (Mingers 1991:322). "The human brain is vastly more responsive to its own internal structures than it is to its sensory/effect surfaces" (Mingers

[27] Otherwise, with no nervous system, as in the behaviour of an amoeba, only the physico-chemical effect of autopoiesis in an environment can be observed. While this example is not without its own vast perspectival complexity, the amount of observable behaviours of this living entity is comparatively reduced at the level of the observation of its motility.

1991:325). It is important to realise that the expanded domains of possible behaviours for human beings are seen as relative *relations* between configurations of neuronal activity and not as the patterns themselves as if they were static representations of the world, like "pictures" or "engrams" (Varela *et al* 1991).

The human nervous system interacts synchronically with vast different states of neuronal activity, and this in turn produces more relative patterns of neuronal activity to be considered independently; the recursiveness achieved by this eventually leaves us with vast domains of possible co-relations in the plasticity of the human nervous system. As Maturana puts it, "although language does not take place within the bodyhood of the living system, the structure of the living system must provide the diversity and plasticity of states required for it to take place" (Maturana 1990:100-1). But this immense diversity of states takes place simultaneously, they are all present at the same time as we produce language. The latter is not 'embedded in our brains' physically, it has an autonomy that can only be sustained collectively. And this is the essence of the organic nature of language, its autonomy depends on the creative involvement of a group of organisms bringing forth the world in which they interact; one that they create and that creates their sense of self back. The human species of the animal kingdom sustains its autopoiesis through physiologically specified, experiential, and autonomous communication. We can therefore 'language' about behaviours that are never enacted, that are supposed to be enacted, that may never be enacted, or that cannot possibly be enacted; but we also definitely 'language' through physiological and experiential common cognitive grounds as the basis for the autonomous domain of language to emerge in our consciousness.

Language is therefore a product of human co-ontogeny originally based on physiological communication and a common domain of experience while growing up. In every individual, our communicative abilities eventually grow beyond our physiology and the direct-experience cognitive grounds, towards interaction through the separate realm of language (the other two are never left behind though); which can be regarded as an autonomous domain of interaction. Nevertheless it is not determined by its own poiesis --language is autopoietic only in that symbols are self-referential (see the discussion of Luhmann's theory of language below)--, rather it is

part of the organic autopoiesis of human beings that interact through it. Maturana says that we find ourselves, as living systems, immersed in it:

> In the explanation of language as a biological phenomenon, it becomes apparent that languaging arises, when it arises, as a manner of coexistence of living systems. As such, languaging takes place as a consequence of co-ontogenic structural drift under recurrent consensual interactions. For this reason language takes place as a system of recurrent interactions in a domain of structural coupling. Interactions in language do not take place in a domain of abstractions; on the contrary, they take place in the corporality of the participants. Interactions in language are structural interactions. (Maturana 1990:94)

When Maturana refers to corporality here, he is not referring to abstract engrams embedded in our brains as pictures or representations of reality; he is speaking of our embodied involvement in the action (or non-action) of interaction. According to Maturana, in the realm of simultaneity of embodied interaction through language, cognition has no abstract content as a biological phenomenon. The observer creates this content, as the observer sees it embodied structurally by our physical involvement in interaction, or what Varela calls *enaction*[28].

However, to Maturana, this physical embodied involvement also unavoidably involves a psychology: the emotional standing of the human that interacts. It is at this point that a thorough philosophical materialism of the kind of Darwin's cannot be wholly embraced in Maturana and Varela's account of life. Imagination and emotions are not seen as a product of the brain itself, but of the dynamic and plastic structural coupling of the brain and nervous system with the social domain of interaction. This does not entail that they immediately embrace a wholly vitalistic account of life, but their explanations lie somewhere in between a purely materialistic account and a purely vitalistic one in the consideration of autopoiesis and consciousness as the substance of life. Tim Ingold clarifies the link between embodiment and consciousness in the human domain by distinguishing between interactions and relationships: "To dissolve a relationship into its constituent interactions is to drain it of the very current of sociality that binds them as moments of a process, and that is of

[28] This concept and its cognitive consequences for human interaction will be dealt with in the first section of the next chapter.

its essence. The creative unfolding of relationships, however, is also a becoming of the persons joined by it" (Ingold 1989:222). The human co-ontogeny that Maturana sees in language is *emotionally* sustained in what he calls "conversations" which are analogous to Ingold's relationships; and from an even wider perspective, are analogous to cultures or world views.

Humberto Maturana and the psychologist Gerda Verden-Zöler explain this perspective in their book on child development *Amor y juego* (*Love and Play* 1995), which is congenial with Ingold's (1986) view that persons exist as embodiments of relationships. From the perspective of the observer, they say, that:

> [W]hat we see when we distinguish emotions in us and in other animals are domains of actions, classes of behaviours, and in our living we flow from one domain of actions to another in a continual emotioning that is entwined with our languaging. To this entwining of languaging and emotioning we call conversing and we hold that all human life takes place in networks of conversations. (Maturana & Verden-Zöler 1995:9)[29]

Only in abstraction can individuals be seen as ready-made entities who interact through the impulsion of their separate natures, this characterisation breaks down in considering human beings as animals that must develop organically within networks of emotioning and languaging, or within psychological relationships. Individuality may itself be seen as the product of an emotional relationship with a culturally produced idea of self. As Ingold puts it, "[w]e rather *start* with social life, as progressive 'building up' of relationships into the structures of consciousness. This 'building up' [...] is equivalent to the generation of persons" (Ingold 1989:222)

According to Maturana and Verden-Zöler, the first stage in human development and ontogeny is dominated by spontaneity in play, while the child grows up. In order to highlight the spontaneous side of growing up, Maturana and Verden-Zöler heavily criticise the instrumentality of Western discipline and its detrimental consequences for the self-respect of growing child; and they argue for letting children live the full spontaneity of play. While I can see the point of their

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[29] *"[L]o que distinguimos cuando distinguimos emociones en nosotros y en otros animales , son dominios de acciones, clases de conductas, y que en nuestro vivir fluimos de un dominio de acciones a otro en un continuo emocionar que se entrelaza con nuestro lenguajear. A este entrelazamiento de lenguajear y emocionar llamamos conversar, y mantenemos que todo en vivir humano se da en redes de conversaciones"* (Maturana & Verden-Zöler 1995:9).

critique of instrumentality and the stress-related problems of modern society's extreme functionalism, a purely organic infancy and childhood could hardly be regarded as human at all. The artificial side of being human does not take place within our embodiment, as Maturana has pointed out, but this embodiment must provide the kind of structural plasticity required for it to interact by means of its artifices[30]. Therefore, while artificiality is not produced by organic processes; the environment where it develops is necessarily organically-based human life. The organic and artificial ideal types of human organisation are two aspects of our structure that exist together in simultaneous structural coupling and autopoietic closure as a characteristic of the human species.

Infancy and childhood are elementary aspects of human development that I consider here as only *mostly* spontaneous during infancy because the disciplinary side of social interaction is already present in the background from birth, and is already an aspect of human ontogeny. The relevance of discipline to the shaping of practical (spontaneous) consciousness through practice grows as the child grows into adulthood. As we will see, discipline is the corner stone of the artificial ideal type of organisation in this work, but it is relevant to our discussion of the organic ideal type in the same way in which spontaneity is relevant during full adult operative disciplined interaction. Awareness expands through disciplined practice, but also through the spontaneity of discovery. And so, the process of growing up is never really finished in the practice of any kind of discipline. Our early ontogeny, as part of our history of interactions shapes spontaneously the initial practical production of ourselves with respect to the world in which we live; but it also teaches discipline, which is not only learnt within family life --the rest of society also contributes-- and is already a realm of living in society.

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[30] "The higher human functions", says Maturana, "do not take place in the brain: language, abstract thinking, love, devotion, reflection, rationality, altruism, etc. are not features of the dynamics of states of the human being as a living system, nor of its nervous system as a neuronal network, they are socio-historical phenomena. At the same time, history is not part of the dynamics of states of a living system because this takes place only in the present, instant after instant, in the operation of its structure in changes that occur out of time. History, time, future, past or space, exist in language as forms of explaining the happening of living of the observer, and thereby partake of the involvement of language in this" (Maturana 1990:100).

Nevertheless, in the ideal organic type of human organisation we concentrate on the spontaneity of growing up, which is linked to the simultaneous structural coupling and autopoietic closure of the nervous system with respect to the rest of our embodiment. This brings us back to the "mechanisms" through which human beings engage in the business of "bringing forth" their world in ontogeny. Before getting an idea of the world, the child must simultaneously create and expand its own "psychic space" that enables it to relate emotionally to people, to things, and to ideas or ideals.

> In this process the boy or girl learns the emotioning and the fundamental relational dynamics which will constitute the relational space that he or she will generate in their living, that is, what he or she will do, hear, smell, touch, see, think, fear, want, and reject, as obvious aspects of individual and social living as a member of a family and a culture. (Maturana and Verden-Zöler 1995:10)[31]

Maturana and Verden-Zöler argue that the basic emotional referentiality is built as a relational space in the intimate life of the baby's bodily contact with the mother or person that takes care of it. They believe that this intimacy is related to the bodily rhythms that the foetus is used to during the time of pregnancy. To them, intimacy is an innate side of being human that springs in complete trust and acceptance of the natural relationship between the child and its parents, or the people who feed, caress, rock, speak, lull, and put the baby to sleep (Maturana and Verden-Zöler 1995:93).

Human embodiment lives in a continuous transformation of its structure determined by this present structure, but contingent to its coupling with the environment. As observers, we can speak of its history of transformation that takes place in ontogeny from its embodied point of origin: the undifferentiated stage of unicellularity in the epigenesis of the foetus. Verden-Zöler uses this notion to illustrate how the baby's consciousness is in a similar state of undifferentiated awareness at the moment of being born; and how, in the spontaneity of play, it begins an analogous process of differentiation which will enable it to develop its full conscious human potentiality. And yet, this differentiation is complemented by the

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[31] *"En este proceso el niño o niña aprende el emocionar y la dinámica relacional fundamental que va a constituir el espacio relacional que él o ella generará en su vivir, esto es, lo que él o ella hará, oirá, olerá,, tocará, verá, pensará, temerá, deseará y rechazará, como aspectos obvios de su vivir individual y social como miembro de una familia y una cultura"* (Maturana & Verden-Zöler 1995:10).

balancing side of unification that brings the child back to its own intimate relationships. But this is done through a 'languaging' of the kind that we share with non-human animals in spontaneous physiological and experienced common cognitive grounds, in touch, gestures and the fulfilment of primary needs, not only physiological, but also --and most importantly to the ulterior conservation of autopoiesis-- emotional needs.

> What in daily life we recognize as emotions when we observe animal behavior (human or non-human) are, as biological phenomena, bodily dynamic configurations that by specifying every instant the possible course of changes of states in an organism, they specify in it a domain of possible actions. (Maturana & Verden-Zöler 1995:91)[32]

According to Maturana and Verden-Zöler human consciousness arises from bodily rhythms and the flow of the sensory-motor configurations of coordinations in the close bodily contact that the child must undergo with whoever raises it during its infancy, but also during childhood in spontaneous play with adults and other children. These configurations, according to Verden-Zöler's research, are simple and basic rhythmic abilities of balancing in order to produce symmetry and movements of equilibrium about a central point. These movements arise in the child "as a process of orientation and spontaneous bodily handling in the freedom of play" (Maturana & Verden-Zöler 1995:94)[33].

Going back to the structure of the organic ideal type of organisation, it is important to point out the relationship between embodiment, spontaneity and path dependencies in the production of a present structure of relationships in constant change. From the perspective of the observer, this structure is reflected upon through language, but it is also embodied in organic elements of the human species. The discursive aspect of language as an autonomous domain of interaction --which nonetheless has a biological role and a domain of intentionality which is eminently

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[32] *"Lo que en la vida diaria distinguimos como emociones cuando observamos la conducta animal, humana o no humana, son, como fenómenos bilógicos, configuraciones corporales dinámicas que especificando en cada instante los cursos posibles de cambios de estado de un organismo, especifican en él en cada instante un dominio de acciones posibles"* (Maturana & Verden-Zöler 1995:91).

[33] *"... como un proceso de orientación y manejo corporal espontáneo en la libertad del juego..."* (Maturana & Verden-Zöler 1995:94)

practical-- will be considered in the next chapter. But before a degree of coherent discursivity is achieved by the growing child --before it finds its place in its own society-- the stage of infancy and childhood is dominated by practical (spontaneous) consciousness.

Maturana and Verden-Zöler consider that before language, in human ontogeny, the child must develop the cognitive configurations of sensory-motor coordinations that will enable it to distinguish practically its own embodiment from other similar embodiments that surround it. The biological role of discursivity in this context, would be to help the child locate its own embodied presence within the ongoing "conversation" (culture or idea of reality) where it is born. This kind of consciousness is developed practically at first, it provides the matter-of-factual certainties on which practical human life and consciousness depends. It is not *unconscious* but received and enacted without the discipline of self-awareness, one that can only be practised after a sense of self is achieved by the growing child (individual or collective self, most commonly experienced as something 'in between' in human relationships). This is why they say that: "When the baby is born it is only an embryonic possibility of consciousness and of reflection about itself" (Maturana & Verden-Zöler 1995:102)[34]. For this to happen, the infant must first detach its first notion of self from the embodiment of the adult (or adults) who they used as their first point of reference. This is an embodied as well as a psychological detachment, when the child has 'constructed' its surrounding world as coherent and operative sensory-motor correlations:

> The child at this point in the process of growing up has already lived the sensory-motor experiences that are a pre-requisite for the constitution of human consciousness: free movement in a social domain as a realm of spatio-temporal relations in the acceptance of itself and of others. (Maturana & Verden-Zöler 1995:103)[35]

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[34] *"Cuando el niño nace es aún sólo una posibilidad embrionaria de conciencia y de reflexión sobre sí mismo"* (Maturana & Verden-Zöler 1995:102).

[35] *"El niño en este punto de su crecimiento ya ha vivido las experiencias senso-motoras que son un pre-requisito para la constitución de la conciencia humana: el libre movomiento en un dominio social como un ámbito de relaciones espacio-temporales en la aceptación de sí mismo y de los otros"* (Maturana & Verden-Zöler 1995:103).

The result of this detachment is an imaginary world that the child uses as its first 'approach' to reality. But this is not a 'picture-like' imaginary world, it is a non-static approach made of structural dynamic correlations that allow the child to interact at the simplest level of social coordination, in constant structural transformation and expansion. This transformation and expansion is never finished in the individual ontogeny of the growing child, not even in adulthood. It is an aspect of its human autopoiesis and it is contingent to its constant interactions and its coupling with its environment. At a particular point in ontogeny this imaginary world achieves a degree of stability that gives grounds for the child to orient itself and 'live' in it as an organic individual. This stable imaginary world is part of the child's "inner mind" or an initial sense of reality in ontogeny, which according to Maturana and Verden-Zöler, is one where the social space is essential and far more important than the physical space. In that inner mind, the child manages its domain of relationships with entities who appear to be permanent and separable from the child, who the child imagines in emotional and experiential correlations. "In other words", says Verden-Zöler, "the child has become able to see in its mind the *Gestalt* (configuration) of human life as its own life in the cyclical movement of advancement and regress that space and time constitute" (Maturana & Verden-Zöler 1995:103)[36]. But just as the age of the child when this happens is particular to the person's ontogeny, also this configuration or *Gestalt* is particular to the 'conversation' or idea of reality where the child is born and develops; always within the structural possibilities of human embodiment.

And it is here where the biological relevance of language acquires a new level of correlations that starts detaching itself from the individual ontogeny of particular human autopoiesis. As we grow up, we realise that the conversations we hold can be brought outside the domain of family life to wider realms of interaction that are essentially collective. Those realms can also be seen as "conversations" metaphorically, but this is a very civilised metaphor. In those realms, the group might

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[36] *"En otras palabras el niño se ha vuelto capaz de ver en su mente la Gestalt (configuración) de la vida humana como su propia vida, en el movimiento cíclico de avance y retroceso que constituyen el espacio y el tiempo"* (Maturana & Verden-Zöler 1995:103).

be related by kin, but it can also be related by the (relevant) history of interactions that produce collective identity and ideas of reality. These may be expanded through empire to become vast imaginary (coherent or not) realms of correlations which human life sustains and creates and which end up creating and sustaining human life back. Language is an important aspect of them; but also religion and belief system. At some point in human ontogeny the wider realms of interaction become relevant for the growing person who determines and is determined by them. This is because this person, in every case, had to be a child and grow in a particular culture and discipline. Living in society implies some form of learnt discipline that is not organically produced and yet is based on the organic integrity of people. This organic base is described by embodiment, spontaneity, and path dependencies that produce a sense of (ever changing) structural actuality. But this is only an ideal type because human organisation has an artificial aspect that only human beings can distinguish as such. This artificial aspect is just an aspect of what it is to be human; it involves disciplined practice and specific expectations from this practice. It involves a type consciousness of self that is only achievable through human ontogeny and an organic development that provides the dynamic structure and plasticity that can manage to represent meaning.

Chapter VII.
The Artificial Ideal Type of Organisation

In the previous chapter, I have referred to order as an organic product of human interaction (both through embodiment and language) in practical consciousness; or as the spontaneity of human life in the organic ideal type of organisation. In this chapter, I will describe the artificial ideal type of organisation and how it sustains the human consciousness of self through disciplined interaction. In a previous chapter I have discussed how a too clear idea of the locus of self may produce assumptions that lack factuality, like the ontological division between subject and object in science. This does not mean that this separation is necessarily false as a methodological tool --it organises effectively wide areas of human interaction-- it only means that, according to the criteria of the Western intellectual discipline itself, it has come to be questioned as an ontological principle that governs universal reality; even while it remains a useful organising principle of factuality. Factuality is the basis of our disciplined *approach* to knowledge about human "reality" and the language that it uses, its verbal structures, are ideally descriptive: symbols with no inherent meaning of their own in order to stand wholly for what they represent. As we will see, this ideal has generally taken to convey literally how it is that meaning is attributed to descriptive symbols, together with other assumptions about logic in language and in human perception. Nevertheless, as has been pointed out in this work, all the verbal structures that characterise the three views of reality effectively overlap in human interaction, and this should be taken into account in the analysis of the latter.

In the first section of this chapter, I will refer to some examples of how the views on language and cognition which have dominated much of the Anglo-American discussion about linguistics, consciousness, mind, and meaning, have been questioned under the light of empirical research. This will serve to illustrate how the human ability to represent and mean something --our discursive consciousness-- is intimately entwined with the human self who perceives itself as embodied and interacts emotionally and imaginatively. I will illustrate with theoretical examples the problematic of regarding the human self as essentially individual and divided from

nature, and the consequences this has for our constructions of conceptions and explanations of consciousness and mind. I also engage with a problem derived from those constructions: the avoidance of the slippery subject of human emotions. The human expression of the latter as trust constitutes probably the single most outstanding feature that distinguishes human from non-human interaction and it is acknowledged in Maturana and Varela's theory of language. I will describe some critiques that have emerged from the field of cognitive science (Winograd and Flores 1987) and that have produced theoretical consequences in the work of Maturana and Varela and in their biologically based account of language and cognition (see Varela 1991), as well as in the American study of semantics, most clearly summarised by George Lakoff (1987, 1988).

The above will be the basis for using a transformed version of Niklas Luhmann's theory of meaning in the construction of an artificial ideal type of organisation. In this type, language plays a central role, as its meaning structures organise the particularly human realm of discursive consciousness. The concept of autopoiesis is a central feature of Luhmann's theory --a term that he explicitly appropriates from Maturana and Varela's work (Luhmann 1995:34)-- which denotes how meaning refers to meaning and to nothing else. In that sense, I will argue, language is organisationally closed, yet structurally coupled to human life and consciousness (an idea that Luhmann does not share, as he believes that language has a deeper kind of autonomy from human consciousness). I will argue that discursive consciousness ideally expresses the disciplined systematicity that is a feature of human life; produces the relevant areas of meaning to project present human activity towards the fulfilment of intended potentiality, and also organises a changing idea of the present consciousness of self (individual, spiritual, or collective) (see Fig 4 at the end of chapter V. above). And so, **discipline**, **potentiality**, and **consciousness of self** are the artificial aspects of human order, constitute the artificial ideal type of organisation, which points at how it is that human beings are different from non-human beings and the former's particular type of organisation of social life as a species, which is nonetheless only ideal and is always complemented by its organic path-dependent, embodied, and spontaneous basis.

VII. 1. Representation and Meaning

In this work, consciousness of self is seen as a changing human experience whose construction varies according to the present idea of reality as a self that is either *individual*, *collective*, or *spiritual*. Its main characteristic is its human ability to interact both emotionally and imaginatively. Human consciousness of self, then, represents reality drawing from relevant embodied experience and interacts through emotion and imagination recursively. Language is seen as the realm of interaction where human discursive intentions may be expressed and from which disciplined behaviour emerges. In human life (ontogeny), disciplined behaviour may at times or eventually abandon discursivity (in mysticism for example), but not without going through learning it in social interaction. This interaction leads the relevant human group to fix recognisable configurations or symbols as the known cosmology, as sacred knowledge, as intellectual understanding, as discipline --from making tools, to myths and rituals, to methodology and science, to poetry and war. Human creates discipline but the latter creates the prevalent human idea of self back through interaction; that is, discipline is created and creative simultaneously, but contrary to what Luhmann sees through social systems, this kind of discursive and communicative order is not autonomous from human life. This creative endeavour that characterises humanity is expressed as interaction through language and symbols; relevant collective figures that represent something, while "meaning" undergoes constant transformation and is orthogonally linked to human ontogeny (Maturana 1990).

The link between human disciplined creativity and its consequences for the creation of an idea of self is illustrated by the scientific discipline as much as by any cosmology within which human beings may live. It is from this perspective, and on the basis of relatively recent discoveries in linguistics and the cognitive sciences, that I will describe the critique of a small group of seekers of new solutions to very old problems who have grown disillusioned with the lack of factuality in the 'realism' of the Western paradigm (see Delanty 1997). Varela *et al.* (1991) criticise what they call

"cognitivism", Lakoff (1987, 1988) calls it "objectivism" and Winograd and Flores (1987) call it the "rationalistic tradition". The latter refer to it as:

> [T]he tradition of rationalism and logical empiricism that can be traced back at least to Plato. This tradition has been the mainspring of Western science and technology, and has demonstrated its effectiveness most clearly in the 'hard sciences' --those that explain the operation of deterministic mechanisms whose principles can be captured in formal systems. The tradition finds its highest expression in mathematics and logic, and has greatly influenced the development of linguistics and cognitive psychology. (Winograd and Flores 1987:14)

What Varela *et al.* call "cognitivism" has its origins in the field of cybernetics of the 1940's in U.S.A., which had the "avowed intention" to create a science of mind. Its basic assumptions were that the brain and mental activity operate through logic and that therefore the brain is regarded as a device whose component elements (neurons) embody logical principles, and neurons were seen as smaller threshold devices that were either active or inactive. These ideas were essential for the invention of digital computers that function on the basis of a binary code, but they also laid the basis for a scientific study of mind which eventually crystallised in the "cognitivist paradigm" (Varela *et al.* 1991:39).

In this paradigm, intelligence --of any kind-- is seen as resembling computation and so cognition is defined as computations of symbolic representations:

> The cognitivist argument is that intelligent behavior presupposes the ability to represent the world as being certain ways. We therefore cannot explain cognitive behavior unless we assume that an agent acts by representing relevant features of her situations. To the extent that her representation of a situation is accurate, the agent's behavior will be successful (all other things being equal). (Varela *et al.* 1991:40)

The physical symbolic expression of representation here is taken to correspond with a global and highly distributed pattern of brain activity, not to symbols physically engraved in the neurons or in specific physical patterns of interaction. The patterns of brain activity cannot be reduced to particular symbols, just like a meaning cannot be reduced to its isolated symbolic expression: "in addition to the levels of physics and neurobiology, cognitivism postulates a distinct, irreducible symbolic level in the

explanation of cognition" (Varela *et al.* 1991:41). And this symbolic level is supposed to both be *unconscious* (absolutely) and get its meaning from the syntactic logic within the system. In cognitivism the brain is thus seen as an information-processing device in a literal sense, not only in metaphor, which has no direct access to its own mental or cognitive processes themselves; "if such cognitive processes could be made conscious, then they could not be fast and automatic and so could not function properly" (Varela *et al.* 1991:49). As Varela explains, the unconscious level of which cognitivism speaks entails a literal separation from the level of consciousness, no access to one's own unconscious level from within one's own mind. In contrast to psychology, where the *unconscious* may be brought to consciousness through therapy and is therefore linked to it --even if thinly and mysteriously--, the cognitivist assumption of essentially unconscious events allows access to them only from an outside syntactical and mathematical formal modelling of that level of events.

The cognitivist paradigm entails the assumption of an essential division between consciousness and mind; and sees mind processes as governed by fragmentated subsystems of processes. "The actual subsystems are deemed to be unproblematic *non*conscious bits of organic machinery, as utterly lacking in point of view or inner life as a kidney or a kneecap" (Hofstadter and Dennet 1981:12)[1]. The problem with those subsystems is that they can only function mechanically, like the Cartesian animal 'automatons', where spontaneity is taken as an epiphenomenon of the formalised abstract structure and not as a structural part of the model. As we will see this is congenial with Lakoff's critique of "objectivism" (1987) or "objectivist cognition" (1988).

It is useful at this point to clarify the notions of syntax and semantics and how they are related in cognitivism/objectivism. Syntax is how the symbols are related to each other and semantics is how they are related to the world; "in a computer

[1] Quoted by (Varela *et al.*1991:50). A kidney or a kneecap might not have a point of view for lacking human personality, even if people do relate themselves emotionally and deeply with their own kidneys and kneecaps, and other body-parts, as to let them rule their own personality. But kidneys and kneecaps may be seen as having an inner life that is definitely rich at a factual level, and from the Eastern/mystic perspective, also at a spiritual level --i. e. in a consciousness that is congenial with our own kind of consciousness.

program the syntax of the symbolic code mirrors or encodes its semantics. In the case of human language, it is far from obvious that all of the semantic distinctions relevant in an explanation of behavior be mirrored syntactically" (Varela *et al.* 1991:42). The syntax referred to here is represented by the algorithmic relationships established by the programmer. A very strong assumption about the factuality of logic is being made in assuming that the world may be efficiently mirrored by an artificial allopoietic creation. The assumption of cognitivism is not that they are using a useful metaphor and putting it for the experienced world as in metonymic language; but that it actually and thoroughly replicates it as in descriptive language. According to Lakoff (1988:123), this is what Hilary Putnam has referred to as the "God's Eye View" according to which;

> reality is structured in a way that can be modelled by set-theoretical models, which consist of abstract entities (which model real-world entities), sets of abstract entities (defined by the common properties of their members), and sets of *n*-tuples (corresponding to relations among entities). (Lakoff 1988:123)

The objectivist tradition that Lakoff criticises assumes that the essence of reality is represented by words, literal meaning, and the rules that relates them, that is by a direct relationship between semantics and syntax. This entails that the symbols themselves be emptied of inherent meaning in descriptive language to stand wholly for the thing that they refer to in the world, but it also entails that meaning be most strongly associated to logical coherence between words. This is supposed to mean that reason can be modelled through computational algorithms, as in the cognitivist paradigm that Varela criticises. According to Lakoff, the central claim of objectivist cognition is that rational thought is "the algorithmic manipulation of arbitrary abstract symbols that are meaningless in themselves but get their meaning by being associated with things in the world" (1988: 117).

The *doctrines* on which the objectivist view of language and semantics is based consider that 1) the world is formed by entities with fixed properties and relations and that this structure is independent of understanding; 2) the entities are naturally divided into categories (natural kinds) which have shared properties; 3) all properties are primitive and complex and the latter are logical combinations of the

former; 4) there are objective rational relations between entities and categories; 5) meaning is based on reference and truth (the doctrine of truth-conditional meaning); 6) truth is based on correspondence between symbols and states of affairs (the "correspondence theory" of truth); 7) there is one objectively correct way to link symbols and things in the world; 8) conceptual categories are seen as sets where their members must be characterised by necessary and sufficient conditions; 9) the definition of a complex concept is a collection of necessary and sufficient conditions on less complex concepts (Lakoff 1988:123-36). Lakoff describes how Putnam criticises this kind of objectivist cognition on the basis of internal contradictions in the methodology used to support its assumed metaphysics.

There are three formal critiques that Putnam carries out and that Lakoff refers to (1987, 1988). First, objective reference cannot be organised because the pairs of the form: 'linguistic expressions' *refer* to 'objects or sets', are linked by *refer*, whose own reference is not clear. Second, reference as necessarily being objectively correct would require that it "be satisfied by one and only one set of pairs of the form (symbol of the language, element of the model)" (Lakoff 1988:128). However, a theory of reference is a sequence of sentences that cannot be satisfied by only one possibility; and thus "the unique, objectively correct account of reference that is required to give meaning to the symbols within objectivist cognition is not mathematically possible, given the proposed mathematical tools" (Lakoff 1988:129). And third, a fundamental requirement of an adequate theory of meaning is that the meaning of the parts of a sentence cannot be changed without changing the meaning of the whole; but if elements of a model have no meaning in themselves, only a set theoretical structure, it is possible to change the "meaning" of parts of a sentence without changing the "meaning" of the whole. "Thus, says Lakoff, what model-theorists call "meaning" cannot be meaning" (1988:129). This derives from his explanation of the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem (Lakoff 1987:232-35) and the accompanying observation that not only are isolated symbols meaningless in themselves, but that the models used to describe their relations are also meaningless structures in themselves. Their relationships are generally interpreted, because interpretation is unavoidable when meaningless sequences of symbols are matched

with meaningless structures, but then meaning is imposed by whomever does the interpretation and does not lie within the structure itself. "It is this fact that Putnam uses in demonstrating that the pairing of *meaningless* strings of symbols with *meaningless* structures cannot provide a theory of *meaning*" (Lakoff 1987:234).

However, on top of a discussion of the formal critique on traditional semantics, Lakoff also discusses empirical evidence to counter the traditional view that conceptual categories are necessarily only structured as clearly defined sets of concepts even if their borders are construed as fuzzy (as in Zadeh 1965)[2]. He gives the example of colour which is considered as a secondary property, one that is not absolutely objective, so it is not considered a meaningful cognitive category in the objectivist paradigm because it is not independent of our embodied perceptual and cognitive experience. And yet it is a meaningful category of mind in human interaction and, most importantly for Lakoff's argumentation, in human reason. This is quite relevant for his subsequent discussion about how it is that human embodiment and imaginative involvement in the production of referential information should be taken into account for an appropriate theory of meaning. His position explicitly abandons the arena of an exclusively *a priori* reasoning in traditional and formalised models of semantics in order to explore the implications of embodiment and imagination in meaning.

From a factual perspective, in metaphoric and metonymic language syntax and meaning may be differentiated easily from each other because the former is seen as the relations between words (grammatical rules) and the latter as their metaphoric or metonymic imaginary meaning. In the descriptive language of the rationalistic tradition though, syntax and meaning should mirror each other, with small margins of error that are considered to be negligible. A problem arises when we assume that, in the mathematical cosmos of abstraction, the margins of error can be abstractly assumed to enfold infinite sequences of fractionate numbers. To use a metaphor explicitly, we could say that the margin of error holds whole universes of imagination between its two extremes. Nevertheless, theoretical scientific discourse

[2] Quoted and discussed by (Lakoff 1987:21-22, 1988:130)

is primarily factual, and therefore, it describes things literally. Lakoff criticises this traditional view of reality in objectivism, which is based in an ontological separation between subject and object; where the subject relates to the object of cognition through 'correct' principles of referentiality. He wants to express a new view on factual rationality which is less rigid and accounts for the imaginative involvement of the one who does the reasoning:

> The traditional view sees reason as literal, as primarily about propositions that can be objectively either true or false. The new view takes imaginative aspects of reason --metaphor, metonymy, and mental imagery-- as central to reason, rather than as peripheral and inconsequential adjunct to the literal. (Lakoff 1987:xi)

But where would science be without its myth of separation between subject and object? Again, this does not mean that because it is based on a particular mythology of essential separation, the scientific method of objective observation is false --it has very real manifestations that we live with everyday-- but it is only a disciplined method of looking at the world. As Northrop Frye says, it is important to be aware of one's own mythological conditioning in order to, on the one hand, produce scientifically useful explanation or patterning and design of relevant generalisations; and on the other, avoid arbitrary impositions of universalistic consequences on oneself and on the world. Here I will take the view that there are necessary areas of overlapping between the three types of verbal structures and that all three of them create our idea of self, our rituals or routines: our disciplined behaviour and the meaningful referentiality that structures human interaction. This position will be further clarified in the explanation of Luhmann's theory of meaning further below.

Lakoff speaks about basic-level categories and schematization as the basis for the study of cognitive semantics, which are very important to my model of human order, because they become part of a transformed version of Luhmann's theory of meaning (see next section of this chapter below). Basic-level categories are considered as cognitively basic because they refer to a level of interaction that our bodies are familiar with and that is characterisable only in cognitive terms; such as the experience that category members have similarly perceived overall shapes, or that

a single mental image can reflect the entire category, or that it is the level first named and understood by children, etc. (see Lakoff 1988:133). It is not the highest or lowest level of categorisation, but somewhere in the middle[3]. He refers to studies of folk terminology for plant and animals, which corresponds quite accurately with the biological level of the genus (one level above the level of the species), even in isolated cultures; specifically, he refers to studies of Tzeltal categorisations by Berlin, Breedlove, and Raven (1974) and Hunn (1977). At different levels of categorisation, which are mainly subject to abstract-imaginative and culturally determined domains of reality (our own "higher" superordinate and "lower" subordinate levels included), correspondence goes away. Therefore, Lakoff's conclusions include that basic-level categories may function relatively accurately for objectivist formalised views on language, but the fact that there is no such accuracy at other levels, makes objectivism implausible. Further, and most importantly for the present discussion, the determinants of the basic-level categories are not objectively in the world; they are more readily related to how human bodies and minds interact with the world (Lakoff 1988:134).

Schematization is a characteristic of the human mind that has been observed by cognitive anthropology (see Varela *et al.* 1991). "Schemas" or "frames" is where most of our cultural shared reality resides, and not in the thing in the world with which we interact. "The need", says Lakoff, "for such schemas has become generally accepted throughout the cognitive sciences" (1988:135); and they reflect a cultural realm of references that is not external to the human mind at all; concepts like 'Wall street', 'bachelor', 'chess', 'objective', 'June', 'sacred vows', etc. reside simultaneously in human minds and intricately entwined with something that is perceived as either abstract (as we imagine it now) or circumstantially external (as we enact it). According to Lakoff, this gives further evidence that the objectivist paradigm is too limited to explain the phenomenon of meaning. Lakoff also refers to polysemy in

[3] Lakoff uses "cat" as an example of basic-level category: "For example, *animal* is a superordinate category for *cat*, while *manx* [a variety of domestic cat] is subordinate. The basic level is the level at which human beings interact with their environment most effectively and process and store and communicate information most efficiently" (1988:133).

order to describe some principles according to which the idea of schematisation can structure cognitive semantics.

Polysemy is the fact that individual words and morphemes have various meanings that are related to each other systematically and this relationship may be said to be determined by certain very natural relationships among experienced schemas (see also Lakoff & Johnson 1980). Existing concepts may direct and structure what we experience, but we are already shaped or embodied in a certain way, which determines presently the human possibilities of concrete experience. This does not mean that our species might not evolve or drift toward a different shape, but for now, this one is determinant. Lakoff describes the 'container', the 'part-whole', the 'link', and the 'source-path-goal' schemas, that are not understood as meaning postulates and their interpretation; rather they are seen as inherently meaningful because they structure our direct embodied experience: Getting in or out of a room or a situation (container schema); referring to parts of our body or of ourselves (like my 'arm' or my 'principles'), and therefore, to parts of other wholes (part-whole schema); physical and abstract connections --the first one in life being the umbilical cord (Lakoff 1988:143)-- (link schema) and directions whose basic experience is bodily movement (source-path-goal).

From here, Lakoff goes on to say that reason may be viewed as eminently based on bodily experience as well as metaphorical projections from concrete to abstract domains, and not necessarily only as *a priori* rationalisation based on premises that are abstract to start off with. This goes against the objectivist assumptions that associate reason with the use of finitary symbols and algorithmic operations with those symbols. Varela *et al.* criticise this view further in their cognitive version of "objectivism", which they call "cognitivism" and involves an idea of cognitive agents in a pregiven world. They refer to two ideas of representation a "weak" one, the one we use everyday to function and convey literal meanings; and a "strong" cognitivist one, which makes epistemological and ontological assumptions about how it is that we think.

> The ontological and epistemological commitments are basically twofold: We assume that the world is pregiven, that its features can be specified prior to any cognitive activity. Then to explain the relation between this cognitive

> activity and a pregiven world, we hypothesize the existence of mental representations inside the cognitive system (whether these be images, symbols or subsymbolic patterns of activity distributed across a network does not matter for the moment). (Varela *et al.* 1991:135)

In order to explain the cognitivist idea of a cognising subject, they use a metaphor, according to which the subject of cognition is "parachuted" into a pregiven world and this entity's cognitive capacities are likened to a map (specified innately and sometimes called a "language of thought") and the task of ontogeny is to learn the correct use of the map.

Varela *et al.* contemplate an objection to their metaphoric representation of cognitivism: Cognitivists would protest that this is a caricature of what they speak about, cognitivist perception is better conveyed by the idea of an active process of hypothesis formation and not only as the simple mirroring of the objective environment. But Varela *et al.* reply to this foreseen cognitivist objection saying that they do not want to caricature a sophisticated research program, only to put in the clearest way possible what it *implies*. Representation is agreed to be a complex process by everyone, but cognitivists regard it as the recovering and reconstructing of features in the environment and outside the cognising agent. Varela *et al.* reject this view, but not to embrace the idealist's position where the world is merely a projection of mental images on a world to which we ultimately have no access; this position leaves the ontological status of a subject-object divide intact (see also Lakoff & Johnson 1980). Cognitivists escape this philosophical impasse by shifting their concern from *a priori* representations to *a posteriori* ones; thus naturalising the concept of representation and still being able to investigate mind and cognition within the rigours of scientific objectivity[4]. But this naturalised conception of representation is still very much linked to the traditional image of the mind as a mirror of nature. "In some ways", say Varela *et al.*, "cognitivism is the strongest

[4] We will recall that this naturalisation of the concept of representation in cognitivism is analogous to that of the concept of natural selection in adaptationism. There are deterministic consequences in both movements of naturalisation because the former speaks about a "correct" way of knowing and dealing with an "outside", "objective" world, and the latter cannot escape its local optimising assumptions.

statement yet of the representational view of the mind inaugurated by Locke and Descartes" (1991:138).

In order to criticise further the deterministic assumptions of cognitivism, Varela and his collaborators also speak about the "connectionist" paradigm and its importance in the emerging paradigm of complexity. This paradigm and its relationship with the ontological status of the subject-object divide is also important in the critique of Luhmann's theory of social systems, below. Varela *et al.* point out that even within the connectionist paradigm where a spontaneous form of order is observed in densely connected systems, it is hard to escape the consequences of an "objectivist" world view, that assumes that the world lies "outside" our embodied consciousness. According to connectionism, what is generally called "emergent properties" --which have been observed in a wide array research domains[5]-- helps to transform the traditional view of representation, where mind (or brain for that matter) is an input-output device that processes information. Here, the role of the environment as pregiven has moved from being the main point of reference to the background that enfolds the mind, which has moved to the foreground of research: "the idea of mind as an emergent and autonomous network of relationships has gained a central place" (Varela *et al.* 1991:138). Connectionism poses densely connected systems that come up with spontaneous orderly patterns of response to the environment, without a central guiding logic as in the cognitivist paradigm. These patterns are spontaneously produced emergent properties that are seen to organise themselves around what has been called "attractors" (See Varela *et al.* 1991:85-103)

However, according to Varela, even in this new view (connectionism) the old traditional view of representation is sustained for lack of a better picture of how it is that cognitive systems interact with their environment at the same time as they are embedded in it. When they refer to networks of relationships that take place in the

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[5] "There is no unified theory of emergent properties. It is clear, however, that emergent properties have been found across all domains --vortices and lasers, chemical oscillations, genetic networks, developmental patterns, population genetics, immune networks, ecology, and geophysics". In these systems, there is no need for a central processing unit as a guide for the specified operation; they go from local rules to global coherence, and during the years of cybernetics, it used to be called self-organisation. "Today people prefer to speak of emergent or global properties, network dynamics, nonlinear networks, complex systems, or even synergetics" (Varela *et al.* 1991:88)

brain, cognitive scientists speak of the processes that carry the brain from state to state, this they consider mind. But what makes them mind-like is that they are seen as "embodying" (cognitivism) or "supporting" (emergent properties) representations of the world that exists independently of cognition and that can act as input of information for a cognitive system. Information is still a prespecified quantity that provides the premises upon which a system computes a behaviour or the output. But, inputs and outputs cannot be specified for highly cooperative, self-organising systems like the brain (Maturana & Varela 1987, Varela *et al.* 1991). Even if there is a flow of energy back and forth, it is impossible to specify when information ends and behaviour begins (Maturana 1970, 1990). According to Maturna and Varela (1987), brains use processes that change themselves, that is, the main activity of the brain is to make changes in itself. In the light of these scientific discoveries, Varela refers to a necessary shift in cognitive sciences:

> This shift requires that we move away from the idea of the world as independent and extrinsic to the idea of a world as inseparable from the structure of these processes of self-modification. This change in stance does not express a mere philosophical preference; it reflects the necessity of understanding cognitive systems not on the basis of their input and output relationships but by their operational *closure*. A system that has operational closure is one in which the results of its processes are those processes themselves. (Varela *et al.* 1991:139)

The essence of this shift is one of perspective, as I have argued in this work; and I propose that a proper perspective for these purposes is the synchronic realm of experience in the *present moment of meaningful interaction*. As has been explained in chapter V, this synchronic moment of observation stands on the existential field of nihility, which is not Absolute emptiness, and so it can still be an intellectual source of knowledge. Varela and his collaborators (1991) believe that a disciplined way of insightfully approaching our own experience and cognition is through the Buddhist notion of "groundlessness". This lies on analogous "grounds" (the word here used metaphorically) as nihilist "nothingness", on which an existential awareness of reality is based. But groundlessness does not follow the path to solipsistic consequences, it abandons despair aspirationally in striving to learn to let go of the deeply rooted tendencies to find the grounds for a definite reality "outside" of our consciousness,

one that we can know objectively "for sure" and in that certainty abolish whole universes of experienced reality. "We could make a similar point phenomenologically by saying that groundlessness is the very condition for the richly textured and interdependent world of human experience" (Varela *et al.* 1991:144).

It is only from this "groundless" condition that they go on to explain how it is that their view of cognition as embodied and *enactive* can represent a genuine alternative to the deeply rooted notion of cognition as *representation*[6]. According to this, then, cognitive systems do not represent an independent world, rather, they enact *a* world as a domain of references and distinctions that cannot be separated from the sensory-motor configurations that unfold throughout the ontogeny of the cognitive agent. With respect to their idea of embodied cognition as enaction, Varela *et al.* "wish to evoke the point that when we begin to take such a conception of mind seriously, we must call into question the idea that the world is pregiven and that cognition is representation" (1991:140). The enactive perspective explicitly seeks a middle path between realism and idealism, both positions which the authors consider analogous to the "chicken and egg" dilemma, where either the world or our internal mind-structure is pregiven, and where the representational paradigm is not essentially challenged, as cognition is either a recovery of world-features ("objectivism") or their projection by our separate minds ("subjectivism") (see Lakoff & Johnson 1980).

The perceiver is the point of departure of the enactive approach, the one who stands at the centre of the present meaningful moment of interaction. From the enactive approach, then, one can

> study how the perceiver can guide his actions in his local situation. Since these local situations constantly change as a result of the perceiver's activity, the reference point for understanding perception is no longer a pregiven, perceiver-independent world but rather the sensory-motor structure of the perceiver (the way in which the nervous system links sensory and motor

[6] This view of cognition is also tied to ideas of efficiency and optimality where the cognitive agent manages to learn to read its innate map properly and therefore performs objectively correct interaction with the environment. As Varela and his collaborators explain, this idea of optimality is congenial to that of progress and optimality in evolution as adaptation. While "representation in cognitive science is the precise homologue of adaptationism in evolutionary theory, for optimality plays the same central role in each domain" (Varela *et al.* 1991:194); "evolution as natural drift is the biological counterpart of cognition as embodied action, and therefore also provides a more embracing theoretical context for the study of cognition as a biological phenomenon" (Varela *et al.* 1991:188).

> surfaces). This structure --the manner in which the perceiver is embodied-- rather than some pregiven world determines how the perceiver can act and be modulated by environmental events. (Varela *et al.* 1991:173)

The enactive approach allows us to convey a synchronic perspective while we describe it phenomenologically. However, I have related "present experience" to the kind of consciousness that we share with animals. Even if their nervous system does not allow for the kind of recursive interaction that produces human discursivity as a characteristic of our species, we share a practical kind of spontaneous consciousness with them.

The problem of consciousness had been provisionally solved for science by assuming the 'natural' division between mind and body, where consciousness and self were granted to the one and denied to the other, mainly because the Western self is identified with intellectual reflection --the Cartesian thinking "I". But in questioning the legitimacy of the division between mind and body in the present time of experience, where they are indistinguishable, our perspective of self, mind, life, and consciousness becomes circular:

> Minds awaken in a world. We did not design our world. We simply found ourselves with it; we awoke both to ourselves and to the world we inhabit. We come to reflect on that world as we grow and live. We reflect on a world that is not made, but found, and yet it is also our structure that enables us to reflect upon this world. Thus in reflection we find ourselves in a circle: we are in a world that seems to be there before reflection begins, but that world is not separate from us. (Varela *et al.* 1991:3)

The Western/Christian divided view of reality (with two 'real' domains: transcendence and world) provided the cosmological form of reality that would legitimise the mind-body divide as a plausible symbology elaborated by the Forefathers of the scientific discipline. But this division is linked to the older philosophical and theological one, in which the Spirit manifests itself in us through our mind and not our body (see Warner:1980). Nevertheless, the mind-body and therefore subject-object divide provided the disciplined means to organise an ongoing debate about consciousness in philosophy and psychology; where the accompanying subject-object divide and its further divisions and classifications of phenomena made the debate possible at all. In phenomenological analysis we cannot

dissolve this divide, all we can do is emphasise it as appearance and be aware that, in our sequential explanations, when we observe the object we stop looking at ourselves as subjects of cognition and assume a privileged perspective at the centre of consciousness.

But as I have repeatedly asserted throughout this work the ontological division between subject and object has been observed to lack factuality, and constitutes one of science's most useful myths. In the light of this century's discoveries in Physics[7] it has been found legitimate to take into account the presence of the consciousness of the observer in her/his observations, and how this makes the experiment itself a much more complex event[8]; one that is not just simply deterministic or random, but stochastic; that is, placed 'somewhere' in between determinism and randomness:

> [I]n a sense, the classical world was in opposition to our internal experience. Today, these new ideas lead to a concordance between the scientific view and our internal and real experience, and therefore the resulting world view is perhaps more open and more tolerant of different cultural origins, recognizing more fully, as it does, a new coherence between subjective experience and the scientific viewpoint. (Prigogine 1984:117)

But even if consideration about the consciousness of either the object of study or of the subject itself has produced these newer research trends, the concept of consciousness itself remains problematic (see Block *et al.* 1997).

Yet, our own everyday human consciousness may be explored experientially and empathically in a phenomenological manner --on the paradoxical grounds of "groundlessness"-- to a better degree that any other species of consciousness on

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[7] Heisenberg's uncertainty principle and the impossibility to measure two aspects of the same physical phenomenon at the same time (velocity and position of microparticles): to see one is to lose sight of the other.

[8] "We now begin to see new possibilities for understanding natural phenomena", says Ilya Prigogine, "which we could not perceive before. The first 50 years of the century were dominated by the discovery of quantum theory and relativity, relating to the extremes of either very small or very large phenomena. In contrast, the last decade has been dominated by an extraordinary growth of physics on our own scale: that of the macroscopic physics of dynamic systems. This research is leading to a much better understanding of our "place" within nature, and we are now discovering extremely interesting phenomena on our own spatial and temporal scale, without needing to go to the classical frontiers of science, namely microparticles or cosmology. The shift from simplicity to complexity is not an ideological shift due simply to some a priori reasoning" (Prigogine 1984:107); he insists that the shift is based on experimental evidence, which produces complex theory that cannot be ignored anymore by deterministic (he calls them simplistic) approaches to science.

earth, because we experience it primarily as human beings. The immediacy of unreflective experience, however, must go through symbological and coherent transformation before it can be voiced in discursive conscious reflection, one that is unavoidably causal, sequential and diachronic, just like any other tale. Consciousness is at the centre of the mind-body divide, but it is a mysterious feature mixed with bodily perception because, even though we all experience it and we can intuitively feel that other species of living beings have consciousness, its present richness cannot be fully described in the sequential symbols of any type of language. It follows that representation of specific experiences of consciousness beyond human is impossible (we can only imagine them in a human way) and representation of a universal kind of consciousness is best left to artists, mystics, and poets or left without representation (as in many spiritual traditions).

However, it is important to remember that --in the phenomenal world of our scientific discipline and tradition-- there is a finite amount of variation of species we can identify with on earth, with organisational limitations that we can observe, even while we understand that those limitations are artificial impositions of our own discipline. Nevertheless, experientially, there are shared human meanings that describe regular features of our physiological and psychological organisation; that is, we can currently recognise other human beings as members of our own species, even if there are racial variations (and even if there have been historical situations in which this was not the case). To be sure, consciousness of self is a subjective experience with abstract potentially infinite possibilities of *structural* variation that is comparable to the abstract potentially infinite structural possibilities of individual embodiment --this is the basis of the experiential reality of the 'multiverse' posed in postmodern constructions. But this image can only run to the extreme of its abstractly infinite conclusions if we see human selves as "disworlded minds"[9] (Varela *et al.* 1991:4). If we are speaking experientially about human perception, it should be situated within our presently known material limitations in the world we perceive

[9] This false image has been built as an excessive idealisation of human freedom, but it can be posed as a criticism to many postmodern conclusions about the self; while at the same time the false image of a "disembodied observer" can be posed as a critique of modern assumptions about reality.

(and this includes embodiment, the particularity of people, and the constant mystery of our own consciousness and of ever present sexuality and death). Other forms of consciousness may be seen as factually different from human if the latter is able to recognise *organisationally* its own difference from them. And yet, they remain a point of reference in order to be able to see how human is also unavoidably animal and structurally coupled to the rest of nature at the same time.

As has been said before, the organic ideal type of organisation shows how human interaction is also animal interaction; while the artificial ideal type of organisation describes how human interaction is different from animal interaction. The basis of this difference has been generally conceptualised with respect to our discursive capacity, and in this respect, this work is no different from other conceptualisations. Nevertheless, here, the ontological division between subject and object has been assumed as a Western myth that cannot be avoided methodologically in order to produce plausible explanations of factuality. The explanations and methodology (as well as the mythology) lie within the scientific tradition and discipline, whose history can be traced through its path dependencies and which has now a structural actuality that we embrace and transform in the continuation of discipline and tradition (even if its roots have been repeatedly and explicitly rejected). As we will see, an essential trust in discipline, even a creatively invented one, is a major organiser for human interaction.

Trust, belief system, symbology, and the experience of time are bootstrapped to each other, producing different human experiences of reality. Trust is directly related to the present structures of belief that allow for spontaneity and discipline to engage in a constant dance of possible interaction --which often may not seem to be as harmonious as the mental image of a dance (besides order, destruction and entropy are always possible). Therefore, the two ideal-typical models of organisation proposed differentiate human spontaneous *organic* organisation from human disciplined *artificial* organisation. We manage to create these types of organisation both intentionally and autopoietically --discursively and practically-- in order to live together and sustain our embodied existence successfully, in a human kind of

awareness of ourselves and of each other, and in the constant management of potential and actual conflict.

Yet, it is important to point out at this stage, that both types of organisation are carved in human belief; even if the realist assumptions of our discipline lead us to believe that the organic side is already 'there', separate from us, and that we wilfully create the artificial side. This assumption is epistemologically located in the subject-object clear divide of our tradition, but in a time-frame that is sequential: it sets past and present in motion in a coordinated manner that allows us to differentiate factual causality clearly, and therefore allows us to produce scientific explanation. But in the present moment of meaningful experience, where object and subject are indistinguishable (except in explanation), the belief that past and present time can be clearly differentiated vanishes in a stable experience of present structures which we observe and which we engage in producing --both in discursive intentionality, and by spontaneity/chance/drift at the same time-- as we interact within them (these 'structures' include our own embodiment). And so, the artificial ideal type of organisation depends on an artificial division of structural features that will be realised for the sake of heuristic objectives. As opposed to the spontaneity of the organic type, this one is ruled by discipline, but we must bear in mind that discipline, as we will see, is both created and creative.

VII. 2. Discipline, Consciousness of Self, Potentiality

As has been mentioned above, the artificial ideal type of human organisation constitutes the grounds on which the human animal differs from non-human animals. But the basis of this difference is not an image of *homo faber* contriving cunning tools or of clear boundaries between savagery and civilisation. Instead, it is built from the perspective of an *existential* human consciousness of self. This means that the observer stands on the field of nihility (Nishitani 1982) or on existential "groundlessness" (Varela *et al.* 1991); while consciousness stands on the actuality of meaning. Consciousness of self has traditionally been construed as based on subjective individuality; where society is essentially an aggregate of wilful conscious actions of agents. Methodological individualism, even that of Weber, has the limitations of a sociology that builds a picture of society from the perspective of a second-order observer who starts "from below"; which regards social interaction as based on "building blocks" that cannot be divided (individual subjects), but that also should converge intersubjectively (however imperfectly) without having mutual access to individual subjectivity. I will argue that consciousness of self, however, cannot be based solely on individuality per se, as embodied by the individual human person; but it is also based on the emotional and imaginative structures of interaction that are *enacted* or practised collectively. These structures are like "changing archetypes" of interaction that human consciousness produces and reproduces, a constant activity that appresents their meaning, our emotional relationship with them, and our consciousness of self at the same time as they are enacted. From an existential perspective, consciousness of self can be therefore conceived of as individual and collective at the same time and thus its construction of society does not start from an individual "below" or from and abstract "above", rather, it stands at the centre of consciousness; this is the reason why this perspective is phenomenological and not objectivist (realism) or subjectivist (idealism).

Here I assume the idea that shared structures of interaction which every person is aware of are not necessarily intellectually shared, as in the ideal of transcendental intersubjectivity; but practically shared (see Czarniawska 1992, 1998).

Nevertheless, in this formulation, structures of interaction are experienced and cognised through human imagination and emotion at the same time as they are enacted. Shared structures of ordered behaviour are reified in disciplined practice, which is continually appresented through practical as well as discursive consciousness; this is a kind of *practical* intersubjectivity that is enacted[10]. But practical consciousness pertains to the realm of organic organisation which has already been discussed, while discursive consciousness structures disciplined practice explicitly, at the same time as there is a constant imaginative and emotional involvement of human consciousness with symbols and their meaning. The structure of discursive consciousness is construed as types of language or verbal structures that co-exist to produce difference, similarity, and sameness in meaning and across meaning domains. This discursive consciousness and the potentiality of its creations and constructions is only half of the medium of the constantly changing criteria according to which there is trust in human interaction (the other half is practical consciousness). The artificial ideal type of organisation theoretically described here considers human consciousness of self, its potentiality (seen as its structural possibilities for the expansion of knowledge --either primary, intellectual, or spiritual) and the type of disciplined practice experientially observed.

In everyday life, difference, sameness, or similarity get the shape of imaginary boundaries that are sustained emotionally and through constant enactment because, linguistically, they disappear as soon as they are used and must be appresented in enaction constantly while the relevant principles of difference, sameness, or similarity are legitimately sustained in emotion and imagination[11]. Emotional grounding is what produces the duration of boundaries (or their dissolution) and their imaginative enaction; it may produce some of the most constant human artificial habits --such as war and religion-- whose particular form of

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[10] From this perspective, it is irrelevant to interaction if the shared meaningful structures are not construed identically by the interacting subjects in their subjective realm of emotion and imagination every time that they are appresented.

[11] For example, the frontiers between countries are continually sustained and enacted by the national governments; but there are different degrees of dedication of resources to the maintenance of an enacted physical border (generally by a monopoly of violence whose source of legitimacy lies on the powerful side of the border). For example, the frontier between Mexico and the United States is enacted in a very different way from that between, say Holland and Belgium.

manifestation nonetheless changes with human ontogeny. This constant creation and dissolution of sameness, similarity, and difference can be observed only from the perspective of an existential consciousness of self, one that stands on "groundlessness", which is aware that our everyday human life-world is sustained through the fleeting present moment of meaningful experience.

From the perspective of existential "groundlessness" consciousness arises from moment to moment out of nothing at all. The phenomenological observer standing on existential "groundlessness" contemplates his/her own newness and impermanence as essential aspects of her/his own consciousness. From here, the observer can see his/her consciousness of self as determined by her/his own assumptions about the reality that s/he interacts with as an illusion of actuality (structural present, actually embodied and enacted, shaped by past interaction)[12]. From this perspective, the ordinary consciousness of self that is observed stands on the present moment of meaningful experience produced synchronically, from moment to moment, and it depends on collective assumptions of who we are and our place in the cosmos and in the world (the life-world), as well as individual features that characterise our personality. These assumptions may lie within a spectrum that goes from the extreme of universal consciousness, through consciousness of smaller groups of entities, to individuality, to one where we may divide ourselves up into parts (either functionally or dysfunctionally). In factual explanation, the individual and the collective realms may be differentiated clearly, but from an existential perspective of consciousness of self, they are indistinguishable.

References to the cosmos, to time, or to personality, establish an imaginary nexus of emotional grounding to those references through consciousness of self. The nexus is confirmed in human interaction which, to consciousness, may at times appear as external to its own imaginary boundaries and at times inside its enactive horizons. But the existential observer should always be aware that the "container" schema of meaning (the 'in/out' schema discussed in the previous chapter) is

[12] This illusion is such, not because it lacks factuality, but because, existentially, its source is regarded as the consciousness and vivid awareness of newness and impermanence; grounded in uncertainty and contingency and, eventually and ultimately, annihilated by death.

intimately bound to our particular embodied perception; and also that the objective-subjective divide of our tradition is organised around this enacted and perceived schema (therein lies its effectiveness). While it has proved to be an important figure of space and time in order to set limits on humanly experienced reality (phenomenal domains); an idea of *universal* and fixed boundaries that are seen to apply for all times and at all levels of experience unavoidably becomes a grand tyrant grounded by emotional ties to certainty. Borderlines can be useful or terrible... and in human interaction there is only a subtle difference between these two possibilities.

An existential consciousness of self is aware of its own grounds as nihility; its unavoidable future death in the historical realm of factuality. Existential reality is newness and impermanence, creativity and irreversibility and so it dares not fix any boundaries anywhere, except for heuristic objectives. From this perspective, the phenomenological observer needs the critical discipline of her/his scientific tradition as well as the vantage point of a transhistorical realm to respond to his/her commitment to truthfulness (however relative to the changing circumstances). In short, the perspective still needs both practice and *mythos*. I speak of myth here, not necessarily in that the principle lacks experienced reality: its structure itself organises the social enactment of intentional practice as experienced reality; the shape (organisation) and structure of the discipline. But the myth itself, its ordered structure, is nowhere to be found in an existentialist contemplation of reality: this observation adopts the transhistorical perspective of complexity and realises that any imagined coherent structure that aspires to explain the observation of synchronic complexity --even while representing and dealing with uncertainty-- is only a metaphor and can never be fully factual. This is coherent with the Kantian tradition according to which we have no access to the "thing in itself"... not discursively, I would add[13].

The disciplined type of human organisation differs from other animal social behaviour in that, structurally, it is not shaped physiologically, but linguistically. It is

[13] Access to the "thing in itself" would lie on the field of *sunyata* or "Absolute emptiness" (see discussion of Nishitani, section IV. 3. above), which is a spiritual realm that lies beyond factual explanation.

shaped linguistically, in as much as it creates a reflexive domain of interaction for human beings --where a discursive intention may be pondered-- that other animals do not appear to produce.

> Human beings are not the only animals that generate linguistic domains in their social existence. What is peculiar to them is that, in their linguistic coordination of actions, they give rise to a new phenomenal domain, viz., the *domain of language.* (Maturana and Varela 1987: 209)

As has been discussed, other animals do interact by "languaging", determined by the physiologically possible sounds, signals, movements, and exchanges that they can perform in structural coupling with their counterparts; they even learn enacted behaviours. But this has been observed to be a spontaneous organic type of social organisation; the one that we share with non-human animals.

The sociality of non-human animals depends heavily on spontaneous "instinctive communicative behaviors, whose stability depends on the genetic stability of the species and not on the cultural stability of the social system" (Maturana and Varela 1987:208). This pre-eminently organic type of collective interaction may result in the creation of particularly determined local "dialects", which *could be* compared to disciplined social order in human society (they are learnt in social animal collective realms of interaction and determined by the history of interactions of a particular group; e.g., a particular beehive; see Ingold 1983). Nevertheless, these dialects do not appear to organise whole imaginary or abstract domains of collective interaction that persist as a characteristic of the species, as in the human one. "The so-called "language" of bees", say Maturana and Varela, "for instance, is not a language. It is a mixed case of instinctive and linguistic behaviors" (1987:208). But human linguistic behaviour does not only include learnt rhythms of organic coordination in a species, it also includes the constant and simultaneous creation of symbols and their meaning.

The domain of human language is not only made out of local symbols that may produce broken and incompatible imaginary realms; it is also integrated in meaningful ideas of reality, cosmologies, sustained in belief --either practically or discursively-- by emotional ties:

> Man lives, not directly or nakedly in nature like the animals, but within a mythological universe, a body of assumptions and beliefs developed from his existential concerns. Most of this is held unconsciously[14], which means that our imagination may recognise elements of it, when presented in art or literature, without consciously recognizing what it is that we recognise. Practically all that we can see of this body of concern is socially conditioned and culturally inherited... One of the practical functions of criticism, by which I mean the conscious organizing of a cultural tradition, is, I think, to make us more aware of our mythological conditioning. (Frye 1982:xviii)

But Frye does not intend to eradicate this conditioning, he just wants to make us more aware of what it is that we have deep emotional ties with; an awareness that produces horizontal cultural tolerance of different ideas of reality. This point is particularly important when considering the subject-object divide in our tradition, which I have regarded as the paradigmatic myth at its foundations; but one that may be very useful in the production of intellectual and factual knowledge. This is the myth that Maturana an Varela also both use and criticise in their autopoietic metaphor for synchronic life; and it is the one that Niklas Luhmann, in his *Social Systems*, is also engaged both in embracing and rejecting through his theory of a self-referential meaning that is bootstrapped to itself. However, while Maturana and Varela effectively integrate the position of the observer (that entails a diachronic shape of explanation as a "history of interactions", what I have called "path dependencies") with her/his awareness that s/he is also an embodied interacting living organism like the observed one (synchronic ontogeny: the autopoiesis and structural coupling of the observer him/herself); Luhmann seems unaware that, while his theory of meaning is based on a phenomenological structure, he also embraces the position of the second-order observer in his theory of social systems through the factuality that he claims for his basic assumptions of hierarchies and borders and for the absoluteness of his functional diachronic and "complex" explanations. His systematic structures are at times based on the connectionist paradigm of "emergent properties" and at times on digital communication --cybernetic system theory (see

[14] In this work, this kind of assertion about an unconscious realm is interpreted as learnt meaning that has been assimilated into the structures of practical consciousness and that remains as part of the *enacted* (Varela *et al.* 1991) realm of interaction, either without or after having achieved a reflexive and discursive awareness about the enactment as such. This awareness comes about as a type of disciplined approach to interaction.

Luhmann 1979:6) which, as has been discussed above, fail to fully abandon the objectivist implications about mind and cognition. I will argue that Luhmann's perspective only becomes phenomenological in his theory of meaning, a modified version of which I will integrate to my model.

Maturana and Varela speak about the perspective of the observer and cannot lose sight of it in themselves as biologists, because in their practice, they must use the scalpel and chop up life in order to study it while, unavoidably, either killing it or needing to artificially keep it alive (clearly and experientially). In contrast to this, in his *Social Systems* (1995) Luhmann's "scalpel" is an abstract knife of *precise* concept formation, and therefore, can keep dividing or differentiating domains of interaction without any organic limitation as to where he can stop chopping up life to analyse it without killing it. He considers that social systems can be construed as a nexus of communications, and their relationship to human consciousness lies in the environment of the social system and they are therefore autonomous from human consciousness autopoietically:

> Such environmental relevance for the construction of social systems constrains what is possible, but it does not prevent social systems from forming themselves autonomously and on the basis of their own elemental operations. These operations are communications --not psychic processes per se, and also not the processes of consciousness. (Luhmann 1995:255)

After having cut off the social system from its source of life (i.e. human consciousness), Luhmann goes on to say that the communications of social systems keep multiplying themselves autopoietically, according to principles that are congenial with insights from the connectionist research project in artificial intelligence (as has been pointed out, he also turns to the old cybernetic one when he describes the use of contradiction as a kind of on/off threshold device). With his abstract scalpel Luhmann carefully cuts the societal communicative layers off the conscious core (the "black boxes" in Luhmann's Parsonian explanation of double contingency); and then proceeds to examine social systems analytically, once they're dead, devoid of consciousness.

I will argue that the major problem with Luhmann's theoretical view of societal interaction is that he embraces two different perspectives as an observer of

social systems, while at the same time trying to reject one of them. One perspective, congenial with this work, is the phenomenological centre of consciousness that Luhmann adopts for his theory of meaning, the other is the 'outside position' of the 'second-order' observer of social interaction that he adopts in order to explain the impossibility of Husserlian intersubjectivity through his functional exposition of double contingency. The problem with this second perspective is that it needs boundaries and hierarchies as basic assumptions of the theoretical model to begin with, just like the subject-object divide. In order to avoid this, Luhmann changes terminology and instead of positing the divide with respect to the conscious human being, he poses it with respect to systems and their environment, whose borders are factually 'there':

> For a (scientific) observer, where the boundaries lie may still remain analytically unclear, but this does not justify viewing the bounding of systems as a purely analytical determination. (Luhmann 1995:30)

But he does not contemplate that social systems are not embodied in anything but human enaction, emotion, and imagination. As has been discussed, the perspective of this work eliminates the possibility of positing borders as an ontological characteristic of the world (of systems or not) and adopts instead the phenomenological notion of abstract horizons (which Luhmann also uses, but which inadvertently they also become functional borders). This is because when Luhmann crosses, analytically, any "factual" horizons he turns them into abstract borders in human interaction, this entails the assumption of a second-order observer that lets go of her/his own consciousness as the centre of phenomenological observation --the world as appearance-- to assume that there is, in fact, a world 'out there' objectively speaking. But this kind of analysis entails that we then take on board objectivist assumptions without questioning them and that the observer assume a privileged perspective: an overview of assumptions that organises our own particular discipline, but that prevents us from considering any other forms of discipline as legitimate sources of knowledge.

In his theory of social systems, Luhmann substitutes the subject-object divide --which assumes the 'subject' as conscious-- for the system-environment divide:

> If one wishes to retain a "subject" terminology, one can still say: a consciousness is the subject of the world, alongside which there are other kinds of subjects, above all social systems. Or that psychic and social systems are the subjects of the world. Or that meaningful self-reference is the subjects of the world. Or that the world is a correlate of meaning. In every case, such assertions burst open the clear Cartesian difference between subject and object. It is superfluous to try to understand the concept of the subject from the viewpoint of this difference; the difference, so to speak, subjectivizes itself. The self-referential subject and the self-referential object are conceived isomorphically --just like reason and the thing in itself for Kant. And isn't the concept of self-reference, then, all that is needed? (Luhmann 1995:438-9)

So instead of organising a second-order observer system of referential rules; Luhmann gives intention --a consequence of consciousness in my model-- to meaning itself and then bootstraps meaning to itself so that it becomes self-referential, and thus gets apparently rid of the problem of consciousness. From the perspective of a second-order observer Luhmann connects system and environment by a realm of *interpenetration*, which communicates black boxes with each other through the dense connectivity between self-referential meanings (who *intend* themselves) and that produce "emergent properties" as complex patterns of communicative interaction that, eventually, reach the conscious states of the "psychic system" as a relativized version of communication through fuzzy "symbolic generalisation". While Luhmann's alternative complex terminology is a very useful metaphor to illustrate the flow of functional discursive intentionality, I argue that the cuts of his abstract "scalpel" include one too many, after which social systems die. I am speaking of his assumption that social systems operate solely through communication, and not through human consciousness, as closed self-referential systems on their own. Luhmann cuts off --in abstraction-- the element of human consciousness in meaningful social systems and puts it "outside" the systems in the environment but connected to it through his *interpenetrative* cybernetic borders.

Luhmann substitutes the problematic notion of human consciousness for an abstract entity of conscious states, the 'psychic system'. He stresses that his "social systems are nor composed of individuals and cannot be created out of bodily or psychic processes" (1995:256). Even though this does not mean to him that there are no individuals in the world of social systems; the latter constitute abstract entities

with self-referential closure and borders, but that lack consciousness in themselves and connect to the human realms through their borders in interaction with psychic systems. For Luhmann, as for Hamlet, man could not be the measure of society as traditionally supposed; yet the former's lack of trust in human is not existential as in the latter, it is formulated as the freedom for irrationality and immorality that human finds in the contemporary functionally differentiated systems of interaction[15] which, as such, Luhmann contemplates as a product of evolution. But Luhmann's notion of evolution of the social systems is problematic because it poses a deterministic mechanism of evolution towards the specific direction of *functional* complexity. According to this mechanism, the core of actuality of meaning is systematically and constantly differentiated from itself *ad infinitum*. This entails that complexity be seen as a factual characteristic of social systems, and not as a research perspective, and that we speak of *higher* and *lower* complexity in different societies determined by Western cultural criteria of what it is to be "higher" or "lower". My objection is that the perspective of complexity is useful in all kinds of present human interaction: from the complex world of gossip, to complex informality, to organised chaos, to complex global interaction; which can only operate --and not necessarily functionally and efficiently-- through human enaction and practical involvement.

Luhmann believes that as soon as meaning is available as an "evolutionary achievement", it proceeds to establish dense connections that increase the system's capability to handle increasing complexity: "an evolution of meaning as such can be set going that tests which schemata of acquisition and information processing will prove themselves (above all, for predication and action) in their quality of making connections" (Luhmann 1995:69). The problem of this functional approach is that it assumes its own neutrality on the basis of functionality (as much of science does) but

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[15] "[T]he distinction between system and environment", says Luhmann, "offers the possibility of conceiving human beings as parts of the societal environment in a way that is both more complex and less restricting than if they had to be interpreted as parts of society, because in comparison with the system, the environment is the domain of distinctions that shows greater complexity and less existing order. The human being is thus conceded greater freedom in relation to *his* environment, especially freedom for irrational and immoral behaviour. He is no longer the measure of society. The idea of humanism cannot continue. Who would seriously and deliberately try to maintain that society could be formed on the model of a human being, that is, with a head at the top and so on?" (Luhmann 1995:212-3)

it ignores the observer's own emotional involvement with systemic functionality as a measure of certainty and of what s/he observes as a "higher" form of complexity. Complexity can be seen as higher or lower only perspectivally and not as a measure of evolutionary achievement (where are the works of evolution in the complex observation of a particle of matter?). In positing different ontological levels of complexity through 'selection' and evolution, Luhmann is unwittingly regarding it as analogous to complication --the one that emerges as problems to be solved within specialisation and differentiation of functions in contemporary global-modern interaction (see Giarini 1984). The paradigm of complexity is construed in this work as a transhistorical perspective for observation, as much present in the most distant past as in the most distant future that we can imagine, mainly because it emerges from a present need for explanation (Morin 1984). Luhmann's idea of evolution is still based on the Spencerian notion of epigenetic development, albeit not in the latter's direction of teleological perfection, but still in a deterministic direction toward further differentiation and complexifization of social interaction; where "meaning is a general form of self-referential adaptation to complexity" (Luhmann 1995:71).

Despite the above rather lengthy digression into Luhmann's systems theory, I will not engage with his construction of social systems mainly because of its inherent perspective of a second-order observer in explaining double contingency where the difference system/environment separates meaning consciousness from human consciousness which remains within its "black box" (What else would give consciousness to meaning?). Nevertheless, I considered it necessary to discuss how it is that the model of human interaction that I propose disagrees with Luhmann's model of societal interaction before proceeding to engage with his phenomenological theory of meaning. If we couple Luhmann's theory of meaning back to human consciousness, it can be seen as a very useful metaphor that explains the functionality of systems purposively designed by the modern mind (which cannot be regarded as wholly allopoietic for being so entwined with practical human ontogeny). And if we move from there to the perspective of an existential consciousness of self (aware of newness and impermanence); the functional (ontological) borders of which Luhmann speaks become fleeting instants of human enactment and dissolution; moving

horizons within the field of consciousness that we experience as appearance, and through which other views of reality can come to be accommodated and given meaning. However, like Luhmann, I do assume that language is self-referential; that is, autopoietically closed and structurally coupled to human ontogeny; but the mechanisms of this coupling are those of consciousness itself seen as human consciousness. In the present theoretical construction of the artificial ideal type of order, language and meaning are seen as structurally coupled to our consciousness of self in an analogous way as to how the nervous system is structurally coupled to our embodiment. But while the nervous system may be observed as a localised organic substance, the "substance" of language is human enaction, emotion, and imagination --through which a consciousness of self (collective or individual) is appresented. The nervous system is a suitable metaphor to describe the domain of language, one that has autopoietic (self-referential) organisational closure at the same time as is structurally coupled to human consciousness. This domain refers to what Maturana and Varela also call "consensual domains of interaction", or "conversations", that are recursively enacted in the form of local views of reality which, through discipline, may be enlarged and become as wide as imaginary whole cosmologies together with their own emotionally *explored* horizons[16].

Maturana and Varela call "cultural behaviour" (1987:201), the nature of the difference between humans and the rest of the animal species on earth; which sociology and anthropology call "social imaginary", "culture", "worldview", "cosmology", etc., and which I have called throughout this work "views of reality" (see also Geertz 1973, Douglas 1986). As a species, humanity is different from all the other species in its ability to produce, both materially and symbolically, realms of interaction that --even if in constant change-- persist as "autonomous" realms (in a linguistic type of autopoietical closure) in the sense that they can be recognised as such by an observer. This claimed autonomy is quite relative because these realms produce human consciousness of self autopoietically --with consequences for human organic integrity. Language as a realm of interaction persists in symbols and families

[16] These are not actual borders, but useful and imagined borders, that are emotionally and imaginatively explored through disciplined observation during their enaction.

of symbols that have meaning because, on the one hand, they refer to each other in autopoietic closure; and on the other, and most importantly, because the meaning of symbols remains "alive" only in as much as it is constantly updated by human imagination and emotional ties to experience: Present legitimate symbols are bootstrapped to present human enaction, imagination, and emotion. From a diachronic perspective, emotion and imagination also determine the history of the structural changes and path dependencies of the symbols themselves --which "embody" coherent aspects of specific views of reality-- and of the material organisations set up for interaction. However, material organisations can always be left to rust, while symbols in the imagination of people are subject to constant emotional creation, change, interpretation, and deformation. Ideas of reality, cosmology, universe, its imagined origins, its end, its purpose, the relevance of time (cyclical, linear, illusory); meta-languages, and languages with various types of symbology persist in the consciousness of human beings; they need our imaginative and emotional involvement and our human realms of sequentiality and synchronicity, they are not embodied by anything that is not human or a human creation, they are both experienced and enacted by us.

I have referred to Varela's formulation of the synthesis between consciousness and embodiment as *enaction*, considered as present at the same time in the embodiment and consciousness of cognitive systems. I have mentioned that Varela's approach considers the Buddhist notion of "groundlessness" through the practice of mindful/awareness in the scientific activity of observing (Varela *et al.* 1991:143). While this practical notion is very illustrative of how different disciplines and world-views can be relevant to ours; a theory of the structure of meaning needs a phenomenological perspective for the observer to position her/himself in such a realm analytically. Here, I have referred to this realm as an existentialist consciousness of self in the present moment of meaningful experience, which is congenial with Varela's views on mindful/awareness (which leads to Absolute nothingness (*sunyata*) or the experience of religious love, see chapter IV above). Maturana and Varela refer to 'love' as the human capacity that gives meaning its consubstantiality. Maturana refers to the "substance" or vehicle of meaningful

patterns of interaction as "conversations" and "consensual coordinations of behaviours" (Maturana 1990, 1995). It is this apparent consensual side of language that Maturana and Varela single out in order to stress that only love can be seen as the origin of the social acceptance of others living beside us as an inherent characteristic of the social process and of humanness:

> We have delved into a social dynamics which points up a basic ontological feature of our human condition that is no longer a mere assumption, that is, *we have only the world that we bring forth with others and only love helps us bring it forth.* (Maturana and Varela 1987:248, their emphasis)

Nevertheless I will argue that, while this shows a disciplinary preference and a moral position, they fail to refer to darker human emotions that are also meaningful; even though the above is an important theoretical point --and it should be stressed because the human embodied need for love, nurture, and care from other embodied human beings is often ignored (except by feminist theory, see Gilligan 1982, 1988). But the above formulation of the human language as an epiphenomenon of our need as a species to live lovingly together remains too harmonious --it is a moral conclusion, which is often at odds with human experience. This reveals that Maturana and Varela are not social scientists, who have to deal with the question of conflict and the critique of power. While it is true that "love" or the consciousness of the other as oneself (here seen more readily as trust), is an important aspect of human interaction that needs some light thrown upon; we must also consider the simultaneous possibility of fear in human interaction (and of a *perverted* kind of love: hate). Between love and fear there is a very diverse spectrum of human emotions and paradoxical situations that often lead to the impossibility of living together, because human beings also engage in enacting and "bringing forth" emotionally incompatible imaginary worlds.

Language also represents conflict and even creates the means for conflict. If we want to concentrate on the realms of order that it produces, we should also be able to look at how "cultural behaviour" deals with conflict. In the spontaneity of interaction (within which all animals, including humans, are located) conflict results in explosive behaviour which (to the human observer) constantly threatens to destroy the gregarious togetherness on which the human species depends. And so, the duality

love/fear (in a mixture of intensity which creates different kinds of love --even perverted love--, attraction, and aversion) is constantly present in any kind of human order. This is where Luhmann's theory of meaning becomes relevant as it points to a systemic absence of humanity, which he unwittingly formulates as the absence of consciousness in the social systems. His is a useful metaphor to complete a theory of artificial human organisation which must also be functional and which takes into account the constant creation of boundaries, however imaginary. Luhmann identifies a structural need to constantly discriminate possibilities through self-referential communicative structures organised around the notion of difference. To Luhmann, meaning results from the unity of the difference, which organises functionality and feeds from disturbances, disorder, and exclusion. But his theory of meaning is incomplete because his systemic 'automatons' engage in a constant change in the direction of further differentiation without the possibility of the opposite direction.

At this point I would like to go back to Northrop Frye's view of language and his classification of verbal structures (see chapter II, section 3 above). This is useful here before explaining Luhmann's theory of meaning, because his theory is organised around factuality, and it is therefore intimately bound to the linguistic function of expressing difference in descriptive verbal structures --one of the three structures that Frye refers to. As has been explained, following Vico, Frye speaks of different types of language which have had pre-eminence in the Western culture at different historical times. However, his classification of language in three types does not entail the description of a progressive evolution towards a deterministic situation in the present (however complex it may seem), Frye borrows the cyclical concept of *ricorso* from Vico in order to describe their alternating ascendancy. Frye speaks of three different kinds of language: hieroglyphic (mythic-metaphoric), hieratic (metonymic), and demotic (descriptive).

In Frye's discussion, there is a sense for the constant presence of the three types of verbal structure in different degrees of pre-eminence according to their legitimacy in the situation or period described. Mythic language is very permissive of an ambiguous mixture of emotion and imagination in its symbols, metaphors express **sameness** and therefore allow for overlapping of difference; metonymic language

expresses **similarity** and is therefore extensively used in the explanation of transcendental concepts and how they can be posed according to worldly references; descriptive language uses symbols that faithfully correspond to what they describe, either in abstraction or in the experiential world and so, they themselves carry the characteristics of factual **difference**. The contemporary structure and assumptions of philosophy and science makes the latter kind of language pre-eminent in our Western tradition of knowledge; this is because "this approach treats language as primarily descriptive of an objective natural order" (Frye 1982:13). It is important to stress that these types of language are never pure in experience, but in different cultures and in different social strata, they enjoy different degrees of pre-eminent legitimacy in order to organise the changing structure of behaviour, which in the artificial ideal type, also organises discipline (Ideally, metonymic language is pre-eminent in the Eastern/mystic idea of reality and mythic language, in the pagan/primitive one).

It is also important to stress though, that these three types of verbal structures depend on each other for the formation of any belief system. It is not always clear that the verbal structures of description --however pre-eminent-- depend on metaphoric structures that disclose sameness (paradigmatic) and metonymic structures that disclose similarity (syntagmatic). Through the latter the descriptive work of differentiation does not end up dissolving consciousness *ad infinitum*. In what follows I will explain Luhmann's theory of meaning organised around functional and descriptive verbal structures, which I will adjust to include the other two verbal structures considered in order to allow consciousness to expand beyond (or below) functionality. This will clarify how discipline is handed down discursively and practically as a part of ongoing human ontogeny, how it is that this enactment may be organised discursively (diachronically and sequentially) which discloses potentiality, and how these "artificial" activities of human consciousness may contribute to the formation of trust as a synchronic aspect of human interaction.

Despite the objections to Luhmann's notion of the absence of human consciousness within social systems themselves, his functional theory of meaning unfolds from a phenomenological perspective; that is, from the synchronic perspective and is therefore very useful to structure a complete notion of the present

moment of meaningful experience (from which imaginary and emotionally grounded borders constantly emerge in practice). In order to do this it is important to stress that the structure of meaning in his theory is based on self-referential unity of the difference (Luhmann 1995:33) and it therefore corresponds to the meaning of descriptive verbal structures. In this structures the symbols are emptied of inherent meaning as they stand wholly for what they represent, and they diachronically "push" centrifugally to further differentiation (Luhmann's "complex" evolution of meaning 1995). And so, I will complement his phenomenological theory by an attempt to fit into it the other verbal structures (metaphoric and metonymic) which point to analogic notions of sameness and similarity that "pull" meaning centripetally to synchronic unity. I will argue that this whole structure, appresented through human emotion and imagination, may be useful to organise meaning and constitutes an explanatory alternative to what Maturana and Varela ascribe to the human capacity of love (1987); in the consideration that fear is equally possible.

A phenomenological description of meaning views it as the focal point, or centre of intention, within a horizon of possibilities that is as broad as complexity itself. Following Husserl, Luhmann regards meaning as the centre of intention surrounded by an infinite horizon of potential possibilities.

> The phenomenon of meaning appears as a surplus of references to other possibilities of experience and action. Something stands in the focal point, at the center of intention, and all else is indicated marginally as the horizon of an "and so forth" of experience and action. In this form, everything that is intended holds open to itself the world as a whole, thus guaranteeing the actuality of the world in the form of accessibility. (Luhmann 1995:60)

This centre is the actuality of meaning, whose referential structure, I have argued, is actualised through consciousness as the standpoint of reality, which Luhmann believes that is actualised by meaning through "consciousness" of itself. What I suggest instead is that this referential structure is self-referential with respect to human consciousness, which refers simultaneously "not only to what is real (or presumably real), but also to what is possible (conditionally real) and what is negative (unreal, impossible)" (Luhmann 1995:60).

In describing the structure of meaning, Luhmann differentiates a fuzzy "core" of actuality from its surrounding close potential alternatives:

> There is always a core that is given and taken for granted which is surrounded by references to other possibilities that cannot be pursued at the same time. Meaning, then, is actuality surrounded by possibilities. The structure of meaning is the structure of this difference between actuality and potentiality. Meaning is the link between the actual and the possible; it is not one or the other. (Luhmann 1984:101-2)

The difference between actuality and potentiality is never seen in its full complex spectrum of possibilities (they are impossible to enlist) it is seen as meaning, or meaningful coherence between possibilities and experience. However, I will suggest that selection of meaning from complexity (or the lack of it) is determined, not functionally, but by that which consciousness holds to be relevant according to enacted, imaginary, and emotional grounding. In linguistic autopoiesis, alternatives are created by consciousness itself, by what it holds to be relevant. This process of identification is entwined with the autopoiesis of consciousness of self who deals with the problem of what is meaningful. But it is important to stress that this meaningful structures are experienced as reality; that is, the idea of reality is only an *idea* to the existential observer. In meaningful enaction, there are not always many alternatives; or rather, there can be unavoidable single imperatives which may even be pursued relentlessly and sustained structurally. This is when the other two types of symbols referred to above (mythic and metonymic) emerge in interaction; they tend, not to differentiation, but to sameness and similarity[17] They are symbolic domains that even ignore alternatives, and constitute an important side of language and of ideas of reality that Luhmann does not consider in his functionally oriented systems.

As has been mentioned, the centre of intention for Luhmann organises its functionality according to constant differentiation; but once we consider consciousness, this centre can also be seen as organising sameness and similarity. Here, I suggest that instead of grounding meaning between a functional intention and an abstract horizon of possibilities; it be grounded between actual enacted and

[17] Luhmann gives this function to symbolic generalisations (1995) and to his functionalist account of trust (also of power, money, and love Luhmann 1979, see also Misztal 1996).

emotional ties and the horizon of possibilities in human imagination (which is always situated in particular people and cultural realms). According to Luhmann, the referential structure of meaning forces the consciousness of difference into constant selection; but we should also remember that selections may be stopped for being unnecessary through consciousness of sameness and that possible alternative selections are also synthesised due to similarity. While the functional process of selection in meaning amounts to a centrifugal push to differentiation; the absence of the need for selection or its solution through synthesis pulls centripetally to an actuality of meaning that is constantly transformed and appresented through emotion and imagination. Thus, meaning contains, in its relationship with human consciousness, the seed for further differentiation and for further unification that is not always necessarily a functional "unity of the difference".

Luhmann's construction of 'meaning dimensions' is useful in order to explain the structure of meaning with respect to horizons, they are the **time**, **social**, and **fact** meaning dimensions. But it is important to remember that these are abstract constructions to aid phenomenological observation that are necessarily differentiated for heuristic reasons, but whose differentiation depends on a synchronic grounding. In present experience, the dimensions are indistinguishable from each other. Luhmann's meaning dimensions cannot be isolated from each other. "They can be analysed separately", says Luhmann "but in every real intended meaning they appear together" (1995:86). The two horizons are different for each of the three meaning dimensions and there are interdependencies between the dimensions that "can serve to condition and de-tautologise self-references" (Luhmann 1995:76).

According to Luhmann's views on the evolution of meaning, the more evolved the complexity in a society, the more differentiated these three dimensions will appear. As has been mentioned though, this construal of evolution is deceptive because it is based on a deterministic belief in progressive systemic and diachronic differentiation; but it does not take into account how much meaning depends on the unifying centripetal tendencies of consciousness towards its core of actuality. Luhmann represents this movement towards unity in the form of "symbolic generalisations", which are supposed to bridge the multiplicity of meaning

dimensions, and makes it possible to solve logical problems. "Even a contradiction or a paradox has meaning" (Luhmann 1995:95). According to Luhmann, the most important function for symbolic generalisations in society is their function in achieving organised complexity: The more tangible the generalisation, the more evolved the society into dealing with complexity; but this only means that a society with preferences for descriptive verbal structures be considered as more evolved. Luhmann's symbolic generalisations have the function of handling multiplicity operatively and keeping the meaningfully grasped "givens" "available again in (more or less) different kinds of situations, at other points in time, with other possible partners of social communication" (1995:93). Symbolic generalisations therefore have the function of structuring plurality through its relation to "a unity and symbolized by it" (1995:93). But this symbolisation of plurality in unity is basically the metaphoric and metonymic function of having something (a past event, a generalisation) to stand for something else (present, particular event). This is the "function" also identified by Lakoff and Johnson for metaphor and metonymy:

> Metaphor is primarily a way of conceiving of one thing in terms of another, and its primary function is understanding. Metonymy, on the other hand, has primarily a referential function, that is, it allows us to use one entity to *stand for* another. But metonymy is not merely a referential device. It also serves the function of providing understanding (Lakoff & Johnson 1980:36)

Generalisation can be included in the structure of meaning dimensions as the centripetal "pull" that the metaphoric and metonymic verbal structures perform towards the actuality of meaning, overriding difference or uniting plurality.

The time, social, and factual meaning dimensions, then, are seen as heuristic aids to realise abstract possibilities of differentiation and assimilation: the most extreme form of diachronic differentiation between the meaning dimensions ideally expresses descriptive verbal structures which are highly functional in purposive behaviour; the *intermediate* one that merges the fact dimension with the social dimension ideally expresses metonymic verbal structures with a syntagmatic function in language; and the least differentiated form of expression between meaning dimensions, the analogic type of communication, ideally expresses metaphoric verbal structures whose function is paradigmatic. Nevertheless, as in the following example

of Frye's, no specific meaning function can be given to a specific symbolic expression:

> Suppose, for example, we were to decide that the "true" meaning of the word "in" was being contained by a container, as with "peas in a pod". In all other cases the word "in" would be metaphorical, including the "in" that stands at the beginning of this sentence. It will soon become clear that nobody can use language like that: all language is permeated by metaphor simply because words are juxtaposed. (Frye 1982:59)

Ideally and analytically, the verbal structures can be differentiated, but in language they are found together, overlapping and complementing each other through human consciousness, enaction, and interpretation. That is, the difference between meaning dimensions is phenomenological and not textual or progressive

Luhmann's 'temporal dimension' of meaning is determined by the before and the after of an event; thus, the horizons of the temporal dimension are past and future. It is also related to presence and absence in the present. Therefore, past and future can only be thematised or intended according to what is or what is not there, but they cannot be experienced or acted upon from the present. From an existential perspective, the present moment unfolds into newness and impermanence, which dictates irreversibility. But from Luhmann's functional perspective, the meaningfulness of past and future experiences creates a sequence that systems can follow in an ordered manner in order to avoid irreversibility. This may be true to a functional and systemic extent, yet the horizon of past path dependencies and future possibilities according to those past dependencies, also organises disciplined potentiality related to the present meaningfulness of synchronic practice. The notion of irreversibility (of newness and impermanence) in the time dimension then organises our present disciplined relationship to the experience of time.

Luhmann lays the horizons of the 'fact dimension' as what the system identifies as 'internal' or 'external' to itself. From Luhmann's functional perspective, this schematization organises the difference between external and internal attribution (disjunction) and defines the borders of the system. However, if we remember Lakoff's discussion about schemas, we will realise that a fact dimension organised around only one of the schemas for human embodied interaction with the

environment, remains too limited. I have suggested above that the subject-object divide is also organised around the 'container' schema, and so, it is a limited perspective considering the present knowledge about human schematization. This is why the horizons of the fact dimension of meaning in the artificial ideal type of organisation are those established by the relevant schema or "frame" used in present meaningful interaction: Whether it is the 'container' schema (inside/outside), (the relevant one in considering Luhmann's model); or other schemas that structure our direct embodied experience such as the 'part-whole', 'link', 'source-path-goal' schemas, or any other that may be found empirically. I agree with Luhmann that the fact dimension "reduces complexity, eliminates references, and makes it easy to join operations onto one another" (Luhmann 1995:84), but instead of placing its realm of relevance in systemic functionality, I place it in the relationship between our embodied existence and the world. Therefore the fact dimension and our embodied experience of it organises our disciplined and enacted relationship to the world.

Through his 'fact' and 'social' dimensions, Luhmann attempts a further division of the subject-object divide which is useful for heuristic objectives. The 'social dimension' is related to the existence of the 'other' in experience; the one that is regarded as one self, as an 'alter ego'. If we assimilate the social dimension with the fact dimension, which to Luhmann organises the difference internal/external, we are left with the subject-object divide. But he objects to this movement, as "[t]he distinction between factual and social dimensions should not be misunderstood as the distinction between nature and humankind" (Luhmann 1995:80). To Luhmann, the differentiation of the social dimension helps us give meaning to the experience of dissent: In systemic interaction differences are sorted out self-referentially and avoided systematically, thus giving rise to the possibility of stable consensus. But in enacted and meaningful human interaction, dissent may well lead to conflict and confrontation and to the transformation of the system or its dissolution. To expand the use of a social dimension of meaning beyond functionality, it may include the horizons of categorisations that are produced socially and imaginatively beyond embodied schemas. The horizons alter/ego are too narrowly defined along individualistic mentalities when referring to people and relevant groups of people;

like families, tribes, organisations, nations, which organise collective identity or sense of self. In metaphoric (mythic) and metonymic (ideal) verbal structures that express these embodied collective identities, it is impossible not to combine the social and fact dimensions or even regard them as indistinguishable. Nevertheless, the social dimension with its alter/ego horizons is useful on its own in order to disclose an individually-based disciplined relationship among people (part of our contemporary modern experience and practice of discipline).

The three meaning dimensions are clearly differentiated from each other in descriptive verbal structures; but in metonymic structures, the fact and social dimension merge into each other (we are left with the traditional past/future and subject/object divides which separate emotion from imagination); and in metaphoric structures the three are indistinguishable (time, facts, and people converge symbologically). But the three types of verbal structure co-exist together at all times as long as the human type of consciousness that we are familiar with is present, but in different degrees of cultural ascendancy. The centre of actuality in meaning coincides with intention; but from the perspective of an existential consciousness that stands on groundlessness this centre is surrounded by the possibilities enfolded in the whole nexus of referentiality, or self-referentiality, the consciousness of oneself. "With *each* and *every* meaning, Luhmann says, incomprehensibly great complexity (world complexity) is appresented and kept available" (1995:60); but I would add to this that its possibilities for differentiation or unity are coupled to the imaginary and emotional movements of human consciousness. I agree with Luhmann in that the world does not become simpler through selections --nor is it simplified through unity in metaphor and metonymy. Selecting one meaning or assimilating different meanings with each other creates further meaning possibilities, as every meaning suggests possibilities of connection or synthesis, thus "making others improbable, difficult, remote, or (temporarily) excluded" (Luhmann 1995:61). However, it is useful to remember that the complex structure of meaning can be dropped at any moment either in the synchronic perspective of observation based on groundlessness, or practically, through disciplined/spontaneous trust in interaction.

The imaginary and emotional ties that produce meaning may be observed both in the collective realm of society and in the individual realm of human beings. In society, emotional ties are collectively determined by recognisable cultural identities, ideas of sacredness, and particular and local "relational spaces"; in individuals, emotional ties are manifested in compassionate behaviour, principles and values (the Weberian substantive rationality) or affective relationships with desires, ideas and ideals, people, groups of people, animals, objects, etc. In interaction, discursive intention is always constructed by discipline either in the future (in promises and resolutions) or *a posteriori*, with respect to the collective realm of references within which one interacts. In the present flow of experience both spontaneity/chance and disciplined intention are present, they cannot be distinguished from each other. Intention is emotionally either discovered in past interaction or seen in future plans. The disciplined observation of this life-path is what is meant by the scrupulous disciplinary maxim "know thyself".

Disciplined behaviour of the kind described as an exclusive characteristic of the human species can also be considered as a biological phenomenon because it is allowed by our physiology (or our biological human organisation and structure), and this is a characteristic of our species: our behaviour is shaped by our culture. One of the most important points of this work is to show that, in order for our species to be creative, intentional human discipline is not enough, nor is it possible. Our organic orderly spontaneity as embodied living beings and as humanly conscious beings cannot be stopped. Spontaneity may be guided to aid creativity, or managed through repression into privacy or a stipulated 'unconscious' realm, but it is experientially ineradicable while we are embodied human beings. This is why only in explanation can we identify disciplined behaviour exclusively with the artificial ideal type of organisation and spontaneous behaviour exclusively with the organic ideal type of organisation. Both spontaneity and discipline contribute to human creativity.

However, in experiential reality, in present consciousness, it is impossible to distinguish between our disciplined and our spontaneous behaviour; in the present moment they are both experienced as being the same thing.

> Note well that innate behavior and learnt behavior are, as behaviors, indistinguishable in their nature and in their embodiment. The distinction lies in the history of the structures that make them possible. Therefore, our classifying them as one or the other depends on whether or not we have access to the pertinent structural history. We cannot make that distinction by observing the operation of the nervous system in the present. (Maturana and Varela 1987:171-2)

In phenomenological observation, it is only when looking to the past that we may be able to reflect on our behaviour *a posteriori* and manage to assess, in explanation, the effect of systematic discipline in the way we live our lives in the present; and so, project disciplined plans for the future. Intentionality and contingency, identified clearly as such, can only be found in sequential explanation, which is already a construction about present experience. But, as a social species, and one that engages in creating an imaginary realm to live in it, human beings cannot stop producing such kind of constructions. The explanation (or construction) attempted in this work assumes that just as there is always a form of discipline (guided by spontaneity) in the development of human; there are also elements of spontaneity (guided by discipline) in present orderly behaviour. They are complementary, the one cannot exist without the other.

Following Luhmann, meaning has been portrayed as the connection between structured actuality and potentiality; and I have portrayed the meaningfulness of the structure as related to human emotion and imagination. The relationship between the latter characteristics of our conscious embodied self both determines *structural limitations* in human interaction (and may appear to determine them rigidly); but also provides the space for *creative possibilities* which may overturn and dissolve structural rigidities at any instant. Structural limitations may result in either diligent disciplined systematicity or in tedious and entrapping oppressive situations; creative possibilities may result in spontaneous refreshing freedom from rigidity or in terrible and violent consequences. The potentiality of a situation is as varied as chance itself --newness and impermanence-- it depends on the particular circumstances and the perspective we assume in assessing a human situation. But this assessment will always be located in the particularity of an enacted and imaginary situation with emotional grounding, and this will be identifiable in the kinds of symbols that the

interacting person or organisation holds as relevant. From an existential perspective, conscious potentiality contemplates infinity itself; but it does not necessarily loses this awareness in the despair of solipsism: it is aware that it stands on nothing and eventually lets go of all possibly meaningful boundaries. In chapter IV above, I have explained that, from here, consciousness of self has the potentiality of becoming *sunyata* or Absolute nothingness --the realm of *karuna* (compassion) and *agape* (religious love). But this is one type of trust in human enaction and interaction which cannot be grasped intellectually, because certain trust is faith --however guided or misguided by symbols--, it is appresented synchronically through experienced moments of unity and simultaneity.

Trust has also been contemplated as spontaneous in the organic type of human organisation; but here, in the artificial type of human organisation, trust is construed as based on discipline. Both of these notions of trust are synchronic and intricately entwined with one another. Both spontaneous and disciplined trust refer to consciousness, but one is practical and the other discursive; the former's intentions are disclosed as they are enacted, but the latter's may be projected through the time meaning dimension into the past and the future. It is both synchronic types of trust that, together, give shape to a sense of systematicity and stability that is lived in human ontogeny[18]. Whether this projection be mythical, transcendental, or factually descriptive is relevant for the potential consequences of the structure of the disciplined practice. It discloses a discursive intentional realm of shared symbolism as the disciplined manifestation of the notion of purpose in human interaction. This is not necessarily the same as purposive behaviour, but a notion of the direction of human consciousness of self be it individual, spiritual, or collective, as consciousness of self conceives of itself (the purpose may not be posed explicitly, and it is very possible that there be an absence of purpose, or that the purpose may be the absence of purpose itself). And so a trust in discipline is produced through a relevant awareness of meaningful potentiality. By the same token, in human order, future projections of behaviour are always framed in a particular tradition and within the

[18] This is the systematicity where Luhmann's functional explanations of trust are based (see Luhmann 1979).

expectations expressed by the created and creative structures enacted by us in collective interaction. The artificial ideal type of human order is sustained by consciousness of self and its disciplined potentiality, however it may be enacted and construed discursively. Organic and artificial organisation both complement and create each other at the same time.

My words are easy to understand
And my actions are easy to perform
Yet no other can understand or perform them.

My words have meaning; my actions have reason;
Yet these cannot be known and I cannot be known.

We are each unique, and therefore valuable;
Though the sage wears coarse clothes, his heart is jade.

--Lao Tse: *Tao Te Ching*
70th verse

CONCLUSIONS:
The *Experientialist Myth* of "Objective" Observation

In the two parts of this thesis I have illustrated two instances of human order which we choose to engage with, and which in the spirit of clarification, I have distinguished as institutions and organisations. What has been shown through this artificial distinction is that all of human interaction has both an ideal aspect and a pragmatic one. The former dictates the shape of orderly practice of discipline, yet the latter finds itself already structured by human worldly --already past-- spontaneous ongoing interaction, experience, and embodiment. The notion of legitimation has been used here to refer to ideal legitimate reality, rather than to legitimate authority; yet any form of authority must resort to the prevalent idea of reality in order to formulate any legitimacy claims. And so, the notion of legitimacy used in the first part of the thesis directly denotes the prevalent notion of what is real, and indirectly points to the idea of reality through which authority formulates legitimacy claims. This latter type of legitimacy, political legitimation, is therefore based on the "spirit of the times" or *Zeitgeist* of the society under analysis. In contemporary global interaction though, the *Zeitgeist* is already based on the modern ideals of liberal democracy, freedom, and humanism; which are values that remain couched within the Western/Christian view of reality as human history. But they are also based in the disciplined practice of living in society through the organisation of secular institutions and the definition of private and public realms of interaction. I have argued throughout this work that even as these values remain important contemporary realms of human interaction, they put too much reliance on the agreed exclusion of areas of human experience which are then deemed illegitimate qua "reality".

Nevertheless, as has been argued in this work, no ideal type is ever fully determinant of human interaction because --organisationally and not institutionally-- there remain areas of human experience that, however privatised by the factualising thrust of modernity, are relevant in ways that overcome our sense for mere "factual historicity". This relevance is the measure of their "reality" in social interaction, and should therefore be considered theoretically at the same level of relevance in any

model of human "public" or social order. I have considered these realms --excluded from historical factuality-- as the spiritual and animal aspects of our humanity, which I have represented through the theoretical presence of cultures other than Western, grouped in two sets --pagan/primitive and Eastern/mystic. This differentiation is arbitrary in the sense that it is still organised by Western perceptions of "other cultures", but as has also been argued, it is difficult to see how we can access other cultures if not through our own cultural inheritance. Through this initial differentiation of cultures, and their theoretical-ideal relationship to relevant realms of human experience, I have organised a critique of their conception as "inferior" or "private" manifestations of human experience within the Western cosmos of what legitimate "reality" is.

This critique brings us into considering the ideal assimilation of both what is spiritual and what is animal to human experience beyond the intimate realm of privacy. The ideal realm of sacred reality is what traditionally has organised the public sphere of human interaction. However, in their self-interpretation, modern cultures --ideally or institutionally-- displace the sacred roots to authority by secular rationality. Yet I argue that, organisationally, this institutional ideal has not been possible, on the one hand due to its ideal essence, and on the other due to structural "path dependencies" within the organisation of cosmology, and so the notion of legitimate reality today effectively remains bootstrapped to sacred mythical roots that remain hidden by the secular expulsion of those roots to oblivion. Also, an ideal assimilation of what is animal to human experience, beyond private and "hidden" awareness, has brought into view the arbitrariness of defining and dividing an animal type of time from a historical human one. The Darwinian cosmological division (legitimate in the modern view of reality), through which humanity dissociates itself from nature, gives a specific kind of humanity --the historically conscious one-- a factual and moral upper hand over it. And so, as has been argued, even if these created borders may be useful in our everyday embodied life in the world, they can also become terrible ontological-cosmological divides that exclude the possibility of breaking with the long-worn habit of seeing nature as our slave, and us as its masters.

The assimilation of nature and spirituality into current understanding of human interaction, I have argued, is important to construe a theoretical model of order that contemplates the present relevance of the humanist moral ideal of a universal humanity as legitimate "reality", as much as both an assimilation of this universality with the infinite particularity of nature *and* with its sacred roots to reality. I have attempted to portray both of these movements of assimilation: The sacred roots to reality are considered in the ideal aspect of human order conceived as the legitimate reality that "institutions" portray (and their relationship with time and language); and the infinite particularity of nature is considered in the ideal types of human order conceived as "organisation", where all of these types of legitimate reality are effectively mixed and simultaneously entwined with human imagined, emotional, and embodied experience in changing structures of actuality. It is this awareness, that gives what I have called the *existential* observer (standing on "groundlessness") a sense for a variously textured approach to empirical "reality", and a very close reflexive consideration of his/her own imagined, emotional, and embodied relationship with the organised world s/he examines. This, I have argued, is an important step towards tolerance in the discipline of modern self-interpretation; as our Western tradition of knowledge is presently ethically moving towards considering "nature" both as part of ourselves and as a social construction (see Delanty 1997), as well as beginning to consider the Eastern traditions of knowledge to aid us in this movement (see Varela *et al.* 1991).

And so, the critique of knowledge aimed at traditional Western assumptions of what knowledge is, in this work, is launched both from the Western tradition of knowledge itself, and from traditions of knowledge that in the West have generally been regarded as 'outsiders' to the realm of what we consider as legitimate secular knowledge. To be sure, one can think of other ways of criticising the Western tradition of knowledge (communitarianism, feminism, post-structuralism, post-modernity); but, as I have suggested throughout this work, these types of critique may also inadvertently rely on the typical Western categories that they try to criticise through a too well-defined rejection of its assumed dichotomies. From my own constructed (and partly constructivist) perspective, that takes into account the

'outsider' traditions of knowledge as well as the notion that our created relationship with reality creates our sense of self back, one can say that our Western tradition of knowledge is couched in too much individual agency, even while individual agency is already culturally relevant in modernity and "real" to us in that sense. But too much agency discloses a tight relationship with a self that is, on the one hand, already constructed as individual, and on the other, too determinant of a view of universal morality which feels itself justified in looking down on particularity. Extreme reliance of individual agency also veils the universal importance of an "ethics of care" to embodied interaction (see Gilligan 1982, 1988). The latter is transcendentally and universally represented in religious love (*agape*) or compassion (*karuna*) (Nishitani 1982).

The Western notion of self, which is constructed as individual due to cultural path dependencies, is at odds with the worldly collective self of the pagan/primitive view of reality. But the latter, even as it is pre-eminently symbolised in fantastic myth, discloses the human emotional, imagined, and experienced collective dependence on each other which, as has been discussed in this thesis, is essential in the constitution of persons within any culture in the ontogenetic process of growing up from infancy to adulthood. As has been said following Frye (1982), human beings live in myth or explanation, and not only this, also the formation of our idea of self is intimately related to some form of imagined and emotionally cognised dependence on myth or explanation. We can speak about these two entities "myth" and "explanation" as if we could clearly differentiate between them. Yet, the two of them remain linked to each other and it is hard to identify where one begins and the other one ends, mainly because "explanation" is so closely related to "objective" reality which, as has been discussed, can itself be regarded as a kind of "myth". Nevertheless, the awareness of this impossibility to differentiate objective explanation from myth is important in order to observe how it is that, despite the Western ideal that we can build a self-determining notion of individuality --and effectively hold an extremely intense emotional relationship with this notion-- we are nonetheless still determined by the type of social interactions that surround us, which in their particular ways determine what we come to regard as our notion of self.

Despite the very high regard that we have for individuals in the West, we do have a notion of self --however minimal and neglected-- that emerges from intimate personal relationships --even if only with one other person. The "freedom" of individuality that the Western person strives for is essentially an ideal unattainable in factual reality (not in spiritual reality), which remains couched in the realm of the 'not yet'. But this predicament is also expressed here through what I have characterised as the pagan/primitive human notion of a collective self that the modern person is unable to leave behind. In other words, organisationally, there is also a collective sense of self in the modern everyday person, even while this sense is not recognised as legitimate and is actively opposed as a "backward" dependence on family or some other person as a form of *pathos* (see Berman 1992, Maturana & Verden-Zöler 1995).

It is an idealistic principle to assume that we ever come to stop relying on the collective self or in fantastic myth to deal with what we experience as "reality". I have tried to express this in a model of human order that points at our extended dependence on metaphor and metonymy as paradigmatic and syntagmatic verbal structures that cannot be left behind by language as the "unity of the difference" (Luhmann 1995), or as purely descriptive language (see Lakoff & Johnson 1980). I have also tried to express this in the assumption that any model of human interaction, no matter how based on any type of experience, remains itself nothing more than a useful myth to organise reality and discipline. Following the Weberian methodology of concept formation, then, "objectivity" is therefore tied to subjectivity in an intimate manner. In our Western tradition of knowledge, this reality is organised around conceptual systems and symbolisms that aspire to be factual and descriptive, but which are structurally displaced from this ideal; and so, our discipline tries to make up for this through theoretical consistency. Nevertheless, as the emerging paradigm of complexity shows, we must now incorporate uncertainty as an element of "objective reality", most clearly perceived in the present experience of paradox, which should be integrated in the structure of the theoretical model itself. My model for observation of human order contemplates complexity and stochasticity as a more

viable route through which to follow the flux of experience, than a pre-established determinism (Morin 1984, Kauffman 1995).

Following the rationale of Lakoff and Johnson, then, I will say that any methodology or disciplinary activity relies on some amount of metaphor and imagery (metonymy) --however small-- and so remains a useful *myth* to approach experience, and nothing more, but also nothing less. "Objectivity", then, always portrays a cultural system and a set of cultural values that may be at odds with other ideal utopias or myths, and so, they may go to their different imagined consequences or even oppose each other:

> Being objective is always relative to a conceptual system and a set of cultural values. Reasonable objectivity may be impossible when there are conflicting conceptual systems or conflicting cultural values, and it is important to be able to admit this and to recognize when it occurs.
> According to the *experientialist myth*, scientific knowledge is still possible. But giving up the claim to absolute truth could make scientific practice more responsible, since there would be a general awareness that a scientific theory may hide as much as it highlights. (Lakoff & Johnson 1980:227 my emphasis)

They call their own approach the *experientialist myth*, basically because they want to highlight that science could be objectively more responsible if its practice remains aware of what scientific knowledge is and what its limitations are. My own approach is congenial with theirs in that I have suggested throughout this thesis that scientists can only produce useful metaphors, always based on honest observation and experience (*experientialist*) and the consistency of theory (*myth*). Any form of symbolisation of social reality conveys a tale that exists nowhere but in human emotion and imagination, as well as in enacted embodiment and conscious involvement within an ongoing view and experience of reality. This latter consideration of unavoidable embodiment gives the *experientialist myth* a common human "grounds" for the type of experience that we are familiar with as embodied human beings. And it is through this *experientialist myth* through which I try to avoid the pitfalls of idealist assumptions: the world as a mere "projection" of our minds and hearts is still "objectivist" in its "subjectivist" extreme (see Lakoff and Johnson 1980:185-194 and also Varela *et al.* 1991).

This is linked with the constant human predicament of trying to realise when the borders that we create are useful and when they become terrible. This is an eternal predicament in as much as it is an ongoing present living aspect of human embodied interaction: one that we deal with alternatively through reflective and disciplined systematicity, through spontaneous trust or distrust, through ethics either of care or of justice, through morality or compassion. I suggest that this predicament may be approached theoretically only in the awareness that the borders that we create are only heuristic fleeting instants of order, and that our Western intellectual discipline is displaced from pronouncing any definition of reality to be taken as truth. As I have tried to show in the model of human order, this attitude may produce synchronic areas of overlapping among different views of human reality which can then be seen as relevant to human experience and organise its ordered perception of reality "objectively" or otherwise.

My own formulation of the above possibility is seen in the synchronicity or simultaneity of the three ideal types of views of "reality": Both transcendentalist views are rooted in cosmological notions of mythical reality that determine them in their structural present actuality, while the mystic notion of ideal (universalist) compassion discloses a type of freedom from attachment which is the self-same freedom that is sought for by the Western (historical and humanist) tradition. Nevertheless, while the Eastern notion of freedom is ideally positioned in transcendence as the only legitimate realm of reality qua infinity, its mystic spirituality cannot be reduced convincingly to any notion of finite self (either collective or individual) and so strives for experienced selflessness; while in the West the striving for freedom is bootstrapped back onto a notion of self that is individual and is systematically confused with the type of experience that can be disclosed by individual human embodiment. And yet, as has been posed, from a synchronic and ideally mystic perspective, universality can be contemplated in the particularity of any of the aspects of the world that we experience, even particular embodiment and personality. However, the ideal Western/Christian view of reality considers both world and transcendence as real, and so, there remains an insurmountable structural gap between world and transcendence that is illustrated by the Cartesian *error*

pointed out by Husserl (whereby the transcendental knowing Ego is identified with the *res cogitans*, Hammond *et al.* 1991); which Husserl himself is then unable to surmount when he wants to go back to his notion of an "intermonadological community of transcendental subjects" which can access transcendental knowledge (Luhmann 1995)

As has been argued throughout this work, the perfect reflection between the particular and the universal cannot be conceived of through conceptual means, it is a spiritual realm of experience. Conceptual symbols are descriptive and factual, or based on "objectivity", which is one of the biggest myths of our times. The perfect spiritual reflection between the particular and the universal is experienced in silence as Absolute emptiness (Nishitani 1982), because it discloses an emotional relationship that humanity has --ideally-- only with the transcendental realm of being. In the experience of Absolute emptiness the factual reality of the world is still perceived, but it is done at peace with what is perceived, with perfect compassion and forgiveness, regardless of the cruelty that might at times seem to be perfectly apparent.

At the beginning of the first chapter of their Book *The Tree of Knowledge*, Maturana and Varela portray the painting *Christ Crowned with Thorns* by Bosch, a Medieval painter, where the figure of Christ stands in the middle in perfect patience, while four other human figures surround him, who represent his tormentors and who also represent "four styles of estrangement and loss of interior calm" (Maturana and Varela 1987:17). One of those figures, they point out, is particularly relevant to their own endeavour --and I would say that it is particularly relevant to the endeavour of anyone who calls her/himself an "objective" observer, a scientist, a philosopher, or a myth-maker. This man, or "human figure" in the picture,

> is grabbing Jesus by the robe, tugging him to the ground. He holds on to him and restricts his freedom, fastening his attention on him. He seems to be telling him: "Now listen to me, I know what I'm saying!" This is the temptation of *certainty*.
> We tend to live in a world of certainty, of undoubted, rock-ribbed perceptions: our convictions prove that things are the way we see them and there is no alternative to what we hold as true. This is our daily situation, our cultural condition, our common way of being human. (Maturana and Varela 1987:17-8)

And so the *temptation of certainty* is also the human need of living in culture, one that we need to interact, but also one that we find ourselves with; as in the Christian original sin or in the Eastern notion of factual experience as the endless sea of suffering. But before (or after) the discovery of transcendence, and at the same time as we are aware of it, there is a synchronic realm of human (animal) experience, where the joy and experienced wholeness of embodiment and worldly interaction is symbolised as legitimate sacred reality. This realm is the source of any ulterior emotional grounding for the symbolisation of what came to be regarded as redemption and deliverance in the transcendentalist traditions. Nevertheless, certainty about this or any other type of symbolisation may eventually become mythical or ideological traps for the expansion of consciousness. The temptation of certainty may become an existential hell of madness; one may restrict ourselves extremely as we restrict one another. And yet, some degree of restriction is needed in order for discipline to be learnt, practised, and handed down ontogenetically. And so, this is why freedom as total release from social restrictions cannot be factual, some degree of restriction is needed in order to give orderly shape and coordination to the realm of human interaction in whatever culture. But I believe that the dynamics through which useful restriction becomes extreme oppression are related to the dynamics through which the human need of living in some form of provisional certainty becomes the temptation of knowing something for certain and attempting to impose this certainty on others.

From this follows that, through any kind of symbols, no definitive or absolute principles about reality may be defined, only general tendencies, affinities, regularities. Borders are useful fictions that help us organise our immediate reality, yet they may produce habits of separation that may become rigid marginalising principles to manipulate reality. I believe that the subtlety of this difference constitutes the eternal human predicament, and it is eternal because it is present and constantly alive. It cannot be solved in a "once and for all manner" in history, nor through mere heteronomous obeisance to legality, nor only through a judgmental moral position; even if these forms of symbolising the predicament are "objectively

real" and must be considered epistemologically in the social sciences. I will argue though, that the "human predicament" ought to also be represented by the social sciences through a simultaneous vocation of the observer towards an existential prehension of peace through trust, forgiveness, and compassion. This "vocation" leads us through the field of nihility (described by Nishitani 1982), which can be translated into an existential awareness of death in embodied observation; but one that is not necessarily nihilistic as it searches for Absolute emptiness. This attitude is expressed by the position of the observer in the *present moment of meaningful experience*, one that is 'not yet' as in our own Western historical tradition and should therefore strive for "objectivity" in consideration of the "far side" transhistorical realm (the Judeo-Christian moral standing), but also constantly searches for the dissolution of the ego in practice and contemplation of the "near side" transhistorical realm (the ethical standing of undifferentiating love as compassion) as a "sign post" towards which the present field of consciousness moves. And yet, this attitude is also aware that any intellectual form of contemplation of human order, as it is based in some sort of 'ideal' myth, is also always a tale of metaphorical nature. Whatever experienced "reality" is remains a boundless mystery. And so the observer knows that s/he is also a primitive entity, the human animal, telling tales to shelter its consciousness of self while experiencing the world.

APPENDIX A
Progress and Transcendence

In the first part of the thesis I argue that Institutional legitimation depends on disciplined practice and on the notion of experienced time that the discipline regards as relevant to its view of reality. While historical consciousness legitimises the experience of time as diachrony, spiritual and primary imagination are legitimised in the experience of synchronic time. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to think that historical reality has overcome its primary-mythological and spiritual roots. Its formulation is based on the Christian Tale of a beginning and an end of times within human progress moving towards transcendence. Every notion of modern progress has the Christian Tale as its mythological ancestor. As has been said, the Jasperian axial age is a good example of a humanist consideration of cultures other that Western in universal history, but it keeps the shape of Christian historiography. This highlights the importance in human order of ritual interaction with the sacred and of hierophany (the experience that discloses the human relationship to transcendence). The notion of progress is already an important part of our Western tradition but its original conception, just as in other cultures, involves the movement of human consciousness towards transcendence. The Western secular tradition has redefined human progress with respect to its Judeo-Christian kind of morality towards political freedom, wealth expansion, rational enlightenment, etc. But I have argued following Voegelin (1974) that these symbols are already deformations of the original path to transcendence. Therefore, transcendence is unavoidably linked to the construction of a historical kind of progress.

According to the typology described above, in our Western tradition, theoretical knowledge is legitimated in the diachronic essence of factual, sequential, and coherent explanation. This means that it is situated within the Western/Christian type of time as human history and as a kind of progressive movement in the expansion of consciousness in the direction of experiencing transcendence --not necessarily in the direction of progressive rationalisation of discipline, as in Weber's *Sociology of Religion* (1965). The pagan/primitive type of an idea of reality is

sustained by an *intuition* of transcendence, which is nevertheless poised on the brink of death by the immediateness of embodiment. But explicit transcendence is the original aim, on the one hand, of the Western mythological tale of collective progress to higher realms of morality in history and of intellectual knowledge in science and secular philosophy, and on the other, of the Eastern/mystic idea of the path towards spiritual Enlightenment. So progress is analogous to the path of expansion of consciousness, either towards self-knowledge or towards transcendence. Any other notion of progress beyond these two is regarded in this work as a deformation of the original spiritual search that can be apprehended as expansion of consciousness[1], and is generally transformed and deformed into forms of organic, material, economic, and political progress. The shape of the deformation of the original spiritual symbol of 'progress' in modernity is captured by Octavio Paz:

> We now know that the kingdom of progress is not of this world: the paradise that it promises lies in the future, an untouchable future, unreachable, perpetual. Progress has populated history with the wonders and the monsters of technology but has not inhabited the life of men. It has given us more things, not more being. (Paz 1993:244)[2]

And yet, diachrony as the typological shape of progress is most conducive to a representation of the development of intellectual knowledge in our Western tradition and scientific endeavour: a disciplined practice which is already structured by it, looking into the past from the contemporary perspective of observation.

I have referred before to the axial age identified by Jaspers as an important age of transformation for the human consciousness. What this means is essentially that during this age, transcendence was experienced and symbolised by what the West considers as some of the most important spiritual traditions. Jaspers identifies this "outburst" of transcendentalism in his axial age but I have said, following Voegelin (1974), that the Jasperian thesis is already framed within the historical

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[1] Although, in our tradition, this consciousness is necessarily informed by progressive noetic clarity, differentiation of symbols into rationally-based abstract concepts, and the secular ideal of striving for self-knowledge.

[2] "*Ahora sabemos que el reino del progreso no es de este mundo: el paraíso que nos promete está en el futuro, un futuro intocable, inalcanzable, perpetuo. El progreso ha poblado la historia de las maravillas y los monstruos de la técnica, pero ha deshabitado la vida de los hombres. Nos ha dado más cosas, no más ser*" (Paz 1993:244)

setting which assumes historical progress, or at least an evolutionary increase in human awareness of the humanist universalist ideals. His account leaves out Moses and Jesus, so the possibility remains that other hierophanies happened and continue to happen beyond his axial age. My assumption is that many were never symbolised by specific peoples or by history, they might not have been relevant to the culturally ascendant type of view of reality in any particular society or at any particular moment in history. Here, I agree with O'Brien's view (1965) according to which,

> apparent variations in the mystical 'outputs' of different ages are an illusion. The explanation for the seeming lack or abundance of mystics at any given period is 'not that a time and place favourable to mysticism brings mystics into existence'. On the contrary, it is merely a question of whether more or less attention is paid to mystics in different ages. Where mysticism is fashionable and accepted it is fully reported; where it is not nobody bothers to keep any record of it. (Lewis 1989:20)

Lewis finds this 'tolerant catholicity' disappointing for his own sociological enquiry according to which transcendental experience is necessarily linked to social environment. But I believe that the latter is an unnecessary form of determinism in order to carry out his sociological analysis: while transcendental experience will *always* be informed by social environment, it does not follow that the social environment will *always* be affected by transcendental experience --yet it sometimes is in very visible and historically important ways. But to pose like Lewis that the social environment is *always* affected by transcendental experience is to give the latter an overwhelming power of historicity and to take away from this experience its essential aspect of intimacy[3].

Nevertheless, the human discovery (or invention) and representation of transcendence provides an aim or objective for the experienced duration of time and life. In the Eastern view of reality, progress is seen as the spiritual development of the initiated soul towards spiritual Enlightenment[4] and in the Christian view, this is the spiritual progress of humanity as a collective body. In our secular view of reality,

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[3] Secret inner-worldly mysticism is celebrated in Tibet as a virtue (Sogyal 1992)

[4] This Eastern notion is closest to the experience of time as history; but it is linked to the individual history of embodiment and the cosmological "wheel of rebirth", not to human history in the Western sense.

progress is a way of symbolising the experience of time and constant change in developmental terms; in physiology and psychology it is applied to the growth of children into adults; and politically in contemporary capitalism, it is seen as the development of nations towards the European ideal of liberal democracy and economic *maturity*. But the notion of movement in time should be seen as a concept laden with mystery and not only as a mere linear process that generally becomes linked to the prevalent values of society --or to materialistic values in modern society (growth, wealth expansion, fitness). Here, it must be stressed again that we can only speak of superiority of the Western tradition with regards to awareness of historical time (a symbological product of this tradition) and its progress towards the emergence of adequate symbolism to represent intellectually differentiated experience --a structural characteristic of the scientific discipline.

> The philosophers must beware of the fallacy of transforming the consciousness of an unfolding mystery into the gnosis of progress in time. A study of order does not have the purpose of showing up the primitivity, naïveté, logical deficiency, or general benightedness of ages of the past but, on the contrary, to show men of the same nature as ours, wrestling with the same problems as ours, under the conditions of more compact experiences of reality and correspondingly less differentiated instruments of symbolisation. (Voegelin 1957:5-6)

Conceptual representation is highly valued in our Western tradition, but it may become a dogmatic 'burden' that defeats its own purpose in a search of a type of 'truth' that is imprisoned by its own dogma. Conceptual differentiation of experiential reality was brought about by reliance in the power of abstraction to portray a kind of reality that was seen as beyond ordinary experience. The creation of abstract symbols may help to expand knowledge of the self, but it may also become a misleading source of symbols for imaginary constructions of reality that may become rigid and oppressive systems of exploitation. The other two kinds of knowledge (primary and spiritual), which exist beyond (or below) precise conceptualisation are also ways of knowing the self and, if acknowledged, may help to prevent the excessive consequences of abstraction. Our tradition contemplates the diachronic symbolisation of historical time as the highest accomplishment of conscious humanity; and the conceptually coherent view of reality that it produces according to the rigid mandates

and conclusions of human rationality, which in their thorough factuality, may miss elements of experience that are equally relevant to the life of human beings.

As I have said before, my criteria to differentiate the legitimate ideal view of reality in any social or historical setting is based on the different symbolic expression of relevant events as either synchronic or diachronic. What this means is that the ideal views of reality express their institutional and legitimate notion of time in disciplined practice as holistic synchronicity or divided diachrony even if the organisation of a discipline already includes both. According to Ricoeur:

> The world of symbols is not a tranquil and reconciled world; every symbol is iconoclastic in comparison with some other symbol, just as every symbol, left to itself, tends to thicken, to become solidified in an idolatry. It is necessary, then, to participate in the struggle, in the dynamics, in which the symbolism itself becomes a prey to a spontaneous hermeneutics that seeks to transcend it. It is only by participating in this dynamics that comprehension can reach the strictly critical dimension of exegesis and become a hermeneutic; but then one must abandon the position --or rather, the exile-- of the remote and disinterested spectator, in order to appropriate in each case a particular symbolism. (Ricoeur 1967:354)

In a similar way, it is important to remain aware that we are always dependent on symbolic expression to carry out the abstract exercises of the critical discipline, and on the appropriation of symbolism for grounds: we are dependent on our own belief system in order to interpret symbolism. Our tradition relies on conceptual clarity in order to symbolise the abstract relations that our rational discipline elucidates; but we also resort to analogies, metaphors, allegories, and even myths (see Lakoff & Johnson 1980). No language, not even the technical kind, is ever wholly free from these associations. The symbols we use to communicate are generally linked on the one hand, to what we know, and on the other, to what we aspire to know, to the unknown. This double horizon makes symbols dynamic and their transformation determined by the prevalent values (emotional ties) of the society where they are used.

According to Northrop Frye, people are unable to live nakedly in nature like animals, and this does not refer only to the human physical need to dress, he speaks about a mythological universe: "a body of assumptions and beliefs developed from his [human] existential concerns" (Frye 1982:xviii). He believes that the conscious

organising of a cultural tradition is the practical function of criticism, and this should make us more aware of our mythical conditioning. I believe that this conditioning may become even more acute --and more misleading-- when the universe of beliefs is accompanied by an extremely artificial environment that is perceived and lived as reality. To be sure, human-created environments have existed all through human history, but never in such an extended manner as in the contemporary urban life, especially in the most affluent societies. It is important to carry out a critique of Western assumptions in order to clarify their position in the universe of human mythical symbolisation. This does not mean that Western symbols do not have an abstract superior clarity, but that precisely because they do, conceptual clarity becomes systematically confused with absolute reality (just like modern artificial environments convey the illusion of human "mastery" over nature). This unavoidably becomes (and has been) oppressive to the infinite possibilities for symbolisation of what human beings can conceive of and experience as "reality". The Western thrust towards rational domination of experience may help to liberate human beings from contingent natural conditions, but it may also at the same time enslave them to their own artificial and intellectual creations. Therefore Western mythology on its own is a two edged sword in its function of providing humanity with order; just as any other form of mythological solution to the human predicament when applied in the absence of balance.

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